Studies in Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition by O'Flaherty, James C. et al.

Studies in Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian 
Tradition
"If the previous course of Western thought is, in a 
decisive sense, summed up and culminates in 
Nietzsche's thought, it follows that a reckoning 
with Nietzsche is a reckoning with Western 
thought." 
Heidegger, Nietzsche 
"The most serious Christians have always been well 
disposed toward me." 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 
Studies in Nietzsche and the 
Judaeo-Christian Tradition
edited by 
james c. o’flaherty, 
timothy f. sellner and
robert m. helm
UNC Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures
Number 103
Copyright © 1985
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons cc by-nc-nd license. 
To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses.
Suggested citation: O’Flaherty, James C., Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert 
M. Helms, editors. Studies in Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. doi: https://doi.
org/10.5149/9781469656557_OFlaherty
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: O’Flaherty, James C., Sellner, Timothy F., and Helm, Robert
M., editors.
Title: Studies in Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian tradition / edited
by James C. O’Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm.
Other titles: University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic
Languages and Literatures ; no. 103.
Description: Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, [1985]
Series: University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic 
Languages and Literatures. | Includes bibliographical references and 
index.
Identifiers: lccn 84011963 | isbn 978-1-4696-5654-0 (pbk: alk. paper)
| isbn 978-1-4696-5655-7 (ebook)
Subjects: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 — Religion. |
Religion — History — 19th century.
Classification: lcc b3318.r4 s88 1985 | dcc 193
Chapter VI is a slightly modified English translation of “Dionysos gegen den 
Gekreuzigten: Nietzsches Verständnis des Apostels Paulus,” originally published in 
Zeitschrift für Religion und Geistesgeschichte © 1974 Verlag E.J. Brill. Republished by 
permission of Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Netherlands.
Chapter XVI is an English translation from Nietzsche, critique des valeurs chrétiennes 
by Georges Goedert (Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1977), and is reprinted here by 
permission of the publisher. 
Chapter XVII consists of an excerpt from Does God Exist? An Answer for Today 
by Hans Küng, translated by Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1980) and is 
reprinted here by permission of Hans Küng.
Chapter XVIII consists of an excerpt from Church Dogmatics ©Karl Barth, edited 
by G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrence, 1960, Church Dogmatics: Vol. 3 Part 2, T. & T. 
Clark, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.
From 1949 to 2004, UNC Press and the UNC Department of Germanic 
& Slavic Languages and Literatures published the UNC Studies 
in the Germanic Languages and Literatures series. Monographs, 
anthologies, and critical editions in the series covered an array of 
topics including medieval and modern literature, theater, linguistics, 
philology, onomastics, and the history of ideas. Through the generous 
support of the National Endowment for the Humanities and the 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, books in the series have been reissued 
in new paperback and open access digital editions. For a complete list 
of books visit www.uncpress.org.

Contents 
Introduction 3 
James C. O'Flaherty 
I. Nietzsche: Critic in the Grand Style 16 
Eugen Biser 
II. The Case against Apolitical Morality: Nietzsche's 29 
Interpretation of the Jewish Instinct 
Harry Neumann 
III. Nietzsche and the Old Testament 47 
Israel Eldad 
IV Morality and Deity in Nietzsche's Concept of 69 
Biblical Religion 
Charles Lewis 
V The Critical Imitator of Jesus: A Contribution to 86 
the Interpretation of Nietzsche on the Basis of a Comparison 
Eugen Biser 
VI. Dionysus versus the Crucified One: Nietzsche's 100 
Understanding of the Apostle Paul 
Jorg Salaquarda 
VII. Amor dei and Amor fati: Spinoza and Nietzsche 130 
Joan Stambaugh 
VIII. Nietzsche and Luther: A Testimony to Germanophilia 143 
Max L. Baeumer 
IX. "The Only Logical Christian": Nietzsche's Critique 161 
of Pascal 
Brendan Donnellan 
X. Lessing and Nietzsche: Views on Christianity 
Diana Behler 
XI. Nietzsche, Heine, and the Otherness of the Jew 
Sander L. Gilman 
XII. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 
Gerd-Gunther Grau 
177 
206 
226 
viii Contents 
XIII. Language and the Critique of Language in Nietzsche 252 
Josef Simon 
XIV. The Intuitive Mode of Reason in Zarathustra 274 
James C. O'Flaherty 
XV. Jesus, Christianity, and Superhumanity 295 
Bernd Magnus 
XVI. The Dionysian Theodicy 319 
Georges Goedert 
XVII. Nietzsche: What Christians and Non-Christians 341 
Can Learn 
Hans Kung 
XVIII. Humanity without the Fellow-Man: Nietzsche's 
Superman and Christian Morality 
Karl Barth 
Contributors 
Index 
353 
375 
379 
Acknowledgments 
The editors wish to express their gratitude to Wake Forest University 
for the grant that has made possible the publication of this volume. 
They also wish to express their appreciation to Mrs. Mary C. Reid, 
secretary of the German Department, for her efficiency and consider-
able patience not only in the typing of the manuscript but also in all 
matters pertaining to the project. Permission to reprint articles in the 
volume as individual chapters granted by the following publishers is 
acknowledged: Verlag E. J. Brill (chap. VI, in translation); Editions 
Beauchesne (chap. XVI, in translation); Doubleday and Co. (chap. 
XVII); T. & T. Clark, Limited (chap. XVIII). 

Key to Abbreviations 
Individual works by Nietzsche: 
GT Die Geburt der Tragodie (The Birth of Tragedy) 
U Unzeitgemiij3e Betrachtungen (Untimely Meditations or Thoughts 
out of Season) 
MA Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (Human, All-Too-Human) 
S Der Wanderer und sein Schatten (The Wanderer and His Shadaw) 
M MorgenrOte (The Dawn or The Dawn of Day) 
FW Die frohliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science or The joyful 
Wisdom) 
Z Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) 
J ]enseits von Gut und Bose (Beyond Good and Evil) 
GM Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals) 
G Die Gatzen-Diimmcrung (The Twilight of the Idols) 
A Der Antichrist (The Antichrist) 
WM Der Wille zur Macht (The Will to Pawer) 
Editions of Nietzsche's works: 
GOE Werkc: Groj3oktavausgabe, ed. Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche et 
al. (Leipzig: Naumann, 1894-1904), 15 vols.; 2nd ed. (1901-
13), 19 vols., indicated by: GOA(2). Vol. XX, published as a 
partial index to 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1926). 
MusA Gesammelte Werke: Musarionausgabe, ed. Richard Oehler, Max 
Oehler, and F. C. Wi.irzbach (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 
1920-29). 
HKG Werke und Briefe: Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. under 
supervision of the "Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv" (Munich: 
Beck, 1933-42), 9 vols. 
K Siimtliche Werke in zwolf Biinden, ed. Alfred Baumler (Stutt-
gart: Kroner, 1964-65). The twelve vols. are reprints of Nos. 
70-78, 82-83, and 170 in Kroners Taschenausgabe series, and 
are identified by the series number in italics, followed by the 
page number, e.g.: 70, 48; 71, 49, etc. The last vol. (170) is 
Richard Oehler's index to the previous vols. 
xii Abbreviations 
W Werke in drei Biinden, ed. Karl Schlechta (Munich: Carl 
Hanser, 1954-56; 1966). Nietzsche Index to foregoing (Mu-
nich, 1965). 
WKG Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967 ff.), about 30 vols. 
planned. 
KSA Siimtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli 
and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980). 
GB Gesamme/te Briefe, 5 vols. in 6 (Leipzig: Inset 1902-9). Vol-
ume V consists of two separately bound parts, designated V/ 
1 and V/2. 
Studies in Nietzsche and the 
Judaeo-Christian Tradition 

Introduction 
fames C. O'Flaherty 
"No one has equaled him [Nietzsche] in the acuteness, depth, and 
radicalness of his thought: not Feuerbach, not Marx and not even 
Freud; at most, Pascal." 
-Hans Kung 
The present volume is a sequel to the earlier Studies in Nietzsche and 
the Classical Tradition published by the University of North Carolina 
Press. 1 The positive reception of that volume, which necessitated a 
second edition, encouraged the editors to publish a second volume 
along the lines of the first but on an even more important subject. 
For, despite the great significance for Nietzsche of the classical tradi-
tion and his own preference for the Greek over the Christian ideal in 
all areas of life, the overriding concern of his writings is, on the one 
hand, to unmask what he conceived to be the decadence of both 
Judaism and Christianity-especially the latter-and, on the other 
hand, to supplant those faiths with the doctrines proclaimed in Also 
sprach Zarathustra. The purpose of the present volume is to present 
studies that deal with crucial aspects of his thought concerning the 
dominant religions of the West. Although there exists a vast body of 
literature on the subject of Nietzsche and Christianity, most of it is in 
German or other languages, 2 and much of it is either out-of-date or 
too tendentious to be considered serious scholarship. Further, since 
1. James C. O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm, eds., Studies in 
Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition, University of North Carolina Studies in the Ger-
manic Languages and Literatures, no. 85 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1976; 2nd ed., 1979). 
2. See International Nietzsche Bibliography, ed. Herbert W. Reichert and Karl 
Schlechta, University of North Carolina Studies in Comparative Literature, no. 45 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); and Nietzsche Studicn, ed. 
Ernst Behler, Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Miiller-Lauter, and Heinz Wenzel (Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 1972- ). See Peter Koster, "Nietzsche Kritik und Nietzsche-Rezeption in 
der Theologie des 20. Jahrhunderts," Nietzsche Studien, 10/11 (1981-82), 615-85, not 
only for an excellent overview of its subject, but also for an indication of the areas 
where more research needs to be done. 
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World War II there has been a general tendency in all Nietzsche re-
search to scant this important subject. The essays presented here are 
offered not only for their intrinsic worth but also as a potential stimu-
lus for further research in the field. With the recent publication of 
the historical-critical edition of Nietzsche's complete works and cor-
respondence by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari a firm basis 
has been provided for a more adequate understanding of Nietzsche's 
thought. 
Nietzsche's relationship to Judaism and Christianity is exceedingly 
paradoxical. Claiming to be the most radical critic of those faiths the 
world has ever known-a claim few would be inclined to dispute--
he has nevertheless evoked from many of their best representatives 
admiration not only for his honesty and courage, but also for his 
genius as a critic of religion and for his uncanny skill at ferreting out 
the alien and secular elements that so often masquerade under the 
cloak of the accepted faiths. On this latter point he makes common 
cause with those sincere Jewish and Christian believers who deplore 
the all-too-easy accommodation of their respective faiths to secular 
culture. One should, however, make no mistake about Nietzsche's 
intentions. As he most emphatically declares in Ecce Homo: "Above all 
do not mistake me!''-which means that he wanted always to be 
known as the implacable foe of Christianity. 
Strangely, however, the spirit of Nietzsche's criticism of Christian-
ity is one that, far from immediately and irretrievably alienating the 
sincere believer, may, and often does, attract and hold his deepest 
attention. In spite of the acerbity of Nietzsche's language and the 
harshness of his judgments, one senses in his assaults a spirit quite 
different from that of most other severe critics of Christianity of 
whatever rank-for example, a Voltaire, an H. L. Mencken, or a Gore 
Vidal. The empty cynicism and at times outright malevolence that so 
often characterize the animadversions of critics are lacking. Perhaps 
Nietzsche's different, if quite vehement, spirit stems from his convic-
tion that one is ennobled by the choice of a worthy enemy. In fact, 
he goes so far in Ecce Homo as to say that for him to attack an indi-
vidual Christian was "a sign of benevolence" (Wohlwollen). Be that as 
it may, it is certainly true that, with the possible exception of David 
Friedrich StrauB, he chose adversaries whom he respected, often 
deeply. There is even evidence that his attitude toward the Apostle 
Paul was not entirely negative. Perhaps it was the underlying respect 
for his antagonists, like that of the true athlete for his rival, or of the 
genuinely chivalric warrior for his foe, that has caused many adher-
ents of the faiths he has attacked to feel a special affinity for him. In 
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any event, it is true that a number of striking paradoxes emerge in 
connection with Nietzsche's view of Judaism and Christianity. 
A brief enumeration of such paradoxes suffices to confirm the chal-
lenge they pose for an understanding of Nietzsche's thought. First, 
there is the singular fact that although Nietzsche has often been re-
garded-and still is by some-as a major source of anti-Semitism, it 
is above all the Jews who have figured most prominently in further-
ing his reputation. Thus, it was the eminent Danish Jewish scholar 
Georg Brandes who first launched the wider reputation and stimu-
lated the serious study of Nietzsche by giving public lectures on him 
in 1888. Sigmund Freud was not at all reluctant to admit that Nietz-
sche had anticipated many of his own basic ideas, and his admiration 
for the German philosopher clearly shines through his references to 
him. Chaim Weizmann, the pioneering Zionist and first President of 
Israel, had been an enthusiastic reader of Nietzsche in his youth, an 
enthusiasm that he never repudiated. Martin Buber, without doubt 
the greatest Jewish philosopher of the twentieth century, once trans-
lated the first part of Also sprach Zarathustra into Polish, and he re-
mained in creative dialogue with Nietzsche's atheism throughout his 
entire career. The Russian philosopher Lev Shestov, who was deeply 
appreciative of both his Jewish heritage and Christianity, could say 
sincerely but with consummate, if unintentional, irony: "Nietzsche 
has shown us the way. We must seek that which is higher than com-
passion, higher than the 'good'; we must seek God."3 
After World War II, when Nietzsche's reputation was at its lowest 
ebb in this century, it was the Jewish scholars Karl Lowith and Wal-
ter Kaufmann who, before the epoch-making appearance of Heideg-
ger's two-volume study of Nietzsche's philosophy, were in the van-
guard of the attempt to recover his reputation as a seminal philoso-
pher and to give the lie to the notion that he was simply a fascist 
ideologist. 4 The names of other important, but lesser-known, Jewish 
thinkers and scholars who, adopting a positive attitude toward him, 
have contributed to a better understanding of his thought might 
very well be added to the list. Responsible scholars have long known 
and stressed that Nietzsche abominated anti-Semitism. Neverthe-
less, there are those who, with obdurate perversity, continue to as-
sociate him with anti-Semitism-indeed, at times, anti-Semitism of 
3. Lev Shestov, In Job's Balances: On the Sources of Eternal Truths, trans. C. Coventry 
and C. A. Macartney (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1976), pp. xi-xii. 
4. Cf. Rudolf Augstein, Der Spiegel, 8 June 1981, pp. 150-84, where Nietzsche is 
presented simply as the theoretician of Hitlerism. 
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the most virulent sort. 5 In the present collection the contribution of 
Israel Eldad is an emphatic reminder of the continuing affinity of 
certain Jewish intellectuals for Nietzsche. A lecturer on the Bible 
at the University of Haifa, Eldad has translated seven volumes of 
Nietzsche's works, as well as Walter Kaufmann's major work on him, 
into Hebrew. 
Even more paradoxical than the Jewish reception of Nietzsche is 
that of leading Christian thinkers, for Christianity was far more the 
target of his attacks than was Judaism. Yet it is precisely among cer-
tain Christian theologians, philosophers, and scholars that we find 
either an appreciative or, in some important cases, a creative encoun-
ter with his thought. His remark in EcceHomo that "the most serious 
Christians have always been well disposed toward me" is not wide 
of the mark. The articles by Karl Barth and Eugen Biser in the pres-
ent collection speak for themselves. But it is impressive to note that 
Christian leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries like Vla-
dimir Soloviev, Nicholas Berdyaev, Adolf Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch, 
Albert Schweitzer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, William Ernest Hocking, 
and Paul Tillich were all appreciative of and influenced by Nietzsche 
in varying degrees. Especially instructive is the impact of Nietzsche 
on that quintessential American philosopher, William Ernest Hock-
ing. Recalling his student days in Berlin, Hocking wrote: "And then, 
oddly enough, I got a good deal from that scapegrace, Nietzsche . 
. . . I found this reckless player-with-lightning [in Also sprach Zara-
thustra] strangely refreshing. I couldn't digest his condemnation of 
Die Mitleidigen but I saw what he meant by saying that 'it is the 
will of all great love, the beloved to create; and all creators are hard.' 
So I changed his 'Wille zur Macht' -to the 'will to suffer in cre-
ation' .... "6 Albert Schweitzer, whose ethical philosophy is the an-
tithesis of Nietzsche's, could nevertheless praise him for his affirma-
tion of life and for holding that "individual morality comes before 
social morality."7 
Of all those named the most impressive is Bonhoeffer, not only 
because of his careful and lifelong study of Nietzsche, but because 
of his martyrdom at the hands of the Nazis. Eberhard Bethge, his 
5. Cf. W. A. Carta's "Publisher's Foreword," in his reprint of H. L. Mencken's trans-
lation of The Antichrist (Torrance, California: The Noontide Press, 1980), p. ix, where 
he speaks of "the myth of the 'Holocaust.'" 
6. Quoted by Leroy S. Rouner, Within Human Experience: The Philosophy of William 
Ernest Hocking (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 157. 
7. Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, quoted by Henry Clark, The Ethical Mys-
ticism of Albert Schweitzer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 25. 
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friend and biographer, writes: "Bonhoeffer read all of Nietzsche very 
carefully, and Nietzsche's tremendous plea for the earth and for loy-
alty to its creatures never left his mind."8 The sincerity of any pro-
fessing Christian whose faith has never been tested by the fires of 
m3rtyrdom may always be brought into question by the skeptic. In 
the case of Bonhoeffer, however, there can be no question. Nietz-
sche's influence combined with that of the Greek myth of the giant 
Antaeus, "who was undefeatable as long as he had his feet on the 
ground,"9 to render Bonhoeffer most sensitive to the need to oppose 
with all his resources the clear and present danger of Nazism in his 
day. 
If we view the essays in the present collection from the stand-
point of Nietzsche's mode of reasoning as it emerges in them, we 
shall find that he employs reason in two major ways: as intuitive 
and as abstract reason. The terms "intuitive reason" and "abstract 
reason" are defined and treated in detail in my essay, "The Intuitive 
Mode of Reason in Zarathustra." It will suffice to say here that intu-
itive reason tends to express itself in metaphorical or poetic lan-
guage; abstract reason, on the other hand, must express itself in 
prose or in its extension as logical or mathematical symbolism. Nietz-
sche's philosophical prose is, of course, characterized by logic, but is 
not dominated by it, as would be the case with a rigorously discur-
sive thinker. Nietzsche was no irrationalist, despite the opinion of a 
Georg Lukacs. He simply uses reason to decry the excessive use of 
reason. This fact results from his conviction that the higher the de-
gree of abstraction, the emptier the concept. His use of logical or 
abstract reason in the prose writings is generally critical or analytic; 
his use of analogical or intuitive reasoning in the poetic writings is 
generally divinatory or prophetic. That he philosophizes in the two 
distinct literary genres is not simply a stylistic matter, but has to do 
with two discrete modes of thought. 
In surveying the following essays briefly from the perspectives 
indicated, I do not desire thereby to see them more narrowly than 
they ought to be or to force them into the framework suggested by 
the argument of my essay. It is simply one helpful way among others 
of looking at them by way of introduction. For even a cursory glance 
at the essays reveals their considerable variety and richness, and 
also the fact that they may be viewed profitably from a number of 
perspectives. 
8. Eberhard Bethge, "The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Theology," in 
Ronald G. Smith, The World Come of Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 27. 
9. Ibid., p. 76. 
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First we may note that Joan Stambaugh's comparison of Spinoza's 
idea of amor dei with Nietzsche's idea of amor fati highlights in a 
special way the contrast between the two kinds of reason with 
which we are concerned here. For despite important substantive 
agreements between the two thinkers, Nietzsche's method of reason-
ing appears in strong contrast to Spinoza's highly abstract method. 
While there is a rationalistic or critical aspect of Nietzsche's discus-
sion of amor fati (e.g., the difference between "Turkish" and "Rus-
sian" fatalism), his mode of reasoning is there primarily intuitive. For 
it is the intuiting soul of the individual, symbolized above all by 
Zarathustra's "azure bell," that divines the meaning of the world as 
well as of the self. As Stambaugh well says, "this poetic 'imagery' for 
the soul is about as far removed from the Cartesian res cogitans as 
possible; the soul is not a separate substantial thinking thing .... " 
In the following group of essays we find Nietzsche employing 
chiefly critical or analytic reason for an explication of his ideas. 
The approaches he adopts are various, and reflect his reaction to 
the subject matter he is treating, but they all fall for our purposes 
chiefly under the rubric of "critical reason." In his introductory es-
say, "Nietzsche: Critic in the Grand Style," Eugen Biser writes that 
"Nietzsche exercises his role as a critic with differing intensity." He 
thereupon mentions individual works, describing each differently ac-
cording to the spirit in which it was written. Thus, one was written 
with "elan," another "with vehemence," and still another "with the 
gestures of an evangelist." One was written "aggressively," another 
"with analytic rigor." Again, Nietzsche writes "in uninhibited and 
tendentious fashion." These changes of mood underlying his criti-
cism are not surprising when we note with Biser that "Nietzsche 
does not merely criticize; he lives and exists critically." This is one 
of the important reasons there exists "a pressing need for a Nietz-
schean hermeneutics." 
In his second essay, "The Critical Imitator of Jesus," Biser argues 
that Nietzsche can be understood properly only by seeing his imita-
tion of Christ as crucial and as the archetype for his relation to the 
numerous and varied figures with whom he compared himself, for 
they too do not escape his criticism. Nietzsche's relation to Jesus 
results in a sort of independent dependence on Him, issuing in "ex-
istential disquietude." The dependent aspect of the relationship re-
sults in Nietzsche's imitation of Jesus, the independent aspect in his 
criticism, which is both positive and negative. 
In "The Case against Apolitical Morality: Nietzsche's Interpretation 
of the Jewish Instinct," Harry Neumann argues that Nietzsche be-
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lieved the Jews had never really given up their Messianic hope and 
hence were always instinctively political. The adoption of (apolitical) 
monotheism in the diaspora was only a means of finally returning, 
with the restoration of the Temple, to the henotheistic Volksgott or 
tribal God. Nietzsche's critique of what he saw as the unfortunate 
transformation of Judaism is also aimed at the Christians. Nietzsche 
saw himself as an outsider, and in this regard he could identify with 
the Jews. However, as Sander L. Gilman emphasizes in "Nietzsche, 
Heine, and the Otherness of the Jew," he was not born an outsider 
like the Jews of the diaspora but, rather, chose the role of outsider. 
Nietzsche saw the Jews in a favorable light when they were the ob-
ject of anti-Semitism, and in an unfavorable light when he recog-
nized in them many of the characteristics of German Christians. 
It is ironic that Nietzsche, the philosopher, did not publish his 
most rigorously philosophical writings, but relegated them to his 
Nachlaft, or unpublished notebooks. In his "Language and the Cri-
tique of Language in Nietzsche" Josef Simon has systematically 
elaborated Nietzsche's epistemology as it emerges from his philoso-
phy of language. Here Nietzsche, the critic, is most analytical, for we 
find him using the criticism of language quite logically to decry ab-
stract or discursive reason. We see clearly from this study that Nietz-
sche actually stands in the tradition of nominalism, which, among 
other and secular predecessors, also includes important Scholastic 
theologians. In my study "The Intuitive Mode of Reason in Zarathus-
tra," insights and practices of Nietzsche's are appealed to, but the 
conceptual framework is, in the main, derived from the language 
philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann; there is, as far as their episte-
mological critique of language is concerned, general agreement be-
tween the two, despite their antithetical views of Christianity. 
In his exhaustively documented study, "Dionysus versus the Cru-
cified One: Nietzsche's Understanding of the Apostle Paul," Jorg 
Salaquarda shows that Nietzsche's criticism of Paul is not entirely 
negative as many commentators have held, but that Nietzsche could 
at times appreciate Paul as "a great man" or as a "Dionysian revalua-
tor," to whom he himself bore a "dialectical resemblance." Sala-
quarda is of course demonstrating Nietzsche's critical powers at their 
strongest and most hostile in the polemics against Paul, but he also 
invokes a kind of Hegelian dialectic as implicit in Nietzsche's late 
philosophy. Thus, Rome represents for Nietzsche the thesis, Pauline 
Christianity the antithesis. The synthesis-which lies in the future-
would not be "a mere return to the 'master morality'" of the Romans, 
but is to be "a forward movement in which the experience that hu-
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manity has made on its way to the present is to be overcome and 
yet preserved." Salaquarda's suggestion here removes Nietzsche's 
thought from the sphere of critical reason to that of speculative rea-
son, the latter certainly a tendency of the late Nietzsche. Neverthe-
less, Nietzsche's speculative thought moves generally in the realm of 
intuitive-not discursive-reason. 
Pascal was perhaps the Christian whom Nietzsche most admired, 
and one whom, as he wrote to Georg Brandes, "I almost love, since 
he has enlightened me infinitely." Brendan Donnellan has shown in 
his essay, " 'The Only Logical Christian': Nietzsche's Critique of Pas-
cal," that both thinkers manifest that incorruptible will to truth 
which is one of the finest fruits of Christianity. In the case of Pascal 
it led to a recognition that Christianity and science cannot be recon-
ciled except through faith; in Nietzsche's case it led to a final rejec-
tion of Christianity; but confrontation with Pascal led him to adopt a 
stringently rationalistic stance and to attack his adversary with tell-
ing logic, as in the case of his critique of Pascal's idea of self-hate. 
The theme of the intellectual honesty of the true Christian and its 
ultimate destructiveness for faith is seen in a different light in Gerd-
Giinther Grau's essay, "Nietzsche and Kierkegaard." Both thinkers 
recognize that the fact that the Second Coming of Christ, the Parou-
sia expected by the early church, did not take place posed, and con-
tinues to pose, a serious dilemma for the believer: he must either 
give up his faith, or acknowledge the "unfulfilled divine interven-
tion" while somehow retaining his faith. Nietzsche followed the first 
course; Kierkegaard, through the "leap of faith," the second. Never-
theless, the problem remained to plague Kierkegaard's personal de-
velopment, for the expected divine intervention in connection with 
his engagement to Regine Olsen failed to materialize. If Pascal's 
problem with Christianity was essentially intellectual, Kierkegaard's 
problem was historical in the sense that man, like Job, receives 
from God no satisfactory answers to his questions. Grau has shown 
that Nietzsche's and Kierkegaard's critiques of historical Christianity 
generally coincide; only their conclusions are radically different. 
Charles Lewis offers, in the essay "Morality and Deity in Nietz-
sche's Concept of Biblical Religion," a metacritique of Nietzsche's cri-
tique of biblical religion. Apart from the question of whether God 
exists or not, Nietzsche failed to discern the difference between the 
biblical and postbiblical conceptions of deity: the former is rooted 
in an attitude of worship that cannot be adequately understood in 
terms of the moral and psychological categories of Nietzsche's ac-
count. It is argued that the God of Nietzsche's critique is the highest 
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Good of a new, essentially moral religion-a religion whose God, 
demythologized through the influence of Western philosophy, must 
be worthy of worship. The biblical God, rightly seen, is not the moral 
ideal of this new religion and hence cannot be understood as a crea-
ture of the ressentiment of inferior human beings that is directed to-
ward their superiors. 
If Nietzsche's speculative thought is generally expressed in terms 
of intuitive reason in his more poetic writings, Georges Goedert's 
study "The Dionysian Theodicy" is a reminder that this is not the 
whole story, for he has garnered the arguments for Nietzsche's "the-
odicy" (Dionysus, the god of this world, is the god to be justified) 
from Nietzsche's philosophical prose writings as well as from Zara-
thustra. One must remember, however, that Nietzsche relegated (as 
he wrote to Franz Overbeck) his major prose works prior to Zarathus-
tra to the status of a mere "commentary" before the fact. Goedert 
throws light on an important aspect of Nietzsche's thought that is 
often overlooked. He shows that Nietzsche did not desire the de-
struction of Christianity, rather its preservation: "in the end, the su-
perman justifies Christian values .... Dionysus ends by rallying to 
his cause the Crucified One." Thus, the pessimism and decadence of 
Christianity provide the counterforce necessary to maintain the vital-
ity of Dionysus. In such a way "Nietzsche at the same time says yes 
and no to Christianity." 
Max L. Baeumer traces Nietzsche's radical change from an "ardent 
admirer to a deadly enemy of Martin Luther" by a thorough docu-
mentation of his comments on the Reformer. In Nietzsche's changing 
view of Luther we have a striking example of how formidable his 
critical powers could be, in whatever direction they might be turned. 
In his early phase, Nietzsche eloquently defends Luther as a bearer 
of the Dionysian spirit. In his later phase, however, he condemns 
Luther as a "barbarian," and sees him together with the Reformation 
as the force that fomented not only a peasant revolt in the literal, 
historical sense, but also a peasant revolt of the spirit that perme-
ated all levels of German society. It was this spirit that, to a great 
extent, aborted the Renaissance in Germany. Baeumer summarizes: 
"Nietzsche is ... not interested in Luther the writer, the theologian 
and religious reformer, unless he can use these aspects of his work 
for his own purpose of praising or condemning German national-
ism." In "Nietzsche and the Old Testament" Israel Eldad casts Nietz-
sche in the role of a literary critic who can value the Old Testament 
above the New. This is true because of the former's "absolute 'Yes' to 
life." Nietzsche admired the "heroic personalities" of the Old Testa-
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ment, "patriarchs, kings, and prophets struggling against the ruling 
priestly establishment." 
In "Lessing and Nietzsche: Views on Christianity," Diana Behler 
underscores the dialectical nature of Nietzsche's critical thought. In 
regard to his fundamental antithesis, "Christ and Christianity-Dio-
nysus and Winckelmann's Greece," Behler cautions, however, that 
the antithesis is by no means absolute, for both Christ and Dionysus 
are linked in their "demands for symbolic, rather than literal com-
prehension." Further, it was Nietzsche's view that "Christianity may 
have spoiled the glorious spontaneity of heathen Greek culture, but 
it simultaneously preserved it and transmitted it to us .... " This 
critical subtlety Nietzsche shared with Lessing, despite their differ-
ing views of the role of reason in the evolution of true humanity. In 
her comparison of Lessing and Nietzsche, Behler stresses that both 
thinkers interpret their religious heritage in the interest of their spec-
ulations. Both want a new Bible: Lessing foresees an extension of the 
biblical revelation, Nietzsche envisions a clear break with it and with 
all forms of transcendence. 
It is worth noting, in our present context, that Spinoza and Les-
sing share a q>mmon approach in their speculative writings. Al-
though the former is more rigorously logical than the latter, both 
view mathematical exactitude and clarity as the model for veridical 
thinking, even in areas remote from mathematics. Since both have 
much to say about God, man, and nature in the Judaeo-Christian 
heritage, their basic presuppositions are to be taken seriously. Nietz-
sche's principal speculative method provides, as we have already 
noted in the case of Spinoza, a striking contrast to that of certain 
rationalistic thinkers. 
The studies we have considered to this point have dealt, for the 
most part, with Nietzsche's critical thought concerning Judaism and 
Christianity. In the remaining essays, those by Bernd Magnus, Hans 
Kiing, and Karl Barth, Nietzsche's divinatory or prophetic role comes 
to the fore. The first half of Magnus's essay "Jesus, Christianity, 
and Superhumanity" is devoted to Nietzsche's critique of the Chris-
tian religion; the second half is concerned with the explication of the 
idea of the superman. Despite the fact that Magnus is not, on the 
whole, interpreting Zarathustra directly, he is doing so indirectly in 
citing other passages from Nietzsche's self-styled prose "commen-
taries" on that work as well as the commentaries of others. Thus, it is 
not amiss to say that here the concern is primarily with Nietzsche's 
intuitive speculation, especially as it appears in Zarathustra. Magnus 
rejects the "ideal type" theory of the superman in favor of an existen-
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tial theory. The iibermensch is one who becomes "aware of what is 
worthy of infinity" in his life, and wills its eternal recurrence, even 
though that would also entail pain and suffering. One might find a 
parallel to this selectivity or judging the worth of an experience 
(though Magnus does not) in Jesus' admonition to seek first the 
kingdom of God whereby all other things will be added or, again, 
in the parables of the kingdom, the pearl of great price, the treasure 
hidden in a field, and others. If these "existential" sayings are true 
parallels to Nietzsche's thought one should not be surprised, for it 
would be simply another way in which Jesus' example comes into 
play. 
Hans Kung deals with Nietzsche's two uses of reason in his article 
"Nietzsche: What Christians and Non-Christians Can Learn." Con-
cerning Nietzsche's critique of Christianity he writes: "If Christian-
ity were as Nietzsche saw it, then it could be and would have to be 
rejected today .... " According to Kung, this misunderstanding 
nevertheless raises searching questions about the Church, the priest-
hood, and the idea of God. He sees in Nietzsche's contrast of histori-
cal Christianity with the religion of Jesus "a provocation for Chris-
tians which can be salutary." If Christians must be radically critical 
of Nietzsche's version of historical Christianity (not only of his un-
derlying assumptions, but also of his knowledge and scholarship), 
non-Christians must be equally radical in their criticism of his specu-
lations regarding the superman. Neither the weakling (allegedly pro-
mulgated as an ideal by Christianity) nor the superman provides a 
genuine model for the realization of true humanity. Not only do 
Nietzsche's ideas bear heavy responsibility for the advent of Nazism, 
but they continue today to spawn relativism and nihilism in morals, 
the justification of war, and even such neo-Nazi ideas as the manipu-
lation of genes through microbiology. 
The most consistent treatment of Nietzsche's intuitive speculation 
in our collection is Karl Barth's essay, "Humanity without the Fellow-
Man: Nietzsche's Superman and Christian Morality." In an excursus 
at the beginning of his discussion, Barth adopts, with remarkable 
empathy, the standpoint of one who sees all of reality in terms of 
his own subjectivity, and he points out what "a powerful radius" the 
"I am" can have. Barth sees Nietzsche as having lived out and ex-
pressed, "in azure isolation," the secret of German Idealism: that 
it was really humanity without the fellow-man. "Nietzsche was the 
prophet of that humanity .... He did not merely reveal its secret; he 
blabbed it out." None of the German philosophical idealists-Kant, 
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel-had had the genuine courage of his deeply 
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held convictions. As for Goethe, Barth suspects that he was "person-
ally a far more obstinate pagan than Nietzsche." Like Magnus, Barth 
cautions against interpreting Nietzsche as the principal source of Na-
zism; he sees the latter rather as a confluence of ideas and impulses 
that were rife in the German culture of the last two hundred years. 
Of the eighteen articles included, thirteen were written expressly 
for the present volume; five are reprints, though one has been re-
vised by the author for inclusion here. Five articles have been trans-
lated from German, one from French, and one from Hebrew. 
It should be mentioned here that the late Walter Kaufmann had 
agreed to give a lecture at Wake Forest University on 4 November 
1980, which was to have been the introductory essay for this volume, 
but fate intervened. That his lecture would, characteristically, have 
raised some penetrating questions about the assumption of the edi-
tors that there is such a thing as a "Judaeo-Christian tradition"10 and 
not simply two discrete traditions, is quite probable. In any event 
the absence of his reflections on our theme is highly regrettable, as 
is indeed the great loss to Nietzsche scholarship in general that 
has resulted from his untimely death. It is further regrettable that 
the untimely death of a colleague at Wake Forest University-James 
Steintrager, a leading Bentham scholar-also deprived the present 
project of a valuable contribution: his essay was to have been a com-
parative study of Jeremy Bentham's and Nietzsche's views of Chris-
tianity. 
If Nietzsche's agonistic striving constantly demands a vigorous op-
ponent against which to measure its strength, there is ample evi-
dence, if the testimony of certain academics is to be trusted, that 
both Judaism and Christianity, far from being moribund, can con-
tinue to offer the required resistance. It was S. S. Prawer who origi-
nally suggested, in his review of Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical 
Tradition, the desirability of such a companion volume as the present 
one on the grounds that it "would bring out more clearly ... the 
fundamental wickedness of this sensitive, intelligent, perceptive, po-
etic, suffering man." 11 And Henry Hatfield wrote, a few years ago: 
"Looking back on many years of interest in German Hellenism, I find 
it surprising that the one figure who emerges as authentic from all 
10. Since the term is generally accepted, no attempt has been made to define "ju-
daeo-Christian tradition." If one were to venture a definition, some interesting ques-
tions would arise. For example, how would Islam, which owes so much to Judaism, be 
related to that faith or indeed to Christianity? 
11. S. S. Prawer, "Nietzsche and the Greeks," Times Literary Supplement, 18 Novem-
ber 1977, p. 1346. 
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the welter of myths is precisely Jesus Christ." It would be absurd, he 
maintains further, to claim that the gods of Greece, whether Winck-
elmannian, Goethean, or Nietzschean, are "even remotely as real as 
Jesus Christ. This is not a matter of religious belief; it is simply an 
observable fact, evident in the texts of the great German writers . 
. . • "
12 One might argue that, in a profound sense, Nietzsche, the 
self-styled "Antichrist," is himself, nolens volens, now part and parcel 
of the Judaeo-Christian heritage-for his work is forever wedded to 
that which he would destroy and supplant. On the other hand, most 
of his readers will probably prefer to take him at his word and see 
his doctrines simply as a radical alternative to both Judaism and 
Christianity. 
That Nietzsche's feelings toward Christianity always remained 
mixed is attested by the fact that as late as 1881 he wrote to Peter 
Cast that he considered it really "the best version of ideal life" that 
he had ever known, adding: "I have followed it from my childhood 
on into many nooks and crannies, and believe in my heart that I 
have never harbored base feelings toward it. After all, I am the de-
scendant of whole generations of Christian ministers."13 Whether the 
ultimate result of his efforts will have a positive or a negative mean-
ing for his great adversary remains to be seen. 
12. Henry Hatfield, Clashing Myths in German Literature: From Heine to Rilke (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 189. 
13. Nietzsche to Peter Cast, 21 July 1881, Briefwechsel, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari, 111-1, (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1981), 109. 
I. Nietzsche: 
Critic in the Grand Style 
Eugen Biser 
(Translated by Timothy F. Sellner) 
I. Some Preliminary Hermeneutic Considerations 
Nietzsche probably never expressed his (inconsistent) position more 
neatly and succinctly than with the sentences from his Genealogy of 
Morals that proclaim the man of the future: "this bell-stroke of noon 
and the great decision who makes the will free again and gives man 
back his hopes, this Antichrist and Antinihilist, this victor over God 
and nothingness."1 For what sounds more critical, revolutionary, or 
destructive than this postulate, which speaks of the victory over God 
and, in doing so, secretly takes up the fight against the essence of 
being, against the central sun of the archetypes gathered in the Pla-
tonic heaven of ideas? And where on earth is there a more positive 
goal than the vanquishing of nothingness, and with it that epochal 
destiny which Nietzsche sought to diagnose, render obsolete, and 
dispense with under the catchword "nihilism"?2 
Nevertheless Nietzsche does not lay claim to this postulate ex-
pressly for himself. Rather, he links it up with the figure of the 
uniquely authoritative Zarathustra, with whom he plays through the 
entire drama of role interchange, beginning with the noon of life, 
when the "friend Zarathustra came, the guest of gue3ts,"3 through 
the phase of identification, in which he speaks of his "son" Zarathus-
tra,4 to the stage of crisis and rejection, in which a "terrible antago-
1. GM, II, sec. 24. All translations from the German are by Timothy F. Sellner. 
2. See also the prefatory remark in The Will to Power, in which Nietzsche designates 
himself as the first complete nihilist in Europe, "who nonetheless has even lived 
nihilism to its conclusion-who has put it behind him and beneath him" (WM, sec. 3). 
3. J, "Aftersong. From High Mountains." 
4. According to the collection Nietzsche in seinen Briefen, ed. Alfred Baumler (Stutt-
gart: Kroner, 1932), p. 366, Nietzsche spoke in a letter addressed to his sister (April 
1885) of his "son Zarathustra," if only as an indication of his incipient dissociation, 
which then (to judge by a note from the spring of 1885) culminated in the resolve: "I 
wish to speak, and no longer [as] Zarathustra." 
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nism" against the entire imagery of Zarathustra takes possession of 
him. 5 
Such evidence in itself should be sufficient to demonstrate the 
pressing need for a Nietzschean hermeneutics. 6 For not only does 
Nietzsche love the play with disguises and interchanged roles, 
which he carries to extremes at the conclusion of his Zarathustra, 
there is hardly a single position that he takes without abandoning it 
again after a time, or even, as is not infrequently the case, exchang-
ing it for its opposite. And it is more than simply a kind of artistic 
skirmishing in the foreground of his thinking when he makes refer-
ence to stylistic differences in his writings and reminds us that 
in dealing with him (for whom nothing is so hateful as the attitude 
of the doctrinaire) we must always be mindful of backgrounds and 
omissions, or even of the converse of these-that is, of polemic over-
statements and tendentious crudities. For in the final analysis, as we 
are told in one of his key statements on the theory of language, it is 
not so much a matter of what is expressly stated as of the music 
behind the words, of the passion behind the music, and above all of 
the person behind the passion who represents the true goal of our 
understanding. 7 
In our attempt to define more precisely Nietzsche's position as a 
critic, it is sufficient to keep the hermeneutic background in mind to 
the extent that we derive the sense of the word "criticism" not so 
much from Nietzsche's domain in the history of ideas as from the 
context of his own life. An important reference point for this notion 
is provided by his expression "the victor over God and nothingness." 
On the one hand, it corresponds precisely to the self-evaluation of 
Nietzsche that in Ecce Homo differentiates the "Yes-saying" part of his 
life's task from its "No-saying, No-doing" half. 8 On the other hand, 
the assignment of a role to the Zarathustra figure with now greater, 
now lesser importance is made understandable by the fact that Nietz-
sche exercises his role as a critic with differing intensity: full of Clan in 
the Untimely Meditations; with anger in Human, All-Too-Human; with 
vehemence in The Dawn; with consummate skill in The Gay Science; 
emphatically, with the gestures of an evangelist, in Zarathustra; ag-
gressively in The Twilight of the Idols; with analytic rigor in On the 
5. In the opinion of Hans M. Wolff, Friedrich Nietzsche. Der Weg zum Nichts (Bern: 
Francke, 1956), p. 204. 
6. For further discussion of this point, see my article "Das Desiderat einer Nietz-
sche-Hermeneutik," Nietzsche Studien, 9 (1980), 1-37. 
7. Nachlap (Die Unschuld des Wenlens, I), sec. 508. 
8. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 1. 
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Genealogy of Morals; in uninhibited and tendentious fashion in The 
Antichrist. 
Naturally we cannot ascribe Nietzsche's role interchange with 
Zarathustra simply to his use of differing styles in his critical activity. 
Moreover, it never reaches the point where he becomes bored with 
criticism, neither in Zarathustra, which up to the very end either 
openly or secretly thrives on antithesis, nor in his (long prepared yet 
never completed) principal work, which, to judge by the material 
collected in his Nachlaf3, would have possessed a strong critical strain 
despite its bias toward systematics. In fact, his relationship to Zara-
thustra makes it clear that criticism for Nietzsche-just as for the 
"victor over God and nothingness" -is not only an instrument for 
analysis, but also, and to a far greater extent, a path to the discovery 
of himself. Nietzsche does not merely criticize; he lives and exists 
critically. And the significance of this is that while Nietzsche, like 
Zarathustra, doubtless often utilizes his critical possibilities instru-
mentally, he also makes ever more conscious use of them in an ex-
istential way. This gives his criticism a quality that raises it above 
other comparable forms of criticism, even if the difference, as a rule, 
is only perceived in terms of atmosphere. We can see this most 
clearly by juxtaposing Nietzsche with his model Heine, whom he 
both admired and imitated at significant points in his life:9 for pre-
cisely where Heine launches into irony and persiflage, Nietzsche re-
mains measured and austere, so that the seriousness of his existen-
tial perplexity is constantly perceptible in the midst of his critical 
encounter. 10 
Yet such a vigorous coupling of criticism with his own existence 
also brings about a more intense relationship with the particular ob-
ject being criticized than is normally the case, especially when it is of 
a higher dignity, as with culture and religion. For the loftier the ob-
ject, the greater the role it plays in connection with the process of 
self-discovery in the critic. 
But what, in fact, are the objects of Nietzsche's critical interest? 
9. Nietzsche repeatedly expressed his high esteem for Heine, who, as he assures us 
as late as Ecce Homo, conveyed to him "the highest conception of the lyric poet" ("Why 
I Am So Clever," sec. 4); the fact that he used Heine in addition as a source and 
model, however, was first shown by Henri de Lubac in his work Die Tragiidie des 
Humanismus ohne Colt (Salzburg: Miller, 1950), pp. 336ff. 
10. The hypothesis formulated by de Lubac, with which I express my complete 
agreement in my article "Nietzsches Kritik des christlichen Gottesbegriffs und ihre 
theologischen Konsequenzen" (Phi/osophisches ]ahrbuch, 78 [1971], 34-65, 295-305), can 
only be confirmed by means of word indices and the comparison of motifs, because 
Nietzsche is silent concerning his definitive "sources" and the extant remains of his 
library do not contain Heine's essay "On Religion and Philosophy in Germany" (1834). 
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II. Preferred Areas of Critical Inquiry 
Nietzsche never consciously sought out the objects of his criticism; 
rather, they were presented to him by the world in which he lived. 
Thus in every case his critical interest changes to the extent that his 
life changes and broadens. It has been established on the evidence 
of his youthful poems that his critical sense was first enkindled by 
the religious beliefs of that pietistically tinged Christianity which, 
together with the demands of bourgeois morality, determined the 
atmosphere in the house of his parents. To the degree that he grows 
away from the circle of his childhood and as a fugitivus errans tra-
verses the landscape of European culture and civilization, he then 
directs his critical sense toward those fields through which he has 
previously passed. That his relationship to them is chiefly critical 
could perhaps be explained by his own impression that he had never 
found the possibility for setting down roots, had never found a place 
of domicile and security. It is this impression that later for him-as it 
had earlier for Franz Schubert1 1-consolidated itself into the figure of 
the "wanderer" who sees himself cast about in the great "desert" of a 
lifeless, disenchanted, and debased landscape, moving from loneli-
ness to loneliness, accompanied only by that inescapable "dog," his 
pain. 12 With the clear-sightedness of the renouncer he conceives of 
these illusions, which constantly shift the "desert" as if it were a 
stage set, and which maintain the measured pace of culture in order 
to simulate life in this landscape of death, as the mere surrogate of 
that which they claim to be. However, since Nietzsche retains as the 
single indispensable conclusion from Christian morality the will "to 
intellectual purity at any price,"13 his critical task is presented to him 
almost of itself; for now, as he states in his preface to The Twilight of 
the Idols, it is a matter of "examining," with the hammer of philo-
sophical criticism, the empty "idols" concerning their content, by 
which he means convicting them of their deception. 14 
From this point on, Nietzsche's criticism is concentrated on four 
areas which, as pseudoforms of that which they claim to be, are 
especially suspicious to him: education, culture, morality, and reli-
gion-the latter being for him, in spite of several allusions to the 
Parseeism with which he came into contact through the figure of 
Zarathustra, synonymous with Christianity. Within this "target qua-
11. See my article "Abschied und Ankunft. Religiose Momente im Werk Franz Schu-
berts," Beitriige zur piidagogischen Arbeit, 23 (1979), 16-28. 
12. MA, IIIII: The Wanderer and His Shadow. 
13. GM, III, sec. 27 (in reference to sec. 357 of FW). 
14. G, foreword of 30 September 1888. 
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ternity," moreover, there exists a relationship of gradation and subor-
dination, since education for Nietzsche is a derivative of culture in 
the same sense that morality appears as a generalizing preformation 
of Christianity. Accordingly, in many cases his criticism of education 
is in fact directed at the phenomena of culture, just as, conversely, 
the most penetrating thrust of his criticism of morality is doubtless 
aimed at Christianity. 
The fact that Nietzsche's relationship to education and culture-
whose enthusiastic advocate he had been in the beginning-became 
increasingly more critical is tied in a fundamental way to his relation-
ship to truth, a relationship that appears more and more strained 
in each of his successive creative periods. Characteristic of this is 
the early study "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" (1873), 
which speaks of a nature that keeps "almost everything" of her se-
crets from mankind: 
She threw away the key; and woe to that fateful curiosity that 
might sometime be able to peer through a keyhole out and down 
from the chamber of consciousness, and would then suspect that 
the thing resting on all the mercilessness, greed, insatiability, and 
murderousness in life is man himself, in the indifference of his ig-
norance, dreaming, as it were, on the back of a tiger. From where 
in all the world do we get the drive for truth amid such a 
constellation?15 
From this time on, even from this early phase of his thought, truth 
for Nietzsche is nothing more than a pragmatic "peace treaty," a 
linguistic regulator that invents universally binding designations 
for things in order to facilitate our orientation in the darkness of 
the unknowable. Accordingly, as he states in the continuation of his 
study, truth is nothing more than a "movable army of metaphors, 
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms; in short, a summation of hu-
man relations," which appeared to people as fixed and binding 
through long usage, and were no longer perceived in terms of their 
illusional nature. 16 From this perspectivistic fragmentation of truth 
we can trace a direct line in Nietzsche's middle period to the note in 
the Nachlafi that no longer views in "truth" anything more than "an 
opinion of various errors regarding each other." 17 Man, however, is 
that certain kind of being which cannot exist without this constella-
15. "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," sec. 1. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Nachlafl (WM), sec. 595. 
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tion of errors;18 for the average man shrinks back just as much from 
the "terrible basic text homo natura" recorded within him as from the 
chaotic sight of the world seen without illusion. 19 In order to tolerate 
the abyss of his own self, man produces for himself the "flattering 
ovcrpainting" of his humanistic self-analysis; to come to grips with 
the chaos that is the "world," he creates culture and education. 
Thus Nietzsche already sees in his first attack on German educa-
tion-which he began with his lecture series "On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions" (1872)-two antagonistic drives at work: 
"on the one hand, the drive toward the greatest possible broaden-
ing of education, on the other, the drive toward a lessening and 
weakening of the same."20 Moreover, the tension in this relationship 
is scarcely alleviated by the fact that at the conclusion of the fifth 
lecture he looks for the educational woes he has just described to be 
overcome by a "preestablished harmony between the leader and the 
led." It is not without reason that he assures us in Ecce Homo that his 
first attack was intended for the German educational system, which 
he looked upon "even then with ruthless disdain."21 Accordingly, 
whoever takes this questionable educational path is threatened by 
the "untragic death" resulting from being "crushed by a statue."22 In 
the same sense Zarathustra also warns his disciples and admirers: 
"Be careful that you are not crushed to death by a falling statue!"23 
Much more dramatic in nature is Nietzsche's critical encounter 
with the "glittering phantom" culture, for the reason that for some 
time the genius of "higher culture" seemed for Nietzsche to be em-
bodied in the figure of Richard Wagner. Just as it was through Wag-
ner that Nietzsche's fascination at first expressed itself in the hope 
for a renewed culture of the future, so the disappointment that Wag-
ner later brought about took the form of an ever more radical criti-
cism of culture. To be sure, Nietzsche holds on to an idealized under-
standing of culture up to the very end: like a pyramid, the dominant 
image "culture" rises up from a "strongly and healthily consolidated 
mediocrity"24-to use the language of one of his later works. Yet at 
the same time he realizes that it is with culture as it is with the 
"glorious dream-birth of the Olympic gods": only with their help 
18. Ibid., sec. 493. 
19. J, VII, sec. 230; FW, III, sec. 109. 
20. From the planned introduction (1871). 
21. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": The Untimely Ones, sec. 1. 
22. "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions," third lecture (1872). 
23. Z, I, "Of the Bestowing Virtue," sec. 3. 
24. A, sec. 57. 
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did the Greeks learn to bear "the terrors and abominations of exis-
tence."25 In view of this schism between greatness and illusion, 
Nietzsche sees culture caught in the undertow of nihilism, so that he 
only is able to make the single prognosis: "Our whole European 
culture has for a long time now moved in a torture of tension which 
increased from century to century as if bent on catastrophe: like a 
stream flowing toward its end, which no longer pays heed to its 
direction and is afraid to reflect, to deliberate."26 
Nietzsche's criticism of morality and religion-the latter for the 
most part synonymous with Christianity-appears, on the other 
hand, as a kind of exaggerated counterpart to that of culture and 
education. Here also a clear downward slope prevails, which be-
comes especially apparent when we consider the conception of mo-
rality that underlies On the Genealogy of Morals. It is appropriate to 
begin with this work, because Nietzsche always considered it his 
business to inquire after the origin of moral judgments and value 
determinations.27 The answer, which obtrudes itself upon Nietzsche 
after his attempt to decipher the "hieroglyphic text of the past of 
human morality," is radically pessimistic: it is the will to nothing-
ness, the disgust with life, the revolt against the most basic pre-
suppositions of life. Moreover, this will to nothingness must be con-
sidered the foremost requirement for moral judgments. 28 For this 
reason it is morality itself that has to be held primarily responsible 
"if the greatest power and splendor in the type man is never at-
tained."29 For morality is not merely that sublimated form of life 
"that itself cuts into life";30 rather, with his notions of moral value 
man has created for himself an ideal counterworld and world-be-
hind-this-world that condemns him to an existence of continuous 
self-estrangement. 31 Thus morality is for Nietzsche, as he explains in 
Ecce Homo, the "Circe of humanity,"32 which seduces us to a total 
25. GT, sec. 3. 
26. Nachlafl (WM), sec. 2. 
27. See, for example, MA, IIIII, sec. 57; FW, IV, sec. 335; Nachlafl (Die Unschuld des 
Werdens, II), sec. 875 (outline of a plan for the Second Book from 1886). 
28. GM, Preface, sec. 7; III, sec. 28. 
29. Ibid., Preface, sec. 6. 
30. Z, Il, "On the Famous Wise Men"; IV, "The Leech." 
31. Wolff (Friedrich Nietzsche. Der Weg zum Nichts, p. 250) finds "this decisive thought 
ot the work" expressed chiefly in the third lecture, "Was bedeuten asketischc !deale?" 
which according to him has its origin in the belatedly added fifth book of FW, "We 
Fearless Ones." 
32. Ecce Homo, "Why 1 Write Such Good Books," sec. 5. 
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suppression of the feeling for life; it is the renunciation of the will to 
existence, or, more succinctly, "a sickness."33 
Nietzsche is convinced that morality in and of itself has as little 
to do with religion as has the latter with morality; nevertheless the 
"two descendants of the Jewish religion"-Christianity and Islam-
are "essentially moral religions."34 Consequently in both religions, 
and especially in Christianity, it is primarily that denial of life ex-
pressed as the essence of the divine which must be opposed; and "in 
fact," according to a note in the Nachlafl, "only the moral God has 
been refuted."35 This fragment, composed in the form of a dialogue, 
is emphatic in its expression: "You call it the self-disintegration of 
God: but it is only his moulting: he is shedding his moral skin! And 
you shall see him again soon, beyond good and evil."36 
This passage signifies an important retreat in Nietzsche's think-
ing, insofar as in it his criticism of morality and religion is in accord 
with his criticism of Christianity. For he sees Christianity too, like 
"all great things," as involved in an "act of self-overcoming." He 
reasons: "After Christian veracity has come to one conclusion after 
another, it will come finally to its most severe conclusion, its con-
clusion against itself." Thus Christianity will perish from its own 
"training in truth," or, to speak concretely, from its morality. 37 The 
prospect of this "great drama in a hundred acts which is reserved 
for the next two centuries in Europe" hardly hinders Nietzsche, how-
ever, from keeping an eye open for additional strategies for destruc-
tion. 38 He proceeds here in precisely the same manner as with his 
criticism of morality and religion. The alleged "self-destruction" of 
God, which represents for him but an early instance of the differenti-
ation between morality and religiosity, is merely additional stimulus 
for him in carrying out the work of the destruction of the Christian 
belief in God. At the same time, he reaches the point where his 
struggle against morality-and especially against the "ascetic ideal" 
-shifts definitively to criticism of religion. 
Nietzsche may have received strong encouragement for this plan 
in the thesis put forth by Heinrich Heine in his essay "On Religion 
33. Nachlafl (WM), sees. 11, 273. 
34. Ibid., sec. 146. 
35. Nachlafl (Die Unschuld des Werdens, II), sec. 994. 
36. Ibid., sec. 949. 
37. GM, III, sec. 27. 
38. See further my Nietzsche article in Rcligionskritik von der Aufkliirung bis zur Gegen-
wart, ed. Karl von Weger (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1979), pp. 241-47. 
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and Philosophy in Germany" (1834), namely, that Kant in his attack 
on the traditional proofs of the existence of God had been able to 
refute only the cosmological and physico-theological arguments, but 
not the ontological argument, which had been present long before 
Anselm of Canterbury in Augustine's treatise De Iibera arbitrio. 39 
Since Nietzsche has no hope of proceeding farther than Kant on the 
path of analysis or speculation, he hits upon the colossal idea of 
defeating the Christian belief in God with its own weapons. Thus in 
The Gay Science he tells the parable of the "madman" who seeks to 
bring about a change in belief after the fashion and style of the par-
ables of Jesus-only in the opposite direction. 40 Accordingly, he has 
this "madman"-a counterpart to the "fool" in Anselm's argument in 
the Proslogion-appear with a lantern in his hand among the godless 
in the marketplace, so that after he had bewildered them with his 
question "Whither has God gone?" he could shout his "God is dead" 
in their faces. 41 The God who saw everything and by means of his 
all-seeing gaze had shown himself to be the last moral court of ap-
peal for man, this God, according to the words of the "ugliest man" 
in the masquerading procession at the end of Zarathustra, had to 
"die." And his reason: "Man cannot bear to have such a witness 
alive."42 
III. The Contours of the Criticism 
If this passage through the fields of Nietzsche's criticism teaches us 
anything, it is the continuous escalation of his critical intent. This 
escalation reveals itself explicitly in the fact that as his involvement 
as a critic increases, his readiness to form alternatives, or even 
to permit them, clearly diminishes. For no matter how mercilessly 
Nietzsche took the German educational establishment to task, his 
reference to the repressive character of the existing educational sys-
tem was motivated by the desire to bring about a change for the 
better-although we must view as questionable that incoherency 
which in this particular instance caused him to speak in terms of 
39. For further discussion, see my article "Nietzsches Kritik des christlichen Gottes-
begriffs und ihre theologischen Konsequenzen" (above, n. 10). 
40. For further discussion, see my Theologische Sprachtheorie und Hermeneutik (Mu-
nich: Kosel, 1970), pp. 441-69, and Die Gleichnisse fesu (Munich: Kosel, 1965). 
41. See also my investigation "Gvtt ist tot". Nietzscltes Destruktion des dzristlichen Be-
wufitseins (Munich: Kosel, 1962). 
42. Z, IV, "The Ugliest Man." 
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"leaders and followers."43 Moreover, within the context of his criti-
cism of culture he has no hesitation, at the end of his critical under-
taking, about offering himself as an alternative: "And in all serious-
ness, no one before me knew the right way, the way upwards; it is 
only beginning with me that there are again hopes, tasks, prescripti-
ble paths of culture-! am their joyful herald."44 
Finally, with the transition to the criticism of morality and religion, 
a more far-reaching change takes place. It is as if his critical will were 
taking the entire task upon itself. Yet this impression is not merely 
accidental. Just as we saw with the exorbitant utterance from Ecce 
Homo, when Nietzsche is dealing with the most significant subjects 
it is a question of the identification of critic with criticism. But it is 
precisely because Nietzsche now "fills out" the entire field of critical 
encounter with his person that new alternatives become possible; 
however, these no longer lie in the realm of emotionally neutral 
counterpositions, but rather in the center of Nietzsche's own will to 
existence. A direct line can be traced from the claim to be opening up 
new paths through himself, to the self-proclamation of the herald of 
madness in which Nietzsche designates himself as the "successor to 
the dead God" who did not dare to carry his own private egotism so 
far as to be able to forego for its sake the creation of the new-
Dionysian-world. 45 If we add to this the appellations of the herald 
of madness in which Nietzsche alternately refers to himself as "Dio-
nysus" or as "The Crucified One," we find confirmation for the 
growing tendency of Nietzsche in his deranged state to identify him-
self with that which had previously been the target of his severest 
polemic. Moreover, he now constitutes the alternative himself by ele-
vating that which he had previously passionately denied to the level 
of content within his own-shattering-existence. 
Even if we merely illuminate the context to this extent, the criti-
cism practiced by Nietzsche gains, at least in its excessive forms, a 
new and quite unexpected aspect. There, where he utters his most 
decisive No, we suddenly find traces of a covert or overt affirmation. 
Thus in its extreme intensity his criticism becomes, in a figurative 
sense, a receptacle whose contours let us see the criticized object as 
if it were in a hollow mold. This opens up the possibility of what is 
at first a completely unsuspected interpretation, for the intensity of 
43. "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions," fifth lecture. 
44. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Twilight of the Idols, sec. 2. 
45. See, for example, the first part of his letter of 6 January 1889 to Jakob Burck-
hardt. 
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Nietzsche's criticism is not merely a measuring stick for that which 
he perceived as the main content of the "No-saying, No-doing half" 
of his life's task, 46 nor does it merely show us what challenged the 
capacity of his critical faculties to react in any given case. Nietzsche's 
criticism rather, at least in its excessive forms, is intended to be un-
derstood and interpreted as a dialectical reflection of its targets. This 
interpretation would-in Nietzsche's own words--be only halfway 
complete if we were merely to see in it his critical genius, the pas-
sion of his power to negate, and the intensity of his destructive will, 
for such a view would fail to perceive the background Yes in his 
foreground No. And with that it would perhaps overlook precisely 
that quality on which Nietzsche himself, with his avowed feeling for 
allusions and inexpressible connotations, presumably would have 
placed the greatest value. 
If we do not wish to forfeit this quality, then Nietzsche's criticism, 
notwithstanding our estimation of its critical-negative approach, 
must be interpreted "reconstructively." It also becomes necessary to 
recognize once again in its "hollow mold" the outline of the object 
of his negation. And not merely in order to do full justice to Nietz-
sche's critical method. Rather, we must acknowledge the fact that his 
criticism also possesses heuristic functions, for Nietzsche's criticism 
is as sensitive as it is severe. No matter how blindly-or filled with 
blind rage-it lashes out in its severity, in its sensitiveness it is of-
ten imbued with an astounding clear-sightedness. As a consequence, 
Nietzsche in using this critical approach feels his way forward from 
a position far in advance of that possible with an affirmative ap-
proach to his subject. This cognitive quality has to be taken into 
account in connection especially with his criticism of religion, for in 
spite of all his passion and the relentlessness of his negation, it is 
precisely here that he not infrequently succeeds in gaining insights 
and perceptions that encroach upon the limits of theological under-
standing. To cite but two examples: Who would have been capable of 
developing an understanding of the parable, at a time when theo-
logical interpretation was for the most part entangled in the concept 
of allegory, that could have vied with that documented in his own 
parable of the "madman"?47 And who, after Nicholas of Cusa, would 
46. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 1. 
47. See further the assessment by Adolf julicher in his monumental work Die Gleich-
nisreden jesu (Tubingen: Mohr, 1910); also my study "Gott ist tot": Nietzsches Destruktion 
des christlichen Bewuj3tseins (above, n. 41), which is continued in Die Gleiclmisse fesu 
(above, n. 40). 
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have emphasized once again the motif of the "allseeing God" with 
such vehemence?48 
One final factor, however, carries more weight than all these heu-
ristic references. For in the existential encounter that at times drives 
Nietzsche the critic of religion almost to the point of identification it 
becomes apparent that the "material" of religion cannot be treated as 
if it were of neutral value, as an object among objects, but only in 
relation to a personal state of inner disquietude. It was not without 
good reason that Rudolf Bultmann compared the cognitive situation 
that arises when we deal with religious subject matter with that in-
volved in the investigation of microphysical processes, in which the 
observing subject comes into play as a factor by himself constituting 
an object. 49 But here he was merely repeating on a theoretical level 
what Jean Paul long before had declared to be the "intention" he 
was pursuing with the "vision of terror" in his "Speech of the Dead 
Christ": 
I also intend with my writing to strike fear into the heart of a few 
Masters of Arts, either now lecturing or who have lectured in the 
past; for truly these people, now that they have been elevated 
from the status of building-slaves in the construction of dikes and 
the shoring up of excavations for critical philosophy to that of paid 
workers, ponder the existence of God as cold-bloodedly and cold-
heartedly as if we were talking about the existence of the kraken 
or the unicorn. 50 
That, however, is the language of an affirmative mode of thought 
that has religious experience on its side. In Nietzsche, on the other 
hand, a voice is raised that concurs in this experience-but from the 
point of view of criticism. And he underscores this concurrence with 
his most suggestive metaphors. After the "madman" has proclaimed 
48. In this sense, the chapter of Zarathustra entitled "The Ugliest Man" has to be 
seen and evaluated in terms of Cusa's De visione Dei. The conclusion of my article 
"Nietzsches Kritik des christlichen Gottesbegriffs und ihre theologischen Konsequen-
zen" (above, n. 10) points out further such cross-references. 
49. In his article "Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung" Bultmann emphasizes 
that modem science has come by means of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle to rec-
ognize that "the object being observed is already disfigured or modified in some way 
by the observer himself" (Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsiitze, vol. 4 [Tiibingen: 
Mohr, 1965], 129). 
50. Johann Paul Friedrich Richter, "Rede des toten Christus vom Weltgebaude 
herab, daiS kein Gott sei," in Siebcnkiis, erstes Blumenstiick; also Walther Rehm, Jean 
Paul-Dostojewski. Eine Studie wr dichterischen Gestaltung des Unglaubens (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 5-53. 
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his terrible tidings of the death of God, he impresses his stunned 
audience with the consequences of this "greatest of modern events" 
by asking them: "What did we do when we unchained this earth 
from her sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? 
Away from all suns? Are we not falling continually? And backwards, 
sideways, forwards, to every side?"51 
No one has ever spoken more suggestively of the loss resulting 
from the "death of God." In these questions is revealed the experi-
ence of that criticism which had been working its way up to this 
"death." But in doing so it has already left its critical function far 
behind. To appreciate fully the significance of this we must follow it 
into another realm. 
51. FW, III, sec. 125. 
II. The Case against Apolitical 
Morality: Nietzsche's Interpretation 
of the Jewish Instinct 
Harry Neumann 
"How can one today still concede so much to the naivete of Chris-
tian theologians that one joins them in decreeing that the develop-
ment of the notion of God, from 'God of Israel,' from a political god 
(Volksgott) to the Christian God constitutes progress?" 
-The Antichrist 
Although Nietzsche welcomed the modern Jew's eagerness to end 
his nomadic existence, the eternal wandering of the galut, he be-
lieved that it arose from the weakening of the Jewish instinct. *1 The 
willingness to find a home in Europe, especially in Germany, fol-
lowed upon Napoleonic destruction of the ghettos in which the ex-
iled Jews had continued to await the messiah who would restore 
their political integrity by rebuilding their ancestral Temple on its 
ancestral site in Jerusalem and by reestablishing the prescribed tribal 
sacrifices in it; until that messianic restoration they chose to live in 
ghettos segregated from the (moral-political) abomination of gentile 
life. Millennia of persecution could not deprive what Shylock still 
called "our sacred nation" of its messianic zeal. Nietzsche considered 
it the goal of the Jewish instinct. By calling it an instinct he inten-
tionally abstracted from Jewish piety. Instincts are shared by all ani-
mals--they do not distinguish men from beasts--yet Nietzsche per-
ceived instinct as central to human life: "Every mistake in every 
sense is a consequence of degeneration of instinct, of the degener-
ation of the will: one could almost define what is bad in this way. 
Everything good is instinct."2 
*The research for this paper was assisted by a grant from the Earhart Foundation 
and the John Brown Cook Association for Freedom. 
1. J, sec. 251. Translations from Nietzsche are those of the author. 
2. G, "The Four Great Errors," sec. 2; FW, sec. 11; Z, I, "On the Despisers of the 
Body"; A, sec. 6. 
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Proper instincts are acquired through millennia of brutal, tyrannic 
imposition of a morality that then becomes self-evident to those so 
educated: "Everything good is inherited: what is not inherited is im-
perfect, is a mere beginning."3 The main human problem is to attain 
"the perfected autonomy of instinct-this presupposition of every 
mastery, of every kind of perfection in the art of life."4 Nietzsche 
prized the Jewish instinct as a more developed form of this mastery 
than that possessed by other European peoples.5 Characteristically 
Nietzsche finds this instinct's most revealing aspect in the uncondi-
tional obedience to parents: "To honor father and mother and even 
in the depths of the soul to be obedient to their will."6 Like most 
modern men, he abstracts, as he must, from the most essential ele-
ment of Judaism, its piety. He discovers Judaism's core in the human 
experience central to it, not in the divine commandment that calls 
forth that experience. 
Nietzsche believed that the Jews originally worshiped their exclu-
sive tribal gods, and particularly their chief war god, whose main job 
was insurance of victory over enemies. The existence of those gods 
was disproved in the only way gods could be disproved in that radi-
cally political world: by military defeat and the subsequent destruc-
tion of their temples. 7 Prior to such catastrophe, the worth of one's 
gods appeared self-evident, subject to doubt only by madmen or 
fools. To its devotees, this piety had nothing to do with faith or 
belief. It informed a way of life in which the main concern-the piety 
that unified the nation-was experienced as self-evident truth. This 
political piety left no room for the serious philosophic or scientific 
questions that became possible only with its discreditation by de-
feat and the destruction of its temples. All moralities or religions 
informed by this disestablishment naturally are experienced as faith 
in something questionable, something open to philosophic-scientific 
inquiry. 
Once the certainties of the old tribal or civic piety are lost, poli-
tics no longer can escape "the police supervision of doubt," however 
desperately partisans may cling to the self-evidence of some pious 
truth. 8 Most men dread the rootless, aimless lives forced upon them 
3. G, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," sees. 47 and 39; J. sees. 188, 229-30, 264; 
GM, II. 
4. A, sees. 57-59. 
5. M, sec. 205; ]. sec. 251. 
6. Z, I, "On the Thousand and One Goals." 
7. A, sec. 25; FW, sec. 136. 
8. FW, sec. 344. 
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by the discrediting of tribal-civic piety. This dread was responsible 
for the Jewish denial that destruction of their temple disproved the 
existence of their gods; instead, they claimed that their defeat and 
enslavement were god's way of testing or punishing them. In time 
that same god would empower the messiah to reestablish their tribal 
sacrifices in their temple. However, a god capable of effecting this 
miraculous resurrection no longer could be merely concerned with 
his own people. "Formerly he had only his own people (Volk), his 
chosen people. Then he, just as his people, went wandering into 
foreign places ... that great cosmopolitan."9 He became the one god 
of all men; the tribal piety of victorious Judaism was transformed into 
the monotheism of defeated Judaism: 
A people that still believes in itself, still has its own god. In him 
it reverses the conditions by means of which it is victorious, its vir-
tues .... Such a god must know how to help and harm, must be 
able to be a friend and an enemy-one admired both his good and 
his terrifying qualities. The antinatural castration of a god to a god 
merely of good qualities would be undesirable here .... What 
would be the use of a god who was not even alive to the delightful 
ardeurs of victory and annihilation of enemies? ... To be sure, 
when a people is destroyed; when it feels the irrevocable disap-
pearance of its faith in its future, its hope for its freedom ... then 
its god becomes a god for everyone, becomes a private person, a 
cosmopolitan. Formerly he represented a people (Volk), the 
strength of a people, everything aggressive and thirsty for power in 
the soul of a people: now he is merely the good god. 10 
Although victorious Judaism had one main war-god, it acknowl-
edged that other peoples had their gods and it itself had various 
lesser gods. 11 This polytheism was a luxury that defeated Judaism no 
longer could afford: what was desperately required was an omnipo-
tent god who could create ex nihilo, transforming ultimate political 
annihilation and degradation into salvation. Since this god could not 
be limited by anything outside himself, he must be the one omnipo-
tent god. Beside him there is only the nothingness out of which he 
creates whatever he wills. Nietzsche interpreted that nothingness as 
the cosmic reflection of the emptiness experienced by Jews when 
defeat discredited their ancestral gods, the guarantors of their politi-
9. A, sec. 17. 
10. Ibid., sec. 16. 
11. FW, sec. 143; Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 2, 15, 17. 
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cal integrity who defined their morality. In their radically political 
world that emptiness meant slavery or suicideY However, Jewish 
invention of omnipotent monotheism permitted them to interpret 
the ultimate degradation, the destruction of their Temple in Jerusa-
lem, as divine providence. 
This desperate invention sprang from "the deepest political in-
stinct (Volks-Instinkt), the toughest will to live that ever existed on 
earth."13 That will's toughness sprang from the realization that life is 
nothing for men deprived of their political integrity: "If I forget thee, 
0 Jerusalem!"14 
In the rebirth demanded by that tenacious will to live, the Jewish 
mission no longer could be what it most wanted to be, that is, deeply 
tribal. Now it was compelled to be global, since divine omnipotence 
must control the whole universe-otherwise it could not bring the 
Jews back to Jerusalem, transmuting defeat into victory. Obviously 
this new piety could be held only by blind, desperate faith in ex nihilo 
creation. Prior to the destruction of their Temple, Jews had experi-
enced no need for such faith. In their old polytheism, military virtue 
corresponded to the role played in monotheistic Judaism by the will 
to believe. The main work of the warriors was also the main work of 
their gods: the destruction of enemies. Only with defeat did peaceful 
priests seem better than the warriors celebrated by the old warrior 
piety, for the omnipotent god valued humility and meekness over 
manly pride. The priests who interpreted that deity's will naturally 
were preferred to the now defeated warriors. 15 
Written by those priests, the Bible, from Nietzsche's point of view, 
is the record not of what actually happened, but of what omnipotent 
monotheism needed in order to transform defeat into victory. 16 After 
the defeat of one's tribal or civic gods, the alternative to this falsifica-
tion of one's past is political suicide or slavery; confronted with this 
alternative the Jews, according to Nietzsche, chose a life grounded in 
lies. Nietzsche interprets this preference as the ground of all subse-
quent politics, a politics separated from religion: "The Jews created 
that miracle of an inversion of values thanks to which life on earth 
12. FW, sec. 136. 
13. A, sec. 27. 
14. Ps. 137. 
15. A, sees. 16-17; cf. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 17: "After its destruction 
and reestablishment, the Jewish state was a mere shadow of the first state, for the high 
priests had usurped the rights of the tribal military commanders." 
16. A, sees. 26-27, 54-58; J, sec. 38; WM, sec. 481. 
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has acquired a new and dangerous charm for a few millennia .... 
The slave-rebellion in morality begins with them." 17 
Nietzsche's Jesus drew the radically apolitical consequences of the 
discrediting of the old polytheism. Open to everything because noth-
ing is foreign to him, he has lost the capacity to experience the 
distinction at the heart of serious politics, the distinction between 
friends and enemies, between his own and what is hostile to it. 18 
Only Israel's original warrior piety justified that distinction by which 
serious politics stands or falls. 
For Jesus, no enemies--and therefore no politics--exist because 
military defeat has deprived his people of the pious ties that made 
them a people, not a group of random, independent individuals. 
Jesus' radical lack of discrimination precludes awareness of any cru-
cial distinctions between man and man and even between god and 
man, heaven and earth: the kingdom of heaven is here and now 
within oneself as soon as one becomes alive to the consequences of 
military defeat for the old political piety. Nietzsche's Jesus refuses to 
discriminate between slave and freeman, male and female, Jew and 
gentile, wisdom and ignorance, life and death, noble and base: 
The glad tidings are precisely that opposites no longer exist; the 
kingdom of heaven belongs to the children; the faith that makes it-
self heard here is no faith obtained through struggle-it is here, it 
exists from the beginning; it is, as it were, an infantilism that has 
retreated into the spiritual ... a retarded puberty caused by degen-
eration .... This kind of faith is not angry, does not condemn, 
does not defend itself: it does not bring "the sword"-it cannot 
even imagine how it might one day be divisive. It does not prove it-
self, either by miracle or by reward and promise or even "by scrip-
ture": it itself is in every moment its own miracle, reward, proof, its 
"kingdom of god." ... It stands outside all religion, history, sci-
ence, all experience of the world, all knowledge, all politics, all psy-
chology, all books, all art-its knowledge is pure foolishness pre-
cisely about the existence of such things .... Such a teaching 
cannot contradict. It cannot even grasp that other teachings exist or 
can exist. 19 
17. J, sec. 195. 
18. Cf. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, ed. and trans. George Schwab (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976), pp. 27-36, 53-55, 69-105; WM, sec. 
218; Z, II, "On Immaculate Perception"; Plato Republic 335B--33hA. 
19. A, sec. 32. 
34 Harry Neumann 
In a passage suppressed by his sister, Nietzsche describes Jesus as 
an idiot-using the word in its ancient meaning, according to which 
an idiot (idiotes) is a private person, a man with no tribal or civic 
gods, and therefore no politics, of his own?0 Such people-mere 
human beings or persons-seemed slavish or infantile on the ancient 
polytheism's radically political horizon. To escape this idiotic fate the 
Jews interpreted it as a temporary divine punishment, which would 
be terminated when their messiah restored their political integrity by 
rebuilding their ancestral Temple on its ancestral site in Jerusalem. In 
opposition to Jesus, the Jews did not see their recourse to monothe-
ism as an end in itself: it was a means to restore their warrior piety. 
Unable to bear the thought of perpetual enslavement, they invented 
an omnipotent redeemer. Yet if this redeemer exists, nothing can 
exist outside him: omnipotence cannot be limited. Jesus' infantilism 
was incapable of experiencing anything as foreign or hostile to its 
kingdom of god. Only their old warrior gods, not their new omnipo-
tent deus ex machina, could justify the Jews' political life, their contin-
ued concern with themselves as a people opposed potentially or ac-
tually to other peoples. 
Since the monotheism needed to restore the old political polythe-
ism reduces everything, including that polytheism, to nothing, it 
cannot restore the old warrior piety. Under monotheism, nothing is 
more than a toy to be willfully created or destroyed by divine omnip-
otence. Nothing is serious because politics no longer is serious. Ap-
parently, omnipotent monotheism can do anything except create a 
world in which warring political gods can be taken seriously; at best, 
such a creation would be childish amusement. 21 
Contrary to Nietzsche's Jesus, his Paul loathed the idiotic conse-
quences of the discrediting of his people's tribal piety. In a monothe-
istic world, the only choice is between political suicide and some 
form of infantilism. According to Nietzsche, Paul wanted revenge 
against the victorious enemies who had forced this absurd choice 
upon his people. Indeed, he wanted to make everything political or 
victorious seem ungodly, and thus he originated the contemporary 
democratic usage of "political" as a term of reproach. Nietzsche in-
terpreted him as the originator of the most powerful expression of 
20. A, sees. 29-31; cf. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 19: "The Christian reli-
gion was not taught at first by kings but by private persons .... among the Hebrews 
things were very differently arranged: for their church began at the same time as their 
dominion, and Moses, their monarch, taught religion to the people, arranged their 
sacred rites and chose their priests" (tr. Elwes). 
21. Z, I, "On the Three Metamorphoses"; Schmitt (above, n. 18), pp. 53 and 98. 
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the spirit of revenge (Geist der Rache), the drive that informs all 
human or cosmopolitan, as distinct from political, thought. 22 Paul 
realized that the destruction of polytheism could not eliminate the 
political passions whose goals that polytheism had sanctified. Those 
passions, especially the need to escape the infantilism fostered by 
monotheism, want vengeance against a world that degrades them to 
mere superstition or "racism." 
To gain that revenge, Paul consciously falsified the meaning of Je-
sus' life: 23 he created Christianity according to which military victory, 
political greatness, was hellish. Thus he dragged his victorious ene-
mies down to the hell into which defeat had cast his people. Paul 
shared Jesus' insight that Jewish messianic dreams were negated by 
the monotheism needed to actualize them. However, his determina-
tion to avenge the defeat responsible for monotheism precluded Je-
sus' infantile harmony with it. For Paul, monotheistic devaluation of 
politics was a way to vengeance, not a way of life. 
Some Christian or post-Christian form of monotheism, and with it 
the death of serious politics, has triumphed everywhere during the 
last two millennia. If isolated pockets of warrior piety exist today its 
adherents are pitied as "backward" or "underdeveloped" peoples, 
that is, people whose "sexist," "chauvinist," or "racist" prejudices 
require replacement by Christian or pacifist ideals. The Jews, and 
only the Jews, never were reconciled to this replacement; they re-
mained aware of the terrifying emptiness of apolitical, cosmopolitan 
solutions. Nietzsche believed that the Jewish instinct constituted by 
this awareness prevented wholehearted acceptance of any religious 
or secularized monotheism. For the Jews, monotheism never was 
more than a means to return to polytheism's serious (political) world. 
Prior to what Nietzsche diagnosed as the dying of their radically 
political instincts, the Jews insisted upon living in ghettos segregated 
from the emptiness, the lack of seriousness, of Christian-cosmopoli-
tan regimes. Unlike contemporary opponents of "segregation" or 
"discrimination" who denounce their ghettos, the Jews demanded 
ghetto segregation so long as their yearning for political regeneration 
had not lost its pious flame. 
Nietzsche knew that the Jewish instinct always had been in danger 
of losing itself to monotheism's apolitical orientation. Both "rational" 
persuasion and horrible persecution joined to weaken that instinct's 
desperate clinging to its impossible goal. The weakening by persua-
22. A, sec. 58; WM, sec. 765; Z, II, "On Child and Marriage"; FW, sees. 359-70; "An 
Spinoza," MusA, XX, 129. 
23. A, sees. 40-49. 
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sion was never very successful until after the American and Napole-
onic "liberation" of the ghettos; however, Nietzsche insisted that it 
already had been responsible for the falsification of Jewish history in 
most of the Old Testament and all of the New Testament. 24 Since the 
destruction of the Temple, Judaism's hallmark has been the conflict 
between this alien tendency to interpret it as essentially apolitical 
and cosmopolitan and the Jewish instinct's subordination of mono-
theism to the restoration of its old warrior piety. That alien, "ratio-
nalist" tendency to reject the depth of instinct linking Jews to their 
ancient polytheism never was stronger or more persuasive than in 
Spinoza, the last Jewish philosopher. 
Nietzsche noted that Spinoza advised abandonment of the Jewish 
instinct precisely because monotheistic omnipotence cannot be lim-
ited by any morality, especially by the warrior piety that it was in-
vented to restore: "How can Spinoza's position, his denial and re-
jection of all morality, be understood? It was a consequence of his 
theodicy!"25 Spinoza defended omnipotent freedom's monotheism 
against limitation by any political-and therefore exclusive-piety. 26 
More knowledgeable about Judaism than most modern Jews (and 
gentiles), he identified it heart and soul with tribal, not cosmopoli-
tan, piety.27 Moreover, he agreed with the Jews that morality or poli-
tics (which the Jews, like all pre-Christians, did not distinguish) is 
possible only in a polytheist world of warring political gods, not in a 
monotheist world of brotherly love: 
[Jesus' words] were spoken to men who were oppressed, who 
lived in a corrupt commonwealth on the brink of ruin, where jus-
tice was utterly neglected. The Christian doctrine inculcated just 
before the destruction of Jerusalem was also taught by Jeremiah 
before the first destruction of Jerusalem .... However, Moses, 
who did not write in times of oppression but-mark this-
founded a well-ordered regime ... ordained that an eye be given 
for an eye .... Jesus' and Jeremiah's teaching concerning submis-
sion to injuries is only valid in places where justice is neglected 
... not in a well-ordered regime. 28 
24. Ibid., sees. 25-27; GM, III, sec. 22. 
25. WM, sec. 410. 
26. GM, II, sec. 15; Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 16; Political Treatise, 2; Leo 
Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken, 1965), 
pp. 231-38, 302 (n. 302). 
27. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 3, 5, 7, 12, 17-19; A, sees. 17, 25; Strauss 
(above, n. 26), p. 18. 
28. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 7; d. ibid., 17: "The Jove of the Jews for 
their own country was not only patriotism, but also piety, and was cherished and 
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Although Spinoza agreed that genuine morality was possib! e only 
in the world of the old Jewish warrior piety, the dread of monothe-
ism's infantilism was weak or nonexistent in his soul. This weakness 
is responsible for the lack of depth discerned by Nietzsche in Spi-
noza and in all men unable to grasp why clinging desperately to 
Jewish messianic hopes, however impossible their realization, re-
veals a rare awareness of the human problem, rare at least in re-
gimes founded on cosmopolitan (apolitical) principles. Nietzsche in-
terpreted Jesus' infantilism as the radicalization of this shallowness. 
Spinoza knew that serious political-moral cares were possible only 
under the ancestral Jewish piety. Consequently he also knew that the 
Jewish instinct, a political will par excellence, required subordination 
of all life to its warrior piety. This piety necessarily hated scientific-
philosophic cosmopolitanism for the same reason that it hated Chris-
tianity, the pacifist way of Jesus' infantilism. 29 Spinoza's attachment 
to his form of (scientific) cosmopolitanism was responsible for his 
attempt to liberalize, that is, depoliticize, Judaism. The heart of his 
liberalization has been elimination of the Jew's instinctual yearning 
for regeneration of his ancestral gods who were discredited by de-
struction of their Temple in Jerusalem. 30 Like all contemporary "liber-
ation" movements, Spinoza's liberalism insisted that there was pri-
vate, apolitical morality as well as political morality; indeed, Spinoza 
and those "liberators" teach the primacy of private-individual-
rights over political duties. 
Spinoza never could persuade genuine (orthodox) Jews to aban-
nurtured by daily rites till, like their hatred of other nations, it passed into their na-
ture .... Thus the heart of the Jews was strengthened to bear all things for their 
country with extraordinary constancy and bravery .... Never so long as Jerusalem 
stood could they endure to remain under foreign domination .... Poverty was no-
where more endurable than in a country where duty to one's fellow-citizen was prac-
ticed with the utmost piety .... Thus Jews were nowhere so well off as in their own 
country; outside its limits they met with nothing but loss and disgrace." 
29. Ibid., 11 (end). 
30. Ibid., Preface: "The law revealed by god to Moses was merely the law of the 
individual Hebrew republic and therefore was binding on none but Hebrews, and not 
even on Hebrews after the downfall of their nation." Cf. ibid., 19: "After the destruc-
tion of the Hebrew dominion, revealed religion ceased to have the force of law; for as 
soon as the Jews were forced to transfer their allegiance to the king of Babylon, their 
kingdom of God and divine right ceased to exist." See also ibid., 12, where Spinoza 
notes the Bible's prudent silence on "what became of the Ark of the Covenant, for 
there is no doubt that it was destroyed together with the Temple; yet there was noth-
ing which the Jews considered more sacred or held in greater reverence .... We 
[Christians or philosophers] must not say that the word of god suffered in like man-
ner, else we shall be like the Jews, who said that the Temple which would then be the 
Temple of god had perished in the flames." 
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don their messianic fervor and, therefore, their ghettos. The alter-
native was too degrading for their radically political yearning. The 
centrality of that yearning links (orthodox) Judaism with Socratic-
Platonic thought, however implausible this linkage may seem to 
most "platonic" scholars. Like the mission of Nietzsche's chief en-
emy, Socrates (or Plato), "the mission of the Jews always was to 
bring a people to reason." In the decisive sense, as Nietzsche real-
ized, this mission is more Socratic than Nietzschean. But Socrates 
both needed and fought the warrior piety for whose restoration Jews 
alone always longed; he saw that this piety (in his case, his ances-
tral Athenian polytheism) gave his philosophy its direction and its 
seriousness. 
The heart of Nietzsche's opposition to modern classical scholarship 
is his awareness of its blindness to Socrates' deep need for the Athe-
nian piety that condemned him to death. Lacking, as moderns do, 
the narrow political piety provided by birth into pre-Christian re-
gimes, modern scholars cannot be alive to Socrates' debt to what 
Nietzsche called his herd instinct?1 
Nietzsche rightly notes that the herd instinct always provides herd 
members with one central care, however differently that care may be 
interpreted in different bestial or human herds. That care concerns 
the right way of life, how best to live-in short, the moral-political 
care. Generally this care is informed by the regnant orthodoxy (in-
stinct) of one's particular herd. Socrates turned that care into a ques-
tion whose answer was not self-evident (as it usually is to champions 
of the going orthodoxy), and spent his life trying unsuccessfully to 
answer that question. In this crucial sense, his life served his (Athe-
nian) herd instinct by trying to answer its main question. Nietzsche 
insisted that all pre-Nietzschean thought served the instinct of the 
thinker's herd: the conscious or unconscious aim of "the famous wise 
men" was to answer the main question of their respective herds, the 
question of how best to live. The heart of pre-Nietzschean thought 
was political (and therefore moral or religious). 
The primacy of politics and the political question cannot be estab-
lished by any philosophic-scientific inquiry. Rather, it is revealed by 
the same herd instinct that inspires the faith that men live in a world 
that exists independently of their experience of it. No rational in-
quiry can show that the so-called "external" world exists indepen-
31. Z, II, "On the Famous Wise Men"; Harry Neumann, "The Beginning of Wis-
dom" (to be published) and his review of Bernd Magnus's Nietzsche's Existential Impera-
tive in The Indepmdent Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1979), 139-41. 
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dently of one's experience-or, for that matter, that one's "internal" 
self possesses this independent reality. 
Socrates saw that the herd instinct that reveals an independently 
existing world and self is not democratic: it presents a (aristocra-
tic) hierarchy of concerns or questions, primarily the moral-political 
question. Denial of this question's priority means denial of the whole 
political (or herd-instinct) orientation, including the faith that one's 
"internal" self and the "external" world exist independently of one's 
experience. 
That apolitical denial of the herd-instinct orientation is at the heart 
of Nietzsche's nihilism. The nihilist denies that anything (this table, 
that tree, his self, the law of contradiction, 32 and so forth) is any-
thing but his experiences, mere impressions as Hume called them. 
There is nothing "in" things (or "behind" or "above" them) that 
gives them a reality apart from immediate experience-whether this 
experience be that of a fish, an infant, or a Socrates. 33 The herd-
instinct faith in such an existence (apart from experience) is a faith in 
"beings," things that exist in themselves, as opposed to what might 
be called mere "things" (or nothings) without any intrinsic being. 34 
Nihilists recognize only things or nothings but no beings. The first 
(and last) sentence of Stirner's The Ego and Its Own summarizes the 
nihilist, and therefore apolitical, core of Stirner and Nietzsche: "I 
have based my reality on nothing" ("Ich hab' mein Sach' auf Nichts 
gestellt"). 
Aware that he himself was radically nihilist, indeed "Europe's first 
perfect nihilist," Nietzsche insisted that truth led to despair, not 
to messianic redemption or to happiness: "Those who really have 
looked into the heart (Wesen) of things-they are the knowers .... 
Knowledge kills action, action needs tl:)e veil of illusion. . . . Real 
knowledge, insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for 
action."35 Realization of the horrible (because radically apolitical) 
truth destroys life, a life grounded in the illusions of common (or 
political) sense, the instincts of one's herd: "Not doubt but certainty 
drives men insane .... We all fear the truth."36 Nietzsche invented 
32. WM, sees. 507, 515-16; Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), I, 
508-616. 
33. WM, sees. 556, 481; FW, sec. 57; Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 16. 
34. Plato Republic 5110; Aristotle Physics 193a1-10. 
35. GT, sec. 7 (end); WM, Preface (sec. 3) and sec. 25; Heidegger (above, n. 32), I, 
436-37; II, 281-83. 
36. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am So Clever," sec. 4; WM, sec. 598; Z, IV, "On Science" and 
"The Shadow"; Heidegger (above, n. 32), I, 531 and 581. 
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the superman, his version of Israel's messiah, to appease the same 
fear of truth's radically idiotic horror that compelled the Jews to live 
on messianic hope.37 
Nietzsche interpreted both Socratic questioning and Jesus' infantil-
ism as consistent efforts to appease that politically inspired fear of 
truth. Socratic questioning is political at heart because it is informed 
by the priority of the herd instinct's main concern. The Socratic ques-
tioner understands himself as enslaved to the herd whose instincts 
give meaning and direction to his questioning. 
Nietzsche commanded a rare insight into the deeply political 
orientation of the Socratic enterprise. In terms of the cave image 
in Plato's Republic (511D-517C), nobody, including Socratic philos-
ophers, ever really leaves the cave to look directly at the sun, the 
idea of the good. The Socratic's relation to that real, self-subsisting 
good is guaranteed by his faith or trust in its reality, a faith inspired 
by his herd instinct. The instincts of his herd teach every herd mem-
ber that his chief concern is securing what is good for him. Insofar as 
he remains a pious herd member and not a questioning, Socratic 
one, he wholeheartedly accepts some form (there sometimes are op-
posing forms) of his regime's regnant orthodoxy about what is good 
for him. Far more than modern "liberated" Jews, Nietzsche knew 
that Judaism's messianic longing-its deepest stratum-is for a re-
gime in which Jews again can be pious herd members in this sense. 
Although Socratic herd members question the goodness of their 
herd's political orthodoxies, they never forget what they owe to their 
herd: it is responsible for their fundamental conviction, the faith 
that the question of the good life is the crucial question and, conse-
quently, that political philosophy is not one "field" or "discipline" 
among many. For the same reason politics is central and not one 
human activity among many. To demote it to one of many essentially 
equal human or "cultural" activities is to reduce the question (or 
care) at the core of serious politics, the question of how best to live, 
to a question of "ethics" (or political or moral science) among other 
equally important questions of "cultural fields" such as science, hu-
manities, stamp-collecting, or religion. On a Socratic horizon, nihil-
ism is precisely this apolitical demotion, not the throwing of bombs or 
the assertion that nothing exists or the denial of external and inter-
nal reality-for these more sensational things are mere consequences 
of that demotion. Both require membership in a sacred political, 
and therefore noncosmopolitan, community. The hallmark of such a 
37. Above, n. 31. 
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community is the identity of politics, religion, and morality in it. 
There can be no Aristotelian division of moral and philosophic vir-
tue or modern opposition between private and public or political 
morality. Such divisions or oppositions presuppose that men have a 
life-often their most important life-apart from the sacred ties of 
birth linking them to their tribes or cities. The necessary, if not suf-
ficient, condition of being either Socratic or Jewish is membership 
in a community whose warrior piety precludes these divisions or 
oppositions. 
Without the faith inspired by one's herd instinct, men (and beasts) 
are nihilist. Socrates owed his escape from nihilism to his rootedness 
in the Athenian herd whose goodness he questioned and who finally 
killed him for that questioning. In this sense his worst enemy (the 
Athenians who killed him) was also his best friend. 
Socratic thought resembles the original Jewish political piety for 
which birth, familial-political rootedness, determines whether one 
is divine or human or a mixture of both. Contrast this emphasis 
on birth with Genesis (3:22) where God, agreeing with the serpent, 
complains that Adam has "become as one of us" (gods) because Ad-
am's disobedience made him knowledgeable about good and evil. 
Here being or becoming a god has nothing to do with birth. Divin-
ity's core is the apolitical, immoral resolve to defy the authority 
("god") dominant in one's herd. The resultant knowledge is not of 
some moral truth or reality outside of one's own will, as Socrates, on 
the basis of his herd-instinct faith, believed the true good is. Socrates 
questioned the claim that the Athenian gods constituted that ulti-
mate, independently existing source of morality; he did not question 
the Athenian faith that such a source, the idea of the good as he 
called it, existed even if it were impossible to grasp adequately. 
Genesis' "knowledge of good and evil" is in reality the radically 
apolitical will to be free and independent, to recognize no moral 
authority outside of one's own nihilist will, a will limited quite liter-
ally by nothing. No wonder that the apotheosis of this apolitical will-
fulness is the biblical god's creation of all reality out of nothing. 
Because he is nihilist will, Genesis' God constitutes rejection of 
politics and political privilege, the privileges of birth common to Soc-
rates and his pious Athenian accusers. He has no parents, no family 
or herd out of which he was born. No herd-instinct faith guides his 
creation ex nihilo. He must create and think ex nihilo because he expe-
rienced no birth or, perhaps, as Mephisto in Goethe's Faust suggests, 
he is born ex nihilo, "that great cosmopolitan" of Nietzsche's Anti-
christ (sec. 17). His omnipotent cosmopolitanism can do anything 
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except what the defeated Jews, in their desperation, required of him: 
restoration of their ancestral polytheism in their Jerusalem Temple-
the earthly not the heavenly Jerusalem! 
Anybody can become a biblical god as God and the serpent define 
divinity in Genesis (3:22). It has nothing to do with birth, with being 
born into an exclusive sacred tribe or city. The sole prerequisite is 
nihilist liberation from such exclusive ties and from the "racist," "sex-
ist," and "chauvinist" "prejudices" created by the bellicose gods 
sanctifying those ties. This biblical divinity liberates men from more 
than the piety into which Socrates was born and whose worth he 
questioned. Genesis' God negates the very possibility of Socratic 
questioning. Nietzsche rightly insisted that Socrates' thought, his 
radically political philosophy, is rooted in faith in the instincts of his 
Athenian herd. That thought is meaningless if those instincts are 
illusory. Consequently the job of Socratic or political philosophy in 
any herd is twofold: (1) to investigate the validity of that particular 
herd's answer to the question of the good life, but also (2) to protect 
the instincts of the herd against nihilist rejection of their validity. The 
second requirement would make Socrates champion the this-worldly 
Jewish messianic enterprise against Christianity's merely heavenly 
Jerusalem; for the same reason, it sparks Nietzsche's ultimate prefer-
ence for Christianity over Judaism. 
Nietzsche noted that modern intellectuals, whether humanists or 
scientists, usually are democratic and egalitarian, opposed to dis-
criminatory, aristocratic emphasis on the privileges of birth. In this 
spirit Hitler once complained that the Kaiser was born with the Iron 
Cross around his neck, while ordinary soldiers had to risk their lives 
to earn it. Similar complaints often are leveled against England's 
queen. Such rejections of the rights of birth would eliminate not only 
Prussian kaisers and English queens, but all Socratic (nonnihilist) 
thought. They would reduce life to an apolitical reality in which 
nothing has a being of its own and, most importantly, in which no 
moral limits exist except by tyrannic fiat. For one learns of those 
limits by birth, by being born into a particular (noncosmopolitan) 
herd whose instincts supply the faith that they exist. Just as not 
everyone could become a god of Greek mythology (as distinct from 
Genesis's God), so not everyone can become Socratic. In both cases 
the prerequisite is birth, being piously rooted in the instincts of one's 
particular herd. Precisely this particular, political rootedness is un-
dermined in modern regimes informed by Christian or post-Chris-
tian (humanitarian) cosmopolitanism. Yet this essential particularity 
Nietzsche's Interpretation of the Jewish Instinct 43 
is the most Socratic aspect of the Platonic problem of participation, 
the question of the relation of particulars to universals or ideas. 
Radically political, the Platonic problem of participation cannot se-
riously arise in the souls of citizens of modern regimes in which the 
legitimacy of politics' exclusive ties is derived from universal ties or 
rights (the rights of man, for example). (Orthodox) Jews always have 
prayed for a messiah to redeem them from the apolitical nihilism of 
these (gentile) regimes. This messianic yearning made them alive to 
the Socratic-Platonic problem of participation as the central question 
of human life and not merely as an academic problem in so-called 
"platonic" scholarship. 
For Socrates, even a man's loftiest metaphysical-theological flights 
remain bound to the instincts of his particular herd: science or phi-
losophy is always herd philosophy. Refusal to acknowledge this po-
litical enslavement as the necessary condition of one's investigations 
is nihilist. Far from nullifying inquiries into being or the universe, 
the philosopher's dependence upon the instincts of his herd, his 
common or political sense, reveals the only nonnihilist way to main-
tain those inquiries. Socrates did not renounce nonnihilist metaphys-
ics or science when he insisted upon political philosophy's priority. 
Socratic emphasis on the moral-political cares of one's herd, his radi-
cally political approach to life, is meant to rescue life from conscious, 
but more often unconscious, nihilism. Nietzsche has just this rescue 
mission in mind when he observes that "we all fear the truth."38 
The Socratic rescue mission is fueled by that fear of truth. Nietz-
sche sees execution of the same mission as the job of Israel's mes-
siah, whose success would restore the necessary condition of So-
cratic philosophy: rootedness in a tribe or city whose piety sanctifies 
only that rootedness. In this crucial-but usually overlooked-sense, 
an "unenlightened" ancient Israeli or Zulu warrior was more Socratic 
than a Jesus, a Spinoza, a Marx, or a Nietzsche. 
Genuinely Jewish hopes always were for a messianic redemption 
in which Jews again could be seriously political and would not be 
degraded to the apolitical level of ancient, medieval, or modern "in-
dividualists." On their horizon, Jesus' crucifixion was a scandal pre-
38. Above, n. 36. Nietzsche does not exempt himself from this fear, which drove 
him to attempt the transcendence of nihilism or moral emptiness. Put differently, 
Nietzsche still yearned to be a philosopher, a lover of truth, although as "Europe's first 
perfect nihilist" he realized how unrealistic the love of (as opposed to fear of or indif-
ference to) truth was: WM, Preface (sec. 3) and sec. 25; Heidegger (above, n. 32), I, 
436-37; II, 281-83. 
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cisely because it pointed to an other-worldly, cosmopolitan redemp-
tion of Jews as individuals and not to the political redemption to be 
effected by Israel's messiah.39 Worship of a crucified "messiah" sanc-
tified the split that Israel's messiah was meant to eliminate: the split 
between private and public, conscience and society, political morality 
and private morality. More decisively, it sanctified the priority of pri-
vate or apolitical morality or religion, thus degrading war and politics 
to-at best-necessary evils. 
Socrates would agree with Nietzsche that in regimes in which this 
priority (of the private or apolitical) determines morality "the mission 
of the Jews always is to bring a people to reason." However, Nietz-
sche knew that Socratic (political) reason is not Nietzschean (apoliti-
cal) reason. Socratic reason can exist seriously only in men rooted by 
birth in a warrior piety no longer available in modern regimes. In 
these regimes the strongest link to Socratic thought would be some-
thing akin to messianic Judaism's impossible yearning, the homesick-
ness for an exclusively political regeneration. 40 
The reason to which Judaism forces men, if they can be made alive 
to its real message, is a harsh, unwelcome ordeal for both Jews 
and gentiles: it is nothing less than the question of whether life is 
worth living after the discrediting of polytheism's warrior orienta-
tion. Would not suicide have been better for the Jews (and for all pre-
Christian peoples) after their Temple was destroyed? Little more than 
the power of the subhuman craving for mere life at any price, a 
passion shared by all beasts, militates against suicide, when the sole 
living choice is between impossible messianic hopes (Jews) and some 
infantile "life-style" (gentiles). It surely is no accident that this crav-
ing's power is apotheosized in Spinoza's omnipotent god whose he-
gemony means the natural right to self-preservation of anything 
powerful enough to maintain itself, however infantile it may beY 
39. 1 Cor. 1:23; Gal. 4:24-36, 3:26-28; Luke 14:26; Matt. 12:47-48. Consider Ps. 137 
and 1 Kings 21:3. 
40. Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag von seiner Heimatstadt Mefikirch (Frankfurt am 
Main: Klostermann, 1969). 
41. GM, II, sec. 15; WM, sec. 410; FW, sec. 349; Strauss (above, n. 26), pp. 231-38; 
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, 16: "For instance, fish are determined by nature to 
swim and the big ones to eat the smaller ones and therefore fish enjoy the water and 
big ones eat smaller ones with supreme natural right. For it is certain that nature has 
supreme right to do anything she can; in other words, her right is co-extensive with 
her power. The power of nature is the power of god, which has supreme right over all 
things .... It is the supreme law and right of nature that every individual should 
strive to preserve itself as it is without regard to anything but itself; therefore this 
supreme law and right belongs to every individual. ... We do not here acknowledge 
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The Jews have two important days of mourning: one generally 
known, the other unknown, to gentiles. The aim of Yom Kippur, the 
individual asking his omnipotent god to forgive his sins, is readily 
intelligible to gentiles; Tishah b' Ab (the ninth of Ab) is not, for it is a 
day of national, not personal, mourning, a day when Jews mourn 
the catastrophe that compelled them either to die politically or to live 
on impossible hopes. On that day dirges are sung mourning the 
destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. If monotheism by its very 
nature cannot restore serious politics, Tishah b' Ab actually is a day of 
mourning for the destruction of the Jewish people. Nor is its mes-
sage of doom limited to Jews! In a world dominated by the nihilism 
responsible for monotheism, Tishah b' Ab is a bitter reminder to non-
Jews that their life, too, lost its seriousness, that is, its political core, 
with the destruction of the old polytheistic world. 
Since nothing goes more against the grain than Tishah b' Ab's mes-
sage, it does not receive the publicity among gentiles that is accorded 
to Yom Kippur. That message is given by Zarathustra's prophet or 
truth-sayer (Wahrsager), "the proclaimer of the great weariness": "Ev-
erything is empty, all is the same .... To be sure we have harvested, 
but why did all fruit turn rotten and brown for us? ... Verily we 
have become too weary even to die; so we are still awake and con-
tinue to live-in tombs! ... Nothing is worthwhile, the world is 
without meaning, knowledge strangles."42 
Zarathustra's truth-sayer also gives the reason for his nihilism: 
"Everything was." That is, genuine politics, which alone makes life 
serious and not infantile "fun," once was--in ancient, polytheistic 
regimes; it no longer exists in modern, post-Christian regimes where 
politics is derived from individual will, government from the consent 
of the governed. The pacifist goal of such regimes can only be some-
thing akin to a Marxist classless society in which politics and the 
state wither away. Once that occurs, individuals will be free to live as 
they-as individuals and not as citizens-please. On this apolitical 
horizon the individual's arbitrary whim determines whether to live 
seriously or playfully, since, "apart from whim or 'taste,' nothing in 
this world is inherently 'choiceworthy.' "43 
any difference between men and other individual natural entities nor ... between 
fools, idiots and sane men. Whatsoever any individual does by the laws of its nature, 
it has a supreme right to do." 
42. Z, II, "The Soothsayer"; IV, "The Cry of Distress"; Strauss (above, n. 26), pp. 10-
11. 
43. Z, II, "On Those Who Are Sublime"; WM, sec. 481. 
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Aware that modern "liberation" movements spark this elimination 
of politics and therefore of seriousness, Nietzsche could not but 
honor the tenacity with which messianic Judaism had clung to its 
dream of political regeneration in spite of refutation (by apolitical 
reasoners) and persecution. It was the quixotic last stand of politics 
in an essentially apolitical and therefore infantile world. Prior to 
what Nietzsche rightly diagnosed as the modern decay of the Jewish 
instinct, nothing could compel Jews not to grieve on Tishah b' Ab for 
what they had lost; nor could anything reconcile them to the finality 
of that loss. Life is hopeless both for them and for Socratic (politi-
cal) philosophers, if truth is on the side of Zarathustra's truth-sayer 
rather than with Israel's messiah. Nietzsche's rejection of that warrior 
messiah and his attack on Socrates both spring from the same roots 
or apolitical lack of roots. 
Nietzsche knew that this lack of roots precludes thoughtfulness (as 
distinct from mere cleverness). Serious thought, that is, Socratic or 
political philosophy, is impossible in modern regimes for the same 
reason that it is impossible in the God and serpent of Genesis. No 
wonder that Nietzsche saw the highest form of life, the superman's, 
as something akin to child's play, an activity recalling the infantilism 
ascribed by him to Christianity's messiah. 44 
44. Z, I, "On the Three Metamorphoses"; and the descriptions of the last man in Z, 
Preface, sec. 5, and of Jesus in A, sees. 29--35. 
III. Nietzsche and the Old Testament 
Israel Eldad 
(Translated by Yisrael Medad) 
Dedicated to the memory 
of Walter Kaufmann 
A Value Judgment 
The dedication of this article to Walter Kaufmann is more than an 
expression of my friendship and personal sorrow upon his death; 
certainly he would have dealt with the subject better than I. Actually, 
the dedication is part of the subject at hand, and I think it well to 
begin by relating something that I remember about him. During his 
stay in Jerusalem, a city he loved, I inquired of him in Kantian style 
while he was visiting with me (for I was then working on my He-
brew translation of Nietzsche): Wie ist Dionysos in Jerusalem miiglich?-
How can Dionysus be possible in Jerusalem? He seemed pleased by 
the question and his reply the next day was a poem whose theme 
was "And David was leaping and dancing before the Lord" (2 Sam. 
6:14). 
Here in one sweep we have three elements: Kaufmann's poetic 
soul, which was full of enthusiasm for Nietzsche; the living Bible; 
and one of the keys to Nietzsche's own love for the Old Testament. 
In fact, this key is provided by Nietzsche himself: "All honor to the 
Old Testament! I find in it great human beings, a heroic landscape, 
and something of the very rarest quality in the world, the incompa-
rable naivete of the strong heart; what is more, I find a people."1 
This respect for the Old Testament is highlighted further when 
compared with Nietzsche's negation of most of the personalities in 
the New Testament, for it is clear that personalities or situations 
of a Dionysian character are absent from the New Testament. Nietz-
sche, in truth, does not mention this biblical episode of David's wild 
1. GM, Ill, sec. 22; Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: The Modern Library, 1966), p. 580. 
47 
48 Israel Eldad 
dance before the Ark of the Lord. Incidentally, the language there is 
more explicit and stronger in that it stresses not the Ark but that he 
danced before the Lord himself, even though the subject there is 
the transporting of the Ark to Jerusalem. Yet the example chosen by 
Kaufmann to illustrate the possible connection between Dionysus 
and Jerusalem is concise in the extreme, as it usually is with ex-
pressionists. Ancient Greek culture had, as is known, a decisive ef-
fect on the thought of Nietzsche, which lends added significance to 
the clash with the culture of Israel, a clash quite surprising in its 
modernity. 
The accepted historiography-and this too with a large measure of 
help from Jewish thinkers-always stressed the polarization between 
Judaism and Hellenism: on the one hand strict ethical monotheism, 
and on the other agnostic polytheism and creative philosophy. Nietz-
sche, however, as a philosopher of culture who opened gates to a 
new value scale, freed himself from such platitudes of thinking and 
unveiled new and surprising vistas. 
It is obvious that Nietzsche possessed a profound knowledge of 
the New Testament and profited greatly from the deep Protestant 
tradition of his family. Yet there is no sharp division between the Old 
and New Testaments. The New is in no way an absolute negation of 
the Old, for already in the Old are to be found the roots of Christian-
ity, for instance in the account of the separating of man from nature. 
Christianity, especially the Pauline version, inherited from Judaism 
the very concept of sin, the "revolt of the slaves," and the priestly 
rule. All these, according to Nietzsche's outlook, do not apply to the 
personality of Jesus himself. At times it seems that the idea of the 
Jews' being "guilty" of Christianity is accepted by Nietzsche not in 
conjunction with the heroes of the Old Testament, but as a postbibli-
cal link. It was the Exile that forced the Jews to develop an unnatural 
Judaism, the fruit of which is Christianity. 
In this sense one can find the discerning distinction between the 
terms "Israel" and "the Jews" or "Judaism." The first usually merits a 
positive response, whereas the latter is treated in a negative fashion. 
"Usually," I note, for, from a historical-psychological standpoint and 
apart from a religious value system, Nietzsche is astonished at the 
will to survive and the strength of life of the Jews throughout their 
exilic history, and especially in their state of dispersion. It is as if 
this strength of will atones for their "sin" toward mankind's history: 
"Jewish" morality. 
And yet, it does not escape the eyes of a man of truth such as 
Nietzsche that the Old Testament already contains the possibilities 
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for the religious-moral development that he negates, just as he ne-
gates the morality that denies nature, even if it is clear to him that it 
was only Christianity that drew the final conclusions from these pos-
sibilities and brought them to a total denial of life, whereas Juda-
ism-and this is its glory and the secret of its survival-did not fol-
low this path to the end. 
The history of Israel is invaluable as the typical history of all dena-
turing of natural values. I indicate five points. Originally, espe-
cially at the times of the kings, Israel also stood in the right, that 
is, the natural, relationship to all things. Its Yahweh was the ex-
pression of a consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for 
oneself: through him victory and welfare was expected; through 
him nature was trusted to give what the people needed-above 
all, rain. Yahweh is the god of Israel and therefore the god of jus-
tice: the logic of every people that is in power and has a good con-
science. In the festival cult these two sides of the self-affirmation 
of a people find expression: they are grateful for the great desti-
nies which raised them to the top; they are grateful in relation to 
the annual cycle of the seasons and to all good fortune in stock 
farming and agriculture. This state of affairs long remained the 
ideal, even after it had been done away with in melancholy fash-
ion: anarchy within, the Assyrian without. The people, however, 
clung to the vision, as the highest desirability, of a king who is a 
good soldier and severe judge: above all, that typical prophet (that 
is, critic and satirist of the moment), Isaiah. 2 
An almost Dionysian description, at least in the later implication 
when Nietzsche's "wildness" was already restrained by the Apollo-
nian element. The use in this instance of the name of the Divinity, 
Yahweh, rather than the plain "God," is an indication of Nietzsche's 
intention: this is His personal name, or in other words, the reality of 
Israel's god, His real sense. This is a living god of a people, an ex-
pression of its natural needs and of its soul. The morality of this god, 
too, is harnessed to Israel's life-needs as well as to its will to power, 
its need to know how to hate its enemies-who, of course, are Yah-
weh's enemies-and how to rejoice in its victories. All of Nietzsche's 
admiration for the Old Testament sterns from the affirmation of life, 
the saying of "yes" to life, in which its religion is subordinated to this 
affirmation of life and its god is patterned on man and this life. The 
2. A, sec. 25; The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Viking, 1954), p. 594. 
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strength of this life is so great in the Old Testament that Nietzsche is 
not above setting it as an example even for the Greeks who are with-
out doubt in his opinion-even in the Apollonian view, without 
mentioning the hedonistic outlook-a sure example and symbol of 
the affirmation of life: "The Jews, being a people which, like the 
Greeks, and even to a greater degree than the Greeks, loved and still 
love life, had not cultivated that idea ['life after death'] to any great 
extent."3 Even the Greeks could learn from the heroism of the Patri-
archs, says the admirer of Greece-that Greece which was itself an 
epitomization of heroic figures. 
The resemblance between the later fate of Greek culture and that 
of Judaism, to Nietzsche's mind, is self-evident, and even more so if 
Hellenization is seen to be an almost inexorable process. There is, 
therefore, a resemblance between the passage from youth to deca-
dence in Hellas and that same passage in Judaism or, to be exact, in 
the Old Testament itself. Socrates and Plato are the watershed of 
Greek culture. All that preceded them was youthful, naive, strong, 
and healthy, even the thought of the earlier philosophers. From 
that time onwards-decadence. The watershed in the Old Testament 
is the struggle of the prophets against the kings: "The appearance 
of the Greek philosophers from Socrates onwards is a symptom of 
decadence. . . . Plato is just as ungrateful to Pericles, Homer, 
tragedy, rhetoric, as the prophets were to David arzd Saul."4 
As a classical philologist, Nietzsche naturally concerns himself 
with the particulars of the Greek stagnation, its "decadence," to a 
greater degree than he does with the Old Testament, more so be-
cause in the former there is spread before him-and his critical soul 
-an aspect of Christianity that is the continuation and extreme ex-
tension of the decadence that began in Judaism. It was as if two 
streams of decadence met within Christianity: on the part of religion, 
the "gloomy religio-moral pathos," and on the part of philosophy, 
the "Platonic slandering of the senses"; in either case, a negation of 
naturalism even unto the negation of life. The line of comparison is 
drawn out until it is established that "when Socrates and Plato took 
up the cause of virtue and justice, they were Jews."5 
Therefore, David dancing before God is perhaps indeed Diony-
sian, just as is his resemblance to Pericles--whom Plato attacks--
3. M, sec. 72; The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levv, 18 vols. (Edin-
burgh and London: T. N. Foulis, 1909-13), IX, 74. 
4. WM, sec. 427 (my emphasis added); The Will to Pawer, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 231. 
5. WM, sec. 429; ibid., p. 234. 
Nietzsche and the Old Testament 51 
when David makes war and establishes a great kingdom. The pres-
ence of these figures in the Old Testament, full of life, full of vivid-
ness, and even imbued with a sense of humor, is what endeared the 
book to Nietzsche over the gloom of the New Testament that could 
not include a dancing David. Dance itself is even one of the signs of 
recognition of the true God: "a god prefers to stay beyond every-
thing bourgeois and rational ... between ourselves, also beyond 
good and evil. ... Zarathustra goes so far as to confess: 'I would 
only believe in a God who could dance.' "6 
The Old Testament David, of course, is not divine, just as Nietz-
sche in The Will to Pawer is not yet Dionysus to the extent that he 
would become in the last months of his creative work. What holds 
Nietzsche's attention is the similitude between the above expression 
of Nietzsche's and the dancing David, which lies beyond the bour-
geois. Michal's despising of David's dancing expresses the situation 
well, and even though she is Saul's daughter, the stern moral spirit 
of Samuel is present and becomes even more evident in Nathan's 
indictment of David's involvement with Bathsheba-another event 
characterized as Dionysian (in the words "also beyond good and 
evil," as noted above). Incidentally, the Old Testament does not con-
sider that it was his act with Bathsheba that was sinful, but rather his 
act directed toward Uriah. 
What happened with the history of the Old Testament, which ap-
pears heroic to Nietzsche (and in the early parts of which Yahweh, 
the God of the Old Testament, is heroic), is not simple and clear-cut, 
just as Nietzsche's views of Socrates and Plato are complex and con-
tradictory. In the first instance, as pointed out above, he sees the 
prophets in much the same way as he does Socrates and Plato, 
branding them as destroyers of the naturalness of ancient Israel. On 
the other hand, Socrates merits high admiration, along with the 
prophets of Israel, if only for having struggled against the establish-
ment in the form of the priesthood. 
"These had a fine sense of smell who, in the past, were called 
prophets."7 There is no contradiction here. Rather, the similarity in 
Nietzsche's view of Socrates and the prophets stems from the same 
process of evaluation. Socrates is the fighter against accepted norms 
and goes forward, nobly and calmly, to his death as a result of his 
struggle. The essence of Socratism is the rule of moral values over all 
other values, and this is exactly what characterizes the prophets. The 
6. WM, sec. 1038; ibid., pp. 534-35. 
7. "Die Unschuld des Werdens," sec. 1047; K, 83, 371. 
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heroic aspect in this is not damaged by the content of their strug-
gle-neither in the case of Socrates nor in that of the prophets-
which Nietzsche rejects as a contradiction of nature. 
While it is Socrates, as befits a philosopher, who upholds knowl-
edge, from which morals stem, the prophets of Israel rank God as 
primary, for it is He who commands morality ("God has been made a 
Jew"). In a deeper sense (as in The Will to Power), what benefits the 
herd is that which speaks through God's will or the metaphysical 
imperative of knowledge. For our purposes, though, nothing more is 
needed than the empirical and conscious level: the prophecy in the 
Old Testament created a new world of values. The prophecy is, in a 
sense, a continuous correction of the establishment; that is its posi-
tive aspect, for it struggles and suffers ("the prophet is naturally 
alone") and is heroic. Nietzsche, thereby, stands before three deci-
sive factors-the Old Testament prophets, the pre-Pauline Jesus, 
and Socrates-in a dual relationship of admiration for their personal-
ities but rejection of their theories, and especially of the conclusions 
drawn from them. These conclusions include, in Judaism, the as-
sumption of the slaves' morality as the fruit of the Exile; in Christian-
ity, the Pauline church; and in Hellenism, the Platonic decadence in 
the world of simplistic "ideals" that affected Christianity as well. 
This dual nature of Nietzsche's relationship to Judaism and the 
Old Testament was expressed in his summing up of "What Europe 
owes the Jews!": 
Many things, good and bad, and above all one thing of the nature 
both of the best and the worst, the grand style in morality, the 
fearfulness and majesty of infinite demands, of infinite significa-
tions, the whole Romanticism and sublimity of moral question-
ableness-and consequently just the most attractive, ensnaring 
and exquisite element in those iridescences and allurements to 
life, in the aftersheen of which the sky of our European culture, its 
evening sky, now glows-perhaps glows out. For this, we artists 
among the spectators and philosophers are-grateful to the Jews. 8 
In spite of the fact that the subject at hand is the Jews and Nietzsche 
goes on to hint at their power to assume control of Europe if they so 
desire, even suggesting an admiration for their propensity-as are-
sult of the loss of the Jewish instinct-to assimilate into European 
culture, it is clear that he is describing not the later Jewish character-
istics but the intensity of life exhibited by them as an imprint from 
the Old Testament. 
8. J, sec. 250; Complete Works, XII, 206-7. 
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In the Jewish "Old Testament," the book of divine justice, there 
are men, things, and sayings on such an immense scale, that 
Greek and Indian literature has nothing to compare with it. One 
stands with fear and reverence before those stupendous remains 
of what man was formerly, ... -the taste for the Old Testament is 
a touchstone with respect to "great" and "small." ... To have 
bound up this New Testament (a kind of rococo of taste in every re-
spect) along with the Old Testament into one book, as the "Bible," 
as "The Book in Itself," is perhaps the greatest audacity and "sin 
against the Spirit" which literary Europe has upon its conscience. 9 
In other places Nietzsche terms the act of the joining together of 
the two portions of the Bible "an act of barbarity." As one who, like 
Schopenhauer, was a devotee of music, which he considered the 
highest expression of man's soul and the soul's contributions, he 
writes in Nietzsche contra Wagner: "It was only in Handel's music that 
the best in Luther and in those like him found its voice, the Judaeo-
heroic trait which gave the Reformation a touch of greatness-the 
Old Testament, not the New, become music."10 
Nietzsche makes a distinction between the Old Testament of the 
"older" parts and that of the "later" sections, a distinction that stems 
from his firm contrast between two philosophies: the one that says 
"yes" to life and the one that says "no." 
What an affirmative Aryan religion, the product of the ruling 
class, looks like: the law-book of Manu. (The deification of the 
feeling of power in Brahma: interesting that it arose among the 
warrior caste and was only transferred to the priests.) What an af-
firmative Semitic religion, the product of a ruling class, looks like: 
the law-book of Mohammed, the older parts of the Old Testament. 
(Mohammedanism, as a religion for men, is deeply contemptuous 
of the sentimentality and mendaciousness of Christianity-which 
it feels to be a woman's religion.) What a negative Semitic religion, 
the product of an oppressed class, looks like: the New Testament 
(-in Indian-Aryan terms: a chandala religion). What a negative 
Aryan religion looks like, grown up among the ruling orders: Bud-
dhism. It is quite in order that we possess no religion of oppressed 
Aryan races, for that is a contradiction: a master-race is either on 
top or it is destroyedY 
9. Ibid., sec. 52; ibid., p. 71. 
10. Nietzsche contra Wagner, "Eine Musik ohne Zukunft"; Complete Works, VIII, 63-
64. 
11. WM, sec. 145; The Will to Pawer, p. 93. 
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Here we have the distinction between Aryans and Semites and, it is 
unnecessary to add, without the two connotations that were at-
tached to the terms as a result of National Socialism. The difference 
between the healthy and sick foundations (in order not to be misled 
by using the phrase "between good and evil") runs through the Ary-
ans as it does through the Semites. The primary and decisive mode 
of measurement is the saying of "yes" or "no" to life. It is at this 
point that the Old Testament, but only in its older parts, finds its 
place among the "yes" -sayers. 
In biblical scholarship, especially that of the Christian school com-
bined with the popular evolutionism of the nineteenth century, there 
most certainly was a distinction between the older and later layers as 
seen from the idealistic-spiritual viewpoint. The assignment of value 
was in terms of a development from the primitive to the sublime, 
and thus monotheism reaches its climax in the days of the Second 
Temple. However, what is presumed by Christian Bible study to be 
progression is termed decadence by Nietzsche. The more the Old 
Testament and the God of Israel assume spiritualization and, more 
importantly, moralization (Mora/in in his words), the more they lose 
their original power. "In itself, religion has nothing to do with mo-
rality: but both descendants of the Jewish religion are essentially 
moralistic." 12 Thus, the Old Testament in its essence and original 
form was not a moral code. What developed from it later, by virtue 
of the prophets and the weakness of the priests who turned morality 
into an instrument of state, was two daughter-religions whose es-
sence derived from that which was either implicit in it or arbitrar-
ily imputed to it-at the least, a deception almost from the start. I 
say "almost," for Nietzsche attempts to represent Jesus as standing 
above good and evil, above morality, a sacred anarchist. Paul is, as is 
known, the greatest deceiver, according to Nietzsche, but this deceit 
is only a continuation of that begun in the Old Testament. The same 
Israelite deity described above (see p. 49), God, is in almost Diony-
sian fashion a deception on the part of the priests. Isaiah, the "typi-
cal prophet," still considers as an outstanding king one who is a 
valiant soldier and bound to justice. 
The concept of justice remains in its naturalness as a servant of 
the self-confidence of the people. But a tragedy occurred as a result 
of the Assyrian destruction or that of Babylon, which was the begin-
ning of the Exile. The priests attempted to explain the tragedy with 
the help of a "sleight of exegesis" and rejected the natural causa-
12. Ibid., sec. 146; ibid. 
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tion in favor of the discovery of a "nature-contradicting cause." In 
the stead of a helping god there appears a demanding god, and this 
is the source of the weakening of the necessary conditions. "Sin" 
is thus a central concept in the morality of Judaism and, in conse-
quence, of Christianity. "The concept of God is falsified ... the 
priest uses the name of God in vain." 
In the hands of the Jewish priests the great age in the history of Is-
rael became an age of decay; the Exile, the long misfortune, was 
transformed into an eternal punishment .... depending on their 
own requirements, they made either wretchedly meek or sleek 
prigs or "godless ones" out of the powerful, often very bold, fig-
ures in the history of Israel; they simplified the psychology of 
every great event by reducing it to the idiotic formula, "obedience 
or disobedience to God." ... the priest lives on sins, it is essential 
that people "sin." Supreme principle: "God forgives those whore-
pent" -in plain language: "those who submit to the priest."13 
This is the effect, according to Nietzsche, that the Exile had on 
the Old Testament in its early form. Classical prophecy is not espe-
cially dealt with by Nietzsche and does not merit the same penetrat-
ing psychological analysis as does the priesthood. Incidentally, the 
priesthood, ruling in the court of sacred falsehood, is not the cre-
ation of Judaism or of the Old Testament in its later parts; that same 
law-book of Manu the Aryan which Nietzsche places alongside the 
life-assertive religions of the Aryan race itself is responsible for the 
sacred falsehood, for it is but an instrument of the will to priestly 
power. The law-book of Manu is based on the sacred falsehood: "we 
may therefore hold the best-endowed and most reflective species of 
man responsible for the most fundamental lie that has ever been 
told .... Aryan influence has corrupted all the world."14 
In the Old Testament, the heroic prophets struggle with the falsifi-
cation of life and, above all, against the corrupt priesthood. Hosea's 
lament that "the sin-offering of my people do they eat and for their 
iniquity each one's soul longs" (Hos. 4:8) reflects concisely the devel-
opment that Nietzsche describes in his criticism of the priesthood 
(although he himself does not quote this stinging verse pointing to 
the vested interests of the priests and their own role in the sins of 
the people). Undoubtedly, it is not easy to distinguish between, on 
the one hand, the prophets-including that typical prophet Isaiah, 
13. A, sec. 26; The Portable Nzetzsche, pp. 596-98. 
14. WM, sec. 145; The Will to Pawer, p. 92. 
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struggling on behalf of the God of Israel, the Lord of Hosts, and 
reproving the corruption-and, on the other, those who demand jus-
tice and morality in the purest sense, not necessarily as instruments 
of nature. Moreover, the distinction that Nietzsche does draw be-
tween the Old Testament in its early parts and its later form-as if 
it were a priestly forgery-cannot be established unless one wishes 
to slice through the entire Scriptures, to dissect them completely. 
For example, the sons of Eli represent the priestly corruption in that 
early portion. Samuel speaks out against this: "Behold, to obey is 
better than to sacrifice, to hearken than the fat of rams" (1 Sam. 
15:22). But what will Nietzsche do when the same Samuel opposes 
the monarchy and Saul, or afterwards, for example in the case of 
Nathan versus David-is this to him like Plato railing against Peri-
cles? And in a deeper sense still, even Moses, the first of the proph-
ets and the lawgiver, formulates a value-system of obedience to God; 
it is unimportant whether this is the original Moses or the product of 
the later priests. Nietzsche does not engage in a scientific analysis of 
the sources. Moses, as he appears, takes the people out of Egypt 
while also constructing a constitution in fine detail that assures the 
rights, and sacrificial offerings, of the priests, the "holy parasites." 15 
"God's will," as it were, was transferred to the priests via revela-
tion-in order to permit the assumption of authority over the peo-
ple--and is expressed in the "Holy Scriptures" that from now on are 
made into a "desecration of nature."16 
If, nevertheless, these "Holy Scriptures" never stopped being 
"the most powerful book"17 (and in another place, in a more mock-
ing manner, "the greatest German book"), this is due to the heroic 
figures therein (the patriarchs and kings). But no less credit is due 
the prophets despite certain reservations of Nietzsche's in connection 
with the prophetic morality. These prophets are prophets of wrath, 
and by their example the people of Israel fashion their God: "The 
Jews, again, took a different view of anger from that held by us, 
and sanctified it: hence they have placed the sombre majesty of the 
wrathful man at an elevation so high that a European cannot con-
ceive it. They moulded their wrathful and holy Jehovah after the 
images of their wrathful and holy prophets. Compared with them, 
all the Europeans who have exhibited the greatest wrath are, so to 
speak, only second-hand creatures."18 It is obvious that Nietzsche is 
15. A, sec. 26; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 597. 
16. Ibid. 
17. MA, I, sec. 475; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 62. 
18. M, sec. 38; Complete Works, IX, 44. 
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still relating in this instance to the early parts of the Old Testament 
that he admires, even though he is speaking of Jews and is not pre-
cise regarding the term "Israel." And "holy wrath" is in this case a 
term of praise and not of disapproval. This admiration for the proph-
ets of Israel is expressed most astutely-as is usual for him-in a 
comparison with the Christian "inheritors" of that prophecy. He 
quotes from Luke 6:23, "For in the like manner did their fathers unto 
the prophets," and bursts forth in the style that marks his later writ-
ings: "Impertinent rabble! They compare themselves with the proph-
ets, no less."19 
This dark and angry horizon of Israel's God is a dialectical neces-
sity for the revelation of the religion of love and grace. This surely 
belongs to the internal contradictions within Nietzsche himself, 
whether he "explains" or is excited by the appearance of the "light" 
out of this deep biblical gloom: 
A man such as Jesus was not possible except on the Jewish hori-
zon-! mean a horizon over which continually hangs the dark and 
exalted storm cloud of a wrathful Yahweh ... the sudden break-
ing-through, quite rare, of a single ray of light from out of the 
dark, perpetual night-day, only here could they feel it as a miracu-
lous deed of "love," a ray of light of grace of which they were un-
worthy. Only here could Jesus have dreamt dreams of the rainbow 
and the heavenly ladder. 20 
The emphasis here is, of course, on Jesus. Thus, the "single ray of 
light": for it was Christianity and its church, and especially Paul, that 
quickly ruined the purity of the love and grace. Further, not all the 
Jewish people felt the need for this ray of grace, since not all felt the 
distress in such an acute way. 21 For this is the advantage of the Old 
Testament, in theory, over the New and the practice in the daily life 
of the people. In other words, the heavenly ladder of Jesus' dream is 
but the upper portion of Jacob's ladder when Jacob-Israel remained 
earthbound, if only in exile. 
Nietzsche saw well the factor that differentiated the New from the 
Old Testament: the difference between "thou shalt love thy neighbor 
as thyself" (which did not overly impress him since, among other 
things, man can hate himself) and "love thine enemy." Nature is 
driven out of morality by this and it is a crime against life. The will to 
19. A, sec. 45; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 624. 
20. FW, sec. 137. 
21. Ibid., sec. 128. 
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life of the Jewish people seemingly prevented the execution of the 
final conclusions of the concept of sin that they created and nour-
ished for the world. Like the chandala, Christianity spread itself 
among the nations and races and lost all trace and symbol of nation-
ality. The Old Testament conceptualization of a jealous and vengeful 
God and of the commandment "thou shalt have no other gods before 
me" (other than the one who took them out of Egypt) preserved the 
survival of the Jewish nation, since "God himself was a Jew" and "a 
nation that yet believes in itself has its own God.d2 
"What importance is there to a God that knows no revenge, jeal-
ousy, scorn, guile, and violence?" This jealousy, in addition to its 
being a national value for a people jealous of its own God, is also a 
general cultural asset that protects against the veneration of man. 
Nietzsche, who envisions a "superman," cannot bear this jealousy 
which truly evolves from the command "there shall be no other gods 
before me,"23 and which in the end leads him-whether because of 
his experimental thought process in general or because of the differ-
ences of the periods--to see the prohibition of "thou shalt have no" 
as one of the most barbaric threats to the culture of man. 
This contradiction in the different evaluations of the idea-content 
of the Old Testament finds its solution in the distinction between 
Nietzsche's descriptive analysis and his admiration for religion, mo-
rality, and human culture overall. Therefore, his criticism of the bibli-
cal law of morality as being a revolt of slaves, a revolt of the rabble 
element of society against the aristocracy-all aristocracy-and there-
fore antinature, does not contradict his positive approach to the re-
volt as revolt. The first tablets should have been shattered; the very 
act of the smashing of the old idols by the Old Testament was heroic. 
Moreover, on a deeper level-fundamentally, and not merely on the 
simple telling-of-the-story level-Yahweh, the Hebrew God of Hosts, 
grants land, a way of life, and nature to his people. And prior to the 
onset of the Exile, the Jewish religion never ceased being a religion of 
nature. All culture is the placing of the tablets and commands upon 
the collective public so as to harness and restrain its urges. Every 
Dionysus requires an Apollo. It is not enough for every prophet to 
rage against the establishment, for he himself must become a law-
giver. A prophet is not a nihilist or anarchist, nor is he decadent. 
This is the difference between a healthy morality, which fixes "do" 
and "do not" commandments because the life-will guides it, and 
22. A, sec. 16. 
23. MA, II/I, sec. 186. 
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Christian morality, which in its entirety is antisocial, antinature, and 
turns God into an opponent of life. 24 The Old Testament established 
new values, but these values still served life. Nietzsche, as is known, 
did not champion a "return to nature" in the style of Rousseau, 25 but 
he did demand a return to the body, "up into the high, free, even 
terrible nature and naturalness."26 
As a result of this, the Greeks are Nietzsche's standard-bearers, 
not on the basis of two or three mentions of the "blond beast" taken 
out of context, but on the basis of restraint. "Before oneself too, one 
must not 'let oneself go.' "27 This is the essence of the sanctity of life 
according to the Old Testament, including that introduction to all 
moral commandments: "Holy shall you be for holy am I your God" 
(Lev. 19:3). Neither death nor any antinatural act is enjoined in those 
commandments, but actually self-restraint on behalf of a more beau-
tiful life. Not in vain does Nietzsche repeatedly make this surprising 
linkage between Jews and Greeks, as pointed out at the beginning of 
this chapter. Moreover, European civilization owes the Jews a debt 
for struggling on behalf of an occidentalization: "if Christianity has 
done everything to orientalize the Occident, Judaism has helped sig-
nificantly to occidentalize it again and again: in a certain sense this 
means as much as making Europe's task and history a continuation 
of the Greek."28 
The words "again and again" imply a constancy of this people in 
keeping alive a spirituality without escaping into nothingness, escap-
ing to the metaphysical from the physical. These words were pre-
ceded by others of appreciation for the Jewish people who gave the 
world the greatest book and life-directed laws (that is, the Old Testa-
ment), the most noble of men (Jesus, who, from various Nietzschean 
sources, is not a Christian in the Pauline sense, nor was he the sole 
and only Christian), and the purest scholar of all (Spinoza: "Deus 
sive Natura"-"God or Nature"-this is the opening of his Law of 
Ethics). 
Nietzsche's positive outlook on the Old Testament-as well as oc-
casionally on the idea of the "Bible" encompassing both books, the 
Old and the New-is a result of three factors: first, his forefathers' 
Protestantism; second, a literary sense that gained more satisfaction 
24. G, "Morality as Anti-Nature," sec. 5. 
25. Ibid., "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," sec. 48. 
26. Ibid.; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 552. 
27. Ibid., sec. 47; ibid., p. 551. 
28. MA, I, sec. 475; ibid., p. 63. 
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from the Old than the New, finding in it a work closer to the epic 
Greek spirit, with more positive figures; and third, his general incli-
nation to prefer the "ancient" over the "modern," just as he pre-
ferred the "ancient philosophy" of Greece-the pre-Socratic-over 
the "new." 
However, it cannot be denied that most of Nietzsche's appreciative 
remarks for the Old Testament, despite his critique of its idealistic-
moral-religious content, flowed from the ever-growing outpouring of 
opposition, revealed and concealed, to Christianity in theory and in 
practice, except for the character of Jesus himself. It is to ridicule 
Christianity, in a certain sense, that he repeatedly raises the positive 
elements in the Old Testament. In like manner, he does not hesitate 
to accuse Christianity of acts of forgery committed against the Old 
Testament. It is here that he castigates the Protestants more sharply 
than he does the Catholics because of their greater use of, and reli-
ance on, the Old Testament: 
What are we to expect of the after-effects of a religion that enacted 
during the centuries of its foundation that unheard-of philological 
farce about the Old Testament? I refer to the attempt to pull away 
the Old Testament from under the feet of the Jews-with the claim 
that it contains nothing but Christian doctrines and belongs to the 
Christians as the true Israel, while the Jews had merely usurped it. 
And now the Christians yielded to a rage of interpretation and in-
terpolation, which could not possibly have been accompanied by a 
good conscience. However much the Jewish scholars protested, 
everywhere in the Old Testament there were supposed to be refer-
ences to Christ and only to Christ, and particularly his cross. 
Wherever any piece of wood, a switch, a ladder, a twig, a tree, a 
willow or a staff is mentioned, this was supposed to indicate a 
prophecy of the wood on the cross .... Has anybody who 
claimed this ever believed it?29 
Due to his intellectual integrity, Nietzsche did not permit himself 
to distinguish between biblical Judaism and Talmudic Judaism or, 
more explicitly, between the Judaism up to Jesus' time--whose goal 
was his coming-and the Judaism after Jesus, which was superflu-
ous and stubborn. The concept of sin before God, which is the cen-
tral iniquity of ancient priestly Judaism, is frequently to be found in 
the Old Testament, although without the extreme metaphysical con-
clusions that resulted in the New Testament with Paul in the fore-
29. M, sec. 84; ibid., pp. 80-81. 
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front. Judaism still maintained as a religion a degree of naturalness 
for the benefit of the people. The obedience to divine command was 
a necessity for survival for Israel, and this remained unchanged even 
after Jewish societal fabric had been altered. "The Jews tried to pre-
vail after they had lost two of their castes, that of the warrior and that 
of the peasant."30 
The healthy God, the God of the people, He is Yahweh whose 
name is special and unpronounceable and He is, understandably, a 
function of the health and naturalness of ancient Jewish society (and 
Nietzsche uses the term "Hebrews" in addition to "Israel"). The Ex-
ile, which did not automatically bring about assimilation and com-
plete collapse-as it did in the case of other ethnic groups who left 
their lands and, with that, their gods and cultures-that Exile caused 
and brought about the critical spiritual turning point in Judaism, 
thus permitting the nation to continue to exist. Moreover, this nation 
created a historic precedent. This Judaism became possible, and per-
haps had to be possible, due to the loss of political independence 
and, afterwards, the probable loss of a state-political ability that had 
become redundant. 
This was also the case with the earliest Christian community ... 
whose presupposition is the absolutely unpolitical Jewish society. 
Christianity could only grow in the soil of Judaism, i.e., amidst a 
people that had already renounced politics and lived a kind of 
parasitic existence within the Roman order of things. Christianity 
is a step further on: one is even more free to "emasculate" one-
self-circumstances permit it. 
One drives nature out of morality when one says "love your 
enemies": for then the natural"Thou shalt love thy neighbor 
and hate thy enemy" in the law (in instinct) has become 
meaningless. 31 
Nietzsche knows just how much this goes against the spirit of the 
Old Testament that establishes the attribution of character to God: "I 
will be an enemy to your enemies," God says, "and an adversary to 
your adversaries" (Exo. 23:22). This, of course, is conditional upon 
the upholding of the commandments of the Torah, but the religio-
spiritual basis is still that of the God of peasants and warriors for that 
chapter and, in fact, deals with the conquest of the Land of Israel 
from the Canaanites and the smashing of their idols. 
30. WM, sec. 184; The Will to Power, p. 111. 
31. Ibid., sec. 204; ibid., p. 120. 
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Nietzsche explains how this people, dose to the earth and almost 
Dionysian, changed into an exiled people, creating new moral values 
for the world and in the process destroying not only the Canaanite 
idols but also those of the naturalist world arbitrated by Christianity. 
Despite the Jews' falling into sin or, in other words, despite most 
sections of the Old Testament, Nietzsche does not hold back his re-
spect for them even in their exile. First of all because they did not 
submit completely to the consequences of their uprooting but pre-
served their national existence in the worst of conditions, and sec-
ond, because they continued to contribute to mankind's culture 
even after the Old Testament basis had been completed: they partici-
pated-and continue to participate, as he emphasizes-in the com-
position of Europe even to the extent of assuming the leading role, 
due to the power of their Geist, their unique spiritual force. 
Because the will to survival of Europeanism sought to prevent it, 
preferring instead the fusion of the races, Nietzsche does not yet 
contemplate the possible political renaissance of the Jewish people, 
its return to the status of a nation of warriors and peasants, to the 
surprise of the world. We may presume, though, both because of his 
sharp recoiling from the "new god" -the state-and because of his 
real interest in having the Jews become absorbed into Europe, that 
Nietzsche would not be counted among the supporters of the re-
newal of the Old Testament of the Jewish people again in its land, 
although, if he would be true to his character rather than to his phi-
losophy, who knows, who knows ... ? 
A Literary Judgment 
We would not be dealing fully with this topic of Nietzsche and the 
Old Testament if we did not speak of the strong impact, deep and 
lasting, that this "Book of Books," as he refers to it, had on his en-
tire work. Of course, while quite important for Nietzsche personally, 
it is outstanding in its influence on European culture beyond its reli-
gious aspects of monotheism, morality, and prophecy. One of the 
most important biographers of Nietzsche, Bernoulli, provides this 
fact with a literary-biographical expression in referring to Nietzsche's 
religiosity: "In the last year of his creativity (1888) ... , religious 
signs became recognizable: an enthusiasm for 'the future and hope/ 
his Zarathustran consciousness bordering on messianism, his Yah-
'Nist jealousy against 'foreign gods' even to the point of a fanatical 
desire to destroy them altogether-these combined with the inner 
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joy of the visionary, the complete piety and prayerful devotion of a 
psalmist."32 
With regard to Zarathustra everything is quite clear and to the 
point. Despite the utilization of the figure of a Persian prophet, the 
founder of the Aryan religion, the volume is entirely "biblical," al-
most without any reflection of the original Zarathustra. Overbeck 
wrote to Rohde, who was not excited about the book's biblical style: 
"Beyond this I do not like the tone and I cannot find any good taste 
outside his primary homeland which is, of course, the Old Testa-
ment prophecy. This caused me added personal worry regarding 
Nietzsche."33 
The prophetic stance of a railer at the gates (as well as in the forest 
or on the hills) is conscious, directed, and even emphasized. Walter 
Kaufmann claims, if critically, that the main difference between the 
status of the prophets and that of Nietzsche is the latter's lack of 
humility: the prophets did not speak in the first person. But in this 
case Kaufmann should have remembered that Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
is a copy not only of the Old Testament but of the New as well. In the 
New Testament the stress is on the "I say unto you," as opposed to 
the "thus says the Lord," "God does speak," and "thus speaks the 
Lord of Hosts" where the prophet is but a mouthpiece, a messenger 
to convey what has been told him. In this case, Nietzsche-Zarathus-
tra is closer to the New Testament, with its personal pretentiousness 
of the single hero of the plot and his prophecy, than to the Old 
Testament with its many prophets, heroes, and saviors--but not one 
Messiah. 
However, the main link between them is internal: the will of Nietz-
sche to appear as a prophet, as the giver of a new law. This is the 
root of the idealistic centrality of "On Old and New Tablets." 
Whereas in the law of Moses the second tablets are exact copies of 
the first, Nietzsche shatters the old, which symbolize a complete 
world of values borne by mankind for more than three thousand 
years, so as to write a completely new set-not in the script of God 
or from His mouth, but specifically and knowingly by man as creator 
and lawgiver. 
Even though in the New Testament's Sermon on the Mount it is 
said plainly that the purpose is not to make new, and whereas most 
of Jesus' parables still remain within the bounds of Old Testament 
32. Carl Albrecht Bernoulli, Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschaft, 2 
vols. (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1908), II, 177. 
33. Ibid., p. 384. 
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morality and are only slightly heightened and brought to an extreme, 
here, in this case, Nietzsche straightforwardly states that the intent is 
to bring down a temple so as to establish a new one, and to overturn 
all the old values. This is the basis for the command: "thou shall not 
pity thy neighbor." It is from here too that he derives the injunction: 
"surely thou shalt shatter the old tablets" because "there are gods 
but not one God."34 This then is the way: contradicting the primary 
commandment of the Old Testament, even "surely you shall destroy 
the righteous and upright for me."35 
This conscious awareness-and it is unimportant if this is only 
pretension-of Nietzsche's, as if he were speaking from a new 
Mount Sinai or Tabor, is what gives the book its subjective strength. 
Nietzsche was convinced that this was the best, most important, and 
most decisive of his works, and not only of his alone. Thus, in this 
framework I will not draw any specific parallels, since the whole 
book, in content and style, is in fact a parallel version. 36 
The biblical "philosophy" (if it is possible and permissible to refer 
to the "philosophy" of a Bible that is anti- or unphilosophical in the 
strict meaning of the term) extends from "In the beginning" as a 
central and determinable expression for the entire world of the Bible: 
there is a creator who directs, knows, wills, and fashions-a reason 
for everything, a beginning. Therefore there is purpose, at least until 
the "vanity of vanities" of Ecclesiastes (Koheleth), "the wisest of men" 
but not necessarily the most loyal (one thousand wives) nor he with 
the most faith ("who knows?" -surely a Socratic agnosticism-is the 
refrain of the book), which must be viewed as an expression of the 
paradoxical nihilism of the ultraoptimistic Bible. 
Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, mocks the godly self-satisfac-
tion of "and it was very good." Every nihilist certainly finds some-
thing on which to fasten in the book of Ecclesiastes. Many presume 
to find Greek sources for the book, even though it is clear today, 
after a comparative study of the various cultures before and after 
Greece, that every culture reaches, in the end, a stage of self-satia-
tion, denial, and vanity such as this. The "eternal return" of Nietz-
sche is not bound up with this book and its recurring, seasonal the-
ories because of differences in psychological points of departure: 
Ecclesiastes is a book of open pessimism and weakness even to the 
34. Z, III, "On Old and New Tablets," sees. 10, 11. 
35. Ibid., sec. 27. 
36. See Hans Vollmer, Nietzsches Zarathustra und die Bibel (Hamburg: Deutsches Bi-
belarchiv, 1936), where literally hundreds of verses are shown to have been drawn 
from the Bible. 
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point of cynicism, whereas the revelation of Nietzsche's "eternal re-
turn" is apparently optimistic, even joyful, and is expressed in an 
abundance of positive statements. The conclusion of Ecclesiastes--if 
also the product of an intervening editor: " ... the conclusion of the 
whole matter: fear God and keep his commandments for this is the 
whole duty of man"-is quite anti-Nietzschean. It is a wonder that 
Nietzsche did not pounce on this hypocritical Pharisaic Philistine, 
who assumed the guise of a rabbi or pope to cover his naked, laugh-
ing, yet unhappy bones, and contrast him with Zarathustra, pro-
claiming the joy of the sun, happy in its might without the laughter 
of man-beast-monkey ("man in God's image is a monkey," says 
Nietzsche, not that God is a monkey but rather man, who wishes to 
copy God). But the undercurrent of opposition I pointed out above, 
between "in the beginning" and "vanity of vanities," is to be found in 
Nietzsche in satirical form: "The history of the world is concentrated 
in nuce:-the most serious parody I have ever heard: In the begin-
ning there was vanity of vanities, and vanity of vanities, by God, 
there was! And God was that vanity of vanities."37 
Paradoxical usages of biblical verses of this type are frequent and 
not necessarily a parody, as with the twisting about of the descrip-
tion of man's failure from Adam and Cain, on through to the genera-
tion of the flood, until God "grieved at his heart" and repented of 
his work. Nietzsche's conclusion is: "What? Is man merely a mis-
take of God's? Or God merely a mistake of man's?"38 And in the 
same connection, regarding the creation of woman: "Man has cre-
ated woman-out of what? Out of a rib of his god-his 'ideal.' "39 
Since we have seen previously how this idealistic act of man "suc-
ceeded," it is obvious to us what this rib is. 
Nietzsche maintains a special affection for these Genesis tales of 
the Old Testament, for he views them as brilliant acts, the little con-
taining much, and he also appreciates their sense of humor vis-a-vis 
the New Testament's lack of humor. And yet, man's fate over the 
centuries has been fixed in these texts of the Creation, the Fall, and 
the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. The deep connection 
between knowledge and death has penetrated into man's conscious-
ness ever since ancient times and in many cultures, as seen, for ex-
ample, in the actions of Oedipus and of the Sphinx, and is reflected 
in modern times in the Spenglerian tension between Dasein and 
37. MA, II/I, sec. 22. 
38. G, "Maxims and Arrows," sec. 7; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 467. 
39. Ibid., sec. 13; ibid., p. 468. 
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Wachsen. It is included in the folk-philosophical tale, humorous as it 
is, of the banishment from the garden of Eden; using as his basis the 
text there ("and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden Cheru-
bim and a flaming sword which turned every way to keep the way to 
the tree of life" [Gen. 3:24]), Nietzsche formulates: "'Paradise lies in 
the shadow of swords' -also a symbol and motto by which souls of 
noble and warlike origin betray themselves and divine each other."40 
Whether intentional or not, there is a contradictory parallel be-
tween two passages: one announces the victory of the one God and 
the other His death, with a satirical whiplash joining the two. The 
first is Elijah on Mount Carmel in the decisive Israelite struggle 
against the multiplicity of idols, against Ashtoreth and Baal, the gods 
of the Zidonites and Canaanites, the lords of nature-a struggle that 
was a victory for the one and only God of Israel. In this dramatic-
satiric scene, Elijah mocks the prophets of Baal, as it is recorded: 
"and he said, cry aloud for he is a god, he is talking or pursuing or 
he is journeying, perhaps he sleeps and must be awakened" (1 Kings 
18:27), so that he may conclude on a triumphant note announcing 
"the Lord, he is the God; the Lord, he is the God" (1 Kings 18:39). 
The definite article is stressed to refer emphatically to the one and 
only God. 
The second happening is at once tragic and satiric, brought about 
by one of the most famous and stinging of Nietzsche's creations, "the 
madman": he is a sort of antithesis of Elijah, announcing in the mar-
ketplace the death of the God whose victory Elijah announced on the 
mountaintop of Carmel. Marketplace versus mountain, death versus 
victory, Nietzsche versus Elijah: "'I seek God! I seek God!' As many 
of those who do not believe in God were standing around just then, 
he provoked much laughter. Why, did he get lost? ... Did he lose 
his way like a child? ... Or is he hiding? ... Has he gone on a 
voyage? or emigrated?"41 
This is a satirical parallel and the fulfillment of tragedy. There and 
then on Mount Carmel Elijah slaughters the prophets of Baal as an 
idol-breaker does those who failed the test. Here and now, "the mad-
man" shouts out: "Whither is God? ... we have killed him-you 
and 1."42 And from the announcement of God's death-and the pain 
of this "heretic" because of God's death needs no proof-Nietzsche 
40. Ibid. 
41. FW, sec. 125; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 95. 
42. Ibid. 
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moves to the grief of the prophet on the threshold of his end. It is 
told regarding the death of Moses: "And Moses went up from the 
plains of Moab to the mountain of Nebo, to the very top ... and the 
Lord showed him all the land" (Deut. 34:1). And in Nietzsche: "The 
place where I am today-on the height, where I will no longer speak 
with words but lightning bolts-ha, how far from this was I then! But 
the land I did see ... this is the great tranquility of the promise, this 
the joyful promise even unto the distances of the future that will not 
remain as only a destiny!"43 Certainly it cannot be assumed that in 
writing these words Nietzsche felt his own end-that is, the end of 
his conscious and willful life-approaching, felt himself on the edge 
of the breakdown that occurred in a matter of days thereafter. How-
ever, his identification at that time with the prophet, one legislating 
for mankind, was not inconsequential in dictating to him this style of 
Moses' dying days: "Ich sah das Land," "I saw the land" (the empha-
sis is Nietzsche's; what is the "land" doing here?)-and immediately 
afterwards "VerheiBung," the "promise." 
Surely one of the elements that attracted Nietzsche to the Old Tes-
tament-one that is missing from the New-is the contest between 
man the believer and his God. Nietzsche turns around the verse "he 
whom the Lord loveth He correcteth" (Prov. 3:12) and writes instead: 
"I love him who chastens his God because he loves his God."44 (And 
in the same connection, in The Dawn of Day, sec. 15, Nietzsche attri-
butes the verse in Proverbs to Christianity without mentioning the 
source.) 
Most certainly it did not escape Nietzsche that God's correctors 
and chastisers were his biblical admirers, such as Abraham, Jere-
miah, and Job. After all, it is because of this aspect that he calls them 
heroic. In one of his Dionysian dithyrambs, Nietzsche, the great and 
loving investigator of the Greek myths and thought, makes use of 
two biblical images (!) to describe his struggling, truth-seeking soul: 
Oh Zarathustra 
Cruel Nimrod! 
Who, until recently, a hunter before God 
you were 
And now you yourself have become the game. 
43. Ecce Homo, "The Untimely Ones," sec. 3. 
44. Z, Prologue, sec. 4; The Portable Nietzsche, p. 128. 
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Why should you slip away 
to the garden of Eden 
of the ancient snake? 
You are the man of knowledge 
Zarathustra the wise. 45 
This is a Nietzschean confluence: Nimrod and Zarathustra, Dionysus 
and Adam, who repeatedly returns-despite the expected punish-
ment-to the tree of knowledge in the garden of Eden. 
In conclusion, there is an aphoristic expression that is the epitome 
of Nietzsche's conciseness on the one hand and the essence of the 
divine outlook of the Old Testament on the other. Preceding the final 
formulation were such phrases as werde der du bist (become what 
thou art) or ich bin der ich sein muj3 (I am what I must be), but in the 
motto of Ecce Homo we have: wie man wird, was man ist-how one 
becomes what one is. Is not this phrase, the essence of all the exis-
tentialist philosophy of which Nietzsche, together with Kierkegaard, 
is considered one of the founders, similar to the forced or willing 
fusion between what must be and the divine image of man that per-
mits him-and obliges him-to choose his fate: the Nietzschean amor 
fati? 
One last question arises for which there is no answer, for it per-
tains to a riddle for every Old Testament commentator that surely is 
not accidentally phrased. I am referring to God's answer to the query 
regarding His own very essence (this being the meaning of the bibli-
cal concept of "name"): "I am what I am" (Exod. 3:14). Is this not a 
basis for a divine existentialism? Did Nietzsche knowingly or un-
knowingly crown the magnum opus of his spiritual life in a truly mov-
ing similitude between the definition of the essence of the God of 
Israel, who reveals Himself to Moses out of a bush, and the defini-
tion of the essence of Dionysus-Nietzsche-Zarathustra, or man in 
God's image? 
A question for prolonged, unceasing study. 
45. WKG, VI, 390-91. 
IV. Morality and Deity in 
Nietzsche's Concept of Biblical Religion 
Charles Lewis 
I 
Nietzsche's attempt to reveal the inner character of biblical religion is 
founded upon his confidence in the modem view, culminating in 
Hegel, that moral and religious concepts are no more, or less, than 
creations of the human spirit and its history. He also joins company 
with the modern view that essential to the biblical concept of God is 
the concept of moral perfection, of supreme righteousness and jus-
tice. Nietzsche's own contribution to this understanding of Western 
religion is found in his treatment of the idea that the biblical concept 
of deity owes its most distinctive features to the quality and character 
of biblical morality. 
With Feuerbach, Nietzsche traces the origin of religious belief 
to the psychology of self-objectification. In this naive form of self-
awareness, a people's most impressive powers and feelings appear to 
them as objective, even alien, realities. 1 When confronted with his 
own strongest impulses and feelings of power, the religious man 
attributes their presence to awesome powers that impinge upon him 
from beyond the limits of his deficient existence. His basic disposi-
tion is one of self-denial, the denial of his own value and power; he 
diminishes and denatures himself through his regard for the other-
ness of his own highest possibilities. It is because of this pathology of 
consciousness that Nietzsche finds the religious man alienated from 
himself, even terrified and humiliated by his Other: "in so far as 
everything great and strong in man has been conceived as superhu-
man and external, man has belittled himself-he has separated the 
two sides of himself, one very paltry and weak, one very strong and 
1. See WM, introduction to "Critique of Religion" (p. 85 in The Will to Power, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Random 
House, 1967]), and sees. 135, 185, 204, 245; A, sec. 16; G, "Maxims," 13; G, "Skir-
mishes," sec. 19; GM, Preface, sec. 5; GM, II, sees. 22, 23; GT, sec. 3; Z, I, "Goals"; FW, 
sec. 139. 
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astonishing, into two spheres, and called the former 'man,' the latter 
'God.' "2 
In his Genealogy of Morals (II, sees. 19ff. ), Nietzsche distinguishes 
three periods of religious consciousness: a prehistoric age of indebt-
edness to and fear of ancestor-gods; an intermediate age of self-glori-
fication through the ennoblement of deity; and a now dying age, 
dominated by Christianity, of the consciousness of guilt before an all-
seeing, holy Judge. The religion of the ancient Greeks and the earli-
est period of biblical religion would belong to the intermediate age. 
In such noble religions, whose gods are destructive as well as cre-
ative, evil as well as good, Nietzsche finds the unmistakable begin-
nings of man's authentic self-revelation, the original form of his dis-
covery and affirmation of his will to power. Thus Israel's preexilic 
Yahweh "was the expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in 
oneself, of hope for oneself: through him victory and welfare were 
expected ... " (A, sec. 25). Even the justice of Israel's old God was, 
in fact, inseparable from the ultimate interests of his chosen people. 
In spite of its noble origin, biblical religion suffered a fateful de-
cline with the catastrophic defeat and exile of the Hebrews. From the 
once noble religion of a God beyond good and evil, it was trans-
formed into its opposite by a people now dominated by a priestly 
caste who nourished an intense resentment and hatred of the natu-
ral expressions of power in noble men. The form of their revenge 
against their conquerors (and, indeed, against all noble types) was 
supremely spiritual: with their most seductive and effective form of 
sublimated aggression, with their weapon of psychological warfare, 
they originated a moral-religious inversion of the values of their mas-
2. WM, sec. 136. Cf. WM, introduction to "Critique of Religion." All quotations 
from this source follow the Kaufmann-Hollingdale translation in The Will to Pawer. 
Subsequent quotations from other sources (except where indicated otherwise) will 
follow the Kaufmann translations in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kauf-
mann !New York: Viking, 1954); Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kauf-
mann (New York: Modern Library, 1968); The Gay Science, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1974). 
Presumably, the religion of sufficiently noble men (as the ancient Greeks, e.g.) is 
immune to the pathological aspect of the psychology of self-objectification. See, e.g., 
GM, II, sec. 23. It should be evident from the account provided below in parts II and 
III that this anomaly in Nietzsche's psychology of religion is exemplified in biblical 
faith to an extent he does not discern or acknowledge. The existence of this anomaly 
provokes, in itself, questions about the relation between Nietzsche's concept of deity 
and his concepts of the Obcrmensch and eternal recurrence. For Karl jaspers's thought 
on this point, see his Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical 
Activity, trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (South Bend: Regnery/ 
Gateway, 1979), pp. 429-49. 
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ters, even of those ultimate values enshrined in the faith of their 
fathers. 
The final consequence, the eventual result, of this "sublime venge-
fulness" was "that ghastly paradox of a 'God on the cross,' that mys-
tery of an unimaginable ultimate cruelty and self-crucifixion of God 
for the salvation of man" (GM, I, sec. 8). Though the old God had been 
sacrificed already upon the altar of Israel's humiliation, this crucified 
God is the New Testament's own judgment upon all that is noble in 
the concept of deity. Already a pallid reminder of too much bloodlet-
ting, the shadow God of the Jews has been supplanted by his Son. A 
God of perfect, of righteous, love is now the ground and meaning of 
all true values. Now the justice of the old God, which was coexten-
sive with the interests of his special people, has been universalized 
in the interest of the general welfare. Now the love of the old God, 
which was bestowed upon a noble people, has been transformed by 
its bestowal upon the neighbor, the suffering, the poor, the unfortu-
nate, the powerless. For this, the religion of an oppressed class, the 
highest values are those of egalitarian justice and a love that secures 
the least of men from final harm, a love for which the blessed are 
these very childlike souls. 
In its fateful dominion over the life of Western man, this ultimate 
expression of the religion of "sublime vengefulness" has become the 
ultimate expression of man's capacity to diminish and denature him-
self. Having been seduced by Christian values, even gifted people, 
who, in different circumstances, would have naturally thought and 
acted in other ways, have been led to despise every noble impulse 
and instinct. In company with ordinary men, they have been taught 
to oppose and suppress their natural instincts and every desire to 
assert themselves. Moreover, the archaic feeling of indebtedness to 
ancestor-gods has become the most severe bad conscience of irreme-
diable guilt before God. The believer thus lacerates himself inwardly 
for every natural, animal, powerful instinct and for his unremittable 
debt to the ground and source of his existence. For such guilt even 
the genius of redemption by divine self-sacrifice can afford only tem-
porary relief. For such a soul even his animal instincts are a form of 
hostility toward, and thus guilt before, God. And so he "ejects from 
himself all his denial of himself, of his nature, naturalness, and actu-
ality, in the form of an affirmation, as something existent, corporeal, 
real, as God, as the holiness of God, as God the Judge, as God the 
Hangman, as the beyond, as eternity, as torment without end, as 
hell, as the immeasurability of punishment and guilt" (GM, II, sec. 
22). 
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In such passages Nietzsche makes clear his conviction that a leit-
motiv runs through the sundry authors, dramatis personae, and long 
history of biblical literature. For him the dominant and fundamental 
character of this religion, in both its Jewish and Christian forms, 
consists in its attitude of moral guilt before a supreme Lawgiver 
and Judge. It is true that Nietzsche has called the New Testament 
the "book of grace" (J, sec. 52), but his point has less to do with 
qualifying the above characterization than with stressing the sub-
limity of the (presumably preexilic) drama of divine justice. More 
significantly, he tends to identify what can be found concerning the 
spirit of grace and mercy in biblical literature with the life of Jesus, 
the deeper meaning of which was not grasped by the authors of the 
New Testament, his own disciples and apostles. 3 Paul was a "genius 
in hatred," an apostle of vengeance and judgment (A, sees. 42, 45), 
and the gospels, though saying "'judge not' ... consign to hell ev-
erything that stands in their way" (A, sec. 44). These gospels, he 
thinks, are steeped to their marrow in the spirit of moral condemna-
tion; in glorifying the divine Judge, the evangels glorify themselves 
and their own judgments. 
In addition to the materials from which Nietzsche constructs his 
speculative psychology of the Redeemer, there are, however, other 
biblical sources concerning the grace and mercy of God. It would 
appear that, in keeping with his conception of the leitmotiv of bibli-
cal religion, Nietzsche is content to view them in terms of his under-
standing of divine love. For the love of God that Nietzsche finds here 
is an invention of biblical religion, indeed, a new love born of Jewish 
resentment and raised by Christianity to its highest extent in the 
form of egalitarianism, pity, and love of the selfless, the weak, and 
the lowly (GM, I, sec. 8; WM, sec. 246; A, sec. 2). This is not the love 
that "loves beyond reward and retribution": "Did this god not want 
to be a judge too?" (Z, IV, "Retired"; FW, sec. 140). 
If Nietzsche has, in fact, plumbed the depths of biblical religion 
with his conception of its guilt and judgment, his understanding of 
the love of God turns even this otherwise ill-fitting theme into a 
fundamental part of what can now be seen as an essentially coherent 
3. See, e.g., FW, sec. 137; A, sees. 32, 37, 39-47; d. J, sec. 164; GM, II, sec. 10. For a 
discussion of Nietzsche's ambivalence toward Jesus, see Karl Jaspers's Nietzsche and 
Christianity, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), pp. 88-93. See also 
Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 337-50. 
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theology of the Old and New Testaments. 4 As indicated, the preexilic 
Hebrews and Jesus are excluded from this characterization. 
II 
From the foregoing it is evident that Nietzsche has approached the 
theology of biblical religion by way of an examination of its morality. 
This approach is a consequence of his view that it is not gods, but 
belief in gods, that determines the content of any theology. And, in 
the case of biblical theology, that which determines the nature and 
content of theological belief is precisely the morality of ressentiment 
and judgment. It is this morality that is reflected in the concept of 
deity, this morality that shapes the character and speaks through the 
voice of God. This God thus assumes the character and voice of 
moral perfection, the most complete and unconditional realization of 
the values and imperatives of biblical morality. 
A consequence of fundamental significance for this understanding 
is the conception of the attitude of worship to which it is unavoid-
ably linked. 5 For a basic feature of this posture of belief must be 
the moral reverence that would be inspired by an exemplar and voice 
of moral perfection. It is in view of this essentially moral character 
of the attitude of worship that one should ask whether Nietzsche 
has, in fact, understood the very heart and soul of biblical religion 
-whether he has, in fact, discovered there a virtually unequivocal 
4. I use the expression "biblical religion" to refer exclusively to the religion of bibli-
cal sources. As I shall argue in part III, Nietzsche's portrayal of Christianity and Juda-
ism actually has its basis in the theology of postbiblical writers, through whom the 
transforming power of Greek philosophy occasioned the rise of a new religion. 
5. "As was the ancient custom of slaves," Nietzsche says in The Dawn, "we are still 
prostrating ourselves before power"; this power he then assesses with respect to the 
"worthiness of being venerated" (M, 148; my translation). This aphorism thus con-
tains the germ of Nietzsche's later thought concerning what I have called the attitude 
of worship. Since Nietzsche does not provide a characterization of this attitude as 
such, I have constructed a formulation of the sort of account that would conform to 
his view of the psychology of belief in God. Phenomenologically considered, the ques-
tion is whether the attitude of worship can be understood properly within the moral 
terms of a Nietzschean account. Considered in this way, the existence or nonexistence 
of God (or gods) is not the issue; rather, the question is whether the phenomenon of 
worship in biblical religion can be described adequately by means of what are, essen-
tially, moral categories. The assumption, whether of atheism or otherwise, that such is 
the only possible or proper description simply begs the question at issue here. 
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leitmotiv of the guilty conscience before an absolute Lawgiver and 
Judge. The consideration of this matter will then be seen to raise a 
further question about the Nietzschean conception of divine justice 
and love. 
In keeping with Nietzsche's moral characterization of the biblical 
God, the attitude of the worshiper would be understood in terms of 
both the depth of his guilt before the divine Judge and the height of 
his regard for the ideal of moral perfection. It is in this guilt and 
regard that the attitude of Nietzsche's believer may be said princi-
pally to consist. From the attention given to the believer's guilt, it 
appears that Nietzsche would take this to be the more fundamental 
aspect of the attitude of worship. Originating in the prehistoric feel-
ing of indebtedness to ancestor-gods, whose great sacrifices and ac-
complishments account for the very existence of the tribe, this debt-
guilt (Schuld) was intensified in proportion to the perception of the 
greatness of God. The result was its supreme moralization as the bad 
conscience and the concept of an irredeemable debt fixed in the idea 
of a corrupted nature, of original sin (GM, II, sees. 19-22). 
This account of the character of the biblical attitude of worship is 
thus cast in the frame of a consciousness of failed reciprocity-that 
is, in terms of relations among men. The human relations in this 
case, however, would not be those that obtain among equals; rather, 
the worshiper's status would be marked by the distance that sepa-
rates inferior souls from the superior power and achievements of 
noble men (d. J, sec. 257; GM, I, sec. 2). And, as noble men are 
those who honor, who revere, all that is like themselves-who have 
deep reverence for age, tradition, ancestors--Nietzsche's worshipers 
also revere, though here in the form of transcendence, what are, in 
reality, their own highest ideals (cf. A, sec. 47; G, "Maxims," 13; G, 
"Reason," 4). In this light the relations that are of the greatest impor-
tance for Nietzsche's account are seen to have the dual facets of natu-
ral disparity and failed reciprocity. 
Yet even when the relations are understood in this manner, it re-
mains the case that they are human relations, relations within the 
purview of what is essentially natural, known or knowable. And it is 
just because of this reliance upon such relations that a Nietzschean 
characterization of the biblical attitude of worship must be called into 
question. 6 For whatever the merits of Nietzsche's psychological ap-
6. The charge that Nietzsche misunderstood Christianity has been made many 
times in ecclesiastical circles: in tracts, sermons, religious periodicals, etc. For a brief 
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proach to this matter, the indispensable datum here is the religious 
self-understanding that can be discerned within the deepest levels of 
biblical faith. With this in view, it is evident that Nietzsche's wor-
shiper would not, nor could he, possess the same self-perception as 
one who has experienced the full range and depth of existing coram 
Deo in the context of biblical religion. It is difficult to avoid the im-
pression that what one finds is an irreducibly religious phenomenon. 
No moral relations among types of men, no matter how disparate, 
can account for the radical condition of this worshiper in relation to 
his God; no natural relation, however concealed by its guises, can 
explain his sense of creatureliness or the greatness of the Power be-
fore which he is but dust and ashes (e.g., Gen. 18:27; Job 42:6; Ps. 
103:14). 
The original and fundamental condition in which the creature 
finds himself in the presence of God is that of sin. "In sin did my 
mother conceive me," says the psalmist, "the sacrifice acceptable to 
God is a broken spirit. ... "7 But the sin of which the psalmist speaks 
is not a condition of failed reciprocity, regardless of the intensity with 
which such failure may become internalized as the bad conscience. 
In opposition to the moralizing interpretations, whether theological 
or otherwise, that have been imposed upon this condition of the 
creature before God, the most extensive and penetrating studies of 
religion have found something here that defies analysis by means of 
categories that would otherwise account for moral phenomena and 
states of consciousness.8 This uniquely religious form of dread is 
grounded in the believer's creatureliness; it is not the result of moral 
failure, however oppressive. It is not what he has done or failed to 
do, but what he is, that defines the essential character of his crea-
tureliness. His condition, as van der Leeuw has described it, is that 
of enmity to God: "sin therefore is hostile contact with God ... 
subsisting in the deepest essential being of man, it brings him close 
survey of this area of research, which "up to the present has been completely ne-
glected," see Peter Koster, "Nietzsche Kritik und Nietzsche-Rezeption in der Theologie 
des 20. Jahrhunderts," Nietzsche Studien, 10111 (1981-82), 626-28. 
7. Ps. 51:5, 17. All biblical quotations are from the RSV. 
8. See, e.g., G. van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, trans. J. E. 
Turner (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938), chap. 78; Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the 
Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), chap. 8; Walter 
Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, vo!. 2, trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: West-
minster Press, 1967), pp. 394ff., 406f.; Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emer-
son Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), chaps. 1, 2, and pp. 311, 343. 
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before God, where will opposes Will, and Power, power."9 It is this 
strange conjunction of presence and alienation, of being and noth-
ingness, that stands in the way of every attempt to explain this phe-
nomenon by means of the moral categories obtaining in natural, hu-
man relations. 
Such relations are likewise the source of the veneration that, with 
guilt, would characterize a Nietzschean account of the religious atti-
tude. The believer's regard-respect, admiration, veneration-for 
the divine exemplar and voice of moral perfection would have its 
natural parallel in the honor and reverence that noble men have for 
their own superior attributes, for age, for tradition, and for ances-
tors. With the biblical attitude of worship, however, it is sin and 
salvation that are the most fundamental aspects of the believer's self-
understanding. His encounter with the dreadful presence of the sa-
cred is also characterized by gratitude for the Power that saves him 
from affliction and annihilation, that brings even beatitude. Thus the 
psalmist who is struck by his sinful nature asks God to "cast me not 
away from thy presence .... restore to me the joy of thy salvation" 
(Ps. 51:11-12). The salvation enjoyed by the sinner is received as a 
gift and not a reward; indeed, for such a one as this there is no 
capacity by means of which he could establish any worthiness before 
God. 
Situated at the intersection of this original condition of sinfulness 
and the gratuitousness of salvation is the divine mystery of election. 
According to Nietzsche's account of the matter, the believer's "humil-
ity" in being chosen by God must be a disguise for his pride (WM, 
sec. 175). The Jews, he says, "feel that they are the chosen people 
among all the nations because they are the moral genius among the 
nations" (FW, sec. 136). But the merit of this as a conception of the 
biblical mystery of election consists only in its faithfulness to the 
natural, moral relations from which the whole of Nietzsche's account 
of biblical religion derives. From the perspective of the specifically 
religious self-understanding of the biblical sources, the election of 
God's people is a mystery that cannot be turned into a quite palpable 
reward for virtue or service rendered. The preeminent manifestation 
of the character of this God is not the moral disposition of his will 
but the greatness of his power to create and to destroy, to annihilate 
and to save (e.g., Isa. 45:7; Deut. 32:39). Before such a God there is 
no worthiness that the creature could turn to his advantage, nor does 
such a God have any need to justify his actions before men. Hence 
9. Van der Leeuw, Religion, chap. 78, sec. 2. 
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the Deuteronomist ascribes the privileged status of his people to 
God's love: "the Lord set his heart in love upon your fathers and 
chose their descendants after them, you above all peoples ... .''10 
What else but the unfathomable mystery of gratuitous love could 
account for the election of a people who must be reproached contin-
ually for their rebellious nature and hardness of heart? 
In the same vein, the Apostle Paul asks why God entered into a 
special relationship with Abraham and his descendants (Rom. 4:13; 
9:9-11), why he hardened the hearts of these very peGple against his 
saving grace in Christ (Rom. 10:7-8; 11:25), and why he extended 
this grace to disobedient Gentiles (Rom. 11:30). The Apostle's answer 
is found in his analogy with the choice of Jacob to receive his father's 
blessing (cf. Deut. 32:8-10): when his mother conceived Jacob and 
his twin, "though they were not yet born and had done nothing 
either good or bad, in order that God's purpose of election might 
continue, not because of works but because of his call, she was told, 
'The elder will serve the younger'" (Rom. 9:11-12). With the Deuter-
onomist Paul ascribes the choice to God's love: "as it is written [Mal. 
1:2-3], 'Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated'" (Rom. 9:13). Paul then re-
sponds to the question of whether this would be unjust, but, rather 
than offering morally sufficient reasons for these most fateful expres-
sions of God's will, he juxtaposes the greatness of God's power and 
mercy with man's "will or exertion" (Rom. 9:16). Declaring that 
God "has mercy upon whomever he wills, and ... hardens the 
heart of whomever he wills" (Rom. 9:18), Paul then asks: "Will what 
10. Deut. 10:15; cf. 4:37; 7:7-8; 9:6-7; 23:5; 32:8-10. See Walter Eichrodt, Theology of 
the Old Testament, vol. 1, trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), 
pp. 237-39, 286; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, trans. D. M. 
G. Stalker (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 223; Gerhard von Rad, Deuteronomy, 
trans. Dorothea Barton (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), esp. p. 68; G. Ernest 
Wright, "The Faith of Israel," in The Interpreter's Bible, vol. 1, ed. George Arthur But-
trick (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1952), pp. 352£., 369. 
The Deuteronomists gave expression to what must be considered the standing bibli-
cal conception, found centuries later in the Pauline epistles, of divine election. Though 
the central part of their text (4:44-30:20) is thought to have been composed before the 
major deportations of the Exile, the remaining portions probably extend from the time 
of the book of Joshua to the end of 2 Kings. According to G. von Rad, "incalculable 
influences have proceeded from it; we can indeed follow the broad stream of Deutero-
nomic tradition in the exilic and postexilic age much more clearly than that which 
issues ostensibly from the Priestly Document. Deuteronomy is the beginning of a 
completely new epoch in Israel. In every respect, therefore, Deuteronomy is to be 
designated as the middle point of the Old Testament" (Studies in Deuteronomy, trans. 
D. M. G. Stalker [London: SCM Press, 1953], p. 37). It is also one of the four books of 
the Old Testament that are most often cited in the New Testament. 
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is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me thus?'" (Rom. 
9:20; cf. Isa. 29:16; 45:9). 
Such pronouncements from the most sophisticated theological 
sources in the Greek and Hebrew texts exist alongside and beneath 
moralizing interpretations of God's choices and actions. Even Paul 
provides interpretations of this sort, but the die is cast decisively by 
his portrayal of the most fateful expressions of the divine will. Here 
the Apostle is led to proclaim: "How unsearchable are his judgments 
and how inscrutable his ways!" (Rom. 11:33; cf. Ps. 36:6). And what-
ever may be said in the Hebrew texts about the divine judgment 
upon disobedience, the fact remains that there is no accounting for 
God's choice of Israel to be the turning point and center of the des-
tiny of the world (e.g., Isa. 2:60). The divine will becomes essen-
tially perspicuous in the light of interpretations rooted in the sphere 
of natural, moral relations. But in regard to such choices and deeds, 
it is not even a matter of the essentially knowable which has not yet 
come to light: "for my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are 
your ways my ways, says the Lord. For as the heavens are higher 
than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my 
thoughts than your thoughts" (Isa. 55:8-9). 
The mysterious and gratuitous love that can be found in the deep-
est levels of the biblical texts is not to be found in Nietzsche's under-
standing of the concept: he sees lying beneath this love, in its various 
expressions, the vengeance and judgment of a type of humanity. 
Morality is thus the basis and determinant of this "new love," which 
reveals and conceals its bitter core of ressentiment. In opposition to 
the high and mighty it affirms the lowly and powerless. In opposi-
tion to the natural order of rank and rights, it posits the equality of 
all men before God (e.g., Z, II, "Tarantulas"; A, sec. 43). But the 
egalitarianism of this "universal love of men" is not what it appears 
to be; it is, in fact, "the preference for the suffering, underprivileged, 
degenerate" (WM, sec. 246). With its complete inversion of the natu-
ral order of justice, the egalitarianism of this new, biblical type of 
love is the substance of Nietzsche's understanding of divine justice. 
What was seen to be a mysterious and gratuitous love is here a form 
of egalitarian justice that nevertheless favors a type of humanity 
whose special worthiness deserves a special reward. In the end, this 
love, Nietzsche says, "wants to be paid well" (A, sec. 45). 
Such love, in the Nietzschean account, may be predicated indif-
ferently of God and the creature, for both of these expressions of 
charity are theological interpretations of an underlying morality of 
inverted justice. This morality is the creation of priestly ressentiment, 
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which took the form of a "moral world-order" whose purview ex-
tends even into the assumptions and constructions of modern phi-
losophy. In essence, this world-order is the morality of a type of 
humanity, behind which stands the authority of its God. The com-
mands of this God set forth for all time an absolute opposition of 
good and evil. The power of this God assures that reward and pun-
ishment will be meted out in accordance with the degree of obedi-
ence to his will. Thus armed and authorized, the priests interpret all 
happiness as a reward for obedience and all unhappiness as punish-
ment. In their book, we have "chance done out of its innocence; 
misfortune besmirched with the concept of 'sin'" (A, sec. 25; cf. G, 
"Great Errors," sec. 7). 
There is no denying that Nietzsche can appeal to an abundance of 
biblical literature in support of his view of divine justice. Of central 
importance for his account of the religion of the Jews is their inter-
pretation of the Exile as punishment for disobedience, for their disre-
gard of the hieratic morality enshrined in "holy scripture" (A, sec. 
26). But standing squarely in the way of such views is the theology of 
Job, which can be seen as an anguished affirmation of the mysterious 
God noted above in relation to the theologies of Deuteronomy and 
Isaiah, the God whose will and ways are beyond the creature's moral 
assessment and understanding. The moral interpretation of suffering 
is represented by Job's friends, whose God is conceived on the scale 
of Nietzsche's own portrayal of deity in biblical religion. A morally 
perspicuous God who can be counted upon to reward obedience and 
punish disobedience is impressed upon a man whose faithfulness is 
nevertheless insistently asserted. "I will defend my ways to his face," 
Job proclaims, for "a godless man shall not come before him" (Job 
13:15-16). 
Why, then, does Job suffer? In posing this question, the writer 
shakes to its foundations the conception of a God who conforms to 
the expectations of the creature, no matter how well-disposed by his 
morality. 11 The very question about Job is seen as a human confron-
tation with the divine, as enmity to God, and is thus met, not with 
an answer from the domain of natural, moral relations, but with an 
impressive reminder of sacred power. In the end, Job submits to this 
power which can do all things, admits to encroaching upon things 
beyond his ken, and repents in dust and ashes (42:2-6). 
11. For a notable assessment of the significance of Job in biblical religion, see Ri-
coeur, Symbolism, pp. 314ff.; cf. pp. 32, 85, 106ff. See also his "Religion, Atheism, and 
Faith" in Alasdair Macintyre and Paul Ricoeur, The Religious Significance of Atheism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 82, 89£., 93ff. 
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It would be shortsighted to dismiss this conception of deity as 
alien to the spirit of biblical religion, for the theology of Job is both 
a recollection of the deepest levels of Hebrew thought and an antici-
pation of their reemergence-most decisively in the Pauline concep-
tion of the mystery of divine election. As shown by the Apostle's 
analogy with the election of Jacob, all considerations bearing upon 
creaturely disobedience, upon "good or bad," are finally overcome by 
the power of God's prevenient will. The desire to see this as the 
election of every person to receive the gift of salvation is motivated, 
as Nietzsche would argue, by the morality of egalitarianism, of pity, 
of fairness to those who may otherwise be excluded by a divine pre-
dilection shrouded in mystery. But insofar as Paul's theology requires 
the unconditioned freedom of God to dispose of his power as he 
wills, this interpretation is an imposition upon the apostolic texts. 
And it is the same with attempts to avoid the implications of gos-
pel references to the elect, to the few who will be saved, and to the 
outer darkness that awaits the rest. 12 Here again, considerations 
based upon the virtue that one might claim in behalf of his election 
do not go unchallenged, as when the owner of a vineyard asks of the 
laborers who thought they had earned more than those who had 
worked less: "Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what be-
longs to me?" (Matt. 20:15). It is the sovereignty of divine choice, not 
the morality of contractual justice, that emerges as the deeper point 
of this parable. The moral expectations of the elder son in the parable 
of the Prodigal (Luke 15:11££.) are likewise dashed by his discovery 
that the blessings of his father are not based upon the extent of 
service to him. As with the workers who had labored longer, the 
elder son could not understand the blessing bestowed upon his prof-
ligate brother. The evangel might have recalled the story of Jacob and 
Esau, as Paul had done. 
Both Paul and the evangels are undeniably subject to the lure of 
the "moral world-order" of law and judgment, punishment and re-
ward, but the fact nevertheless remains that they, with the ancient 
tradition of faith from which they originated, have also given expres-
sion to an elemental aspect of the attitude of worship that cannot be 
assimilated by the moral point of view. This powerful undercurrent 
of biblical faith arises from the primordial basis of the uniquely reli-
gious, the attitude of worship, wherein an original condition of sin-
fulness is conjoined with gratitude for a mysterious and salvific love. 
Neither the expectation of reward nor the fear of punishment can 
12. E.g., Matt. 22:13£.; 24:22-24, 31; Mark 13:20-22, 27; Luke 13:23££.; 18:7. 
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account for this enmity and this gratitude for deliverance from alien-
ation and annihilation. 
Apart from this original and fundamental aspect of the attitude of 
worship, the biblical concepts of law and judgment cannot be under-
stood. For in spite of the insistent urging of the moral point of view, 
the most sophisticated theological sources attempt to draw the vec-
tors of law and judgment within the orbit of divine love. The divine 
law is then seen as itself a gift rather than a burden borne in return 
for favor. It is because of his standpoint within this perspective that 
the psalmist can exclaim "Oh, how I love thy law .... thy word is a 
lamp to my feet and a light to my path" (Ps. 119:97, 105; cf. Deut. 
4:8). Even Paul, who saw the law as an end in itself for the Jews, 
could view it in relation to divine love: the law, he says, "was our 
custodian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith" 
(Gal. 4:24). For the Apostle, this faith is itself a gift of God's love 
(Eph. 2:8-9). 
III 
In light of this account of the origin and ground of the biblical con-
cept of deity, it is apparent that Nietzsche's conception has failed to 
situate the morality of law and judgment within the deeper signifi-
cance of a love that is beyond moral limits upon its power to bestow 
and to withhold the gift of salvation. Beneath and within the layers 
of commandments and judgments in biblical religion there exists the 
concept of a God who is thus not without attributes dear to Nietz-
sche's own heart. Yet more notable is the fact that the original and 
fundamental attributes of this God-creative and destructive power, 
gratuitous love-are the highest values in the Nietzschean pantheon. 
Where such values are deified, religion is a "form of thankfulness," 
whose god "must be able to help and to harm, to be friend and 
enemy-he is admired whether good or destructive" (A, sec. 16). 
The deity of a decadent people, on the other hand, is "gelded in his 
most virile virtues and instincts," a god of the weak, of the "physio-
logically retrograde" (A, sec. 17). For those who are secure in their 
power, "a gift-giving virtue is the highest virtue," which Zarathustra 
calls "love," and "whole," and "holy" (Z, I, "Gift-giving," sec. 1). 
With such power there is the authentic love that "always occurs be-
yond good and evil" (J, sec. 153; d. GM, II, sec. 10). 
At this point, a question that can be avoided no longer: If the 
biblical concept of deity is a reflection of biblical morality, how can 
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the one be centered upon values not found in the other? How can 
Nietzsche's portrayal of a biblical morality of weakness and judgment 
be reconciled with the God of power and love in biblical religion? If a 
people's conception of deity is the reflection of its highest values, 
then the highest values of biblical morality should include the mor-
ally unconditioned power and unlimited will that are basic attributes 
of its God. 
Nietzsche would not be compelled to grant this conclusion as it 
stands if he were to acknowledge an important distinction that can 
be found in the context of the attitude of worship. Misled in his 
understanding of biblical religion by his reliance upon the natural 
relation of reciprocity and the distance that separates noble men 
from the weak, Nietzsche was not disposed to see what, for the 
believer, is an important implication of the disparity between the 
sacred and the profane: for such a distance as this, attributes that 
characterize the sacred belong to a realm beyond that which is defini-
tive for creaturely life. Taking the latter as "moral" limits, the crea-
ture's attempt to exercise his profane power without regard for mo-
rality is to presume for himself the freedom and sovereignty that are 
God's alone. In worship he is confronted with the absolute limits of 
his creaturely power. His will to power beyond these limits is the 
root and branch of his enmity to God. In gratitude for the life that 
has been given to him, the worshiper seeks forgiveness for his sin, 
acknowledges his limits, and thus regards the imperatives of mo-
rality as ordained for his weakness and well-being as a creature. 
From the standpoint of biblical faith, however, the believer's grati-
tude for life, even creaturely life and its limits, is surpassed by his 
gratitude for gifts greater than life itself. For beyond the distance 
between the sacred and the profane is the gift of God's own partici-
pation in the life of his chosen people. For his people, creaturely life 
is thus raised to a higher plane of existence wherein the believer lives 
under the command, which is a permission, to partake of God's own 
loyalty to covenants and to share in his own power to love unmoti-
vated by desire. This love, which arises from abundance of power 
rather than need, Nietzsche attributes to the noble man, of whom it 
is said that his power "seeks to overflow, the happiness of high ten-
sion, the consciousness of wealth that would give and bestow ... 
[which] helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity, but 
prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power" (J, sec. 260; 
d. A, sec. 57). The believer, however, unlike Nietzsche, sees this 
gratuitous love, not as a value-creating power by which man rises to 
his own highest possibilities, but as a gift bestowed by a value-creat-
ing Power that flows from beyond the sphere of human possibilities. 
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There remains, on the other hand, the biblical portrayal of this 
God as Lawgiver and Judge, the righteous God who rewards justice 
and punishes injustice. The God who for Nietzsche occupies the 
foreground, if not the whole, of the biblical horizon is not to be 
denied his place within this framework. Yet when viewed from the 
perspective of the morally unconditioned power and mysterious love 
of the God portrayed in the foregoing account, the biblical concepts 
of divine justice and judgment must occupy a far more limited place 
than that assigned to them by a religion in which the divine power 
to bestow or withhold salvation must exist within an overarching 
moral world-order. For such a religion, the moral world-order pro-
vides the setting within which the divine power is exercised. Accord-
ingly, those not blessed with the gift of salvation must suffer because 
of their disobedience. Or, in another version, a morally perfect God 
excludes no one; his purpose is to see that all men will eventually 
become morally fit for his heavenly kingdom. Thus John Hick, in 
his monumental theodicy, postulates existence "beyond the grave in 
which the moral structure of reality is borne in upon the individual. 
... an idea ... not far from the traditional Roman Catholic notion 
of purgatorial experiences occurring (for those who die in a state 
of grace) between death and entry into the final heavenly King-
dom .... " 13 
It is clear enough that Hick has banished the God of uncondi-
tioned power and love to the darkness of an unenlightened morality. 
And, though the theologies of Roman Catholicism and classical Prot-
estantism have retained the old God's power to exclude whomever 
he wills from salvation, they have, at the same time, tried to recon-
cile his mysterious ways with a moral world-order. Linked in a com-
mon destiny with the genius of Greek philosophy, the concepts of 
divine law and justice have been lifted from their former position 
within the scheme of biblical faith and provided with a new, more 
profound significance. A fateful shifting of the center of gravity in 
biblical religion has thus begun. Drawn within the orbit of the ethical 
and metaphysical concepts of Greek philosophy, the prevailing post-
biblical traditions of faith have embraced a God who is UJOrthy of 
worship. 14 
13. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 382f. 
14. For an account of Jewish thought on this point, see Louis Jacobs's essay in Reli-
gion and Morality, ed. Gene H. Outka and John P Reeder, Jr. (New York: Anchor, 
1973), pp. 155-72. For an examination of the meaning of divine goodness in biblical 
religion and of the meaning it has come to have in the Western world, see my "Divine 
Goodness and Worship Worthiness," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 14 
(1983), 143-158. 
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The persistent rationalism of the philosophers has made ever more 
appealing the idea of a metaphysical Being, at once the timeless 
ground and source of a universal, rational world-order, the basis of 
all things, the God of all mankind, the highest Good. With the en-
lightened Plato, or the Plato of their Platonism, the postbiblical tradi-
tions could identify this as the only true God; with his Socrates they 
could deliver the verdict that evil, arbitrary, provincial gods are not 
worthy of the best city. 15 It is in view of this development and its 
significance for the religion of the West that Nietzsche's description 
of Christianity as "Platonism for 'the people'" (J, Preface) is most 
revealing. 16 For by way of the synthesis effected in the prevailing 
theological traditions, the highest Being, the God of perfect good-
ness, is also the God of religious faith. 
But such a coincidence would not have been possible without the 
prominence that was given to the elements of divine law and justice 
within biblical religion. Through the synthesis of these elements 
with concepts arising from the central concerns of the philosophers, 
a new, essentially moral religion came into existence. However higher 
than all worldly things, the highest Being, above all else, is the high-
est Good. The dread inspired by a God whose thoughts and ways are 
beyond human ken has been supplanted by moral reverence. How-
ever supreme, the highest Good is not beyond human ken. It can 
inspire moral reverence because of its relation to human good, to the 
more or less familiar categories of virtue and lawfulness. Where God 
is, above all else, the highest Good, worship is, above all else, moral 
reverence, veneration, adoration. 
The God whose mysterious love was related, originally and funda-
mentally, to his unconditioned power of election has become a God 
whose love is related, preeminently, to his justice. Wherever the 
dominant tendency of this new religion is not fully realized, the 
divine goodness poses an enigma for the believer-as when Saint 
Anselm cannot understand why "among men who are equally evil, 
thou dost save some and not others, through thy supreme goodness, 
15. See Plato Republic 379C-E; cf. 3648-C, 3910-E; Timaeus 29A, 30A; Laws 716A-
'717B; Epinomis 977 A. Cf. also Aristotle Metaphysics A. 982b, 32ff. 
16. On the other hand, it conceals the fact that Plato himself does not share the 
egalitarian conception of justice that Nietzsche finds at the heart of Christian faith. 
Furthermore, Max Scheler argues that this faith, in itself, is not egalitarian; see his 
Ressentimellt, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: The Free Press, 1961), chap. 4, 
esp. pp. 119, 128ff.; also pp. 143f. For a different view of Platonism and Christianity on 
this point, see Harry Neumann, "Superman or Last Man? Nietzsche's Interpretation of 
Athens and Jerusalem," Nietzsche Studiell, 5 (1976), 1-28, esp. pp. 2-3. 
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and dost condemn the latter, and not the former, through thy su-
preme justice."17 It is evident that the moral impulse at work in this 
counterpoint of motives cannot find rest in such an unhappy alliance 
of divine love and justice. There is thus no reason for surprise when 
one finds that the God of an enlightened faith must be a God whose 
love can exclude no one. From the Nietzschean perspective, this 
God's love shows itself to be the morality of pity, of identification 
with the unfortunate, of egalitarian justice. It is here, in relation 
to this development within the history of postbiblical religion, that 
Nietzsche's account of morality and deity becomes a genuine con-
frontation with that faith to which the prevailing morality owes its 
soul and substance. 
Where God is, above all else, the greatest Good, Nietzsche thinks 
that a "hiding place" for truth has been the attempt to prove God's 
existence. But that which truly matters, which is truly a revelation, 
is the concept of God (WM, sec. 251). And on this point he is joined 
by those who, believing themselves to be the true heirs of biblical 
faith, have nevertheless abandoned the existent God in their vener-
ation of an authentically Jewish or Christian morality. In Nietzsche's 
prognosis, however, such heirs are also symptoms of failing health 
and decline. 
17. Saint Anselm, Proslogion XI. Translation by Eugene R. Fairweather in A Scholastic 
Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, ed. Eugene R. Fairweather (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 
p. 81. 
V. The Critical Imitator of Jesus: 
A Contribution to the Interpretation of 
Nietzsche on the Basis of a Comparison 
Eugen Biser 
(Translated by Timothy F. Sellner) 
I. The Impulse to a Comparison of the Two Figures 
In the recently discovered Gospel of Thomas, which came to light as 
the result of a grave find in Upper Egypt, Jesus addresses Himself to 
His disciples with the challenge: "Compare me, and tell me whom I 
am like" (Logion 131). Seen in the context of the 114 statements of 
Jesus summarized in this gnostic gospel writing, these words are 
uttered not out of a feeling of uncertainty and the need for identity-
such as might be inferred from the biographical context of the par-
allel canonical text, the scene at Caesarea Philippi (Matt. 16:13-20)-
but rather out of the consciousness of an ultimate incomparability, 
and they are spoken with the unequivocal intention of bringing this 
incomparability to light. 2 
Over against this we have Nietzsche's appeal to his interpreters: 
"Above all, do not mistake me for someone else!"3 He would have 
considered it an excess of such a "mistaken identity" if he were 
someday-as he fears in Ecce Homo (and quite rightly so, to judge by 
a number of rampant growths in the history of the interpretation of 
that work)--to be pronounced holy. 4 To this extent his challenge, in 
contrast to the intention implied by the words of Jesus, is upheld by 
l. Cf. Willem Cornelis van Unnik, Evangelien aus dem Nilsand (original title: Open-
baringen uit egyptisc/z zand) (Frankfurt am Main: Scheffler, 1960). 
2. Martin Buber, in his book Zwei Glaubensweisen (Zurich: Manesse, 1950), pp. 28ff., 
interprets this passage in the sense of a fundamental uncertainty; on this point, cf. the 
exposition in my book Der Helfer: Eine Vergegenwiirtigung Jesu (Munich: Kosel, 1973), 
pp. 89ff. 
3. Ecce llomo, Preface, sec. 1. All translations from the German are by Timothy F. 
Sellner. 
4. Ibid., "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. l. 
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the consciousness of a special affinity with the figures being com-
pared with him-and thus of an overarching comparability between 
himself and the other figures. The extent to which this consciousness 
took possession of Nietzsche toward the end of his creative life is 
shown by the note from his Nachlafi stating that he had always lived 
"in that which had moved Zarathustra, Moses, Mohammed, Jesus, 
Plato, Brutus, Spinoza, [and] Mirabeau,"5 but it is shown above all by 
the phrase in the great letter to Jakob Burckhardt from the days of 
Nietzsche's collapse, in which he states that it is unpleasant for him 
and offends his modesty "that in the final analysis every name in 
history" is his own6 (a statement that finds its negation, however, in 
the admission stemming from the period of Zarathustra: "I longed for 
people, I sought after people-I found only myself"). 7 
In this context it is perhaps relevant to note that there arises from 
Nietzsche, as from hardly any other figure in modern intellectual 
history, a permanent impulse to ever new comparisons; the course of 
his influence consists, in significant measure, in the conclusions de-
rived from an analysis of Nietzsche's relationship with these other 
figures. 8 The arc formed by the figures brought into comparison with 
Nietzsche extends surprisingly far, not least by virtue of the affini-
ties made apparent by the glaring light of his love-hate relationship 
with them: it extends from Holderlin, whose similarity in type to 
Nietzsche had already occurred to his contemporaries, back to Pascal 
(Vaglia), Dante (Biser), Socrates (Sandvoss), Kierkegaard (Jaspers), 
and Heine (Spencer), as well as forward to Dostoevsky (Shestov), 
Kafka (Sokel), and to Thomas Mann (Piitz), who wove together sig-
nificant elements from Nietzsche's biography into the figure of his 
Doctor Faustus, conceived as the symbolic representation of the 
decadence of the German Geist. 9 
The most extreme position of anyone utilizing this approach was 
taken by Franz Brentano, in an essay from his Nachlafi, when he 
juxtaposed the author of The Antichrist and the founder of Christian-
ity. 10 Conversely, shortly before Nietzsche's death the Russian phi-
5. Nachlaft (Die Unschuld des Werdens, II), sec. 1117. 
6. Nietzsche to Jakob Burckhardt, 6 January 1889. 
7. Nachlaft (Die Unschuld des Werdens, II), sec. 1167. 
8. Cf. the introductory remarks to my article "Nietzsche und Dante. Ein werkbio-
graphischer Strukturvergleich," in Nietzsche Studicn, 5 (1976), 146£. 
9. Cf. further Peter Piitz, "Thomas Mann und Nietzsche," in Nietzsche: Werk und 
Wirkungen, ed. Hans Steffen (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), pp. 91-114. 
10. Franz Brentano, "Nietzsche als Nachahmer Jesu," in Franz Brentano, Die Lehre 
Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung, ed. Alfred Kastil (Leipzig: Meiner, 1922), pp. 129-32. 
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losopher of religion Vladimir Soloviev, in his "Short Story of the 
Antichrist," had stylized Nietzsche into the precursor of the adver-
sary of God who will appear in the last daysY In spite of the distor-
tion caused by Nietzsche's most extreme denial of God, he appears 
even here to possess a "subliminal" kinship to Jesus, so that the 
comparison undertaken by Brentano can be considered merely as the 
consistent elaboration of a thought-model that is already to be found 
in Soloviev. It is no less consistent that Brentano concentrates his 
investigation on those specific statements in which the self-interpre-
tation of both figures under comparison can be documented. 12 Just 
as Jesus understood Himself as the light shining in the darkness, so 
Nietzsche, according to Brentano, also perceived himself "as a super-
abundance of light"; just as it is reported of Jesus that He spoke with 
authority, so Nietzsche, he states, also took to giving orders rather 
than offering arguments; just as Jesus preaches conversion, Nietz-
sche also demands "the revaluation of all values"; and just as Jesus 
lived in the consciousness that "in Him the fullness of time had 
come," Nietzsche also viewed himself, in Brentano's version, as an 
event of epochal significance that was determining the course of hu-
man history. Yet no matter to what extent Nietzsche took Jesus "as 
his model," his attempt not only to equal Him, but to surpass Him, 
becomes for Brentano a mere caricature, especially since his "teach-
ing concerning the pitilessness of the overman" was refuted by his 
own life history in the sense that he saw himself dependent on pity 
and compassion as almost no other. 
Whoever still wished to speak of similarity in the face of such 
contradictions would expose himself to not only the ridicule, but 
also the indignant protest of Nietzsche himself, if the latter had not 
already challenged him to make comparisons by virtue of his own 
demand not to be taken for someone else. This is reason enough, 
it seems, to examine the problem-alluded to by Brentano but not 
elaborated upon-once again from the distant perspective of the half 
century or more that has elapsed since his work. 
11. Cf. the analysis in my study "Gott ist tot": Nietzsches Destruktion des christlichen 
BewujJtseins (Munich: Kosel, 1962), pp. 267£., where Nietzsche is also compared struc-
turally with Soloviev; cf. also my article "Das Desiderat einer Nietzsche-Hermeneu-
tik," in Nietzsche Studien, 9 (1980), 19f. 
12. In spite of its sketchy nature, Brentano's article could actually be described as a 
comparative analysis of christological declarations of nobility; for further information 
on this topic, see the investigation by Ferdinand Hahn, Christologische Hoheitstitel. Ihre 
Geschichte im friihen Christentum (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966). 
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II. Jesus within the Scope of 
Nietzsche's Critique of Christianity 
In Nietzsche's view, the figure of Jesus does not receive its complete 
profile until it has been brought into connection with his critique of 
Christianity. 13 As is made clear in the vehement conclusion to The 
Antichrist-a passage that calls Christianity "the one great curse, the 
single great innermost corruption for which no means is poisonous, 
clandestine, subversive, petty enough," and finally "the single im-
mortal blemish of humanity" -this critique has for its goal radical 
negation and destruction. 14 In the aggressiveness of this statement is 
reflected the crisis in the development of Nietzsche's work in which 
The Antichrist stood at that time. Originally conceived as the "first 
book" of the "revaluation of all values" and proclaimed in its subti-
tle as an "Attempt at a Critique of Christianity," the work was then 
plucked by Nietzsche from its planned context in the hectic rush of 
his last creative days--so evident in its concluding passages--and, 
having been provided with the new subtitle "Curse on Christianity," 
was brought into action as "heavy artillery" against the embodiment 
of all life-denying powers, the Christian religion. 15 
The question with which the "madman" concludes his proclama-
tion of the death of God sounds hardly less radical: "What are these 
churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchres of God?"16 
The context of these two utterances is rendered apparent through 
the idea developed by Jaspers that for Nietzsche God dies "through 
the consequences of Christianity."17 Nevertheless, this context must 
be made broader by means of the opposing viewpoint that Christian-
ity as "a system, as a thoroughly conceived and total view of things," 
is being destroyed by the concept of God on which it is based, a 
concept that Nietzsche understands as a syndrome of destructive 
13. Karl Jaspers's essay Nietzsche und das Christflltum (written 1938) must still be 
considered the best statement of the problem (1946; 2nd ed., Munich: Piper, 1952). 
14. A, sec. 62. 
15. The fact that Nietzsche increasingly fell into this attitude of the artillerist can be 
seen from the letter to Georg Brandes (20 November 1888) in which, alluding to Ecce 
Homo, he declares: "I am after all the foremost psychologist of Christianity and can, 
old artillerist that I am, bring up heavy artillery .... " 
16. FW, III, sec. 125. 
17. Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Christentum, p. 18. 
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and life-denying tendencies. 18 For, as an institutional manifestation 
of the frustrating fiction that in the form of the concept of God 
gained power over man and robbed him of his best qualities, Chris-
tianity itself is an intellectual symbol of domination that draws its 
entire repressive power from the narcotic effect of the illusions uni-
fied within it. As such, it is simultaneously the "most disastrous kind 
of arrogance" ever known, as well as a "monstrous sickness of the 
will, which undermines, in addition to everything that promotes and 
favors life, the will to life itself." With its life-denying tendency it was 
the first really to conjure up the devil of negativism in the world, to 
raise ignorance to a virtue, to declare doubt a sin, to give Eros poison 
to drink and thereby to commit a singular crime against life. 
In the nature of this fiction, however, lies also the chance for over-
coming it. For it is merely necessary to break a single concept away 
from this fictional system or, better yet, to put a single reality in its 
place, "and the whole of Christianity hurtles down into nothing-
ness."19 In the meantime it is not only important for Nietzsche that 
those "spirits which have become free" should be seen through the 
"fabric of nineteen centuries of lies"; even more important is the 
notion that in Nietzsche's view Christianity, of its own accord, pres-
ently finds itself in a state of self-destruction that is being brought 
to light by the process of historical erosion. For like "all great things," 
Christianity is also condemned to perish of its own creations-first 
"as dogma," then "as morality," and thereby finally "through an act 
of self-overcoming": "After Christian truthfulness has drawn one 
conclusion after another, it must in the end draw its most strik-
ing conclusion, the conclusion against itself; this will happen, how-
ever, when it poses the question 'what is the meaning of all will to 
truth?' "20 Nietzsche sees himself as an observer of this scene, stand-
ing at the "deathbed of Christianity," dazed and overcome by this 
great drama "in a hundred acts, reserved for the next two centuries 
in Europe," this "most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also 
most hopeful of all dramas."21 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche keeps in readiness not only his criticism 
of the system of Christianity, but also a "genealogical" explanation 
of the Christian religion. The first essay of his Genealogy of Morals, 
he assures us in Ecce Homo, offers "the psychology of Christianity," 
18. Cf. the explanation in my book Theologie und Atheismus: Anstii(Je zu einer t/zeolo-
gischen Aporetik (Munich: Kosel, 1972), pp. 27ff.; 55f. 
19. A, sec. 39. 
20. GM, III, sec. 27. 
21. M, I, sec. 52; GM, III, sec. 27. 
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for it describes, as he states in an allusion to his famous early work, 
"the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of ressentiment."22 What he 
has in mind concerning this "birth" he then develops in the notion 
that Christianity proceeded from a-truly world-altering-act of in-
terpretation, and that for this reason it is to be understood in terms 
of its development as a unique "history of interpretation." At its be-
ginning stood the fact of the death of Jesus, this "most horrible of 
paradoxes," which confronted the disciples, who were far from "for-
giving this death," with the real riddle: "Who was this? What was 
this?"23 
This fact remained to be interpreted. In the course of the history 
of interpretation that ensued, four interpretations came into play 
which have thereby "ruled over Christianity": "Judaism (Paul); Plato-
nism (Augustine); the mystery cults (doctrine of redemption, em-
blem of the 'cross'); asceticism (-enmity toward 'nature,' 'reason,' 
'the senses' -the Orient)."24 The initiator of this process was Paul, 
who set to work with the logical cynicism of a rabbi and saw to it that 
the worst of all possible tidings followed on the heels of the glad 
tidings of Jesus by placing life's center of gravity "in the beyond" 
with his lie of the "resurrected" Jesus, and who thus for the first time 
really nailed the Redeemer to the cross--"to his own cross." While 
the "bearer of glad tidings" died as He lived and taught, and while 
He attempted with His death if necessary "to give the strongest dem-
onstration, the proof of his teachings," Paul brought to the fore that 
feeling most alien to the gospel, revenge, by stylizing Jesus' death 
on the cross into a "sacrifice"; brought the question of the existence 
of the individual after death into a "causal connection with that sac-
rifice"; placed "the concepts of guilt and sin into the foreground"; 
falsified the "assassination attempt on priests and theologians" 
carried out by Jesus into a "new priesthood and theology"; and 
thus built up again in the grand style precisely "that which Christ 
had annulled by means of his life." Consequently, "in the concept 
'Church' precisely that was canonized ... which the 'bearer of glad 
tidings' felt was beneath him, behind him." 
The result of this unfortunate history of interpretation set in mo-
22. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Genealogie der Moral. 
23. A, sec. 40. The following quotations are taken from a collage of aphorisms 28-51 
of A, along with sections 158-216 of the notes from the Nachlafl published under the 
title The Will to Power. The latter, too little acknowledged by scholars, must be consid-
ered as that collection of materials from which Nietzsche put together his last broad-
side against Christianity. 
24. Nachlafl (WM), sec. 214. 
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tion by Paul is quite obvious: " 'Christianity' has become something 
quite different from that which its founder did and what he wished"; 
and "The Church has become precisely that which Jesus preached 
against-and taught his disciples to fight." Strictly speaking, there is 
really no room for Jesus in this view of the question. As Jaspers quite 
appropriately sums it up, He has "actually nothing to do with the 
history of Christianity."25 In the final analysis there was for Nietzsche 
"only one Christian, and he died on the cross."26 
III. Jesus within the Context of 
Nietzsche's Conflict of Values 
By means of this hermeneutic "trick" Nietzsche obtains a view of 
Jesus that is only slightly encumbered by his anti-Christian polemic. 
We must emphasize the word "view" (Blick) here, for to judge by 
one of the poems of his youth, which still finds its echo-although 
not without polemic distortion-in his "Ariadne's Lament" from the 
"Dionysus-Dithyrambs," Nietzsche's religious development began 
with the experience of being struck "in the heart" by the gaze (Blick) 
of the Lord, calling him to Himself: 
Thou hast called: 
Lord, I hurry, 
And tarry 
At the steps of Thy throne. 
Burning with love 
Thy gaze so heartily, 
Painfully 
Shines into my heart: 
Lord, I come. 
I was forlorn, 
Enraptured, 
Captured, 
To Hell and suffering born. 
Thou stoodst from afar: 
Thy gaze ineffable 
Impelling 
25. Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Christentum, p. 19. 
26. A, sec. 39. 
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Struck me so oft: 
Now I come gladly. 27 
From all indications, with this point of departure the end of Nietz-
sche's positive relationship to Jesus had already been reached, for 
only a year later in his satirical poem "Before the Crucifix" Nietzsche 
challenges the Crucified One half-mockingly, half-pityingly to climb 
down from His "martyr's-stake" in order together with him to come 
"down to earth."28 Long before Zarathustra will entreat his brothers 
to "remain true to the earth" and not to "believe those who speak 
to you of otherworldly hopes!"29 the basic motif of such an appeal 
is already struck here. From this point on, Nietzsche's relationship 
to Jesus enters further and further into that state of disunity which 
arises from his lingering dependence on Jesus and his continually 
more pronounced movement toward the values of this life and 
world. This lingering dependence is responsible for the fact that 
Nietzsche articulates his growing alienation and the criticism that it 
provokes in somewhat muffled tones--certainly less harshly than he 
does in comparable instances. 
It is significant in this regard that Thomas Mann, in agreeing with 
the judgment of August Messer (a Nietzsche interpreter from the 
twenties), comes to the conclusion that Nietzsche had left "the per-
son Jesus of Nazareth" untouched "by his hatred for historical Chris-
tianity," although his explanation for this circumstance sounds rather 
daring: "for the sake of the end, of the cross, which he loved from 
the depths of his soul."3° For it was not the convergence that he 
27. "Du hast gerufen; I Herr, ich eile, I Und weile I An deines Thrones Stufen. I 
Von Lieb entglommen I Strahlt mir so herzlich, I Schmerzlich I Dein Blick ins Herz 
ein; I Herr, ich komme. I 
Ich war verloren, I Taumeltrunken, I Versunken, I Zur Hoi!' und Qual erkoren. I Du 
standst von Ferne; I Dein Blick unsaglich I Beweglich I Traf mich so oft; I Nun kornm' 
ich gerne ... " (Jugendschriften; HKG [Werke], II, 80). In terms of the history of religious 
expression Nietzsche is here uniting himself with that mystical tradition which finds 
its most penetrating documentation in Nicholas of Cusa's treatise De visione Dei (1454). 
Cf. further the introduction to the latter work edited by Elisabeth Bohnenstadt (Leip-
zig: Meiner, 1944), pp. 1-52. 
28. Jugendschriften; HKG (Werke), II, 188. 
29. Z, Preface, sec. 3. 
30. Thomas Mann, "Nietzsches Philosophie im Lichte unserer Erfahrung," in Neue 
Studien (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1948), pp. 133f.; according to August Messer (Erliiuterungen 
zu Nietzsches Zarathustra [Stuttgart: Strecker und Schroder, 1922], p. 20), Nietzsche 
always maintained for Jesus "a tender reverence in spite of his hostility to Chris-
tianity." 
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anticipated in his end-it is well known that Nietzsche in his insanity 
spoke of being crucified by his doctors in "a complicated way," after 
he had been signing his messages of madness alternately "Diony-
sus" and "the Crucified One"-but rather his sense of having been 
affected by the figure of the living Jesus that colored all his criticism 
and that caused Jesus for Nietzsche to become the basis for repeated 
attempts at interpretation in spite of all his resistance and rejection. 
It sounds very much like an attempt to understand Jesus from the 
standpoint of his own sociocultural presuppositions when Nietzsche 
concludes in The Gay Science that a Jesus Christ was possible only in a 
landscape "over which the melancholy and sublime thunderclouds 
of the angry Jehovah continually hung," so that "the rare and sud-
den breakthrough of a single ray of sunlight through the gruesome, 
all-encompassing, and perpetual day-night could be experienced as 
if it were a miracle of 'love.' "31 To be sure, Christ, as Nietzsche con-
cludes in Human, All-Too-Human, fostered the stupefaction of man-
kind by placing Himself "on the side of the intellectually weak"; yet 
one must think of Him "as the warmest of hearts."32 Thus Nietzsche 
asks himself how much has to be overlooked in the total evaluation 
of a people "to which the world owes the most noble man (Christ), 
the most truly wise man (Spinoza), the most powerful book, and the 
most effective moral law in the world."33 In line with this positive 
"prejudice" he would have us ponder the question he poses in Be-
yond Good and Evil of whether "underneath the holy fable and dis-
guise of Jesus' life" there does not lie "hidden one of the most pain-
ful cases of the martyrdom of knowledge about love."34 Even in The 
Antichrist he is still of the opinion that one could, "without stretching 
the meaning of the expression too much, call Jesus a 'free spirit,'" for 
"he does not care for anything solid."35 
Thus it is that in Zarathustra, in which Nietzsche takes his final 
position opposing the message of Jesus, he creates an image of the 
latter that leaves open for Him the possibility of a "conversion" to 
Zarathustra's doctrine of belief in this world: 
Truly, too early died that Hebrew whom the preachers of slow 
death honor: and that he died too early has ever since spelled 
doom for many .. 
31. FW, III, sec. 137. 
32. MA, I, sec. 235. 
33. Ibid., sec. 475. 
34. J, IV, sec. 269. 
35. A, sec. 32. 
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Had he but stayed in the wilderness and far from the good and 
the just! Perhaps he would have learned to live and to love the 
earth-and to laugh as well! 
Believe me, my brothers! He died too early; he himself would 
have recanted his teaching if he had lived to my age! He was no-
ble enough to recant!36 
Eventually, however, the criticism inflicted upon Christianity pene-
trates through to its founder. Now Jesus appears in Nietzsche's view 
as the "holy anarchist," who, by summoning "the lowest classes, 
the outcasts and the 'sinners,' the chandalas within Judaism to op-
position against the dominant order," became a "political criminal" 
and brought upon Himself the punishment of the cross. 37 In the fi-
nal analysis, according to Nietzsche, it was Jesus Himself who was 
responsible for the fact that Christianity developed into a "form 
of mortal enmity against reality" that has never been surpassed. 38 
Thus nothing would be more preposterous than to make a hero out 
of Jesus and to raise Him to the level of a "genius": "Speaking with 
the severity of a physiologist, an entirely different word would be 
more nearly fitting here: the word idiot."39 
All the more surprising, then, is the sympathetic picture that 
Nietzsche draws in contrast to the "crude fable of the miracle-worker 
and redeemer" developed by Christian dogma regarding Jesus and 
His gospel. For Nietzsche the gospel is that "True life, eternal life has 
been found-it is not promised, it is here, it is in you: as a living in 
love, in love without removal or exclusion, without regard for sta-
tion."40 Accordingly, the "kingdom of heaven" proclaimed by Jesus is 
a "state of the heart-not something that is to come 'above the earth' 
or 'after death,'" nothing that we expect; "it has no yesterday and no 
day after tomorrow, it will not come in 'a thousand years'-it is an 
experience of the heart; it is everywhere, it is nowhere .... "41 
This approach toward Jesus--which nevertheless keeps its dis-
tance-reaches its highest point when Nietzsche sums up "the en-
36. Z, I, "On Free Death." 
37. A, sec. 27. 
38. Ibid. 
39. A, sec. 29. As is well known, this expression was suppressed by Nietzsche's 
sister in the early editions of A, and was finally brought to light through the investiga-
tions of Josef Hofmiller in his article "Nietzsche," in Siiddeutsche Monatshefte, 29 (1931), 
74-131. 
40. A, sec. 29. 
41. Ibid., sec. 34; cf. also Nachlaft (WM), sec. 161. 
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tire gospel" in the words of the Crucified One to His fellow sufferer 
on the cross: " 'This was truly a godly man, a child of God!' says 
the malefactor. 'If you feel this'-answers the redeemer-'then you 
are in paradise, then you, too, are a child of God.' "42 In fact, Nietz-
sche had already formulated this paraphrase of the crucifixion scene 
in Luke (23:39-43) perhaps even more cogently in the preliminary 
study to this text: "The malefactor on the cross: when even the crimi-
nal himself, suffering a painful death, judges: 'As this Jesus is dying, 
without rebellion, without enmity, benevolently and submissively-
this alone is the right way,' then he has affirmed the gospel, and with 
that he is in paradise .... "43 
lV. Jesus within the Field of Tension 
of Nietzsche's Own Self-Descriptions 
Just as Nietzsche's youthful impression that he has been struck by 
the gaze of Christ finds its echo in "Ariadne's Lament" and, even 
earlier, in the accusations of the "ugliest man" (revealed by Zarathus-
tra to be the murderer of God),44 so we can also notice in the utter-
ances of the Jesus-critic an existential disquietude brought about by 
the figure of Jesus, regardless of whether these utterances are in-
tended to perform a critical or an analytical function. If we pursue 
this further, we come in the end to those role-figures through which 
Nietzsche plays in the--ultimately vain-hope of finding his own 
identity in them. 
Beginning with the most strident formulation, the figure of the 
"Antichrist," we find that Nietzsche had already (in his "Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism" at the beginning of the new edition of The Birth of 
Tragedy of 1886) asked in the form of a barely concealed reference to 
himself: "who could claim to know the rightful name of the Anti-
christ?" And because during the writing of Ecce Homo the right time 
seems to have come to let the last of his masks fall, he also assures us 
very openly here: "I am, in Greek and not only in Greek, the Anti-
42. Ibid., sec. 35. In his Nietzsche article (above, n. 39) Hofmiller points out 
(pp. 94£.) that this passage as well was suppressed by the editors of the early editions 
of A (ostensibly because it was exegetically indefensible). 
43. Nachlafi (WM), sec. 162; the extent to which this interpretation coincides with my 
own understanding of the scene is made clear in my article "Der Leidcnsgefahrte," in 
Geist und Leben, 48 (1975), 40-50. 
44. Just as the lamenting Ariadne feels herself wounded by the gaze of the god who 
is pursuing her, the gaze of the allseeing God also becomes the central motif for the 
murder of God by the "ugliest man" (Z, IV, "The Ugliest Man"). 
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christ .... "45 In spite of this, and although in the brief conclud-
ing aphorism of his hyperbolic autobiography he plays off "his" god 
Dionysus against the Crucified One, he does not hesitate to imitate 
the air of Jesus when he assures us: "And in all seriousness, nobody 
before me knew the right way, the way upward; it is only beginning 
with me that there are hopes once again, tasks, ways that can be 
prescribed for culture-! am the bearer of these glad tidings.-And 
for this reason I am also a destiny."46 
He subsequently even gives the reason for this sudden turning 
from critique to affinity. It is his will to drive a contradiction to such 
an extreme that it is transformed into a new affirmation: "I contradict 
as no one has contradicted before, and am nonetheless the antithesis 
of a No-saying spirit. I am a bearer of glad tidings like no one before 
me, I know tasks of such magnitude that up to now the very idea of 
them has been lacking; it is only beginning with me that there are 
hopes once again."47 
In the same context Nietzsche gives us the motivation for the pub-
lication of his biography by stating that he has a "terrible fear" of 
someday being canonized-he does not wish "to be a saint, but 
would prefer to be a buffoon."48 This preference for the role of the 
fool is not merely a manifestation of the hectic rush of a will to ex-
pression driven to its limits, for it is but a small step from the "buf-
foon" to the role-figure of the "madman," through whom Nietzsche 
first proclaimed the convincingly formulated message of the death of 
God. 49 In the proclamation of this "bearer of glad tidings" as well, a 
contradiction has been extended to the point where it becomes an 
affinity. 
Not only does the "madman" expect consequences from the death 
of God that immediately remind us of Jesus' proclamation of the 
kingdom of God ushered in by Him, it is even more significant that 
he relates the story in such a way that it can function as a perfect 
reformulation of the type of parable that Jesus preferred to use in his 
proclamation of this kingdom of God. 50 Thus the possibility arises for 
45. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books," sec. 2. 
46. Ibid., Twilight of the Idols, sec. 2. 
47. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 1. 
48. Ibid. See also what has been said above (Part I of this article). 
49. The aphorism "Die Gefangenen" from MA (liiii, sec. 84) must be considered 
more as a "provisional" formulation in this regard; cf. my study "Nietzsches Kritik des 
christlichen Gottesbegriffs und ihre theologischen Konsequenzen," Plzilosop/;isclzes 
jalzrbuch, 78 (1971), 34~65, 295~305. 
50. This is further discussed in the work cited above (n. 49). 
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a text-immanent solution to the problem, which then presents itself 
in the form of the shocking designation of Jesus as an "idiot." But 
before we begin to consider, along with Jaspers, Nietzsche's depen-
dence on Dostoevsky's novel of the same name and to speculate 
whether Nietzsche was aware at least of the title of the work, which 
at the time of the writing of The Antichrist was not yet available in 
German translation, we should first take hold of this key offered by 
Nietzsche himself. 51 For when it is said of Jesus in The Antichrist 
that He not only "denied any breach between God and man," but 
that He "lived" precisely this proclaimed unity between God and 
man as His glad tidings, 52 it is basically that very thing being im-
puted to Him which is intended by the proclamation of the "mad-
man," namely, the reclaiming of the attributes "wasted" on God for 
mankind itself. 53 
All this leads us to the conclusion that Nietzsche's criticism of Je-
sus, measured against the vehemence of his criticism of Christianity, 
is a great deal more restrained, because in his critical encounter with 
Jesus Nietzsche was confronted by the remains of a bond he had 
never quite given up. Zarathustra's relationship to the priests is also 
characterized by the same "disassociated affinity": 
Here are priests: and even if they are my enemies, pass by them 
quietly and with a sleeping sword! 
There are heroes even among them; many of them have suf-
fered too much: thus they want to make others suffer .... 
But my blood is related to theirs; and I want to see my blood 
honored even in theirs. 54 
It is this feeling of a "blood relationship" withstanding all estrange-
ment that determines Nietzsche's relationship to Jesus and makes 
it possible for us to hear in his No a repressed assent and in his 
accusations a suppressed homage. However far Nietzsche moves 
away from Jesus, it is still in the sense of the consciousness described 
in the aphorism "Star Friendship," of being inescapably associated 
with Him, the One he passed by and left behind. 55 This residual 
51. Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Cl!ristentum, pp. 22£. 
52. A, sec. 41. 
53. The aphorism "Excelsior" (FW, III, sec. 285) deals expressly with this anthropo-
logical objective of the denial of God. 
54. Z, II, "On Priests." 
55. FW, IV, sec. 279. The aphorism must be considered as Nietzsche's most subtle 
self-revelation concerning his relationship to Richard Wagner. 
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feeling of a bond between them may have moved Nietzsche to su-
perscribe that exorbitant self-portrait he placed before mankind-
in the last outbreak of his desire to communicate with it-with the 
"most Christian title of all," Ecce Homo. 56 
56. Mann, "Nietzsches Philosophie im Lichte unserer Erfahrung," p. 123. 
VI. Dionysus versus the Crucified 
One: Nietzsche's Understanding 
of the Apostle Paul 
Jorg Salaquarda 
(Translated by Timothy F. Sellner) 
I 
Nietzsche's explicit statements concerning Paul are predominantly 
negative. *1 He describes the Apostle as a "typical decadent" and calls 
him-borrowing a term from the Manu Lawbook2-a "chandala-
type." In his sharp polemic in The Antichrist he designates it as "the 
greatest, most evil assault on refined humanity" that in the New Tes-
tament every Peter and Paul is granted "immortality," thereby fur-
thering decisively "the revolt of everything crawling on the earth 
against that which has nobility."3 In a few places he singles out Paul 
in particular from the ranks of others he considers decadents in order 
to polemicize against him with special vehemence. In such passages 
Paul appears as the exponent of that Judaism which in Christianity 
*This chapter is a slightly modified English version of Jorg Salaquarda, "Dionysos 
gegen den Gekreuzigten: Nietzsches Verstandnis des Apostels Paulus," Zeitschrift fUr 
Religion und Geistesgeschichte, 26 (1974), 97-124; the German version was again pub-
lished in Nietzsche, ed. Jorg Salaquarda, Wege der Forschung, no. 521 (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), pp. 288-322. 
1. Nietzsche's works and literary remains (NachlajJ) are cited from the Kritische Ge-
samtausgabe edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (WKG); material that has 
not yet appeared in this edition is quoted from the Grofloktavausgabe (GOA) or the 
Kleinoktavausgabe (KOA). Quotations from letters are drawn mainly from the Gesam-
melte Briefe, abbreviated as GB. Translations from the German are by Timothy F. Sell-
ner. 
2. Cf. G; "The 'Improvers' of Mankind," sees. 3 and 4; WKG, VI-3, 94f. In the 
philological commentary to G (KSA, XIV, 420) Montinari points out that Nietzsche 
drew his information from the following book, which can still be found in his library: 
Louis Jacolliot, Les legislateurs religieux. Manou-Moi'se-Mahomet (Paris: Lacroix, 1876). 
Cf. Nietzsche's letter to Gast of 31 May 1888; GB, IV, 381£. 
3. A, sec. 43; WKG, VI-3, 216. 
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had asserted itself victoriously;4 in others he figures as the example 
par excellence of the "ascetic priest," a type that Nietzsche had already 
developed in the Genealogy of Morals. 5 In The Antichrist Nietzsche 
writes, referring expressly to his earlier psychology of the "ascetic 
priest": "Paul was the greatest of all the apostles of revenge .... "6 
Already in his earlier writings we find characterizations that unmis-
takably express aversion and condemnation, as for example: "Such 
natures as that of the Apostle Paul have an 'evil eye' for the passions; 
they come to know of them only what is dirty, deformed, and heart-
b k• u7 rea mg .... 
A number of the authoritative interpreters of Nietzsche's criticism 
of religion and Christianity have apparently derived his understand-
ing of Paul from this and other similar passages. Thus Karl Jaspers, 
for example, names Paul as the foremost of those figures who "are 
always rejected by him [sc. Nietzsche ]."8 Ernst Benz expresses him-
self in more detail, but in the same vein: "To no other Christian does 
Nietzsche betray such animosity, such an explosive and measureless 
hate as he does to Paul. In no other case do the most negative desig-
nations, the sharpest accusations pile up as in that of Paul; moreover, 
no one is the object in the same way of Nietzsche's personal mock-
ery, abhorrence, disgust, and repugnance as this particular apostle."9 
Walter Kaufmann finds Nietzsche's "attack on Luther's sola fide and 
on Luther's great example Paul, ... even more impassioned than his 
diatribes against the Church."10 And even Overbeck noted with con-
sternation the vehement polemical form in which his friend had ex-
pressed his understanding of Paul, though with regard to the con-
tents he preferred it to other interpretations. 11 
Other writers have viewed as questionable any one-sided attempt 
4. Cf, for example, Nachlaj3, November 1887 to March 1888, 11 [364]; WKG, VIII-2, 
403 (WM, sec. 214). 
5. GM, III; WKG, VI-2, 355ff. 
6. A, sec. 45; WKG, VT-3, 221. 
7. FW, sec. 139; WKG, V-2, 166f. 
8. Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche. Einfiihrung in das Verstiindnis seines Philosophierens, 3rd ed. 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1950), p. 27. 
9. Ernst Benz, Nietzsches Idem zur Gesclzichte des Christentums und der Kirche (Leiden: 
Brill, 1956), p. 36. 
10. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 3rd ed. (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 343. 
11. "An evaluation [sc. of Paul] by Nietzsche diametrically opposed to that of Well-
hausen. I prefer it, as repugnant as its invective character is to me" (Franz Over-
beck, Christentum und Kultur, 2nd ed. [1919; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1962], p. 55). 
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to impute certain opinions to Nietzsche on the basis of any of his 
extreme statements. According to this approach, if we were to judge 
by the rules of formal logic, then Nietzsche frequently "contradicted" 
himself. But we are not simply to follow the customary (pre)judg-
ments of "common sense"; rather, we ought to understand that 
Nietzsche always brought different perspectives to bear on a subject 
and that he made full use of the "magic of an opposite way of think-
ing."12 Is it not possible that this basic tendency in his thought could 
provide insight into his understanding of Paul as well? Could not 
the vehemence of the polemic correspond to the closeness of the 
kinship? 
The thesis stated here in question form has been advocated most 
decisively by Ernst Bertram. For Bertram, accordingly, Nietzsche is 
also Paul, the vanquisher of the Law, of the "old tablets," the pro-
claimer, servant, and interpreter of a new Lord of our souls. Not 
the Paul, of course, whom the '~ntichrist" out of vengeful self-
hate and using all the techniques of a malicious and fanatical psy-
choanalytical approach intentionally misconstrues as a decadence-
type. Not Paul the "dysangelist," the theatrical "genius of hate," 
the "chandala-type." ... Rather, the affirming half of his exis-
tence is "rather" akin to the Paul of Albrecht Durer, who, with 
book and sword, composed, half imbued with Attic wisdom, half 
with Northern melancholy, looks out at us from the panel of the 
"Four Apostles" in the Alte Pinakothek in Munich .... 13 
Yet even when we divest this thesis of its inspirational phraseology 
it fails to be convincing. Bertram proceeds from the correct observa-
tion that Nietzsche taught and practiced a mode of perspectival cog-
nition, and he concludes correctly that a polemic never signifies for 
Nietzsche mere rejection or repudiation. But when he wishes to 
show the other side, that is, the "kinship" of Nietzsche with Paul, 
then he makes use of images and turns of phrase that he cannot 
prove have their origin with Nietzsche himself. The fact that no 
image of Paul as imbued partly with "Attic wisdom," partly with 
"Northern melancholy" is to be found in Nietzsche's writings does 
not, of course, vitiate Bertram's thesis, since he assumes from the 
very beginning that Nietzsche did not wish to acknowledge such a 
12. Nachlafi, autumn 1885 to autumn 1886, 2 [155]; WKG, VIII-1, 140 (WM, sec. 470). 
13. Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie, 7th ed. (Berlin: Bondi, 1929), 
p. 54; cf. the context and pp. 61, 129, 133, and 314. Cf. also Fritz Wenzel, "Das Paulus-
bild bei Lagarde, Nietzsche und Rosenberg" (Diss., Breslau, 1937), pp. 29f. Wenzel is 
heavily dependent on Bertram for his concept of Nietzsche's image of Paul. 
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kinship. Nevertheless, the thesis fails to hold even if it can be shown 
that Nietzsche's intentions were nothing of the kind-which, in fact, 
is precisely the case. 
Carl Bernoulli also added his opinion to this complex of views, 
agreeing to a certain extent with the thesis of Bertram, but arguing 
more cautiously for a positive interpretation. While discussing Nietz-
sche's relationship to Calvin he appends an interesting remark: we 
can "be certain," he says, "whenever [Nietzsche] takes someone es-
pecially severely to task that a secret kinship is always behind it."14 
To support this he includes two references, which he fails, however, 
to think through to their conclusion. In the one case he draws a 
connection between Nietzsche's "vision" of Sils-Maria and the Da-
mascus experience of Paul; 15 in the other he considers the question 
of whether kinship and opposition need to be judged from two sepa-
rate sides. But when in addition he establishes "love" as the com-
mon and deciding factor, 16 he loses the firm footing provided by that 
which can be substantiated from the text. 
II 
If we examine all the passages in which Nietzsche does not merely 
mention Paul in passing but deals with him with some degree of 
thoroughness, then it becomes clear that while he treats Paul in po-
lemic fashion most of the time, this is not always the case. A crude 
division, left undifferentiated until a later time, may serve to point 
the way to further examination of the problem: Paul is interesting to 
Nietzsche as a "Christian" and as a "great man." These two aspects 
doubtless merge continuously into each other, yet their division 
14. Carl A. Bernoulli, Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschaft, 2 vols. 
(Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1908); here, II, 4. 
15. "Nietzsche had experienced ... in that first summer at Sils his day of Damas-
cus; it was as if the scales were falling from his eyes; he completed the progression 
from No to Yes; Saul became Paul; the pessimist became the optimist" (ibid., I, 316). 
The comparison between "Sils-Maria" and "Damascus" is more significant than Ber-
noulli was aware; it is also correct that Nietzsche advanced by means of his insight at 
Sils from No to Yes. But one can maintain that Nietzsche became an "optimist" only 
when one uses this term in a quite different sense from that in which Nietzsche 
himself used it. 
16. "The cause of his [sc. Nietzsche's] hatred of the Apostle Paul could have been 
that the latter had debased his immortal song to the glorification of love as the basic 
force through which man first becomes man because of his teleological allusion to the 
goal and fulfillment of man as lying in the world beyond" (ibid., II, 267). 
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helps us to recognize more clearly certain characteristics of Nietz-
sche's understanding of Paul. Nietzsche did not (as, for the most 
part, the interpretation of Jaspers one-sidedly maintains he did) 17 
from the very beginning see in the "Christian" Paul the antipode of 
Jesus. In many of his notes Nietzsche leaves the question open as to 
whether he considers Jesus or Paul to be the authoritative "founder" 
of Christianity. In a passage typical of this attitude he states that 
"Jesus (or Paul)" had possessed that decisive psychological insight 
to which Christianity owed its triumphant progress. 18 At another 
point Nietzsche even names other possible "founders": "Half the 
earth now bends its knee" before "three Jews, as we know, and one 
]ewess" who succeeded in overcoming "Rome"-namely "Jesus of 
Nazareth, the fisherman Peter, the tentmaker Paul, and ... Mary."19 
Even in a late note from the Nachlaf3 that he accompanied with the 
caption "against Jesus of Nazareth as a seducer," Nietzsche leaves 
unanswered the question concerning the decisive impetus for Chris-
tianity: he did "not like it at all about that Jesus of Nazareth or his 
Apostle Paul that they put such big ideas into the heads of the little peo-
ple . ... "20 
It is not until The Antichrist that Nietzsche achieves an unequivocal 
differentiation of the roles of Jesus and Paul in the origin of Chris-
tianity, and at the same time arrives at an unrestrained opposition to 
the Apostle. The following formulation is typical of the trend in his 
late work: "In Paul is embodied the antithesis-type to the 'joyful her-
ald' [sc. to Jesus], the genius of hatred, in the vision of hatred, in 
the unbending logic of hatred."21 To be sure, this differentiation had 
been proposed much earlier. Among the fragments and notes of the 
Nachlaf3 from 1880-81 are to be found a few notes that anticipate the 
antithesis of The Antichrist but in a milder form. In the middle of 
the deliberations stands Paul; Jesus is brought under consideration 
only insofar as Paul is said to have "used" him. "Paul believed in 
Jesus," reads one of these notes, "because he had need of an object 
that would concentrate, and thereby satisfy him.'m These and other 
notes reflect Nietzsche's musings following his reading of Hermann 
17. Cf. especially Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Christentum, 2nd ed. (Munich: 
Piper, 1952), pp. 25ff. 
18. FW (Book Five), 353; WKG, V-2, 271. 
19. GM, I, sec. 16; WKG, Vl-2, 301. 
20. Nachlafi, beginning of 1888, 12 [1]; WKG, VIII-2, 448; and Nachlafi, autumn 1887, 
10 [86]; WKG, VIII-2, 172 (WM, sec. 205, offers an abbreviated version). 
21. A, sec. 42; WKG, Vl-3, 213f. 
22. Nachlafi, summer 1880, 4 [261]; WKG, V-1, 495. 
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Ludemann's description of Pauline anthropology. 23 The thrust of 
his excerpts24 and the accompanying musings show clearly what it 
was in Ludemann's study-today little regarded by New Testament 
scholars25-that attracted and interested him: the thesis that in Pau-
line theology the Law was denied any power of salvation. Nietzsche 
drew from this a more far-reaching conclusion: he understood the 
positive statements concerning the Law in Romans as a temporary 
accommodation on the part of the Apostle to the "Jewish-Christian 
congregation in Rome, which was as yet unknown to him."26 With 
23. Hermann Ludemann, Die Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus und ihre Stellung inner-
halb seiner Heilslehre. Nach den vier Hauptbriefen dargestellt (Kiel: Toeche, 1872). Nietzsche 
had probably heard about this study from Overbeck; in any case he borrowed it from 
his friend in July 1880 (cf. Nietzsche's letters to Overbeck from 22 June and 7 July 1880 
and Overbeck's letter of 10 July 1880). In a letter dated 19 July 1880 Nietzsche thanked 
Overbeck for the forwarding of several books and indicated that he had at least read 
this particular study: "Ludemann's work," he writes, is "a masterpiece in a very diffi-
cult field," but the author is "unfortunately ... no writer." 
24. The information that the notes cited below deal with excerpts from Ludemann's 
Anthropologie des Apostels Paulus was obtained from Mazzino Montinari. The excerpts--
partly word-for-word quotations, partly paraphrases--are to be found in the Nachlafl, 
summer 1880 (WKG, V-1), in the following fragments (the corresponding pages of 
Ludemann's book are included in parentheses): 4 [217] (13); 4 [218] (16-19); 4 [219] 
(this major excerpt refers to pp. 8-206, although omitting or only briefly touching 
upon a great deal of material). Nietzsche's musings in connection with his reading are 
most likely contained in the following fragments: 4 [220]; 4 [231]; 4 [253-55]; 4 [258]. 
For a complete listing of Nietzsche's excerpts from Ludemann, see Nietzsche, ed. Jorg 
Salaquarda, Wege der Forschung, no. 521 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft, 1980), pp. 321-22, and Montinari's commentary in KSA, XIV, 361ff. 
25. In this regard cf. above all Rudolf Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 2nd 
ed. (Tubingen: Mohr, 1959), pt. 2, I, A. 1. ("Die anthropologischen Begriffe," within 
the section "Die Theologie des Paulus"). 
26. This is clearly expressed in the major excerpt 4 [219] (WKG, V-1, 484-86), which 
is chiefly concerned with the equation of "flesh" and "Law." The note concludes with 
the observation: "pp. 204-5 contain the gist of the matter." Ludemann writes in this 
passage: "First of all, there can be no doubt that the impossibility of fulfilling the 
Mosaic Law was an axiom for Paul which he at no time in any of his letters lost sight 
of .... How does he come now to speak, as he apparently does in Romans 2:7, 10, 13, 
and 4:2, in such a way that he maintains the objective validity of the Law and treats as 
an open question the capability of man, which might perhaps aid him in attaining 
justification through its fulfillment?" (204). According to Ludemann, Paul cannot have 
meant that to be taken seriously, for the idea of a "self~correction of God," namely the 
replacement of one means to salvation (Law) by another (Jesus), would have been 
impossible for Paul's "theological-deterministic way of thinking." Paul thus comes to 
the conclusion: "if the Law has never been fulfilled, then fulfillment must have been 
impossible because of its very nature; consequently, the Law was never meant to be 
fulfilled in the first place" (205). 
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this thesis he deviates from Ludemann, who reports on the theory 
and considers it, but who ultimately rejects it. 27 
In conjunction with his work of 1887 and 1888-first for his 
planned book The Will to Pawer, then for the four-part Revaluation of 
All Values-Nietzsche read other works that were directly or indi-
rectly relevant to the theme "Jesus and Paul." The most important of 
these is "My Religion" by Tolstoy, followed by Dostoevsky's The Pos-
sessed and works by Wellhausen and Renan. 28 Tolstoy's understand-
ing of the message of Jesus may perhaps have provided the final 
impetus for Nietzsche's fundamental differentiation between Jesus 
and Paul; in addition, Nietzsche was indebted to this author for hints 
and suggestions for the "Psychology of the Redeemer" presented in 
The Antichrist. "No God died for our sins; no redemption through 
faith; no resurrection after death"-these were the tendencies of the 
"joyful message" of Jesus that Nietzsche noted to himself while read-
ing Tolstoy. "These are all forgeries of true Christianity, for which we 
must hold that pernicious crank [sc. Paul] responsible."29 Among the 
musings that Nietzsche wrote down in connection with this subject 
we find turns of phrase that he transferred almost word-for-word 
into The Antichrist, as for example: "That is the humor of the matter, a 
tragic humor: Paul built up again in the grand style precisely that 
which Christ had annulled by means of his life."30 "We see what had 
become of the death on the cross. Paul appears as the daemon of the 
dysangelium .... "31 
I maintain that Nietzsche initially regarded Paul as one of the deci-
sive figures in the origin of Christianity, and finally as the decisive 
figure alone. With that we have obtained the prerequisite for Nietz-
sche to observe and analyze Paul under the aspect of the "great 
man." 
At this point we can identify formally the first characteristic of 
the alleged "kinship" behind Nietzsche's polemic against Paul: it is 
a kinship with regard to "greatness" in the sense of one's being ele-
27. To be sure, Ludemann's rejection is not convincing. It is based on a solution that 
is remarkably pallid in comparison to the problem worked out earlier with such clarity. 
Paul, he maintains, neither attributed a direct power for salvation to the Law, nor did 
he--even in his Epistle to the Romans--ever effect a mere accommodation; rather, he 
understood the Law as an "eternal moral idea." Accordingly, in Romans "that idea 
comes into play which is constantly in the thought of Paul ... , that the moral idea 
basic to Mosaic Law has eternal value and enduring significance" (ibid., p. 214). 
28. In this regard d. the "Vorbemerkung der Herausgeber" in WKG, VIII-2, vff. 
29. NachiajJ, November 1887 to March 1888, 11 [275]; WKG, VIII-2, 345. 
30. Ibid., 11 [281]; ibid., 350. 
31. Ibid., 11 [282]; ibid., 351. 
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vated from the masses. To be sure, the "greatness" that Nietzsche 
grants the Apostle he views as destructive; but the more vehemently 
he opposes it, the more he obviously feels compelled to regard it 
as definitive. A closer examination of Nietzsche's differentiation be-
tween Paul and Jesus will show this even more clearly. Nietzsche 
rejects the thesis of Renan that the terms "hero" and "genius" had 
anything to contribute to the understanding of Jesus. He writes: 
"Speaking with the strictness of the physiologist, a quite different 
word would sooner be appropriate here: the word idiot."32 Nietzsche 
understands "idiot" essentially in terms of its Greek meaning, that 
is, as the designation for an "apolitical man," a private citizen refrain-
ing from participating in the business of the state. 33 Jesus is an "id-
iot" for him, because the way of life he practiced and taught is only 
possible as the "most private form of existence," which presupposes 
"a narrow, solitary, and completely unpolitical society." Nietzsche 
states that such a way of life belongs "in the conventicle"; it is "still 
possible at any time," providing similar conditions are present. 34 
Nietzsche thought he recognized one such unpolitical society in the 
Russian peasants, who were repressed and yet accommodated them-
selves to their repression. He praised Dostoevsky, who as a conse-
quence of his knowledge of the Russian people had understood the 
"psychological type" Jesus. "I only know of one psychologist who 
has lived in that world where Christianity [sc. in Jesus' sense] is 
possible, where a Christ can arise at any moment ... that is Dosto-
evsky. He fathomed Christ." A few lines later he states, in the middle 
of his critical encounter with Renan: " ... can one make a worse 
error than to make a genius out of Christ, who was an idiot?"35 In 
another passage-representing, as does the one quoted above, pre-
liminary work to section 29 of The Antichrist-Nietzsche utilizes the 
32. A, sec. 29; WKG, VI-3, 198. 
33. Nietzsche uses the word "idiot" several times with this meaning, and herein 
agrees with Dostoevsky. On this point, cf. Martin Dibelius, "Der 'psychologische Typ 
des Erl<isers' bei Friedrich Nietzsche," Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift fUr Literaturwissen-
schaft und Geistesgeschichtc, 22 (1944), 61ff. Remarkably, no notice has been taken of this 
study, the best and most detailed one by those authors who later concerned them-
selves with Nietzsche's use of the word "idiot" (cf. Erich Podach, Nietzsches Werke des 
Zusammenbruchs (Heidelberg: Rothe, 1961], pp. 61ff.; Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 
pp. 340f., n. 2; and Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Christentum, p. 21 and n.-although 
one can at least excuse Jaspers for the reason that he agreed in 1952 to the unaltered 
reprinting of his study of 1938). 
34. Nachlaft, autumn 1887, 10 (135]; WKG, VIII-2, 198 (WM, sec. 211); and Nachlaft, 
November 1887 to March 1888, 11 [365]; WKG, VIII-2, 404 (WM, sec. 212). 
35. Nachlaft, spring 1888, 15 [9); WKG, VIII-3, 203. 
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word "idiot" expressly in differentiating between Jesus and Paul. He 
begins with the proposition: "Jesus is the antithesis of a genius: he is 
an idiot," and supports it with the same argument that he puts forth 
in The Antichrist. At the conclusion of the characterization Nietzsche 
finally turns to its further development: "One must keep this in 
mind: he is an idiot in the midst of a very clever people. . . . Yet his 
disciples were not that at all-Paul was definitely no idiot!-the his-
tory of Christianity depends on this fact." 36 
In a note written somewhat earlier Nietzsche had formulated in a 
general and problematic way what he later coined primarily with 
reference to Jesus and Paul and put forth as a definite thesis: "The 
founder of a religion can be insignificant,-a match, nothing more!"37 
Another note reads: "The concept 'originator' is so ambiguous that it 
can even signify the mere cause of a favorable opportunity for a 
movement. ... " The concrete example for this idea is once again 
furnished by the relationship between Paul and Jesus: "Consider the 
freedom with which Paul treats the problem concerning the person of 
Jesus, coming near to juggling the facts-Someone who has died, 
whom people have seen after his death, someone who was delivered 
to death by the Jews .... A mere 'motif'; he then creates the music 
for it .... A cipher at the beginning .... "38 
We see that to the extent that Nietzsche divests Jesus of the "re-
sponsibility" for the origin and rise of Christianity, Jesus also de-
creases for him in "greatness" in the sense of his effectiveness in 
determining the events of history. The fact that the name "Jesus 
Christ" has attained world-historical significance is due to its propa-
gation and promotion by Paul, whereby he neither carried out nor 
developed the intentions of Jesus, but twisted them completely 
around. As we have seen, Paul was not an "idiot" in Nietzsche's 
eyes, but a man of genius. 39 Nietzsche accords him "greatness" and, 
in his later writings, even towering "greatness"; in his writings of 
1888 Paul-next to Socrates40-is the most decisive promoter of deca-
dence morality. 
36. Ibid., 14 [38]; ibid., 29. 
37. Nachlafl, spring 1884, 25 [419]; WKG, VII-2, 118 (WM, sec. 178). 
38. Nachlafl, spring 1888, 15 [108]; WKG, VIII-3, 263. This fragment was previously 
known as No. 177 of the WM, where of course the pointed final phrase was omitted. 
39. Cf., for example, A, sec. 58; WKG, VI-3, 244f. Also Nachlafl, autumn 1887, 10 
[181]; WKG, VIII-2, 230 (WM, sec. 175). Note the comparison between "genius" and 
"idiot" in the fragment cited in n. 32. 
40. On the later Nietzsche's understanding of Socrates, cf. especially G, "The Prob-
lem of Socrates"; WKG, Vl-3, 61ff. For an interpretation, see Hermann Josef Schmidt, 
Nietzsche und Socrates. Philosaphische Untersuchungen zu Nietzsches Socratesbild, Monogra-
phien zur philosophischen Forschung, no. 59 (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1969). 
Nietzsche's Understanding of the Apostle Paul 109 
In the writings and notes of the years before 1888 are to be found a 
few passages in which Nietzsche in other contexts treats directly or 
indirectly the question of the "greatness" of the Apostle. Of interest 
in this regard is the thesis that the founder of a system of morality 
must stand above this system, and may not be "moral" in precisely 
the sense of the system that he sets out to establish. 41 Since for 
Nietzsche religion is essentially morality (that is, a complex of val-
ues), then Paul, too, as the founder of a religion, is--according to 
this thesis--elevated above the mass of merely religious or merely 
moral men. In a note in the Naclzlaf3 he writes in this context: "Paul-
who is one of those great immoralities in which the Bible is richer 
than we think."42 Nietzsche also considers Paul's case when he occu-
pies himself with the problematic question of the "ascetic priest."43 
The ambiguity of this type-in that on the one hand it is guided by 
the instincts of decadence, and on the other is nevertheless "strong" 
enough to channel the "will to nothingness" of the decadents for a 
time into another direction-Nietzsche apparently sees personified 
especially in Paul. In a fragment put on paper relatively early, Nietz-
sche sought to comprehend genealogically the raptures of the ascetic 
martyr, and in this connection Paul came to mind. "It is not entirely 
impossible that even the souls of Paul, Dante, Calvin, and others of 
their kind have penetrated at one time into the terrible secrets of 
such ecstasies of power."44 In another note, this one rather isolated 
from its context, Nietzsche singled out because of their psychologi-
cal insights three of the "Christians" he used to oppose most vehe-
mently: "All deeper men are in agreement-Luther, Augustine, Paul 
come to mind-that our morality and its attendant actions do not 
coincide with our conscious will . ... "45 
In summarizing the results of this section of the investigation it 
can be said that Nietzsche's estimation of Paul generally is the same 
as that of all "great men" whose "greatness" he views as the promo-
tion of a decadence movement. He dealt in similar fashion with Socra-
tes, with the great theologians of antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
with the reformers, with the exponents of "modern ideas," and with 
41. Cf. G, "Morality as Anti-Nature," sec. 5; WKG, Vl-3, 96: "It may be established 
as a primary tenet that to make morality one must have the definite will to do the 
opposite .... To put this in terms of a formula, one might say: a// means whereby 
humanity was previously to have been made moral were from the very outset im-
moral." 
42. Nachlafl, July-August 1879, 42 [57]; WKG, IV-3, 463. 
43. Cf., as the most important text, the third essay of GM; WKG, VI-2, 357ff. 
44. M, sec. 113; WKG, V-1, 102. 
45. Nachlafl, autumn 1885 to autumn 1886, 1 [55]; WKG, VIII-1, 20. 
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others. 46 In a number of aphorisms and notes Paul figures as only 
one of many. In The Antichrist, however, Nietzsche emphatically sin-
gles him out from the large number of promoters of the values of 
decadence. By polemicizing against him with previously unequaled 
severity, he simultaneously elevates him by means of stylization to 
the promoter of the decline. 
III 
In the course of the year 1888 Nietzsche's impression intensified that 
on the basis of his insights he was depicting a decisive crisis in the 
history of humanity. Excluding Ecce Homo, he speaks of his world-
historical significance in the introductory passages to his last writ-
ings, 47 in his correspondence, 48 and in a number of fragments in his 
Nachlafl. 4q He maintains that only "from him on" was there "great 
politics" (i.e., that which calls "life" in its total development to ac-
count);50 that he is breaking world history into two pieces;51 that he 
must undertake an enormous task52 -these and similar utterances 
are characteristic of his later work. The process that brought about 
this extravagant presentation of himself Nietzsche designates as the 
"revaluation of all values."53 As the negative side of the "revaluation" 
he understands the opposition to, and vanquishing of, the values of 
decadence; as the positive side, the erection and reinforcement of new 
values stemming from those who have turned out well (die Wohlgera-
tenen).54 For the designation of the positive side Nietzsche made use 
46. In this regard, cf. A, sec. 4; WKG, VI-3, 169. 
47. Cf. the Preface toG; WKG, VI-3, 51£.; and above all, section 1 of the Preface to 
Ecce Homo; WKG, VI-3, 255. 
48. Cf., for example, his letters to Brandes of 20 October 1888, to Strindberg of 
7 December 1888, and to Overbeck of 24 December 1888, among others. 
49. From among a profusion of notes, cf., for example, the two fragments from the 
Nachlafi, December 1888 to the beginning of January 1889, 25 [6 and 7]; WKG, VIII-3, 
453£. 
50. Cf. ibid., 25 [1]; WKG, VIII-3, 451£. 
51. Cf. his letter to Strindberg of 7 December 1888. 
52. Cf. G, Preface; WKG, VI-3, 51. 
53. Cf. in this regard my article "Der Antichrist," in Nietzsche Studien, 2 (1973), 9lff.; 
here, 93f., especially nn. 10-12. 
54. Cf. the plan in the Nachlafi, September 1888, 19 [8]; WKG, VIII-3, 347. The first 
three books were to establish the tendencies of decadence and proclaim their defeat. 
Nietzsche wanted to oppose Christianity as the Antichrist, philosophy up to his time 
as a free spirit, and decadence morality in general as an immoralist. Under the superscrip-
tion Dionysus the fourth book was to establish the new and positive valuation-a 
"philosophy of the eternal recurrence." 
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of the symbols "Dionysus" and "Zarathustra" as well as formal titles 
such as "philosophy of the future.'65 
In order to render credible the necessity and inevitability of his 
"revaluation," Nietzsche placed his morality of decadence before the 
eyes of his readers in a continuous onrush of ideas: he speculated 
about their origin, exposed their inner contradictoriness, described 
in strident fashion their negative consequences, and attempted at 
the same time to root out their fundamental indefensibility. This 
tendency found its clearest expression in The Antichrist, from which 
Nietzsche expected a powerful effect. 56 At the end of Ecce Homo 
Nietzsche finally coined what is probably the most easily remem-
bered formula for the direction of his "revaluation": "Dionysus versus 
the Crucified One."57 Whoever propagates the new values, the "disci-
ples of the philosopher Dionysus,"58 must oppose the values desig-
nated by the symbol of "the Crucified One." The accurate decoding 
of these two symbols and their formal comparison is thus the most 
appropriate path to Nietzsche's later philosophy. When Nietzsche 
says "the Crucified One," "God on the Cross," or "Christ on the 
Cross," he does not have the "historical Jesus" in mind, and conse-
quently we cannot connect these symbols in any relevant way with 
his "psychology of the redeemer."59 Rather, these symbols sum up 
the basic inclination of later Christianity, whose true founder Nietz-
sche identified as Paul. Nietzsche reminds us of "the inestimable 
words of Paul: 'The weak things of the world ... hath God chosen': 
that was the formula, decadence was victorious in Hoc signo.-God on 
the Cross--do we still not understand the terrible ulterior motivation 
behind this symbol? Everything that suffers, everything that hangs 
55. On "Dionysus," cf. n. 54 above and the text below; "Zarathustra" needs no 
further reference; on "philosophy" and "philosophers" "of the future," cf., for exam-
ple, J, sees. 42 and 210; WKG, Vl-2, 55 and 146ff. The subtitle of J is "Prelude to a 
Philosophy of the Future." 
56. Cf. in this regard my article "Der Antichrist" (above, n. 53), p. 93 and n. 8. 
57. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 9; WKG, VI-3, 372. 
58. Ecce Homo, Preface, sec. 2; WKG, Vl-3, 256. Cf. the study by Rose Pfeffer, Nietz-
sche: Disciple of Dionysus (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1972), and my 
review in Nietzsche Studien, 2 (1973), 315ff. 
59. It is thus incorrect and can lead to untenable conclusions when a critic such as 
Jaspers takes "the Crucified One" as Nietzsche's symbol for (the historical) Jesus: "For 
Nietzsche, the great adversary of Jesus was Dionysus. Almost all statements of Nietz-
sche are expressed in terms that are against Jesus and for Dionysus. Jesus' death on the 
cross was for him the expression of declining life and an indictment of life ... " (Nietz-
sche und das Christentum, p. 73). This criticism can also be made of Paul Wolff-cf. his 
"Dionysus oder der Gekreuzigte. Zur Lebensidee Nietzsches," in Wolff, Denken zmd 
Glauben. Reden und Aufsiitze (Trier: Paulinus Verlag, 1963), pp. 85ff. 
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on the cross, is divine .... We all hang on the cross, consequently 
we are divine ... we alone are divine. Christianity was a victory, a 
more noble sentiment perished because of it,-Christianity has been 
mankind's greatest misfortune so far .... "60 
If it is in Christianity that the life-hostile morality of decadence re-
ceives especially clear expression, and if it has shown itself in this 
form to have been a factor in history such as no other, then it is 
understandable that the "revaluator" Nietzsche viewed Paul, the "in-
ventor" of Christianity, as one of his great adversaries, and finally 
as the great adversary. In his reflections on the symbol of "the Cruci-
fied One" Nietzsche expresses both his decisive rejection of this 
symbol and his respect for the overwhelming significance of it and 
its "creator." Nietzsche states emphatically that "God on the Cross" 
was and is far superior to all earlier and later symbols of decadence in 
terms of its power and range. An indication of this is his thesis that 
all countermovements to Christianity that have been produced up 
to now were in fact merely propagating secularized variations of 
the Christian ideas of morality. Nietzsche notes, for example, "irony 
against those who believe Christianity has been overcome by the 
modem natural sciences. The Christian value-judgments are abso-
lutely not overcome by means of these. 'Christ on the Cross' is the 
most sublime symbol-still .... "61 Acknowledgment of the great-
ness and decisive rejection of the tendency complement each other. 
Thus while Nietzsche speaks of the "grandiose paradox" expressed in 
the formula "God on the Cross," he adds, however, that with that 
"all good taste in Europe for millennia" has been destroyed. 62 
In a note from within the compass of The Antichrist Nietzsche ex-
pressly places in juxtaposition "The two types: Dionysus and the Cru-
cified One." In his opinion, the two types differ "not ... with regard 
to their martyrdom; it is merely that in each case this has a different 
significance," namely, in the one the negation of life and the denun-
ciation of its essential impulses as "evil," in the other the "promise 
into life" -it "will be eternally reborn and return from the destruc-
tion."63 In order for a disengagement from Paul's symbol and the 
consequences of its propagation by him to take place, fortunate cir-
cumstances are needed, in Nietzsche's view. Even those who have 
turned out well and the brave, who are capable of taking steps in 
60. A, sec. 51; WKG, VJ-3, 230. 
61. Nachlafl, autumn 1885 to autumn 1886, 2 [96]; WKG, VIII-1, 106. 
62. Nachlafl, spring 1884, 25 [292]; WKG, VJI-2, 82. Cf. ibid., 25 [344], 98f. 
63. Nachlafl, spring 1888, 14 [89]; WKG, VIII-3, 57ff. 
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this direction, will not remain without "attack," as the following 
note reveals: "What kind of character traits a person must have to 
dispense with God,-what kind, to dispense with the 'religion of 
the cross'? Courage, sternness of mind, pride, independence and 
hardness, decisiveness, no melancholy, etc. Christianity is victorious 
again and again by means of a retrogression.-Certain circumstances 
must be favorable."64 
It is well known that Nietzsche already uses the term "the Diony-
sian" as well as the symbol "Dionysus" in his early work The Birth of 
Tragedy. While he still uses them equivocally in this work-on the 
one hand as the designation for one of the poles in the contrasting 
pair Apollo-Dionysus, and on the other, however, as the overriding 
unity of both-they later become more and more Nietzsche's symbol 
for the one reality. 65 This is revealed above all in Nietzsche's self-
interpretations. 66 In the Preface of 1886 he writes in retrospect: "It 
was against morality that my instinct ... turned at that time; it was 
an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for itself a 
fundamentally opposite valuation of life ... [I] baptized ... it ... in 
the name of a Greek god; I called it Dionysian."67 At the end of The 
Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche likewise comes to speak of his early 
work and stresses: "The Birth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of 
all values." He emphasizes that he still cherishes the symbol "Dio-
nysus," for he himself is "the last disciple of the philosopher Dio-
nysus," and as such "the teacher of the eternal recurrence."68 At 
another point Nietzsche states with emphasis what is negated by 
means of the symbol "Dionysus" and how fundamental is this nega-
tion: "Whoever does not merely comprehend the word 'Dionysian,' 
but comprehends himself in the word 'Dionysian,' has no need of a 
64. Nachlafl, spring 1884, 25 [404]; WKG, VII-2, 113. 
65. Cf. the beginning of GT: "We will have gained much for the science of aesthetics 
when we ... perceive with absolute certainty that the further development of art is 
bound up with the Apollonian and Dionysian duality ... " (GT, sec. 1; WKG, III-1, 21), 
and in contrast to this the identification of the Dionysian with the single world-will in 
sec. 18 of the same work (WKG, 111-1, lllff.). On the interpretation of the "Diony-
sian," d. the studies of Peter Koster, esp. Der sterbliche Colt. Nietzsches Entwurf iiber~ 
menschlicher Grofle, Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, no. 103 (Meisen-
heim am Clan: Hain, 1972), and "Die Renaissance des Tragischen," in Nietzsche Stu~ 
dien, 1 (1972), 185ff. 
66. "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," that is, the later Preface (first pub. 1886) to GT; 
WKG, III-1, 5ff. Cf. further Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": The Birth of 
Tragedy; WKG, VI-3, 307ff.; and FW (Book Five), 370; WKG, V-2, 301££. 
67. GT, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," sec. 5; WKG, III-1, 13. 
68. C, "What I Owe to the Ancients," sec. 5; WKC, Vl-3, 154. 
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refutation of Plato, or of Christianity, or of Schopenhauer-he smells 
tlze decay . ... "69 
The thrust of the above-cited statements reveals that with the sym-
bol of "the Crucified One" Nietzsche does not have in mind merely 
Christianity in the stricter sense, but rather its chief characteristic, 
which also receives expression in other decadence teachings. With 
the formula "Dionysus versus the Crucified One" he is, accordingly, 
concerned with the question of revaluation in general, with the 
struggle of the values of ascending life ( = of those who have turned 
out well) against the values of declining life ( = of the decadents). 
With the invention or "creation"70 of God, which is expressed in the 
symbol "God on the Cross," Paul, according to Nietzsche's analysis, 
brought about a "revaluation" whose boldness even his most reso-
lute opponents can only stand back and admire. To be sure, an "un-
timeliness," an elevation of one's self above the standards of the 
time, is necessary in order to be able to see and evaluate this. Only 
whoever is a "revaluator" himself can judge the greatness of the 
deed of an earlier "revaluator" in proper fashion. "Modern men, 
dulled to all Christian nomenclature, no longer sense the awful su-
perlative for a classical taste that lay in the formula 'God on the 
Cross.' Never yet and nowhere else has there been such boldness in 
reversing course, never anything as horrible, questioning, and ques-
tionable as this formula; it promised a revaluation of all the values of 
antiquity.'m 
Nietzsche expressed in Ecce Homo in coded form the manner in 
which the "Dionysian revaluator," who intends with his "revalua-
tion" to bring about a dialecticaz72 return to the original valuation of 
those who have turned out well, 73 must confront and at the same 
69. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": The Birth of Tragedy, sec. 2; WKG, 
VI-3, 310. 
70. A, sec. 47; WKG, VI-3, 223. Cf. Eberhard Jungcl, "Deus qualem Paulus creavit, 
dei negatio. Zur Denkbarkeit Gottes bei Ludwig Feuerbach und Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Eine Beobachtung," in Nietzsche Studien, 1 (1972), 286ff., esp. 296. 
71. J, sec. 46; WKG, VI-2, 65. 
72. If I am advocating the thesis that certain of Nietzsche's lines of thought must be 
interpreted, in the words of Rose Pfeffer, as most nearly "analogous to the Hegelian 
dialectical movement" (Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus, pp. 39ff.), then it should be 
carefully noted that it is a matter here of analogy and not of identity. The reader will 
find a more detailed explanation at the beginning of Section V. 
73. Although Nietzsche saw in the Greeks before Socrates an enduring prototype 
for all those who had turned out well and their system of values (cf., for example, 
Nachlafi, June-July 1885, 37 [71; WKG, VII-3, 306-308), he did not wish simply to 
return to them with his "Dionysian philosophy." He wanted certainly to be "the Anti-
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time be a match for the one who brought about the "revaluation" in 
favor of the values of decadence. 
People have never asked me, although they ought to have, what 
precisely in my mouth, in the mouth of the first immoralist, the 
name Zarathustra means, for that which constitutes the enormous 
historical uniqueness of this Persian in history is exactly the oppo-
site of this. Zarathustra was the first to observe in the fight of 
good and evil the very wheel in the machinery; the transposition 
of morality into the metaphysical realm ... is his work. But this 
question would in fact be its own answer. Zarathustra created this 
disastrous error, morality; consequently he must be the first to rec-
ognize it. Not only because he has had more experience in this 
matter, and for a longer time, than any other thinker-the whole 
of history is after all the refutation by experiment of the principle 
of the so-called "world order"-but what is more important, Zara-
thustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His teaching and 
his teaching alone regards truthfulness as the highest virtue-this 
means the opposite of the cowardice of the "idealist," who flees 
from reality; Zarathustra has more intestinal fortitude than all 
other thinkers put together. 74 
Nietzsche is saying in this passage concerning the relationship be-
tween "his Zarathustra" and the "historical Zarathustra" that the for-
mer is inimical to the latter in that it draws conclusions from the lat-
ter's teachings. This corresponds to what he says in other passages 
concerning the "self-overcoming" of Christianity. The "truthfulness" 
he speaks of in the above quotation Nietzsche designates at other 
points as the Christian virtue par excellence/5 and he places value on 
the conclusion that it is precisely this consequence of Christianity of 
which it will ultimately perish. 76 When Nietzsche in his late phase 
confronts the "revaluator" Paul as a "Dionysian revaluator" with the 
christ ... in Greek," but by no means "only in Greek" (Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such 
Good Books," sec. 2; WKG, VI-3, 300). 
74. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 3; WKG, VI-3, 365. 
75. Cf., above all, FW (Book Five), 344; WKG, V-2, 256ff. 
76. Cf. Nachlafl, autumn 1885 to autumn 1886, 2 [127]; WKG, VIII-1, 123-25 (WM, 
sec. 1): "the sense of truthfulness, developed highly by Christianity, is nauseated by the 
falseness and mendacity of all Christian interpreters of the world and of history." Cf. 
FW (Book Five), 357; WKG, V-2, 282: "We see what was actually victorious over the 
Christian God: Christian morality itself, the ever more rigorously understood concept 
of truthfulness .... " 
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formula "Dionysus versus the Crucified One," then this signifies that 
he conceives of his relationship to the Apostle essentially in terms of 
neither a mere conflict nor a secret kinship, but rather in terms of a 
dialectical overcoming _77 
IV 
If Nietzsche comes to speak of the great representatives and promul-
gators of the values of decadence, then he chiefly names Socrates and 
the "founder of Christianity" (i.e., Jesus or Paul; ultimately, Paul 
alone). In the end Paul apparently became more important for Nietz-
sche than Socrates--this, at least, seems unmistakable to me. Nietz-
sche's polemic against the Apostle is much more vehement/8 he fa-
vors the title ''Antichrist" over that of the "free spirit"; and most 
importantly, he sums up in Ecce Homo his entire struggle precisely 
with the formula "Dionysus versus the Crucified One." Why Nietz-
sche finally came to view Paul as the decisive "revaluator" in favor of 
the values of decadence can perhaps be explained by the following 
more detailed examination of his understanding of Paul. For the time 
being it can be said that in general he conceives of Christianity as the 
most comprehensive movement in which the values of Western phi-
losophy have been preserved, so to speak. 79 Moreover, the fact that 
Socrates' design for a system of values exists merely in isolated frag-
ments80 that do not give us as clear a picture as in the case of Paul 
may also have played a role here. 
As we have mentioned, Nietzsche twice dealt with Paul more thor-
oughly: on the occasion of his work on The Dawn, and in his last 
creative year. If we want an overview of his understanding of the 
person and work of the Apostle, then it is best to proceed from the 
more objective, less polemic notes and reflections from the years 
77. This is the true gist of Bernoulli's thesis regarding kinship in opposition (cf. 
nn. 14-16 above). 
78. Compare A, sees. 37ff., with G, "The Problem of Socrates." 
79. Thus "in the final analysis" Nietzsche sees in Kant only an "underhanded Chris-
tian" (G, "'Reason' in Philosophy," sec. 6; WKG, VI-3, 73), and "German philosophy" 
in particular is for him "basically ... an underhanded theology" (A, sec. 10; WKG, Vl-3, 
174). 
80. Regarding the best-known and most influential image of Socrates, that of Plato, 
Nietzsche cannot free himself from the suspicion that behind this image lies a drama 
similar to Pascal's: Plato, originally one of those who had turned out well, was weak-
ened and "moralized to death" by Socrates (cf. on this point the Preface to J; WKG, VI-
2, 4f.; and Nachlafl, spring 1888, 14 [94]; WKG, VIII-3, 64). 
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1880-81. The most detailed passage of this period, the sixty-eighth 
aphorism of The Dawn, 81 is basic to the characterization that follows. 
Its heading-"The First Christian" -betrays that in it Nietzsche for 
the first time presents to the public that thesis to which he did not 
always hold at first, but which in his late phase became decisive 
for him: namely, that Paul and not Jesus is to be regarded as the 
"founder" of Christianity. Nietzsche introduces this thesis in the fol-
lowing way: without the "remarkable history" of Paul, "without the 
confusion and turmoil of such a mind, such a soul, there would be 
no Christianity; we would scarcely have heard of a small Jewish sect 
whose master died on the cross." The fact that this insight had not 
long been known and acknowledged was due, in Nietzsche's view, to 
our reluctance-which had become a matter of habit-to read and 
interpret the New Testament just as any other book. Since people 
either believe "in the authorship of the 'Holy Spirit'" or stand in 
some way "under the influence of this belief," they pay as a rule little 
attention to who is writing here and with what intent. For a millenni-
um and a half, he states, nobody had read the New Testament writ-
ings from a new standpoint, and later on only "a few scholars" at the 
most. 82 But if we were to begin to read the New Testament "not as 
the revelation of the 'Holy Spirit,' but rather with an open and hon-
est mind of our own, and also without thinking thereby of our own 
personal need"-if we were to begin to read the New Testament in a 
philological sense, 83 we would then discover in the writings of Paul 
the true origin of Christianity, and its effectiveness would soon be at 
an end. 
Further passages have it as their goal to investigate what lies be-
hind the writings of Paul and the reports concerning him, and by 
means of a "psychology" of the Apostle Paul84 to understand the 
genesis of Christianity. Paul is exposed in Nietzsche's analysis as 
nature in conflict with itself, and thus as a decadent. He was "hot-
81. WKG, V-1, 60ff. If not otherwise noted, the citations that follow are taken from 
this aphorism. 
82. This remark is probably an allusion to Ludemann (d. n. 23 above). 
83. Cf. A, sec. 36; WKG, VI-3, 206: "For the first time we, we who have become free 
spirits, have the presuppositions for understanding something that nineteen centuries 
have misunderstood .... " 
84. "On the Psychology of Paul," reads the heading to a note in the NachlajJ, spring 
1888, 14 [57]; WKG, VIII-3, 36 (WM, sec. 171). In A Nietzsche only briefly repeated his 
earlier "Psychology of Paul" published in M, essentially taking it for granted. On the 
other hand, his "Psychology of the Redeemer," namely Jesus, nowhere received such clear 
contours before (cf. A, sec. 28; WKG, VI-3, 196). 
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headed, sensual, melancholy, malicious in his hatred"; his extant ut-
terances are suggestive of all that lay on his conscience, namely, 
"hostility, murder, idol worship, filthiness, drunkenness, and a de-
sire for dissolute revelry." The concept sarx, with which Paul himself 
summed up all such tendencies as these, is rendered by Nietzsche as 
"carnality."85 In opposition to this "carnality," Paul had always pas-
sionately striven to fulfill the Jewish Law and its demands. Just like 
Luther later on, Paul must have had moments in which he gave vent 
to the contradictoriness of his inclinations with the lament: "It is all 
in vain! The torment of the unfulfilled Law cannot be overcome."86 
The fanatical zeal with which Paul persecuted the Christian sect 
is taken by Nietzsche as a double indication: on the one hand, of 
Paul's difficulty in fulfilling the Law, which he wished to overcome 
by means of such activities; on the other, of the fact that the Apostle 
suspected that a way out, that a possible solution to his problem 
might lie with this sect. His thoughts at this time must have revolved 
more and more around the problem of why he "could not fulfill the 
Law itself; in fact, and this is what seemed strangest to him, that his 
wanton lust for power was continually stimulated to overstep it, and 
that he had to give in to this thorn." One step further and he would 
not have been able to rid himself of the suspicion that it was not 
"carnality" that was causing him to transgress the Law, but "the Law 
itself, which must continually prove to be unfulfillable and tempts 
us with irresistible fascination to transgression."87 Nietzsche here 
breaks off briefly and remarks that Paul "at that time" had "not yet 
[seen] this alternative" clearly. A special event was necessary to con-
vey these reflections all at once fully into his conscious mind-the 
vision before the gates of Damascus.88 As Nietzsche depicts it, this 
key experience had the function of making Paul immediately aware 
of his problem and its solution; further, it allowed him to understand 
these insights as having been revealed from God or the resurrected 
85. Among Nietzsche's fragments from Ludemann's book cf. fragments 4 [231] and 
4 [251]; WKG, V-1, 488 and 492. 
86. In this regard a clear parallel can be found in Nietzsche's image of Socrates. In 
Nietzsche's opinion, Socrates also had "every evil vice and desire" within him, but 
overcame them nevertheless through the erection of a "tyranny of reason" (d. G, "The 
Problem of Socrates," esp. sees. 3, 9, and 10; WKG, VI-3, 63 and 65f. Nietzsche's 
source was Cicero, Tusc. IV, 37, 80, where the "physiognomist" is identified as Zopy-
rus. Cf. also Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, an author whom Nietzsche admired and 
whose works he possessed ("Uber Physiognomik" in Vermischte Schriften, 8 vols. [Got-
tingen: Dieterichsche Buchhandlung, 1867], IV, 31). 
87. Here Ludemann's interpretation comes into play (cf. above, nn. 26 and 27). 
88. Cf. Acts 9:1-9; 1 Cor. 9:1 and 15:8. 
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Christ. "And finally the saving thought occurred to him simulta-
neously with a vision-as it could not otherwise have been the case 
with this epileptic: to him, the fanatical zealot of the Law who was 
inwardly sick unto death of it, to him appeared on a lonely road 
that same Christ with the glory of God on his countenance, and Paul 
heard the words: 'Why persecutest thou me?'" 
What is of interest here in terms of Nietzsche's psychological 
analysis could be described as a process within the "mind" of the 
Apostle. His mind became clear-Paul understood all at once the 
cross and the resurrection of Christ as the convincing answer to 
his problem. According to Nietzsche, Paul later declared that Jesus 
Christ had fulfilled the Law on the cross and with his resurrection 
had overcome it. He is the "destroyer of the Law." As a consequence 
of this experience Saul, the zealot of the Law, becomes Paul, the 
"teacher of the destruction of the Law." What gives the "conversion" of 
Paul the rank of a "world-historical event" in the eyes of Nietzsche 
and elevates it above a merely private experience is its illustrative 
character; here the "genius" of Paul becomes manifest, for he found 
a solution that many who came after him could understand and ac-
cept as a solution to their own problems. In an earlier work Nietz-
sche had described "genius" in the following way: "To desire a lofty 
goal and the means to attain it."89 As mentioned above, 90 he later 
conceived of this "desire also for the means" in terms of involvement 
in political activity, and contrasted the "man of genius" with the 
unpolitical"idiot." In our aphorism Nietzsche describes Paul in such 
a way that we must understand him as such a "man of genius." "The 
enormous consequences of this idea, of this solution to his problem, 
whirl before his eyes; suddenly he becomes the happiest of men-
the fate of the Jews, no, of all people seems to be bound up with 
this idea, with the very instant of his sudden inspiration; he has 
the thought of thoughts, 91 the key of keys, the light of lights; from 
henceforth history will revolve around him!"92 
As an addendum to this climax of his exposition Nietzsche para-
phrases or quotes a few more statements of Paul, placing his main 
emphasis on the idea that for the Apostle "carnality" and the Law 
work together in tempting man to sin. With the conclusion to the 
aphorism Nietzsche finally returns to its title. 
89. Cf. MA IIII, sec. 378; WKG, IV-3, 162. 
90. Cf. WKG, IV-3, Sf. 
91. It is important to note the use of this phrase, which Nietzsche otherwise only 
applies to his idea of recurrence. 
92. Cf. also NachlajJ, autumn 1887, 10 [1811; WKG, VIII-2, 230f. (WM, sec. 175). 
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Just a short time longer amid this decay!-that is the lot of the 
Christian before he, having become one with Christ, rises again 
with Christ, takes part in the divine majesty along with Christ, 
and, like Christ, becomes the "son of God."-With that Paul's ec-
stasy is at its peak, and likewise the obtrusiveness of his soul-
with the thought of becoming one with Christ every bit of shame, 
subordination, every barrier is removed from his soul, and the in-
tractable will of the desire for power manifests itself as an anticipa-
tory reveling in divine majesty.-This is the first Christian, the in-
ventor of Christianity! Up to then there had only been Jewish 
sectarians. 
The "kinship" to Paul that has been correctly assumed to lie behind 
Nietzsche's vehement polemics against the Apostle has been charac-
terized above as a "dialectical resemblance." A sketch from Nietz-
sche's attempt to draft a "history of morals" will help to shed light on 
this thesis. 93 
According to Nietzsche's view of history, originally (that is, in the 
long periods of prehistory) only those who had turned out well were 
value-creating and value-determining. 94 The establishment and pro-
mulgation of values was accomplished in spontaneous, instinctive 
acts of life; it was not supported by theories and was thus, so to 
speak, pretheoretical. The victorious ones at any given time, the su-
perior caste, the tribe that had subjugated another-these succeeded 
in making their value-judgments valid within the sphere of their 
domination. Whenever the rulers lost their dominant position, then 
their values as well had to make way for those of the new victors. 
Thus only very little remains of these early forms of "master mo-
rality";95 what we have left are mere traces that extend forward into 
the historical period in the form of codices and the like. For example, 
Nietzsche regarded the Greeks up to the fifth century before Christ 
93. An important section of Nietzsche's work in this regard is the fifth book of J 
("Natural History of Morals"; WKG, VI-2, 105ff.). Cf. on this point Wolfgang Mi.iller-
Lauter, Nietzsche. Seine Philosophic der Gegensiitze und die Gegensiitze seiner Philosophic 
(Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1971), pp. 34ff. 
94. Cf., for example, J, sec. 260; WKG, Vl-2, 218: "The noble type of man feels 
himself to be value-determining ... he knows himself as that which first gives honor 
to things, he is value-creating." 
95. J, sec. 260; WKG, VI-2, 218 and 221£. Cf. The Case of Wagner, Epilogue; WKG, VI-
3, 44. 
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as a well-turned-out, value-setting people whose system of values in 
outline was basic to the thought of the great "tragic philosophers" 
before Socrates. As regards the pre-Socratics themselves, Nietzsche's 
position is not consistent: he first viewed them as strong types in 
whom the antithetical tendency to Socratic decadence was expressed;96 
but soon his judgment began to vacillate.97 In his late phase his inter-
est in these philosophers diminished; when he reproaches the phi-
losophers as a group for lacking a sense of history and distrusting 
the witness of the senses, then he excepts only Heraclitus to a certain 
extent. 98 
If one interprets the "history of morals" that can be ascertained 
from Nietzsche's numerous statements as a dialectic movement, then 
this first epoch stands as the thesis. The establishment, promulga-
tion, and supersession of values is carried out during this epoch in 
close harmony with life and its vicissitudes, and lacks all theoreti-
cal foundation. When value-systems in rough outline of the type of 
the "master morality" become codified, fixed in constitutions, or are 
even written down or expounded philosophically at the beginning of 
the historical period, then, in Nietzsche's view, an ambiguous situa-
tion arises: the danger exists thereby that a certain complex of values 
may become cut off from its supporters and from the conditions un-
der which it is meaningful and promotes life, and that this complex 
of values may then become entrenched. 
The way for the second phase in the history of morals was pre-
pared, according to Nietzsche, in various areas and cultural realms 
by means of this sort of severing and entrenchment. Nietzsche 
speaks in terms of decadence movements and he attempts in greater 
or lesser detail to describe them. His most frequent and intensive 
critical encounters have been with the Jews, who "brought into be-
ing that marvelous achievement of the inversion of values" by hold-
ing fast to their God and the values he represented even after they 
(the Jews) had lost their dominance. Nietzsche claims that he can 
also read with particular clarity in the further development of the 
Jews and their religion the difficulty that was caused by this "inver-
sion." In Nietzsche's view, the inner consequence of their attempt 
forced the Jews more and more to reinterpret and falsify their his-
tory-to write as if their past greatness were the cause of their pres-
96. Cf. Die Philosophie im tragischen Zcitalter der Griechen (1873); WKG, III-2, 293ff. 
97. Nietzsche writes accordingly in one of his notes in the Nachlafi (summer 1875, 6 
[35]; WKG, IV-1, 188) that the disunity of the Greeks and the Persian Wars were to 
blame that the beginnings of a higher and further development did not last. 
98. Cf. on this point G, "'Reason' in Philosophy," sees. 1 and 2; WKG, Vl-3, 68f. 
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ent decline. Nietzsche is even able to say at one point that it was 
with the Jews that "the slave rebellion in morals" began-namely, 
the establishment and promulgation of values that have arisen from 
the perspective of powerlessness. 99 Nietzsche believed he could per-
ceive in Buddhism, especially Chinese Buddhism, a less aggressive 
attempt to hold to traditional values in spite of a decline. 10° From his 
late period we should also mention his reading of the Manu law-
book, in whose caste system he saw delineated a relatively accept-
able classification of the values of decadence. 101 
An even more interesting decadence movement for Nietzsche, and 
one which by virtue of its effect is of greater importance in the 
long run, is that of Greek philosophy after Socrates. In contrast to 
the Sophists, the post-Socratic philosophers were, from Nietzsche's 
standpoint, typical reactionaries who were striving to get back to 
"the old virtues." The philosopher "desired the ideal polis, after the 
concept 'polis' had become obsolete (much the way the Jews held on 
to the idea of themselves as a 'people' after they had fallen into 
bondage)." Here, too, reinterpretation and falsification were immedi-
ately put into practice. "Gradually everything genuinely Hellenic"-
thus, precisely that which was to be protected and preserved-"was 
made responsible for the decline (and Plato was just as ungrateful to 
Homer, tragedy, rhetoric, and Pericles as the prophets to David and 
Saul)-the decline of Greece is understood as an objection to the founda-
tion of Hellenistic culture: fundamental error of the philosophers . .. .'1102 
If we follow Nietzsche's reasoning, then these transitional forms 
remained for a long period merely local movements, or those re-
stricted to certain portions of society (namely, the "lower" levels). 
Nietzsche begins by saying that similar tendencies will always ex-
ist-in fact, must always exist. For, as he writes in a note from the 
Nachlaft, "decadence ... belongs to all epochs of humanity; there ex-
ists everywhere discarded and decayed material; it is a process of 
life itself, the elimination of decaying and degenerate creatures."103 
Nietzsche questions in passing whether his own time, which he con-
siders "in a certain sense ripe (namely, decadent)," does not need a 
99. ], sec. 195; WKG, VI-2, 118f. Cf. also GM, I, sec. 10; WKG Vl-2, 284ff.; and A, 
sec. 25; WKG VI-3, 191f. 
100. Nietzsche took "chinoiserie" (Chineserei) as his symbol for the "deepest level-
ing" (FW [Book Five], sec. 377; WKG, V-2, 311); Kant was designated disapprovingly 
as the "great Chinaman from Konigsberg" (J, sec. 210; WKG, VI-2, 148). 
101. Cf. G, "Morality as Anti-Nature"; WKG, VI-3, 76ff. 
102. Nachlaf3, November 1887 to March 1888, 11 [375]; WKG, VIII-2, 410. 
103. Ibid., 11 [226]; ibid., 329. 
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new "Buddhism," which could supersede "aggressive Christianity" 
and its secularized daughters; "a European Buddhism might perhaps 
be indispensable."104 Along with the "decadence movements, accord-
ing to Nietzsche's analysis, there also existed in this transitional pe-
riod value-systems in outline form of those who have turned out 
well, and these have been the determinant and dominant ones. 
Nietzsche names the Romans as the chief bearers of the master mo-
rality during this period. The growing threat of the values of deca-
dence was compensated for by the overwhelming strength of the 
ruling Romans, and the victory procession of the "decline" was de-
layed. The Romans were "the strong and noble, and none stronger 
and nobler has ever existed on earth or has ever been dreamed of; 
every remnant of them, every inscription delights us, provided that 
we divine what was writing there.''105 
According to this thesis of Nietzsche's late philosophy, the situa-
tion did not change until the rise of Christianity. This particular deca-
dence movement succeeded in seizing power and holding it for an 
extended period of time. That it was able to do this was due chiefly 
to the work of Paul. To a certain extent we have already shown how 
and with what arguments Nietzsche presents this thesis; the follow-
ing comments will serve to round out his argumentation. 
Among Nietzsche's statements concerning the origin of Christian-
ity two above all are of interest in regard to the theme of the present 
investigation. The first has to do with his thoughts on the "trium-
phant progress" of Christianity. He establishes as decisive the fact 
that Christianity was successful in taking up and binding to itself 
the main tendencies of all the important decadence movements of an-
tiquity: it took its "basic foundation" from Judaism, from which it 
arose and which, as Nietzsche maintains, it simply carried on in freer 
form; from Greek philosophy it drew the structures of its method of 
reasoning and verification; the idea of redemption and its practical 
applications it took over from the Near Eastern mystery religions; 
contemplation and asceticism from the older Asiatic decadence move-
ments; and so on. Secondly, in Nietzsche's opinion it has been deci-
sive for Christianity that it directed itself from the beginning to the 
lowest segment of society, to those who were never integrated, to 
the "chandala," without thereby disregarding the other groups-the 
oppressed, the weary, the mediocre, and finally even those who 
had turned out well. Christianity, he says, was conceived from its 
104. Ibid., 11 [366]; ibid., 404; and Nachlafi, autumn 1887, 9 [35]; WKG, VIII-2, 14-16. 
105. GM, I, sec. 16; WKG, VI-2, 300. 
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inception as a mass movement and was successful in promoting this 
idea. As we have seen, in Nietzsche's analyses the "slave revolt in 
morality" begins "when ressentiment ... becomes creative and gives 
birth to values," which occurs chiefly in the Jewish decadence move-
ment. It should be added here that Nietzsche views the "symbol of 
the holy cross" as the true sign of victory for this "revolt": "At least it 
can be said for certain that sub hoc signa Israel with its revenge and 
revaluation of all values has triumphed again and again up to now 
over all other ideals, over all more noble ideals."106 
It should now be clear that according to Nietzsche's ultimate thesis 
the aggregation of the basic characteristics of all the decadence move-
ments in Christianity, their concentration in the symbol "God on the 
Cross," and their orientation primarily toward the lower classes were 
the work of Paul. Thus the latter becomes for him the true "revalua-
tor" in favor of the values of decadence-he becomes that "world-
historical personality" who definitively ends the first epoch in the 
history of morals and ushers in a new one. As the creator of the 
victorious decadence movement, Paul serves as the exponent of antith-
esis in Nietzsche's view of history. 
As a consequence of this development brought about by Paul, 
Nietzsche states, "Judea" (that is, Pauline Christianity) was victori-
ous against "Rome" and "morality in Europe today is herd animal mo-
rality."107 True, there was no lack of countermovements by those who 
had turned out well, yet as a whole "slave morality" prevailed. 108 In 
his own conception of the "revaluation" of all values Nietzsche saw 
now the necessary third step. If we survey the numerous statements 
in which he characterizes his "revaluation," it becomes apparent that 
he describes it in a formal sense as a kind of synthesis akin to that of 
Hegel. Nietzsche's synthesis is first of all a return to the thesis: the 
type of the "master morality" is again to become valid. In a second 
sense, it is a negation of the antithesis: it opposes the values of deca-
dence and seeks to overthrow their (exclusive) legitimacy. Thirdly, it is 
preservation: Nietzsche does not want a mere return to the "master 
morality," but is interested in a forward movement in which the ex-
periences of humanity on its way to the present are to be overcome 
and yet preserved. The first two impulses, return to the thesis and 
negation of the antithesis, are undisputed by Nietzsche scholars 
and have been examined continuously. Simultaneously problematic 
106. Ibid., sees. 10 and 8; ibid., 284 and 283. 
107. GM, I, sec. 16, and J, sec. 202; WKG, VI-2, 301 and 126. 
108. Cf. my article "Der Antichrist," pp. 100-102. 
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and interesting is the third impulse, however-that of "overcoming 
preservation." 
Nietzsche does not merely intend with his philosophy of a "re-
valuation of all values" to propose a new interpretation of the reality 
of the world. Neither is it his aim to increase by one the series of 
world models thought up by Western philosophers from Socrates on. 
Rather, he wishes to establish a new "emphasis," by means of which 
the strivings and tendencies of the well-turned-out are furthered, 
and those of the decadents are hindered. Only when we take into 
account this far-reaching intent do we become aware of the sover-
eignty with which Nietzsche surveys the future in his last writings 
and notes-the sovereignty with which, in fact, he believes he can 
even look back from the future to the present. 109 Nietzsche the "re-
valuator" is here laying a cornerstone and mortaring it so firmly that 
it is to last for millennia. All architects to come will be able, in his 
opinion, to further the structure he has begun and to shape it in 
different ways-but they must proceed from the cornerstone that has 
already been laid. 
In conformity to the preaching of Paul and yet simultaneously 
surpassing it, Nietzsche offers his "gospel of the future." His "for-
mula"-"The Will to Pawer. Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values"-
stands for "a countermovement ... with respect to principle and task," 
which finally is to overcome the decadence valuation altogether, not 
merely one of its transitory forms. This all-encompassing counter-
movement will not come to pass merely in the form of an abstract 
contesting of this valuation, as can be seen from the fact that in 
Nietzsche's opinion it "logically and psychologically" presupposes 
the basic inner characteristic of decadence values, namely "nihilism"; 
it can "in the final analysis only come after it and from it." "For why 
is the advent of nihilism," that is, the "truth" now becoming evident 
of all valuations of the decadents, "now necessary? Because it is our 
previous values themselves which draw their final conclusion in it; 
because nihilism is the logic of our great values and ideals thought 
out to its conclusion-because we must first experience nihilism in 
order to get behind what was actually the value of these 'values.' 
109. Cf. Nachlafl, November 1887 to March 1888, 11 [411]; WKG, VIII-2, 431f., a text 
that Nietzsche had planned to use as a preface for his book Tlze Will to Pawer and to 
which the later editors assigned the same function in their compilation of that name: 
"Conversely, he that speaks here [sc. in opposition to the decadents of his time] has so 
far done nothing but reflect; a philosopher and recluse by instinct ... who has already 
lost his way once in every labyrinth of the future; a soothsayer-bird spirit who looks 
back when prophesying what will come" (p. 432). 
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... "
110 Whoever has already experienced that, whoever "as Europe's 
first complete nihilist ... [simultaneously] has within himself al-
ready lived nihilism to its end, whoever has it behind himself, under 
himself, beside himself" -Nietzsche is maintaining this all of him-
self-"is the called 'revaluator.' "111 Nietzsche describes himself as a 
man who, as his opposite Paul once did, has already lived out in 
exemplary fashion that which still lies in the future of other men. In 
the course of the coming centuries, he believes, more and more peo-
ple will have to agree with his insight and the consequences that he 
drew from it. 
VI 
It is thus of interest to work out that particular understanding of Paul 
from which Nietzsche directs his harsh attacks in his late work, since 
it provides an important resource for the proper interpretation of 
Nietzsche's own philosophy of the "transvaluation of all values."112 
To pursue such an interpretation further, however, no longer lies 
within the framework of the present investigation. The following 
more detailed examination of the symbol "God on the Cross" is con-
sequently intended merely to support the above thesis and to indi-
cate its direction. 
In Aphorism 68 of The Dawn Nietzsche established that Paul un-
derstood the "Crucified One" as the "destroyer of the Law." As has 
already been shown, the law plays a role as well in Nietzsche's "his-
tory of morals": the decadents of the transition phase shore them-
selves up against the tyranny of the well-turned-out-who are con-
tinually seeking to establish their own law-by appealing to the 
(universal) law. As a "typical decadent," Paul cherished the law and 
defended it against all despotism before his Damascus experience. 
According to Nietzsche, in that vision it became clear to Paul that 
this attitude of advanced decadence-his own, first, and then that of 
the many who would come after him-was no longer appropriate. 
For in the face of increasing disgregation of the drives and desires it 
becomes less and less possible for the advanced decadent to see the 
law as a protection; from a certain stage on, he suffers more from it 
than from any despotic act of the strong. It seems unavoidable that 
110. Ibid. 
111. Ibid. 
112. Cf. my article "Umwertung aller Werte," Archiv fiir Begriffsgeschichte, XXII/2 
(1978), 154-74. 
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one weakened in such a way will gradually perish. This path of a 
"Buddhistic peace movement," forbidding itself action of any kind, 
was introduced and taught by Jesus, according to the thesis put forth 
by Nietzsche (above all in The Antichrist). Here Paul did not follow 
Jesus: he made possible what was apparently impossible by open-
ing up a new source for the feeling of power, with whose help the 
advanced decadents could once again hold back their destruction. 
Alongside the effective sources up to that time, namely the values 
of those who had turned out well and universal law, Paul placed a 
third source, that is, the concept of a redeemer in the world to come, 
who chooses the weak and removes them from the observation of the 
law. Paul's "solution," as Nietzsche sees it, can consequently be de-
scribed in the following way: precisely that which the "weary one" 
( = the decadent of the first stage) plays off against the despotism of 
the strong and which gives him strength and security, namely the 
law, tortures the advanced decadent ( = the decadent of the second 
stage) most of all; whoever, therefore, overcomes the law in a way 
that can become a new source of the feeling of power for the one 
suffering from the law, "redeems" him. Thus Nietzsche calls the idea 
of the "destruction of the Law" the "thought of thoughts, the key of 
keys, the light of lights."113 
The "revaluator" Nietzsche confronts the "revaluator" Paul. In the 
symbol "Dionysus" he believes he has found that formula which no 
longer draws its strength from the formula "God on the Cross," and 
which therefore is uniquely in a position to drive the former gradu-
ally from the field. If we proceed from the idea that Nietzsche under-
stood the "subject" preserved in the Pauline formula as a basic ten-
dency, then we are not far from the conjecture that the situation is 
the same for the "subject" designated by the term "Dionysus." The 
"subject" to which the late Nietzsche refers in the symbol "Diony-
sus" he calls, as we are reminded by several quotations above, the 
"eternal recurrence of the same."114 
A few observations show that Nietzsche in fact draws a parallel 
between "destruction of the law" and "eternal recurrence of the 
same," so that for these two doctrines the same dialectic relation-
ship can be posited that we have already worked out between Nietz-
sche and Paul. As the first manifestation of this can be cited the fact 
that Nietzsche owed his recurrence idea to an experience similar to 
that of Paul before Damascus. Nietzsche's first report of this experi-
113. M, sec. 68; WKG, V-1, 63. 
114. See above, n. 54, as well as pp. 112, 113 and nn. 63 and 68. 
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ence-"The recurrence of the same. First draft"-is furnished with the 
postscript: "The beginning of August, 1881, in Sils-Maria, 6000 feet 
above the sea and much higher above all human concerns!"115 The 
fact that he had a kind of "vision" may not have been all that surpris-
ing to Nietzsche, for he had previously engaged in various musings 
on the subject of "elevated moods," inspirations, and the like. To be 
sure, this tendency increased with him after the year 1881, as Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra clearly shows. To a few friends and acquaintances 
Nietzsche gave hints, partly orally, partly in writing, that have to do 
with his "vision" and its "contents." Because of the exceptional na-
ture that Nietzsche himself attributed to his experience in the Swiss 
mountains, the report of Lou Andreas-Salome, which he allegedly 
was able to relate to her only softly and haltingly, 116 is particularly 
informative. Nietzsche indicated that his experience took on a plas-
tic and visionary nature by drawing imagery for his description from 
the visual realm, for example, in the coded reference made to Gast: 
"Thoughts have arisen on my horizon the likes of which I have not 
yet seen."117 Shortly before his experience at Sils, Nietzsche had 
used a similar image in his description of the vision of Paul: "finally 
the saving thought struck him."118 A further parallel is the most ob-
vious of all: Nietzsche calls the two thematic tendencies here-and 
only these tendencies---"thoughts of thoughts."119 He thus considers 
them and only them as central thoughts, which bind together and 
give structure to all other thoughts. A final important common factor 
becomes apparent when we look at the consequences that Nietzsche 
drew for himself with respect to the two experiences: as Paul became 
the "teacher of the destruction of the Law," Nietzsche himself became 
the "teacher of the eternal recurrence."120 
115. Nachlafi, spring-autumn 1881, 11 [141]; WKG, V-2, 392. Cf. also Nietzsche's 
own quotation of this note in Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, sec. 1; WKG, VI-3, 333. Ryogi Okochi, "Nietzsches Amor fati im Lichte 
von Karma des Buddhismus," in Nietzsche Studien, 1 (1972), 36ff. (here: 49ff.) gives an 
overview of the most important texts pertaining to this theme. 
116. Lou Andreas-Salome, Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken (Vienna: Konegen, 
1894), p. 224. 
117. Letter to Gast of 14 August 1881; GB, IV, 70. Cf. the reference to the striking 
phrase "to see a thought" in Okochi, "Nietzsches Amor fati," p. 46. 
118. M, sec. 68; WKG, V-1, 62. 
119. Concerning Paul, cf. M, sec. 68; WKG, V-1, 63; concerning Nietzsche's idea of 
eternal recurrence, cf. NachlajJ, spring-summer 1881, 11 [143]; WKG, V-2, 394; and 
Nachlafi, summer 1888, 20 [1331; WKG, VIII-3, 375. 
120. M, sec. 68; WKG, V-1, 63; and G, "What I Owe to the Ancients," sec. 5; WKG, 
VI-3, 154. 
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In the idea of the eternal recurrence of all things Nietzsche felt he 
had found that "emphasis" with which he could successfully combat 
the tendency "destruction of the law" (and also, naturally, the "es-
tablishment of the law," which proceeds from it). To be sure, the 
supersession of the old values, which he takes to be unavoidable, 
can, in his opinion, be completed only by means of a long, drawn-
out process. "Let us be on our guard against teaching such a doctrine 
like a sudden religion! It must soak in slowly, whole races must con-
tribute to it and become fruitful-so that it may become a great tree 
overshadowing all humanity yet to come. What are the couple of 
millennia during which Christianity has existed! For the greatest idea 
many millennia are necessary-it must be small and powerless for a 
long, long time!" 121 
121. Nachlafi, spring-autumn 1881, 11 [158); WKG, V-2, 401. For a detailed discus-
sion of the doctrine of eternal recurrence see the excellent study by Bernd Magnus, 
Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 
1978) and my review in Nietzsche Studien, 9 (1980), 432-40. 
VII. Amor dei and Amor fati: 
Spinoza and Nietzsche 
Joan Stambaugh 
The aim of this paper is to try to make some sort of comparison 
between Spinoza's amor dei, love of God, and Nietzsche's amor fati, 
love of fate. I do not wish primarily to deal with what Nietzsche 
thought of Spinoza (although that would be a valid and interesting 
topic), but rather to throw some light on the extraordinary phenome-
non that both thinkers, independently of each other, experienced: the 
love of God or fate. I shall begin by centering on two questions: (1) 
What is it that is loved, and (2) What kind of "love" is involved here? 
A discussion of (1) will point up some fundamental similarities, per-
haps identities, between Spinoza and Nietzsche. 
Spinoza's God and Nietzsche's fate have at least the following 
qualities in common: neither is a personal creator-God, neither has 
anything to do with teleological purposes (and thus the world utterly 
lacks these), and both are strictly necessary and could not be other-
wise in any way. Both thinkers stress the "immanence" of God or 
fate, and both could be called "pantheistic" in a qualified sense. 
Of course, Spinoza's concept of God is more developed than is 
Nietzsche's concept of fate because God is the very core and foun-
dation of Spinoza's thought. Novalis had called him a "man drunk 
with God" ("ein gottbetrunkener Mensch"). In contrast, what Nietz-
sche means by fate is intertwined with his basic ideas and is scarcely 
coherent or meaningful without them. In other words, God is the 
all-encompassing reality for Spinoza, whereas what Nietzsche says 
about fate is by itself not sufficient to delineate the originality of 
what he had in mind. 
1. What it is that is loved-Spinoza 
Having briefly stated what the two thinkers have in common-which 
will be the substance of this paper-let us examine some of the 
unique features of Spinoza's God. Spinoza begins his Ethics by defin-
ing causa sui, the cause of itself whose essence involves existence, 
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God; but this does not tell us what is unique about Spinoza's concep-
tion because it is the traditional definition going back to medieval 
times, with its ultimate roots in Greece. How to think a cause of it-
self concretely is problematic anyhow. It seems to be primarily a way 
of asserting the absolute independence of God; no one else caused 
Him. 
Negatively speaking, God is not a person, and He does not create 
the world. The world follows from God with an immediate necessity 
which Spinoza describes in geometrical terms. Because we are con-
cerned with the naturans and not the naturata right now, with God 
and not with the world, we shall focus on what it means to say that 
God is not a person. For Spinoza, man is not created in the image of 
God, rather it is man who in his ignorance tries to "create" God in 
the image of man. Intellect and will in God are entirely different from 
human intellect and will in both essence and existence, so much so 
that all they have in common is the mere name. 1 Most importantly, 
God's intellect is spontaneous, not receptive, to use Kantian terms. 
What He thinks, He thereby creates. In God, intellect, will, and 
power are one and the same thing, and God's very essence is power. 2 
If we can conceive of God as power and spontaneous intellect to-
gether, we approach the nonanthropomorphic and nonanthropological 
dimension of Spinoza's God. He is absolutely necessary and cannot 
possibly be other than He is. Necessity and freedom coincide; to be 
free is to be self-determined from the necessity of one's being. This is 
what is distinctive about Spinoza's conception. The rest of what he 
says coincides more or less with traditional ideas. 
2. What kind of love 
What kind of relation does man bring to this God whose intellect 
and will are so different from his that they have nothing in common 
but the name? Spinoza defines love as joy accompanied by the idea 
of an external cause. 3 Joy he defines as a man's passage from a lesser 
to a greater perfection,4 stressing that joy is not perfection itself since 
that would not involve emotion. Joy is, so to speak, on the way to 
perfection. Emotions always move in a certain direction; they take us 
somewhere. 
1. Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, I, prop. XVII. 
2. Ibid., prop. XXXIV. 
3. Ibid., III, prop. XIII. 
4. Ibid., def. 11. 
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But what does Spinoza mean by perfection? He states that the 
most common way of speaking about perfection and imperfection is 
analogous to the way men talk about good and evil. They have an 
ideal standard in mind, say of a house, and according to how some-
thing does or does not measure up to this standard it is judged per-
fect or imperfect, good or evil. These are merely human ways of 
thinking and feeling; essentially they say nothing about the actual 
nature of what is being judged. Furthermore, such judgments make 
sense for Spinoza only in relation to man-made objects, objects of 
techne; they are totally inapplicable and inappropriate to things of 
nature, which just are as they are and cannot be otherwise. 
Spinoza's own use of the word "perfection" (perficere) is closer to 
the nonjudgmental quality of being accomplished, completed, in this 
sense per-fected. 5 In keeping with his constant and vigorous rejec-
tion of final causes, Spinoza states that things are not put in the 
world by God in order to attain some end that they (and He) lack, 
but rather they endeavor to persist in and increase their being, com-
ing as close to perfectedness as possible. But perfection and reality 
are the same things. 6 Reality, however, is God or nature or sub-
stance. Thus, man's relation to God is that of love, of increasing his 
being and thus becoming like nature: more free, more independent, 
more powerful because the very essence of God is his power. 7 
This love is intellectual. What does Spinoza mean by this? What 
kind of love can man have for God, particularly for Spinoza's God? 
The common image of the love of the child for the father seems 
totally out of place here. The Greeks had three words for love: eros, 
the love of the lower for the higher, closest to "erotic" love; philia, the 
love between equals, closest to friendship; and agape, the love of the 
higher for the lower, closest to selfless love, or even compassion. 
None of these seems to help us understand what Spinoza is talking 
about. 
Let us try to throw some light on what Spinoza meant by intellec-
tual love. Intellectual love arises from the third and highest kind of 
knowledge, which is intuition or immediate insight: "From the third 
kind of knowledge necessarily springs the intellectual love of God. 
For from this kind of knowledge arises joy attended with the idea of 
God as its cause, that is to say, the love of God, not insofar as we 
5. The last line of Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonos, usually rendered "For all this is 
determined," could also be read "For all this is perfected." 
6. Ethics, II, def. 6; IV, preface. 
7. Ibid., I, prop. XXXIV. 
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imagine him as present, but insofar as we understand that he is 
eternal; and that is what I call the intellectual love of God."8 
This love of God is identical with understanding his true nature; it 
does not represent him as some present thing, but understands him, 
has a direct insight into him, in his eternity which has nothing to do 
with duration, time, or space. Understanding God in his eternity 
becomes love for God when man grasps his identity with substance 
and realizes that he is one of its modes. "The intellectual love of the 
mind toward God is the very love with which he loves himself."9 
Let this rather schematic presentation suffice for now, and let us 
turn to Nietzsche. 
3. What it is that is loved-Nietzsche 
Nietzsche repeatedly speaks of amor fati as his innermost nature. 10 
To begin with, it might be helpful to look at his distinction between 
"Turkish" and "Russian" fatalism. We should note that he makes 
no consistent demarcation between the terms "fate" and "fatalism" 
(and, in one passage, even "determinism"); they are interchangeable 
in his usage. 
Turkish fatalism. Turkish fatalism contains the fundamental error 
of placing man and fate opposite each other like two separate 
things: Man, it says, can strive against fate, can try to defeat it, 
but in the end it always remains the winner, for which reason the 
smartest thing to do is to give up or live just any way at all. The 
truth is that every man himself is a piece of fate; when he thinks 
he is striving against fate in the way described, fate is being real-
ized here, too; the struggle is imaginary, but so is resignation to 
fate; all these imaginary ideas are included in fate. The fear that 
most people have of the doctrine of determinism of the will is pre-
cisely the fear of this Turkish fatalism. They think man will give 
up weakly and stand before the future with folded hands because 
he cannot change anything about it; or else he will give free rein 
to his total caprice because even this cannot make what is once de-
termined still worse. The follies of man are just as much a part of 
8. Ibid., V, prop. XXXII, corollary (trans. William Hale White, rev. Amelia Hutchin-
son Sterling, 4th ed., rev. and corr. [London: H. Frouder, 1910]). 
9. Ibid., prop. XXXVI. 
10. See Nietzsche contra Wagner, Epilogue; Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good 
Books": The Case of Wagner, sec. 4. 
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fate as his cleverness: this fear of the belief in fate is also fate. You 
yourself, poor frightened man, are the invincible Moira reigning 
far above the gods; for everything that comes, you are blessing or 
curse and in any case the bonds in which the strongest man lies. 
In you the whole future of the human world is predetermined; it 
will not help you if you are terrified of yourself. 11 
That "Russian fatalism" of which I spoke manifested itself to me 
in such a way that for years I clung tenaciously to almost unbear-
able conditions, places, habitations, and companions, once chance 
had placed them in my way-it was better than changing them, 
than feeling that they could be changed, than revolting against 
them .... He who disturbed this fatalism, who tried by force to 
awaken me, seemed to me then a mortal enemy-in fact, there 
was danger of death each time this was done. To take one's self as 
a destiny, not to wish one's self "different" -this, in such circum-
stances, is the very highest wisdom. 12 
Turkish fatalism conceives of man and fate as separate. Fate is 
something to which man is subjugated and against which he is pow-
erless. This form of fatalism Nietzsche connects with traditional reli-
gion, with the demand for obedience to a power external to oneself. 
To consider: to what extent the fateful belief in divine providence-
the most paralyzing belief for hand and reason there has ever 
been-still exists; to what extent Christian presuppositions and in-
terpretations still live on under the formulas "nature," "progress," 
"perfectibility," "Darwinism." ... Even fatalism, the form philo-
sophical sensibility assumes with us today, is a consequence of 
this long belief in divine dispensation, an unconscious conse-
quence; as if what happens were no responsibility of ours. 13 
Thus, the brand of fatalism that Nietzsche calls Turkish fatalism is 
basically an instance of man robbed of his autonomy and his freedom 
by a religion imposing a moral order on him from without. Let us 
now make the linguistic distinction that Nietzsche did not make, 
and call this Turkish fatalism "fatalism" as opposed to what he de-
scribes under the term Russian fatalism, which we shall henceforth 
call "fate." Fate is his own positive concept; fatalism is his polemical 
target. He loved fate, not fatalism. 
11. S, sec. 61 (author's translation). 
12. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am So Wise," sec. 6 (trans. Fadiman). 
13. WM, sec. 243 (trans. Kaufmann). 
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To sum up, by fatalism we understand the traditional popular view 
of determinism, that man is completely determined by outside forces 
or, more importantly for Nietzsche, by an outside Force, God, and 
His moral decrees of good and evil. In the face of this, man can do 
either of two things: he can give up and cease to will or do anything, 
or he can devote himself to total caprice and arbitrariness, just aim-
lessly doing anything at all for the sake of doing something. Both of 
these options are fundamentally nihilistic. In contrast to this, Nietz-
sche's own conception of fate, expressed as Russian fatalism, lies in 
understanding oneself as fate. 
What does it mean to understand oneself as fate? Apart from some 
abstract consideration of fate as a decree of God, as some sort of 
predestination, or as a kind of world order (moira), what Nietzsche 
really emphasizes most about fate is that things cannot be in any 
other way than they are. It is in this that he and Spinoza are in 
complete and astonishing agreement. But in keeping with his more 
personal and poetic style, Nietzsche stresses the relation of the indi-
vidual to fate. Because fate is not bound up with the Judaeo-Chris-
tian idea of God, the question arises as to the "source" of fate, of 
who or what planned it-if indeed that is the case-and whether 
the individual is then free or determined. This latter question had 
become absolutely central in the nineteenth century, especially with 
Schelling. If you understand human freedom and its role in the 
scheme of things, you also understand the Absolute, nature, and 
essentially everything else. The question of freedom or determinism 
of the individual brings us to the second aspect of our inquiry, to the 
question of what kind of love is at stake here. But first we need to 
say something more about the source of fate and about what exactly 
fate is. The two questions actually blend into each other in Nietz-
sche's case: our two initial aspects, what it is that is loved and what 
kind of love, collapse into one. 
As we have said, one of the main traditional sources of fate would 
be a decree of God. This is obviously ruled out for Nietzsche. The 
alternatives would seem to be some theory of heredity or environ-
ment or, most likely, some inscrutable combination of both; or else 
some dimension of the individual that escapes sociopsychological 
analysis. The trouble with sociopsychological analyses is that they 
inevitably lack precision and reliability; there are too many "excep-
tions." For example, identical twins can grow up in the same envi-
ronment and turn out to be quite different from each other. Heredity 
and environment are indisputably influences on everyone, but "in-
fluence" is too vague and inconclusive to deserve the name of fate. 
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So we are left with the question of a nonsociopsychological dimen-
sion of the individual. If fate is not to be understood as an external 
decree or power, then it must be grasped philosophically, not just 
genetically or environmentally, as something within the individual 
that molds him. "The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand 
in a Dionysian relationship to existence-my formula for this is amor 
fati."t4 
The philosopher strives for a Dionysian relation to existence as his 
highest state. What is a Dionysian relation? It is a way of being or 
living, perhaps best to be conceived in the Kierkegaardian fashion 
where what matters is not the "what" but the "how." Kierkegaard 
says something to the effect that it is better to be an authentic pagan 
than an inauthentic Christian. Dionysus, the wine-god, the god of 
intoxication, is the god of destruction and creation, of death and 
birth, of rebirth. To live in a Dionysian relation to existence means to 
live the creation and destruction that lie at the very heart and core of 
existence. The opposite of the Dionysian relation would be the Pla-
tonic quest for unchanging being that Nietzsche so vehemently re-
jects. Plato sought the eternal eidos or Form that has nothing to do 
with change and is inaccessible to the senses; Nietzsche absolutely 
denies the possibility of any static persistence and seeks "eternity" in 
becoming itself, in change, in creation and destruction, in eternal 
recurrence. 
To live in a Dionysian relation to existence means to affirm the 
elements of creation and destruction as inherent in eternal recur-
rence. Nietzsche, as perhaps no one before him, discovered and ex-
pressed the paradox that one can create nothing new unless one 
affirms what is already there. And this "already-there-ness," this giv-
enness, is what he means by fate. 
The passage in Zarathustra entitled "On Redemption" contains the 
pithiest presentation of Nietzsche's thoughts on the will's attitude 
of revenge. We do not want to go too deeply into that here, but only 
to state that revenge is one of several of man's extremely negative 
and crippling attitudes or feelings. Pity, envy, ressentiment, and hate 
would be other examples. Revenge is the will's antiwill against time 
and the "it was" or the past. Time is irreversible. What once hap-
pened I cannot undo or change; what once was, I cannot get back or 
regain. The past slips away from me off into some inaccessible "re-
gion" where I can neither get at it in order to change it nor possess 
14. Ibid., sec. 1041 (trans. Kaufmann). 
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it again. And from this "region" it intractably exerts its influence 
on my present situation; it affects me, but I am powerless to affect 
or change or regain it. It is out of my reach, forever; and yet it af-
fects me. 
Zarathustra states that the will must learn reconciliation with time, 
and something higher than reconciliation. The "it was" is a frag-
ment, an enigma, and dreadful chance until the creative will says to 
it: "I willed it thus!" Having said that, the will can then say: "I will it 
thus! I shall will it thus!" Only when the will can affirm the past as it 
is is the will capable of willing creatively, not reactively, in the pres-
ent moment and capable of freely willing the future: "Has the will 
yet become his own redeemer and joy-bringer? Has he unlearned the 
spirit of revenge and all gnashing of teeth? And who taught him 
reconciliation with time and something higher than any reconcili-
ation? For that will which is the will to power must will something 
higher than any reconciliation; but how shall this be brought about? 
Who could teach him also to will backwards?"15 
After these words Zarathustra falls fiercely silent, badly shaken. 
He is thinking thoughts that he apparently decides not to utter. Rec-
onciliation with time occurs as willing back. This could mean either 
of two things: (1) to will backwards in time, so to speak, turning time 
around, reversing it, or (2) to will things and events back, to will 
them to come again, to return. Both of these ideas are unusual, to 
say the least, and might strike us as impossible. No one that we 
know of has ever succeeded in reversing the direction of time in the 
sense of literally willing backwards. This first alternative is so obscure 
that we are not even certain what it would mean, to will backwards. 
But it is fairly certain that the general import is to change what has 
already occurred, to reverse time. 
The second alternative at least makes more sense, even if it seems 
implausible. To will back things and events of my life means to will 
them again. This is Nietzsche's repeated question: Can I will that 
everything come again, can I will to live my life again and again 
exactly as it is? If I can say yes to this question, then I have a Diony-
sian relation to life. Strictly speaking, this does not reverse time, 
which continues to occur in a "forward" direction; however, nothing 
gets lost, it all comes back again. "My formula for greatness in man 
is amor fati: that one wants nothing different, neither forwards nor 
backwards nor for all eternity. Not just to bear what is necessary, still 
15. Z, II, "On Redemption" (trans. Kaufmann). 
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less conceal it-all idealism is falsehood in the face of necessity-but 
love it." 16 
4. What kind of love 
The above passage may serve to introduce the last section of our 
study, the question of what kind of love is at stake here. As we 
remarked earlier, the kind of love has really ceased to be a separate 
issue since the question of what it is that is loved now completely 
defines the kind of love involved. One has a certain kind of love for 
a child, for a parent, for a man or woman, for an animal, for a piece 
of music, for a painting, for a landscape. They are all different feel-
ings, which get lumped together under the well-worn blanket term, 
"love." But in each case the type of love is attuned to its "object," to 
what is loved. Thus, if the soul loves fate, the kind of love must be 
appropriate to fate, must be fate-ful-in other words, the soul itself 
becomes fate. This is a bold statement which we must consider very 
carefully. Let us look at a passage from Zarathustra entitled "On the 
Great Longing": 
0 my soul, I taught you to persuade so well that you persuade the 
very ground-like the sun who persuades even the sea to his own 
height. 
0 my soul, I took from you all obeying, knee-bending, and 
"Lord" -saying; I myself gave you the name "cessation of need" 
and "destiny." 
0 my soul, I gave you new names and colorful toys; I called you 
"destiny" and "circumference of circumferences" and "umbilical 
cord of time" and "azure bell."17 
This passage dramatically expresses why we are no longer dealing 
with two separate questions: fate is a name for the soul. The soul is 
placed in a cosmic dimension in that it is compared to the sun, just 
as Zarathustra often speaks with the sun and, like it, periodically 
goes under. This means that the soul is not to be understood in a 
personal or psychological way, but as part of the cosmos, indeed as a 
very important part. Playing on the word for necessity, Not-wendig-
keit, Nietzsche gives it the very concrete meaning of "turning the 
16. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am So Clever," sec. 10 (author's translation). 
17. Z, III, "On the Great Longing" (trans. Kaufmann). 
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need" and couples it with fate. The soul is fate and necessity, fate 
and turning the need. Of the other, more poetic, names for the soul, 
the phrase "azure bell" occurs earlier in the section "Before Sunrise," 
when Zarathustra speaks cosmically, this time with the heavens. He 
begins, 
Together we have learned everything; together we have learned to 
ascend over ourselves to ourselves and to smile cloudlessly-to 
smile down cloudlessly from bright eyes and from a vast distance 
when constraint and contrivance and guilt steam beneath us like 
rain. 
And when I wandered alone, for whom did my soul hunger at 
night, on false paths? And when I climbed mountains, whom did I 
always seek on the mountains, if not you? And all my wandering 
and mountain climbing were sheer necessity and a help in my 
helplessness; what I want with all my will is to fly, to fly up into 
18 you ... 
and continues with the azure bell functioning almost as a leitmotiv, 
But I am one who can bless and say Yes, if only you are about me, 
pure and light, you abyss of light; then I carry the blessings of my 
Yes into all abysses. I have become one who blesses and says Yes; 
and I fought long for that and was a fighter that I might one day 
get my hands free to bless. But this is my blessing: to stand over 
every single thing as its own heaven, as its round roof, its azure 
bell, and eternal security; and blessed is he who blesses thus. For 
all things have been baptized in the well of eternity and are be-
yond good and evil. . . . 
This freedom and heavenly cheer I have placed over all things like 
an azure bell when I taught that over them and through them no 
"eternal will" wills. 19 
Here, Zarathustra speaks of himself as of a heaven, a rounded, 
rooflike, azure bell that eternally protects and shelters everything in 
a joyful, eternal blessing. This poetic "imagery" for the soul is about 
as far removed from the Cartesian res cogitans as possible; the soul is 
not a separate substantial thinking thing, but rather a sheltering pro-
tection that grants eternal and blissful safety to all things. The shel-
tering heaven is not oppressive and opaque, but free and luminous, 
18. Ibid., "Before Sunrise" (trans. Kaufmann). 
19. Ibid. (trans. Kaufmann). 
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transparent light. The pure, deep heaven is an abyss of light. As so 
often in Zarathustra, the imagery here is paradoxical. The heaven 
above is an abyss; to throw himself into its height is Zarathustra's 
depth; it speaks mutely to him. In another passage he says: Listen! 
for I want to hear you. The ordinary ways of thinking about things 
collapse here, and we are forced to experience them in a new way. 
Finally, we need to look at the section in Zarathustra entitled "At 
Noon," where Zarathustra falls into a unique kind of sleep while his 
soul remains awake. He speaks of and speaks to his strange, won-
der-full soul, comparing it to a ship that has finally come into a still 
harbor. It is midday, and all is still; the world is perfect. Zarathustra 
muses about happiness, about how little is needed for happiness, 
and then corrects himself: more radically, precisely the very least 
makes up the best kind of happiness. 
Precisely the least, the softest, lightest, a lizard's rustling, a 
breath, a breeze, a moment's glance-it is little that makes the best 
happiness. Still! 
What happened to me? Listen! Did time perhaps fly away? Do I 
not fall? Did I not fall-listen!-into the well of eternity? What is 
happening to me? Still! I have been stung, alas--in the heart? In 
the heart! Oh break, break, heart after such happiness, after such 
a sting. How? Did not the world become perfect just now? Round 
and ripe? Oh, the golden round ring-where may it fly? Shall I 
run after it? Quick! Still!20 
The best happiness is experienced in a moment (Augenblick) that is 
so much the very least that it has nothing to do with time or duration 
at all. Zarathustra asks, What happened to me? What is happening 
to me? Am I not falling, did I not fall into the well of eternity? There 
is no distinction between past and present. This whole experience of 
noon is timeless, for when it was all over the sun stood in exactly the 
same place as when it started. It is clear that Zarathustra had some 
sort of experience of eternity. We cannot and need not go into the 
meaning of eternity here; what concerns us is the effect of that expe-
rience on his soul: 
"Who are you? 0 my soul!" (At this point he was startled, for a 
sunbeam fell from the sky onto his face.) "0 heaven over me!" he 
said, sighing, and sat up. "You are looking on? You are listening 
for my strange soul? When will you drink this drop of dew which 
20. Z, IV, "At Noon" (trans. Kaufmann). 
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has fallen upon all earthly things? When will you drink this 
strange soul? When, well of eternity? Cheerful, dreadful abyss of 
noon! When will you drink my soul back into yourself?"21 
Suddenly, Zarathustra becomes aware that his soul is strange; what 
we all take for granted as being the most familiar thing in the world, 
our souls, our selves, suddenly becomes totally unfamiliar, un-
known. Who are you? Zarathustra asks his soul, and then asks the 
heaven, the well of eternity, when it will drink his soul back into 
itself. 
To sum up the question of what kind of love is involved here: 
strictly speaking, it is less a matter of love than it is of a kind of 
identity. The soul not only loves fate; the soul is fate. Here the "is" is 
used in a transitive sense to mean the soul is, exists fate in much the 
same way that Sartre said, "I exist my body." Thus, to say the soul is 
fate is not tantamount to saying flatly soul equals fate, soul· is the 
same thing as fate; but soul lives out fate, soul is the living occur-
rence of fate. This identity also characterized what Spinoza was talk-
ing about when he said that "The intellectual love of the mind to-
ward God is the very love with which He loves Himsel£."22 
By way of conclusion, we shall attempt once more to clarify what 
Nietzsche meant by fate. First of all, he did not mean what most 
people mean by that word: he did not mean some kind of predesti-
nation. In this sense he is closer to the Greek idea of fate (moira), 
to the Greeks for whom the gods themselves were subject to fate, 
rather than to the Judaeo-Christian idea. We shall gain a last insight 
if we take a look at the world-view that both Nietzsche and Spinoza 
rejected, at teleology. God and fate are, so to speak, the opposite or 
the negation of teleology, to use the via negativa. 
If I have a purpose or goal or telos, it is something that I lack now 
and must strive after. This was Spinoza's objection to the purposeful 
"will of God," that His goals should be lacking to Him. Rather, Spi-
noza says, everything is already there and cannot possibly be other-
wise. It must be just as it is. Nietzsche reached this insight when he 
realized that not only can we affirm the world process if we remove 
the idea of purpose from it; removing the idea of purpose first en-
ables us to affirm the world process as it is, not as it ought to be. To 
consider the world process as it ought to be lands us back in the 
realm of good and evil, of Platonic backworlds, a world behind this 
21. Ibid. (trans. Kaufmann). 
22. Ethics, V, prop. XXXVI. 
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world judging our world to be imperfect and without value. Nietz-
sche strives for the innocence of becoming, becoming affirmed as it is 
with no reference to anything outside it. The innocence of becoming 
names the "world" aspect of fate, just as the soul names the "self" 
aspect. 
Question: does morality make impossible this pantheistic affirma-
tion of all things, too? At bottom, it is only the moral god that has 
been overcome. Does it make sense to conceive a god "beyond 
good and evil"? Would a pantheism in this sense be possible? Can 
we remove the idea of a goal from the process and then affirm the 
process in spite of this-This would be the case if something were 
attained at every moment within this process-and always the 
same. Spinoza reached such an affirmative position insofar as 
every moment has a logical necessity, and with his basic instinct, 
which was logical, he felt a sense of triumph that the world 
should be constituted that way. 23 
If something is attained in every moment of the world process, no 
moment ever exists for the sake of another; each moment has its own 
necessity. In conclusion, we can say that both Spinoza and Nietzsche 
experienced fate as inner necessity, not as predestination or some 
kind of compulsion from without. To find and follow your inner ne-
cessity is to find freedom. The freedom of a painter is to find the 
inner necessity of his painting, to get it just right, neither too much 
nor too little, to get it the way it has to be. One could say the same 
thing for many activities in the arts, in acting, in writing, even in 
sports. Spinoza defined that thing as free which exists from the ne-
cessity of its own nature alone. And Nietzsche echoed this thought 
when he wrote, "The unconditioned necessity of all occurrence has 
no compulsion about it; he stands high in knowledge who has thor-
oughly realized and felt this,"24 and "Fatum is an elevating thought 
for him who comprehends that he belongs to it."25 
23. WM, sec. 55 (trans. Kaufmann). 
24. GOA, XIII, 63. 
25. GOA, XIV, 99. 
VIII. Nietzsche and Luther: 
A Testimony to Germanophilia 
Max L. Baeumer 
A few years ago, students at the University of Wisconsin in Madison 
were allowed to inscribe their criticism and concern on a temporary 
wooden fence surrounding a building-site on the campus.* One of 
the graffiti read: "Nitsche says: God is dead." The spelling of the 
name was wrong, but the quotation was right and apparently still 
prevails among our young people. 
What gives the statement "God is dead" its pungent quality is 
the fact that it is the message of a descendant of a line of Lutheran 
clergymen and theologians reaching back into the seventeenth cen-
tury. Friedrich Nietzsche, who, in his relentless critique of Western 
civilization, rejects and attacks Christianity and teaches superman as 
the highest type of humanity without God and religion, was the son 
of a Lutheran pastor, a devout Lutheran who started his academic 
career as a student of Lutheran theology at the university in Bonn 
in 1864. Fourteen years later, he became the archenemy of religion, 
Christianity, and Lutheranism, to use his own words, "in thunders 
and lightnings against everything that is Christian or infected with 
Christianity."1 
Everything that is Christian, whether good or bad, is personified 
for Nietzsche in Martin Luther. In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietz-
sche praises Luther as the "deep, courageous, and spiritual" re-
former, one "of our sublime protagonists," "of our great artists and 
poets" (sec. 23). 2 In Luther's Reformation, he sees the youthful "im-
"This is the text of a lecture given at Wake Forest University in April1981. Therefore, 
its style is that of an oral discourse, and introductory remarks may seem elementary to 
the Nietzsche scholar. But on the advice of the editors, I have decided to print it in the 
form in which it was delivered. 
1. Georg Brandes, Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. A. G. Chater (London: Macmillan, 
1909), p. 94. 
2. W, I, 128. Except where further specification is necessary, I shall refer, for the sake 
of convenience, to sections that are preserved in all of the various editions of Nietz-
sche's works. For English versions of Nietzsche's texts I am indebted to the transla-
tions by Walter Kaufmann, published by Random House, New York, and to the less 
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pulse of the free spirit" (in 1878: MA, I, sec. 26). But nine years later, 
Nietzsche proclaims: "Luther's Reformation [is the] coarsest form of 
moral mendaciousness under the guise of 'evangelical freedom' in 
which the slandered instincts try to create a right for themselves" 
(WM, III, sec. 786). Luther, whom Nietzsche in 1872 praises as the 
healthy-minded son of an ore miner (W, I, 261), is fifteen years later 
only a pathological fanatic, "the reverse type of the strong spirit that 
has become free" (A, sec. 54), a "monk, with all the vindictive in-
stincts of an abortive priest in his body" (sec. 61). 
Nietzsche's brilliant language can be harsh to the ear, crude in 
expression and provocative and aggressive in style, especially when 
he attacks bourgeois morals and Christianity. He arouses not only 
the young and discontented, but also the scholar and academic. The 
theme "Nietzsche and Christianity" has been treated in more than 
140 publications ~ince Nietzsche's death in 1900. More has been 
written on this subject than on "Nietzsche and Superman" or "Nietz-
sche and Richard Wagner." The topic "Nietzsche and Luther" has 
been discussed from various viewpoints in more than twenty schol-
arly investigations. 3 The greater number of these publications deal 
with our topic less critically, either from a German nationalist point 
of view4 or under the catchy headline "Luther-Nietzsche-Hitler."5 
Theological discussions mainly emphasize partial aspects of the reli-
gious controversy "Luther-Nietzsche."6 The most important literary 
reliable translations of the edition of The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar 
Levy (1909-13; reprint, New York: Russell and Russell, 1964). However, I have felt free 
to modify existing translations deviating too much from the original German. 
3. Cf. International Nietzsche Bibliography, revised and expanded, comp. and ed. Her-
bert W. Reichert and Karl Schlechta, University of North Carolina Studies in Compara-
tive Literature, no. 45 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), and 
Nietzsche Studien (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1972- ). 
4. For instance Jules Paquier, Le protestantisme allemand, Luther-Kant-Nietzsche, lOth 
ed. (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915); Jean-Edouard Spenle, La pensee allemande de Luther a 
Nietzsche (Paris: A. Colin, 1924, 1935, 5th ed. 1955; German ed.: Der deutsche Geist von 
Luther bis Nietzsche [Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1949]); Bernhard Schulz, "Die Sprache als 
Kampfmittel. Zur Sprachform von Kampfschriften Luthers, Lessings und Nietzsches," 
Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 18 (1940), 431-
66. 
5. Gerhard Hultsch, Friedrich Nietzsche und Luther, Diss. Breslau 1940, Schriftenreihe 
der Luthergesellschaft, Heft 13, (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1940). William M. Mc-
Govern, From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy (1st ed. 
by M. Sait, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941; reprint, Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin, and New York: AMS Press, 1973). J. de Courberive, Genies devoyes, 
Luther-Nietzsche-Hitler (Avignon: E. Aubanel, 1953). 
6. Arvid Runestam, "Nietzsches Oberrnensch und Luthers freier Christenmensch," 
Zeitschrift fUr systematische Theologie, 1 (1924), 520-32. Fritz Buri, Kreuz und Ring. Die 
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and historical investigations of Nietzsche's ideas and views of Martin 
Luther are Emanuel Hirsch's study "Nietzsche und Luther" of 1921; 
a series of four articles on Nietzsche, Luther, and the Reformation, 
by Heinz Bluhm, in The Publications of the Modern Language Association 
of America between 1943 and 1956; and the book by Ernst Benz, Nietz-
sches Ideen zur Geschichte des Christentums und der Kirche (Nietzsche's 
Ideas on the History of Christianity and the Church) of 1956? 
These scholars concentrated on two main questions: How can 
Nietzsche's radical change from an ardent admirer to a deadly enemy 
of Martin Luther be explained? Secondly, what ideas and which writ-
ers influenced Nietzsche to launch the most violent attack on Chris-
tianity and Luther in modern times? Emanuel Hirsch (p. 67) believes 
that Nietzsche's turn to hatred and contempt toward Luther was 
"nothing but the echo from the infamous History of the German People 
written by the Catholic priest Johannes Janssen" in 1879, of which 
Nietzsche remarked in a letter of 5 October 1879 to his friend Peter 
Gast that after having read this book, he was no longer capable of 
saying honestly anything good about Luther. But Heinz Bluhm ([2], 
pp. 1053-68) proved in 1950 on the basis of newly available records 
that the sharp turn in Nietzsche's attitude toward Luther and the 
Reformation occurred well before the appearance of Janssen's book 
and differs greatly from Janssen's, Heinrich Denifle's, and Hartmann 
Grisar's Roman Catholic criticism of Luther. 
According to Bluhm's thorough investigation, Nietzsche changed 
his view on Luther radically between 1876 and 1878 with the ap-
pearance of Human, All-Too-Human. His praise of Martin Luther ex-
presses nothing but the general and superficial opinion held by most 
Protestants of the time, while in his attack, Nietzsche evaluates Lu-
ther increasingly against the background of his own Weltanschauung. 8 
Ernst Benz (pp. 10-13) infers that Nietzsche basically blames Luther 
Kreuzestheologie des jungen Luther und die Lelzrc von der ewigen Wiederkunft in Nietzsclzes 
"Zarathustra" (Bern: P. Haupt, 1941). 
7. Emanuel Hirsch, "Nietzsche und Luther," ]ahrbuch der Luther-Gesellschaft, 213 
(Leipzig, 1921122), 61-106 (also in: Emanuel Hirsch, Lutherstudien II [Giitersloh: C. 
Bertelsmann, 1954], pp. 168-206). Heinz Bluhm, "Das Lutherbild des jungen Nietz-
sche," PMLA, 58 (1943), 264-88 (hereafter cited as Bluhm [I]); "Nietzsche's Idea of 
Luther in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches," PMLA, 65 (1950), 1053-68 (hereafter cited as 
Bluhm [2]); "Nietzsche's View of Luther and the Reformation in Morgenriite and Friih-
liche Wissenschaft, PMLA, 68 (1953), 111-27 (Bluhm [3]); "Nietzsche's Final View of 
Luther and the Reformation," PMLA, 71 (1956), 75-83 (Bluhm [4]). Ernst Benz, Nietz-
sches Ideen zur Geschichte des Christentums und der Kirclze, Beihefte der Zeitschrift fzir 
Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1956). In the following text these three 
commentators are quoted by page numbers. 
8. Bluhm (4), p. S3. 
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for preventing, through his Reformation, the victory of the strong, 
healthy, and pagan Renaissance over the weak and backward Chris-
tianity in Germany and all of Europe. These are the general conclu-
sions of previous research on Nietzsche and Luther. 
However, we want to base our investigation on Nietzsche's own 
statements about Luther and consider his assertions in their histori-
cal context, a task that hitherto has been neglected. The first of a few 
meager autobiographical remarks of the fifteen-year-old Gymnasium 
student, on the occasion of a visit to places associated with Luther in 
Jena and Eisleben, is already typical of Nietzsche's attitude toward 
Luther: "It gave me much pleasure to visit the greatest leaders of 
our nation: Luther, Goethe, Schiller, Klopstock, Winckelmann, and 
many others" (W, III, 41-42). Fourteen years later, in his preliminary 
notes to the second part of his Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche writes 
in the same vein: "When we speak of the German spirit ["vom deut-
schen Geiste"], we mean Luther, Goethe, Schiller, and some others" 
(GOA [2], X, 278). In spite of being destined by his pious family and 
by himself to become a Lutheran pastor, young Nietzsche prefers to 
see the founder of his Church only in connection with the greatest 
and rather worldly and un-Christian German writers. Secondly, he 
values Luther not as the reformer but as a leader of the German 
nation. 
From his earliest years, Nietzsche saw the Prussian State (or later 
the German Empire) and the Lutheran Church as the two institu-
tions that determined the national life and glory of Germany. He was 
proud to share his birthday, the fifteenth of October, with the reign-
ing king of his Prussian fatherland and he found it "appropriate," as 
he says, to have received "in holy baptism" the king's name "Frie-
drich Wilhelm" (W, III, 13, 90, 93). During the victorious war against 
Austria in 1866, he called himself an "enraged Prussian" (ibid., 
p. 1360). Just as he was taken by the festive "German music" of Rich-
ard Wagner, he enjoyed the Nationalfest of Schiller's One Hundreth 
Anniversary in 1859 as "a significant omen for the reawakened Ger-
man national consciousness" (ibid., pp. 75-77). 
In 1864, as a student in Bonn, he complained bitterly that "our 
Reformation festival is ignored by the university" (HKG, Briefe, I, 
313). Three years later, in 1867/68 when Nietzsche joined the Pros-
sian army, the combined 350th anniversary of the Reformation and 
dedication of the Luther Monument in Worms marked the climax of 
the many national festivals of that time. All the Lutheran princes of 
Germany were present when the colossal monument by Ernst Riet-
schel, the creator of the magnificent Goethe and Schiller statues in 
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Weimar, was unveiled with the words: "German folk, the highest 
crown bestowed by you rightfully belongs to this glorious miner's 
son."9 As far as I know, Nietzsche did not mention this Luther fes-
tival, but thenceforth he adopted the famous epithet "the miner's 
son" for his own association of Luther with German nationalism. In 
the fifth of his lectures "On the Future of Our Educational Institu-
tions" (1872), Nietzsche characterizes the patriotic spirit of the Deut-
sche Burschenschaft (the nationalist German Student Association, 
founded in 1813 during the Wars of Liberation from the yoke of Na-
poleon) with the words: "That earnest, manly, stern, and daring Ger-
man spirit; that spirit of the miner's son, Luther, which has come 
down to us, healthy and unbroken from the time of the Reformation" 
(W, III, 261). 
Nietzsche's nationalistic view of Luther becomes even clearer 
when we consider my abbreviated introductory quotation from his 
earliest work-The Birth of Tragedy-in its wider context. Here in 
section 23, Luther is called "our sublime protagonist" as the model 
and leader for "a restoration of all things German." Talking about 
the desperately hopeless situation "von unserem deutschen Wesen," 
of "our German substance and character," in modern civilization, 
Nietzsche implores his German readers: 
All our hopes stretch out longingly towards the perception that 
beneath this restlessly palpitating civilized life and educational 
convulsion there is concealed a glorious, intrinsically healthy, pri-
meval power, which, to be sure, stirs vigorously only at intervals 
in stupendous moments, and then continues to dream of future 
awakening. It is from this abyss that the German Reformation 
came forth: in the choral-hymn of which the future melody of Ger-
man music first resounded ... , this chorale of Luther ... , the 
first Dionysian luring call breaking forth from dense thickets at the 
approach of spring. To it responded with emulative echo the sol-
emnly wanton procession of Dionysian revelers, to whom we are 
indebted for German music-and to whom we shall be indebted 
for the rebirth of the German myth. 
What Nietzsche proclaims here in 1871 is a national rebirth of Ger-
many out of a unification of Dionysian blissful ecstasy, as revealed in 
the music and choruses of Richard Wagner, with the youthful and 
glorious Reformation, as it burst forth from Luther's chorale. Nietz-
9. Cf. Max L. Baeumer, "Lutherfeiern und ihre politische Manipulation," Deutsche 
Feiern, ed. Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermand (Wiesbaden: Athenaion, 1977), p. 53. 
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sche continues: To reach this goal we must, first of all, "hold fast to 
our shining leaders, the Greeks," from whom we "borrowed the two 
divine forms" of aesthetic knowledge, the Dionysian and the Apollo-
nian. Then, to eliminate the foreign Romanic element from "the pure 
and vigorous kernel of the German character," "the German spirit 
... must begin its struggle" and be encouraged by "the victorious 
bravery and bloody glory of the late war." This is the Franco-German 
War of 1870/71, which ended with the proclamation of a German 
Kaiser and in which Nietzsche participated as a volunteer medical 
orderly for three weeks until he became sick with infectious diarrhea. 
In this struggle, Nietzsche says, the German spirit must "be eternally 
worthy of our sublime protagonists on this path, of Luther as well as 
of our great artists and poets .... And if the German should be 
looking around timidly for a 'Fuhrer,' a leader, to guide him back 
to his long-lost homeland ... , let him but listen to the ecstatic lur-
ing call of the Dionysian bird, which hovers above him and will 
show him the way." Again, Luther is supposed to be the leader 
and luring idol for a second, a Dionysian reformation "of all things 
German." That, in those years from 1871 to 1873, was Nietzsche's 
strange German-Dionysian perception of Martin Luther. Nietzsche 
was, in his nationalistic attitude-and as some scholars argue10-
little influenced by Richard Wagner, who also glorified the "German 
spirit" of the Reformation and "Luther's magnificent chorale."11 
If we give due consideration to the close connection and politically 
motivated affiliation of Lutheranism and German nationalism during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, if we bear in mind how the 
state, the Lutheran and Reformed Landeskirchen, cities and towns, 
schools and universities taught, solemnly declared, and glorified Lu-
ther as a national hero, if we can imagine the high national feelings 
of the Bismarck era, the successful Prussian wars, and the splendid 
foundation of the so-called Second Reich and new German Empire, 
then we realize to what a great extent Nietzsche, Wagner, and other 
contemporaries appear as part of this general national movement 
and how they are totally immersed in this new national environment 
of religion and patriotism, of Luther and "all things German." Wag-
ner's Teutonic operas and Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit 
of Music (that is, out of the spirit of Wagner's German music) were 
determined in many respects by the national condition and by na-
tionalistic attitudes of the time, as much as the vehement attacks by 
10. Cf. Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche. Versuch einer Mythologie (1918; 7th ed., Berlin: 
G. Bondi, 1929), passim. Hirsch, p. 64. Bluhm (1), pp. 276-80. 
11. Richard Wagner, Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen (Berlin: Bong, n.d.), IX, 116 
and 95. 
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Arthur Schopenhauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, David Friedrich StrauB, 
Bruno Bauer, Paul de Lagarde, Karl Marx, and Nietzsche, a few years 
later, were directed against the same German nationalism, its hero 
Martin Luther, and the Church that he personifies. Nietzsche him-
self was fully aware of the dialectic process of his own change from 
the affirmative view of a Luther of the "German spirit" to a totally 
negative judgment of a backward Luther of "German barbarians" 
(FW, III, sec. 149). Referring to his passage about the Dionysian lur-
ing call (quoted above), he says in the book "We Fearless Ones," 
added to his joyful Wisdom in 1887: "I interpreted for myself German 
music as the expression of a Dionysian power in the German soul: 
I thought I heard in it the earthquake by means of which a prime-
val force ['the German Reformation'], that had been imprisoned for 
ages, was finally finding vent. ... It is obvious that I then misunder-
stood what constitutes the veritable character both of philosophical 
pessimism and of German music-namely, their Romanticism" (sec. 
370), which he calls in his Preface an "imprudent spiritual diet and 
pampering" in opposition to "the frolicking of returning energy, of 
newly awakened belief in a tomorrow and after-tomorrow." 
Nietzsche never repeated his daring, if not incomprehensible, con-
ception of Luther as the Dionysian lurer and leader for a new Refor-
mation of "the German spirit"-"der deutsche Geist." But he does 
restate in his lectures of 1872, mentioned before, that the healthy 
spirit of Martin Luther, the miner's son, is a sublime example of the 
tough and courageous German character and that "the rebirth of real 
culture must emerge from the true German spirit ... , which speaks 
to us so marvelously from the innermost core of the German Refor-
mation, German music, and German philosophy ... , from which 
we can expect a victory over that voguish pseudo-culture of the pres-
ent day." 12 
In Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations of 1873 and 1874, it is "Luther's 
Reformation" and "the German Reformation" to which religion, art, 
and culture in Germany are indebted for the continuation of their 
existence and for their liberation from the shackles of governmental 
power (W, I, 254, 332). In his "Thoughts: Reflections on Philosophy 
in Distress," written at the same time, Nietzsche sees Luther even 
as a sociopolitical revolutionary: "If a Luther were to arise today, 
he would revolt against the loathsome disposition of the capitalist 
classes, against their stupidity and thoughtlessness."13 Although this 
is only a one-time assertion-Luther as a liberator from capitalism-it 
12. GOA (2), IX, 416, 370, and 350. See also Bluhm (1), pp. 274-75. 
13. GOA (2), X, 302. See also Bluhm (1), p. 282. 
150 Max L. Baeumer 
clearly shows Nietzsche's predominantly political conception of Lu-
ther and the Reformation. A few years later, Nietzsche again was to 
call Luther a revolutionary, but this time in a directly opposite mean-
ing: Luther as the backward leader of the Reformation as a mob re-
bellion in Germany and Northern Europe. Yet in 1875, Nietzsche still 
enjoyed the "good and pure air of Protestantism" when he wrote to 
his friend Erwin Rohde on February 28: "Never before have I felt 
more strongly my innermost dependency on the spirit of Luther than 
now." Nietzsche's last positive utterance about Luther, in his fourth 
Untimely Meditation-"Wagner in Bayreuth" (1876)-is in connection 
with his praise of Wagner's Meistersinger von Nurnberg, Tristan, and 
the Nibelungen Ring: these operas demonstrate "the life and sub-
stance of all truly great Germans," based on "that exclusively Ger-
man serenity (Heiterkeit) of Luther, Beethoven, and Wagner, which 
other nations can never comprehend and which the present-day 
Germans seem to have lost" (W, I, 408-9). The concept of Heiterkeit, 
serenity, has been identical, since Winckelmann's day, with the spirit 
of classical art and the Greeks. Nietzsche's presumptuous and na-
tionalistic glorification of Luther, Beethoven, and Wagner has its cli-
max in bestowing on them the shining and august quality of serenity, 
by which German writers have always characterized the greatness of 
classical Greece. 
But why did Nietzsche's view of Luther now change to the nega-
tive? It has been widely assumed among scholars and biographers 
that Nietzsche's break with Wagner resulted also in an adverse posi-
tion to Luther. 14 This is not the case, as Nietzsche's own "Thoughts 
of January 1874 about Richard Wagner" demonstrates. Here, he ex-
presses a negative opinion about Wagner for the first time, specifi-
cally by comparing him negatively with Luther, whom he still esti-
mates very positively. Wagner is too arrogant, Nietzsche writes, to be 
a true German or a Martin Luther. He does not possess the straight-
forwardness and unselfishness that Luther had, and he has the par-
ticular ambition to relate himself to the greatest men-Schiller, 
Goethe, Beethoven, Luther, the Greek tragedians, Shakespeare, and 
Bismarck. 15 Of course, Nietzsche does the same thing of which he 
accuses Wagner, comparing Luther and Wagner (and also himself) 
with the greatest ones of mankind, and above all, with the great 
Germans. Here Luther even appears in line with Bismarck. 
14. See Hirsch, p. 64; Bertram, passim; Benz, p. 14. Against this position: Bluhm (1), 
p. 283. 
15. GOA (2), X, 441, 433, and 446. See also Bluhm (1), p. 283. 
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Nietzsche's turn against Luther four years later can therefore 
hardly be explained as a consequence of his break with Wagner. He 
never again mentions Luther and Wagner together. But since Nietz-
sche so obviously and consistently relates his estimation of Luther 
not to theology and religion, but to the greatest German personal-
ities, the German scene, and to a rebirth of Germany, I would like to 
suggest that we continue to direct our attention to Nietzsche's judg-
ment of Germany at the time when he changed his view of Luther so 
drastically and unexpectedly. 
In regard to "the German scene," Nietzsche was not only a specta-
tor from the outside, but since 1873 he had been fleeing Germany 
and the Swiss-German border town of Basel as often as possible. He 
felt estranged in the German environment, took sick leaves from the 
University of Basel after 1876, and lived mostly in Italy and in the 
south, which he considered his "promised land" (W, III, 1365-70). 
His nationalistic "Exhortation to the Germans," the Mahnruf an die 
Deutschen, supporting the foundation of the Bayreuth Wagner-Fest-
spielhaus, had been publicly rejected in Germany and one of his 
closest Lutheran friends, Heinrich Romundt, had turned Catholic. 
Nietzsche's letters show him to be increasingly disgusted with the 
educational, cultural, and political conditions of imperial Germany-
plagued by Bismarck's Kulturkampf, by his struggle with the Catholic 
Church, by two attempted murders of the Kaiser, by rising socialism, 
and by the effects of a rapidly growing economy and life of luxury. 
At the same time, Nietzsche sharply criticizes, in his four Untimely 
Meditations, the religion, history, philosophy, and culture of contem-
porary Germany as lifeless, philistine, and un-German. His changing 
view of Luther corresponds exactly to his new and negative attitude 
toward Germany and to his criticism of German culture. His new 
estimate of Luther and the Reformation found its first literary expres-
sion in the aphorisms of Human, All-Too-Human (1878-80). 
Nietzsche himself confirms this break and change of direction 
in autobiographical notes (Ecce Homo, "Human, All-Too-Human," 
sec. 1) and in the introduction to this book when he says: "Human, 
All-Too-Human is the monument of a crisis. It is entitled: A book for 
free spirits ... meaning a spirit that has become free." In his pre-
vious writings and in his comments on Luther, he was concerned 
about the "German" spirit. Now it is in the name of the "free spirit" 
and "the liberation of the spirit" that Nietzsche attacks Luther; first 
in a section (26) on "Reaction as Progress," where he calls him one 
"of the rugged, powerful, impetuous, but nevertheless backward-
lagging spirits which conjure up once more a past phase of man-
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kind" and adds that Luther's Reformation stopped "all the move-
ments of freedom of the spirit, [that is] of the whole Renaissance." In 
another section (237), entitled "Renaissance and Reformation," 
Nietzsche explains his stand more precisely: 
The Italian Renaissance contained within itself all the positive 
forces to which we owe modern culture: The liberation of thought, 
disregard of authorities, the triumph of education over the dark-
ness of tradition, enthusiasm for science, and ... the unchaining 
of the individual. ... On the other hand, the German Reforma-
tion stands out as an energetic protest of backward spirits, who 
were by no means tired of the medieval views of life. . . . With 
their northern strength and stiff-neckedness they threw mankind 
back again. [So] the great task of the Renaissance could not be 
completed; it was prevented by the resistance of the contemporary 
backward German spirit. But if Luther at that time had been burnt 
like Huss,-the morning sun of enlightenment would probably 
have risen earlier and with a splendor more beautiful than we can 
now imagine. 
Two things have become clear from this and the previous quota-
tions. First of all, Nietzsche totally reverses his positive view of Lu-
ther. But positively as well as negatively, he sees Luther first as the 
representative of the so-called rebirth, then as the reactionary spirit 
of German backwardness and resistance in Europe. 
Secondly, it is evident that Nietzsche's estimate of Luther, whether 
affirmative or negative, always portrays Nietzsche's image of the 
German national character. Whether praised as an ideal of hopeful 
renovation or condemned as a force of retrogression and decadence, 
Luther personifies for Nietzsche the German spirit, and the Reforma-
tion and Lutheranism equal everything German. "Essentially, we are 
still the same people as those Reformation men," Nietzsche tells the 
Germans. Only the fact that we no longer burn our adversaries or 
resort to the methods of the Inquisition distinguishes us from the age 
of the Reformation and proves that we belong to a so-called higher 
culture (MA, I, sec. 633). 
The Reformation itself, Nietzsche says, is "the disaster of modern 
German history" and hindered "the unity of the German nation," 
because "Luther's thick head full of suspicious and strange misgiv-
ings struggled against it" (MA, II, sec. 226). In The Dawn of Day 
(1881), Luther is "the great pessimist," who impressed the German 
soul with that typically "German logic": credo quia absurdum est, 
which for every true Latin is a sin against the intellect (M, Preface, 
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sec. 3). Nietzsche continues: While the Catholic Church has some-
how preserved the fine spirit and a sense of beauty for European 
humanity, Luther is responsible for the "brutalization of the clergy" 
(1, sec. 60) and is possessed by a deadly hatred against the whole 
priesthood (sec. 68). In the eyes of Nietzsche, Luther remained "that 
uncompromising miner's son, who was always suspicious of the vita 
contemplativa and the saints" and edified the Germans-to their lik-
ing-that the saints were no better than the rest of us (sec. 88). 
In a paragraph on "The Attitude of Germans to Morality," Nietz-
sche states that since a German is capable of great things but is un-
likely to accomplish them because he obeys whenever he can, sub-
mission and obedience-whether public or private-are the German 
virtues. Luther taught the Germans that they must obey a being in 
whom they can trust implicitly. This is indeed the worship of the 
German, the more so, as there is now less worship left in his religion 
(MA, III, sec. 207). Exploiting the semantics of the word "Reich," 
meaning "empire" as well as "the Kingdom of God," Nietzsche sug-
gests that Luther in his processional hymn "A Mighty Fortress Is 
Our God" has expressed, better than he himself could have done, 
"the demon of power" that satisfies man more than all his posses-
sions and enjoyments. Then he quotes Luther's fourth stanza: "And 
though they take our life, I Goods, honor, children, wife, I Yet is 
their profit small, I These things shall vanish all, I The Kingdom 
[das Reich] it remaineth." Nietzsche adds (V, sec. 262), "Ja! Ja! Das 
'Reich'!"-"Yea, Yea, the German Empire!" 
When these words were written, Bismarck had just strengthened 
the Kaiserreich by an alliance with Austria and Russia. A year before, 
the thirty-eight-year reconstruction of the Gothic Cathedral of Co-
logne had been completed, to which Luther's wedding ring had been 
presented with great fanfare and then recognized as an embarrassing 
forgery. So the Catholic Cologne Cathedral, still a famous showpiece 
for travelers, was dedicated in a splendid celebration by the Protes-
tant Kaiser Wilhelm I as a magnificent national symbol for the rees-
tablishment of the old German Empire. 16 
It is exactly this boisterous celebration and mutual dependence 
of German nationalism and Protestantism that was personified for 
Nietzsche and his contemporaries in Martin Luther and that Nietz-
sche attacked now in Luther more and more violently. We can show 
16. Quoted after Erwin Miihlhaupt, Der Kiilner Dom im Zwielicht der Kirchen- und 
Geistesgeschichte (Dusseldorf: Presseverband der Evangelischen Kirche im Rheinland, 
1965), p. 21. 
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this development only in a few typical examples from a multitude of 
available quotations. In The joyful Wisdom of 1882, which Nietzsche 
calls "the Saturnalia of a spirit of hope" and a "seriously frivolous 
book" (Preface to the second edition), he makes Luther responsible 
for putting an end to a blooming Christian culture in Germany (FW, 
sec. 148) and argues that the success of Luther's Reformation in the 
north was possible only because "the north had remained backward 
in comparison with the south of Europe" (sec. 149). 
Above all, he explains the Reformation under the heading "The 
Peasant Revolt of the Spirit" (FW, sec. 358). Here he says that Luther, 
as a man from the lower people, lacked all the hereditary qualities of 
a ruling caste, and all the instincts for power, so that his work, his 
intention to restore, merely became the commencement of a work of 
destruction. He unraveled, he tore asunder with honest rage, where 
the old spider (the Church) had woven longest and most carefully. 
He gave the sacred books into the hands of everyone. He demol-
ished the conception of "the Church." He gave back to the priest 
sexual intercourse and thereby destroyed the respect and belief of the 
simple people, especially the women, in something superhuman in 
an exceptional man. "Every man his own priest"-behind such for-
mulae and their boorish slyness, there was concealed in Luther the 
profoundest hatred of the "higher man" and of the rule of "higher 
men." As a matter of fact, he, the impossible monk, repudiated the 
rule of the "homines religiosi." He consequently brought about pre-
cisely the same thing within the ecclesiastical social order that he 
combated so rigorously in the bourgeois civic order, namely a "peas-
ant revolt." His Reformation is also responsible for the degeneration 
of the modern scholar, with his lack of reverence, of shame, and of 
profundity. In short, it is responsible for the "plebeianism" of the 
spirit that is peculiar to the last two centuries. Lastly, the "modern 
ideas" of the state belong to this peasant revolution of the north 
against the cooler, more ambiguous, more suspicious spirit of the 
south (sec. 358). 
It has not hitherto been recognized that Nietzsche's conception of 
Luther's Reformation as a "peasant revolution" puts him right into 
the Marxist camp of his time, which he regarded as "decadent," and 
"rabble."17 And Voltaire, whom Nietzsche praised as "a grand sei-
gneur of the spirit: exactly that which I am," had already considered 
the Reformation a great-the first-"revolution d'esprit," but still a 
"barbaric pollution" of that splendid sixteenth century of arts and 
17. G, sec. 37; A, sec. 57. 
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enlightenment. 18 Nietzsche calls Luther the "German barbarian" (J, 
sec. 46) and attacks him and the Reformation for resisting "the liber-
ation of the spirit" during the splendid era of the Renaissance, as we 
have seen. 
In 1850 Friedrich Engels, the clarion of Karl Marx, proclaimed 
(with the same words used by Nietzsche thirty-two years later) Lu-
ther's Reformation as a peasant revolution. 19 In 1884, when Nietz-
sche was expounding the same thesis, but under different premises, 
Engels stated: "The Reformation-the Lutheran as much as the Cal-
vinist-is the first bourgeois revolution in which the Peasants' War 
constituted the critical episode." Marx asserts that this revolution 
was "the most radical fact of German history, an undertaking that 
was wrecked by theology."20 
But here the basic difference between Marx and Nietzsche be-
comes evident. Marx sees the Reformation solely as an appendix 
to the Peasants' War. He defines and thereby canonizes Luther's 
Reformation for Marxism as "the first bourgeois revolution in reli-
gious disguise.'t21 Nietzsche, however, considers the Reformation 
negatively as a religious and ecclesiastical revolt, led by that one 
peasant, Martin Luther. Therefore, Nietzsche calls Luther's Reforma-
tion "the peasant revolt of the spirit," while Marx insists on a non-
religious "bourgeois revolution" of the exploited German peasantry. 
We do not know whether Nietzsche was influenced by Marx and 
Engels in formulating his own and opposite conception of theRefor-
mation. However, as we have seen, he holds Luther's Reformation 
responsible for the "plebeianism" of modern political ideas about 
"this peasant revolution of the north." Nietzsche's remark could 
easily be read as an indication that he was well aware of the affinity 
and the difference between his own and Marx's stands on the Refor-
mation and that he intentionally used the punning expression "peas-
ant revolt" for satirizing Luther's Reformation and poking fun at the 
socialism of this time, of which he says that it also "appeals to the 
Christian instincts" (W, III, 821). 
In Beyond Good and Evil (1886) Nietzsche continues the theme of 
Luther, the "Germanic barbarian," and his "belligerent slave-faith" 
(J, sec. 46). Luther's "passion for God" is "boorish, naive, and trou-
18. Fran~ois Marie Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs et l' esprit des nations, chap. 128. 
19. Friedrich Engels, "Der deutsche Bauemkrieg" (1850), Karl Marx, Friedrich Eng-
els, Werke, 5th ed. (Berlin: Dietz, 1973), VII, 327-413. 
20. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke, ed. Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim 
ZK der SED, 39 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1956-68); here, XXI, 402-3, and I, 386. 
21. Ibid., XXXVII, 274. 
156 Max L. Baeumer 
blesome" (sec. 50). The book On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) por-
trays the Reformation as "that radically plebeian, German and En-
glish movement of revenge" against "the brilliant revival of the 
classical ideal in the Renaissance" (GM, I, sec. 16). When Nietzsche 
explains his "ascetic ideal," he points to Luther as a negative exam-
ple: "This most eloquent and insolent peasant whom Germany has 
had, that typical Lutheran tone, in which he felt quite the most in 
his element during his tete-a-tetes with God." "Luther's opposition," 
Nietzsche says, "was at bottom the opposition of a boor, who was 
offended at the 'good etiquette' of the Church .... But for Luther 
the peasant that was simply not German enough. He wanted to talk 
directly, to talk personally, to talk 'straight from the shoulder' with 
his God. Well, he has done it" (III, sec. 22). 
Some scholars, however, would like to take note of two positive 
statements about Luther in Nietzsche's writings on morals and 
"good and evil." In the one case Nietzsche remarks, in connection 
with Richard Wagner's alleged intention to compose a play about 
"Luther's Wedding" for his German audience, that it would be a 
good idea to write "a bold and pleasing Luther comedy" for the 
many libelers of sensuality among the Germans and that "perhaps 
Luther's greatest merit lies just in the fact of his having had the 
courage to live up to his 'sensuality,' which was called at that time 
and delicately enough, 'evangelical freedom'" (GM, III, sec. 2). 
However, there seems to be sufficient reason to doubt the positive 
character of this assertion. 
In the other case, Nietzsche argues that in Germany there has 
been only one kind of public and approximately artistic discourse-
that delivered from the pulpit. "The masterpiece of German prose is 
therefore with good reason the masterpiece of its greatest preacher 
[Luther]: The Bible has hitherto been the best German book. Com-
pared with Luther's Bible, almost everything else is merely 'litera-
ture' -something which has not grown in Germany, and therefore 
has not taken ... root in German hearts, as the Bible has done" (J, 
sec. 247). In order to value and understand these remarks about Lu-
ther, the greatest preacher and master of German prose, more fully, 
we have to consider a statement in Nietzsche's letter of 22 February 
1884, written two years earlier to his friend Erwin Rohde after he had 
finished the three main parts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "To you, as a 
'homo litteratus,' I shall make a confession-! pride myself on having 
brought the German language to its perfection with this Zarathustra. 
After Luther and Goethe, one more step had to be taken .... I excel 
Goethe in a more vigorous and bolder line of expression, yet without 
falling among the boors, like Luther" (W, III, 1215). 
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Nietzsche was very much aware of the excellence and brilliance of 
his own language. He acknowledged how much his Zarathustra owes 
to the language of Luther and Goethe. But he was not willing to 
deviate from his negative estimation of Luther as the rebellious peas-
ant in German history. 
Nietzsche's last two works, written the year before he collapsed, 
insane, on a piazza in Turin, bear the religious titles Ecce Homo and 
The Antichrist (the subtitle "A Curse upon Christianity" is usually 
translated "An Attempted Criticism of Christianity"). Here Nietzsche 
once more summarizes his stand on Luther and Germany. The Ecce 
Homo section of scathing criticism, "Nothing shall prevent me from 
being rude, and telling the Germans some unpleasant truths;m is 
repeated, with a few minor changes, in section 61 of The Antichrist. 
Referring to Friedrich Theodor Vischer's Aesthetics or Theory of the 
Beautiful (1846-57), Nietzsche repeats (in the above section of Ecce 
Homo) Vischer's so-called "truth, which made the rounds of Ger-
man newspapers: The Renaissance and the Reformation ... consti-
tute a whole-the aesthetic rebirth and the moral rebirth." Nietzsche 
continues: 
Such sentences exhaust my patience, and I feel ... it my duty, to 
tell the Germans ... :Every great crime against culture commit-
ted during the last four hundred years lies on their conscience! 
... The Germans deprived Europe of the fruits, the whole mean-
ing of her last period of greatness--the Renaissance .... Luther, 
that fatal monk, not only restored the Church, but what was a 
thousand times worse, restored Christianity the very moment that 
it lay prostrate .... Catholics would have good reason to celebrate 
Luther festivals, produce Luther plays--Luther and the "moral re-
birth"! To the devil with all psychology! 
It is interesting to note that Nietzsche, who, it will be recalled, 
had written about the "Lutherfest" in Bonn and the need for a Lu-
ther comedy on sensuality, refers here again to Luther festivals and 
plays. Shortly before, in 1883, the 400th birthday of Martin Luther 
had been celebrated in festivals, plays, historical processions, and 
military parades all over Germany and with all the pomp and display 
of German nationalism. Full of resentment against the chauvinism of 
the Bismarck era, Nietzsche satirized the vogue and cult of these 
nationalistic Luther festivals. Here in Ecce Homo, he continues his 
scolding of the Germans: "With this [that is, Luther's Reformation] 
they incurred the responsibility for everything that resulted, every-
22. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": The Case of Wagner, sec. 2. 
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thing that exists--the sickliness and stupidity that opposes culture, 
the neurosis called nationalism, from which Europe suffers" ("The 
Case of Wagner," sec. 2). The same section on Luther and Germany 
closes in The Antichrist with an even stronger rebuke: "They [the 
Germans] also have the most unclean, the most incurable, and the 
most irrefutable kind of Christianity-Protestantism-on their con-
science. If we shall never be able to get rid of Christianity, the Ger-
mans will be to blame" (A, sec. 61). 
Nietzsche's last two statements only confirm our findings that, in 
his eyes, Luther is just the embodiment of everything German. For 
Nietzsche, Luther's Reformation is the cause of all the cultural ills 
and national evils of Germany, including socialism. After praising 
Luther during his first thirty years as an incarnation of the "dar-
ing German spirit" and as "leader" to another German reformation, 
Nietzsche then made him the scapegoat for the sins of modern Ger-
many. In Nietzsche's writings, Luther is nothing but a cleverly cho-
sen symbol for the author's own and radically changing attitudes 
toward his German and Protestant inheritance, a symbol for "every-
thing German." Nietzsche is, therefore, not interested in Luther the 
writer, the theologian and religious reformer, unless he can use these 
aspects of his work for his own purpose of praising or condemning 
German nationalism. 
More than ninety percent of Nietzsche's statements about Luther 
refer to German culture, history, and nationalism. Why has this 
fact been overlooked? Why have Nietzsche's assertions about Luther 
never been critically investigated and judiciously evaluated? A few 
less thorough and mostly sensational publications deal with German 
nationalism from Luther to Nietzsche, or to Hitler, in general-but 
they do not examine Nietzsche's political views of Luther in any de-
tail. 23 Theological investigations can hardly shed any light on Nietz-
sche's nationalistic interpretations of the reformer, and have failed to 
do so (Benz, pp. 2-7). Let us therefore turn once more to earlier 
scholars of literature and history who have dealt with Nietzsche and 
Luther. 
Emanuel Hirsch judges the pro-German attitude of the earlier 
Nietzsche toward Luther as "so genuinely German" (p. 63) and is 
"ashamed" that Nietzsche obtained his negative view of Luther al-
legedly from that un-German Catholic priest Janssen (p. 67). Ernst 
Benz emphasizes Nietzsche's "German way of thinking," his "Ger-
man conception" (p. 13) and "German consciousness of history" 
23. See the publications by Spenle, Schulz, and McGovern listed above, nn. 4 and 5. 
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(p. 79). Heinz Bluhm considers Luther's Reformation not only "Ger-
man," but "Germanic." He states that Nietzsche, in The Birth of 
Tragedy, "summons the true and deep German character ... in 
his creed, written with blood, [and] opposed to a shallow, essen-
tially un-German presence." He considers Nietzsche's joining the Lu-
theran Gustav-Adolfsverein in Bonn an "ebullition of his Protestant 
blood inheritance," and his confession of a "heartfelt dependence on 
the spirit of Luther" in his letter of 28 February 1875, mentioned 
above, "the instinctive voice of the Protestant blood in Nietzsche."24 
It must be added that this strange "blood and soil" estimate of Nietz-
sche and Luther appeared in March 1943, when the United States 
and the free world were fighting the horrible excesses and dangers of 
that same "blood and soil" ideology on the battlefields. 
Benz and Bluhm refer to Ernst Bertram's book on Nietzsche, in 
which we are assured that "Martin Luther is the oldest name in 
Nietzsche's line of intellectual ancestors" and that "Nietzsche's unre-
strained and odious Luther-enmity is only a symbol of fraternal strife 
in his own heart: Faustian and super-German." It is out of his "nor-
dic Ch.istianity" that Nietzsche "attacks that Asiatic, decadent-Helle-
nistic Christianity, the slave-religion of Paulus."25 While Benz rejects 
Bertram's "super-German" interpretation as racist and folk romantic 
(p. 14), Bluhm fully acknowledges this "intellectual-spiritual kinship 
of Nietzsche to Luther," expressed not only by Bertram, but also by 
Kurt Hildebrandt/6 as "far more grandiose" than his own rather 
modest investigation (Bluhm [1], p. 265). 
The result of this brief retrospect into the prevailing scholarship on 
our topic is astounding as well as pretty obvious: so far, all the inves-
tigators of the Nietzsche-Luther relationship follow only the tracks of 
Nietzsche himself. Either they have accepted, uncritically and un-
conditionally, Nietzsche's philosophy and his nationalistic view of 
Martin Luther, or their own attitude toward Luther, Protestantism, 
and Germany is exactly the same as the one that Nietzsche character-
izes so perfectly as bourgeois German. Others, especially Karl Ja-
spers and Ernst Benz,27 want us to believe that Nietzsche's unrelent-
ing fight against Christianity, the Reformation, and Luther has, in 
24. Bluhm (1), pp. 272-73, 284-85. 
25. Bertram (see above, n. 10), passim. 
26. Kurt Hildebrandt, Wagner und Nietzsche. lhr Kampf gegen das neunzehnte Jahrhun-
dert (Breslau: F. Hirst, 1924). 
27. Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche und das Christentum, 2nd ed. (Munich: R. Piper, 1952), 
especially p. 25 (1st ed., Hameln: F. Seifert, 1946; English ed., Nietzsche and Christian-
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the last analysis, the positive meaning and purpose of a criticism that 
opens up "a wide range of new possibilities" for a reform of modern 
Christianity. While this is certainly a good way for a Christian to 
value Nietzsche's assault, the latter himself has never given any indi-
cation that he meant anything but the destruction of Christianity. 
For an admirer of Nietzsche, there is also the distressing if not 
painful conclusion of our investigation that Nietzsche's estimate of 
Martin Luther is basically superficial and conceived exclusively un-
der the notion of German nationalism. Nevertheless, Nietzsche was 
very right when he caricatured the national-heroic Luther image of 
his time, an image that still prevails in our day. Forty-five years after 
Nietzsche's Antichrist, the "Deutsche Christen" movement within the 
Protestant Church of Germany greeted Hitler's seizure of power as "a 
German revolution in the spirit of Martin Luther,"28 while many other 
Lutheran pastors and Christians resisted the Nazi onslaught and suf-
fered imprisonment, concentration camp, and death. In 1967, Luther 
was celebrated in East Germany as "the most courageous organizer 
of the most important revolution in German history before 1945."29 A 
few years ago, the official newspaper of the German Democratic Re-
public, Neues Deutschland (14/15 June 1980), announced the formation 
of a planning committee under the chairmanship of the state and 
party chief Erich Honecker to prepare a grand celebration to mark 
the SOOth anniversary of Luther's birth in 1983. Honecker stated in 
his opening speech: "Martin Luther is one of the greatest sons of the 
German people ... , whose precious heritage the German Demo-
cratic Republic has accepted as her own." 
There seems to be no end to "Luther the great German." There-
fore, Nietzsche's antiproclamation of "Luther the impossible Ger-
man" still has its justification in the domain of politics and na-
tionalism. 
28. Cf. Baeumer, "Lutherfeiern," p. 58. 
29. Ibid., p. 60. 
IX. "The Only Logical Christian": 
Nietzsche's Critique of Pascal 
Brendan Donnellan 
In a letter written shortly before the eclipse of his creative life by 
madness, Nietzsche compared his ambivalence toward Dostoevsky 
with his relationship to Pascal, "whom I almost love, since he has 
enlightened me infinitely: the only logical Christian." 1 It was the 
challenge presented by the most formidable apologist of Christianity 
that increasingly fascinated and exasperated Nietzsche to the point 
of obsession, especially in the later works. This mixed attitude is 
perhaps summed up most revealingly in his confession in Ecce Homo: 
"I do not read but love Pascal, as the most instructive victim of Chris-
tianity, murdered slowly, first physically then psychologically-the 
whole logic ·of this most gruesome form of inhuman cruelty" (WKG, 
VI-3, 283). Yet, alongside horror at Pascal the Christian, and admira-
tion for Pascal the thinker and psychologist, there is identification 
with Pascal the man far exceeding Nietzsche's relationship to most 
previous philosophers. In the famous "Journey to Hades" aphorism 
from Human, All-7bo-Human (VM, sec. 408), Pascal belongs to the 
select company of great minds whom Nietzsche has sought out in 
the Underworld and whose "eternal liveliness" he commends. An 
unpublished sketch from the time of the composition of The Gay Sci-
ence even asserts that when Nietzsche speaks of Plato, Pascal, Spi-
noza, and Goethe, "then I know that their blood rolls in mine-I am 
proud when I speak the truth of them-the family is good enough 
not to need invention or concealment" (WKG, V-2, 483). 
It is a consistent feature of Nietzsche's dialogue with past thinkers 
that vehement disagreement is by no means a sign of personal dis-
paragement: "attack is in my case a sign of good will, sometimes 
even of gratitude. I honor, 1 distinguish by associating my name with 
1. Nietzsche to Brandes, 20 November 1888 (Gesammelte Briefe, vol. 3 [Berlin/Leipzig: 
Schuster & Loeft1er, 1905], p. 322). Translations from the German are bv the author. 
Pascal translations are taken from Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (Har-
mondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1966). References are given in the text, specifying 
the Pensee number according to Louis Lafuma's classification, which Krailsheimer 
follows. 
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that of a cause or person: pro or con-that makes no difference to me 
at this point" (WKG, VI-3, 273). This profound respect for intellec-
tual opponents is specifically related to Pascal in another sketch from 
Nietzsche's middle period: "I have the contempt of Pascal and the 
curse of Schopenhauer on me! And can anyone be more affection-
ately inclined toward them than myself! But admittedly with that 
affection which remains frank in order to remain a friend and not 
become a lover and fool" (WKG, V-1, 686). 
Nietzsche's encounter with Pascal's thought represented the clash 
of the most aggressive modern spokesmen of two militant and mutu-
ally inimical Weltanschauungen: Christianity and atheism. Pascal pre-
sented an irresistible challenge to the German through the riddle of a 
strong and brilliant personality rejecting anthropocentric values for 
the absolute claims of an increasingly moribund religion. The specta-
cle of a proud and powerful mind falling prey to the "illusions" of 
Christian transcendence never failed to fascinate and horrify Nietz-
sche, not least because of the obvious sense of kinship that he felt 
toward an incisive and original thinker who in many ways antici-
pated his philosophical views. Nietzsche's attempts to reconstruct 
the emotional-and physiological-motivation of his rival reach their 
pitch in the later works, but the story of his relationship to the Jan-
senist can be traced back to the earliest stages of his philosophical 
development. In general, one can say that Nietzsche's preoccupation 
with the content of Pascal's thought is at the forefront in his early 
and middle works, while in the later works it is the pathology of his 
spiritual opponent that whips him up to a fever pitch of personal 
involvement. 
In his early and middle works, dominated as they were succes-
sively by the ideals of the "genius" and the "free spirit" who stand 
above their time, Nietzsche felt a particular affinity to Pascal as an 
embodiment of the contemplative life. In the first Untimely Meditation 
he supports his criticism of the unreflecting industriousness of mod-
ern man with a summary of the urge to diversion (divertissement) that 
is born of restlessness and boredom: "Now, Pascal suggests that men 
only endeavor to work hard at their businesses and sciences with the 
view of escaping those questions of greatest import which every mo-
ment of loneliness or leisure presses upon them-the questions relat-
ing to the wherefore, the whence, and the whither of life" (U, J, sec. 8; 
cf. Pensees 132-39). Throughout his life, with similar intensity, Nietz-
sche himself was to put Pascal's question as to the purpose of life, 
although, unlike the Frenchman, he could not allow himself a super-
natural solution. Several years later, when he laments in Human, 
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All-Too-Human the modern mis-estimation of the vita contemplativa, 
which has been replaced by the "disease" of industriousness, he 
cites Pascal as one of the former great moralists who are now un-
justly neglected (MA, I, sec. 282). 
Both Nietzsche and Pascal offer an ideal beyond man's constant 
alternation between an ultimately purposeless flight from the self in 
diversion and the barren misery of loneliness and boredom. At one 
point in Human, All-Too-Human Nietzsche defines boredom as a state 
of being accustomed to work, and envisages a stage beyond work (a 
task performed out of need) and play (work undertaken with no 
other purpose than to satisfy the desire for work): the blissful, tran-
quil vision of happiness of the artist and the philosopher (MA, I, 
sec. 611)-which corresponds, in essence, to the picture of the free 
spirit's serene detachment from life given at the end of the first sec-
tion of Human, All-Too-Human (MA, sec. 34). For Pascal the misery 
associated with the realization of one's condition is a result of origi-
nal sin. Besides the instinct for external diversion we have a higher 
instinct for the true source of peace and happiness: "God alone is 
man's true good, and since man abandoned Him it is a strange fact 
that nothing in nature has been found to take His place" (148; cf. 
136). Both Nietzsche's solution to man's dilemma-a superior per-
sonal culture-and Pascal's promise of spiritual union with God thus 
equally depend on the abandonment of meaningless activity for a life 
dedicated to contemplation. 
It was not until his apparent conversion to rationalism and science 
in Human, All-Too-Human that Nietzsche concerned himself with the 
Christian apologist as a phenomenon in his own right who was to be 
taken seriously and overcome on the moral and religious levels. The 
subsequent tenor of his polemic against Pascal is struck in a short but 
crucial aphorism that marks the beginning of his intellectual battle 
with the Frenchman by proclaiming the rights of the self against 
Christian attempts to discredit and abuse it: "Contrasts.-The most 
senile thought ever conceived about men lies in the famous saying, 
'The self is always hateful,' the most childish, in the still more fa-
mous saying, 'Love thy neighbor as thyself.'-With the one, knowl-
edge of men has ceased; with the other, it has not begun" (VM, 
sec. 385). 
Thus Pascal, with his conviction that "le moi est halssable" (597), 
stands at the end of the religious tradition of denial of the self 
through love of one's neighbor inspired by the "childish" words of 
Christ. The "senility" of Pascal is symptomatic of his role as the last 
serious apologist of a dying religion, whose precepts now empha-
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size, instead of the immature but outgoing idealism of the founder, 
a negativistic criticism and contempt of the human self. This princi-
ple of self-abasement constituted the major stumbling-block for his 
German reader, whose momlism consisted of a vindication of the 
rights of the higher self and a sense of the undesirability, not to 
mention the impossibility, of purely altruistic behavior. Despite its 
other changes of course, Nietzsche's philosophy remained consistent 
in its emphasis on the self as both the starting-point and the goal for 
development in the postsupernatural understanding of man's role in 
life. 
Pascal's supposedly perverse degradation of the self is a main 
theme of The Dawn, where the Frenchman comes to the forefront as 
a moral rival and opponent of Nietzsche. The latter begins to inter-
pret Pascal's religiosity, like Rousseau's, in terms of self-hatred. This 
leads him to ironic conclusions concerning the doctrine of loving 
one's neighbor as oneself: if one also follows the Christian concept of 
the self as hateful, most dramatically expressed in recent times by 
Pascal, the natural consequence is bound to be the latter's misan-
thropy (M, sec. 63). Nietzsche again plays on the paradoxical notion 
of self-hatred when he objects: "If our self, according to Pascal and 
Christianity, is always hateful, how could we even permit and accept 
others loving it-whether God or man!" (M, sec. 79). 
Pascal had eloquently summed up his doctrine of hatred of the 
self while at the same time positing a presence of the divine within 
each person that Nietzsche would certainly have interpreted as a 
disguised love of part of the natural self: 
The true and only virtue is therefore to hate ourselves, for our 
concupiscence makes us hateful, and to seek for a being really 
worthy of our love in order to love him. But as we cannot love 
what is outside us, we must love a being who is within us but is 
not our own self. And this is true for every single person. Now 
only the universal being is of this kind: the kingdom of God is 
within us, universal good is within us, and is both ourselves and 
not ourselves. (564) 
For Pascal the human ego is criminal both in its self-absorption and 
in its instinctive injustice: "In a word the self has two characteristics. 
It is unjust in itself for making itself center of everything: it is a 
nuisance to others in that it tries to subjugate them, for each self is 
the enemy of all the others and would like to tyrannize them" (597). 
Love of self implies hatred of truth: self-love is the source of all injus-
tice and disorder (617, 978). Love of God implies hatred of the self, 
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and hatred of the self implies love of God (618). It was this awareness 
of the exclusive claims of the Christian deity that led Nietzsche to 
rejoice in the nonexistence of God, since otherwise man could not 
bear being unable to become a god himself (WKG, VI-1, 106), an 
attitude that Pascal had already known and condemned: "Anyone 
who does not hate the self-love within him and the instinct which 
leads him to make himself into a God must be really blind" (617). 
Nietzsche's fundamental argument with Pascal was precisely on 
this issue of the moi haissable. On the one hand, he felt this to be 
typical of the Christian denial of the legitimate rights of a self free 
from the tyranny of external sanctions. On the other hand, he saw 
Pascal's Apology as appealing, ironically enough, to the most selfish 
instincts: man consoles himself for his weakness and anxiety by in-
venting belief in a supernatural life-in Nietzsche's eyes one of the 
lowest forms of self-seeking. He accuses Pascal of sacrificing the life-
enhancing passions for the sake of a sterile private preoccupation, 
of stressing the self-absorbed individual at the expense of the phe-
nomenon of Becoming (WKG, V-1, 700). For him, Pascal, like all 
saints, is a self-centered egoist (WKG, V-1, 654, 669-70). To religious 
egoism he opposes the philosophical ideal by which the individual 
paradoxically renounces himself to proclaim and further the maxi-
mum intensification of the life force, an all-consuming task making 
him indifferent to his personal fate: "'What do I matter!' is the ex-
pression of true passion, the utmost stage of seeing something outside 
of oneself" (WKG, V-1, 656). 2 One might observe, however, that Nietz-
sche did not fully realize that it is only man's concupiscence that 
Pascal finds hateful, that he allows a legitimate self-love (cf. 119, 
450), and that the apparently negative element of self-hatred is bal-
anced by the positive vision of charity in his system of values. 
In The Dawn Nietzsche demonstrates his detailed knowledge of the 
Pensees when he attacks other specific aspects of that work, including 
the confidently argued defense of the "hidden God," which he sees 
as masking Pascal's inner uncertainty (M, sec. 91), perhaps subscrib-
ing to the notion current in the nineteenth century of Pascal as a 
secret skeptic, desperately suppressing his own doubts. In a note 
from this time he also criticizes Pascal's theory of the "automaton," 
which recommends that man at first go through the motions of reli-
2. Elsewhere, examining the "psychology of the psychologist," Nietzsche contrasts 
his own approach with the morbid introspection of the Frenchman even more explic-
itly: "We are no Pascals, we are not especially interested in the 'salvation of the soul,' 
in our own happiness, in our own virtue.-We have neither the time nor the curiosity 
to rotate about ourselves in that way" (WM, sec. 426). 
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gious observance mechanically in order to acquire the habit of belief 
(418, 821): for Nietzsche this is simply "making one's dishonesty 
pay" (WKG, V-1, 719). Particularly, he condemns the tactic adopted 
in the Pensees that aims to bring home to the reader the misery of 
human life in order to create utter dissatisfaction with his condition, 
describing Pascal's works as typical of the ignoble attempt by Chris-
tianity to exploit the capacity for despair of a certain kind of men, 
stalking them like a hunter his prey. Pascal, he reflects, attempted to 
determine "whether with the help of the most cutting knowledge 
everyone could be brought to despair;-the attempt failed, to his 
second despair" (M, sec. 64). 
The Christian calumniation of life as a means of ruining men's 
pleasure in existence-in order to bring them in despair to the 
Church--was a practice that Nietzsche censured at first compara-
tively mildly, in Human, All-Too-Human (e.g., MA, I, sees. 119, 555), 
but then with ever-growing rigor, ending in a crescendo of hatred 
and disgust in his final diatribe against Western religion, The Anti-
christ, in which he accuses the Christian Church of "living on states 
of distress, creating states of distress in order to eternalize itself" 
(A, sec. 62). That Pascal personifies for Nietzsche this kind of Chris-
tian nihilism becomes increasingly clear in the course of his works. 
On the one hand, he considers Pascal to have exaggerated the ills of 
human life (cf. WKG, V-1, 683); on the other he calls into question 
the validity of the Christian alternative so movingly evoked in the 
Pensees. Nietzsche does not deny that Christianity may bring happi-
ness and peace of mind (d. GM, III, sec. 24), but he objects that this 
effect is no argument for its truthfulness. 
Pascal had presented the positive advantages of Christian faith as 
justifying the gamble that it entailed: "No one is so happy as a true 
Christian, or so reasonable, virtuous, and lovable" (357). Nietzsche, 
however, is impressed neither by the "proof of pleasure" (MA, I, sec. 
120), nor by the logic that a need necessitates the means to the relief 
of this need, which he considers the ultimate in impertinence (d. M, 
sec. 90), and still less by the faculty of intuition so extolled by Pascal: 
"Hunger does not prove that a food exists to satisfy it, but it desires 
the food. 'Divining' something does not mean perceiving the exis-
tence of a thing in any way, but considering it possible, to the extent 
that one wishes or fears it; 'divination' does not take us a single step 
further into the land of certainty" (MA, I, sec. 131). 3 
3. Cf. Nietzsche's later refutation of Christian "proofs by potency" (A, sec. 32), and 
specifically of Pascal's proof by necessity: "Pascal's main error: he thinks he can prove 
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In The Dawn, repudiation of Pascal's doctrines is balanced by an in-
eradicable respect for Pascal the man, and by acknowledgment of 
his passionate Christian conviction. The aphorism in which this is 
expressed is entitled, appropriately, "Wishing Perfect Opponents 
for Oneself." Nietzsche's adversaries in this case are the great reli-
gious spokesmen produced by the French nation, which he describes 
as "the most Christian people in the world: not in the sense that 
the piety of the masses is greater in them than elsewhere, but be-
cause the most difficult Christian ideals have transformed them-
selves among them into men, and not just ideas or attempts. Take 
Pascal, in the union of passion, spirit, and honesty the leading Chris-
tian,-and consider what had to unite here!" (M, sec. 192). Despite 
Nietzsche's violent criticism of Pascal's methods and conclusions, he 
recognizes the sincerity and genius that animate his vision. His re-
spect for the impossible task of reconciling reason and faith that Pas-
cal almost carried out is further attested by his comment that the 
perfect examples of Christianity found among the seventeenth-cen-
tury French produced perfect counterparts in the later libertins: "The 
French freethinker always combated great men and not merely dog-
mas and sublime abortions, like the freethinkers of other nations!" 
(ibid.). Here, as always, it is the incorporation of a belief in a great 
and original personality that impresses Nietzsche despite all dis-
agreement. 
After Zarathustra it is above all the simultaneous intellectual and 
physical destruction of Pascal by Christianity that fascinates and ap-
palls Nietzsche. He had already suggested that Pascal's addiction to 
Christianity had been responsible for the breakdown of his health. 4 
The later analyses are variations on this theme of the bodily and 
spiritual ruin of the Frenchman by religion, which in Nietzsche's 
opinion led to his early death. Pascal's faith is described as "a pro-
that Christianity is true because it is necessary-this presupposes a good and true 
providence, which makes everything necessary true as well: but there could be neces-
sary mistakes! And finally! The necessity might only seem that way because one has 
become so used to error that it dominates like a second nature" (WKG, V-1, 696). 
4. Cf. Ida Overbeck: "The problem of the relationship between the body and 
thought in Pascal preoccupied him very much. Already in 1878 or 1879 he was claim-
ing that Pascal's dependence on Christianity could well have wrecked him" (Carl Al-
brecht Bernoulli, Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Fmmdschaft, 2 vols. [Jena: 
Diederichs, 1908], I, 133); and Nietzsche's sister: "He loved Pascal as a kindred spirit; 
he was as moved by his end as if it had been that of a beloved friend, indeed, as if he 
himself were threatened by it" (Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, Oas Leben Friedrich Nietz-
sches, 2 vols. in 3 [Leipzig: Naumann, 1895-1904), II, 883-84). 
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tracted suicide of the intellect" (J, sec. 46) and a sacrifice of the intel-
lect (J, sec. 229), illustrating the loss of all freedom and pride that 
Christian self-abasement brings. The struggle to reconcile religion 
with knowledge that homines religiosi had to undergo could only be 
understood fully, Nietzsche comments, by one whose intellectual 
conscience was "as profound, as wounded, as monstrous as Pascal's" 
(J, sec. 45). At the end of the section on the religious nature in Beyond 
Good and Evil, Pascal is cited as the most notorious example of the 
destructive power of Christianity and its waste of precious human 
potential, provoking the angry concluding indictment: "He who ... 
with some divine hammer in his hand, approached this almost delib-
erate degeneration and stunting of man such as constitutes the Euro-
pean Christian (Pascal for instance), would he not cry out in rage, in 
pity, in horror: '0 you fools, you presumptuous, pitying fools, what 
have you done!'" (J, sec. 62). 
Subsequent (mostly unpublished) references continue to empha-
size the masochistic, self-torturing nature of Pascal's attempt to ac-
commodate reason to religion. He is presented, for example, as a 
brooding hypochondriac (WKG, Vl-3, 88), or as the most deplorable 
case of Christian depravation of even the intellectually strongest na-
tures to the point where they find their very intellectuality mislead-
ing and sinful (A, sec. 5). 
Pascal is claimed by Nietzsche to have praised sickness as a state 
superior to health (WM, sees. 227, 246), although there is no evi-
dence that he actually did so, and Pascalism is even reduced to "a 
pathological condition of the nervus sympathicus" (WM, sec. 312). 
Nietzsche's central explanation of the origin of religious feelings as a 
misinterpretation of physiological states of discomfort or pleasure 
(G, "The Four Great Errors," sec. 6) had been anticipated by an ear-
lier analysis tracing Pascal's sense of man's sinfulness back to a mis-
understanding of unknown bodily states as moral and religious phe-
nomena (M, sec. 86). 
Pascal and Schopenhauer are cited as prime examples of the 
gloomy capacity of the strong to believe in the implications of herd 
values more earnestly than do the mediocre themselves, and thus to 
calumniate precisely the superior features that set them off from the 
mass (WM, sec. 276). Nietzsche's tragic pity over the annihilation of 
Pascal's noblesse is summed up when he polemicizes: "Christianity 
should never be forgiven for destroying such men as Pascal. One 
should never cease to combat exactly this in Christianity: That it has 
the will to break above all the strongest and noblest souls" (WM, sec. 
252). 
We have seen how Pascal the Christian apologist intensely inter-
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ested and provoked Nietzsche throughout his philosophical career. 
At this stage we may take a closer look at the areas in which the 
concerns of Pascal and Nietzsche overlap, and in particular at Nietz-
sche's increasingly vehement critique of the aims and tactics of the 
Apology. 
One of the most crucial differences between Pascal and Nietzsche 
is in their respective assessments of the compatibility of reason and 
belief. Although a mathematician and physicist of genius, Pascal 
was convinced that the conclusions of science and logic are valid 
only on one plane, while questions that belong to another dimension 
can only be solved by correspondingly different faculties. He distin-
guished a hierarchy of three separate but complementary modes: the 
order of the body, or senses; of the mind, or reason; and of the heart, 
or intuition. Of these the order of the heart is the highest faculty, 
since it alone can sense the basic premises from which the reason 
develops its systems: "Principles are felt, propositions proved" (110). 
Instinct and logic belong to different orders that can never meet on 
the same plane, a postulate most tellingly expressed in the famous 
pun "The heart has its reasons of which the reason knows nothing" 
(423), while the last step of the rational intellect lies in recogniz-
ing that there are an infinite number of things beyond it (188). Feel-
ing is thus portrayed as a pre- and supra-rational knowledge of the 
truth beyond the superficial and unreliable constructs of deductive 
thought, a certainty that no process of logical reasoning will be able 
to challenge or replace. 
The fact that religion cannot be completely proved by the reason is 
of no relevance, since religious truth can only be apprehended by the 
heart. Since they are such separate faculties, there is no question of a 
conflict between reason and religious intuition, although in his sys-
tem of converging proofs Pascal also uses the findings of the mind 
(rational argument) and of the senses (biblical proofs and miracles) 
to support the insights of the supreme faculty of the heart. Even 
though he himself recognized that "there is something astonishing 
about Christianity" (817), he found it an eminently reasonable reli-
gion: he does not try to destroy the limited authority of reason, but 
to show how Christianity conforms to it and confirms it, to the extent 
that it can do so without ceasing to be a religion. Nietzsche was to 
object vehemently that "Christianity is incompatible with science, 
religion, truth" (A, sec. 47), while Pascal used precisely these realms 
of experience, in an intricately intermeshed system of emotional, 
logical, and factual argumentation, to prove how they all are mean-
ingless without Christianity. 
For Nietzsche the issue was clear-cut, despite his own radical skep-
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ticisrn as to the power of reason: Christianity is incompatible with the 
present state of knowledge; it is indecent for modern man to be a 
Christian (A, sec. 35). Religion and knowledge are natural enemies: 
"The priest knows only one great danger: that is science" (A, sec. 49). 
Hence the fascination of the case of Pascal for him: he was particu-
larly intrigued by the tension of soul that arises when a strong and 
noble soul submits to Christian ideals. Pascal was for Nietzsche the 
noble exponent of a faith that mainly catered to the low, the vulgar, 
and the unintelligent. At the same time, Nietzsche remained aware 
of the paradox that the modern scientist's and philosopher's devotion 
to truth was also a form of the religious instinct. He described his 
own thought as having grown out of Christianity, as a severer form 
of piety, now forbidding him to be a Christian (WKG, VII-1, 163). 
Another unpublished note reveals that his profound interest in truth 
is indebted to Christianity-and specifically to Pascal (WKG, VII-2, 
235). 
The dialectics of Nietzsche's relationship to Pascal are sustained 
above all by Pascal's position at a great historical watershed between 
the age of religion and the age of science. Pascal, in Nietzsche's eyes, 
came at the end of the truly Christian era, just as Paul, "the Jewish 
Pascal," had actually begun it (Nietzsche's dissociation of the harm-
less idealist Christ from the sect that sprang up after him is amply 
documented [cf. A, sees. 27-40; WM, sees. 158-72]). The Christian 
word was already perverted in the pages of Paul's Epistles, which, 
read honestly, would have done for Christianity by exposing its ori-
gins, "just as the pages of the French Pascal expose its future and 
what will destroy it" (M, sec. 68). At first sight, the comparison of 
Paul, considered by Nietzsche to be a crude, fanatical, and supersti-
tious bully, with the exquisite genius of Pascal is startling-until 
one realizes that it is exactly Nietzsche's intention to show how 
Christianity, as a movement, started as an expression of the lowest 
classes of the Jewish nation by feeding on resentment and vengeful-
ness (cf. GM, I, sees. 8-10; A, sec. 27); became more refined in time; 
and, with the independent cultivation of the ideal of truthfulness 
that evolved from it in the form of modern rationalistic science, col-
lapsed, despite the attempts of increasingly subtle intellects to rescue 
it from the tide of skepticism sweeping it away at the end of its 
natural course. 
Nietzsche found Pascal's depiction of the fallen state of man and 
his immersion in sin all the more ironic since Jesus Himself had abol-
ished the concept of "guilt" and denied the existence of any chasm 
between man and God (A, sec. 39). Paul is consistently presented in 
Nietzsche's work as the actual founder of the institution of Christian-
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ity, and it is apparent that Pascal would not have been exempted 
either, despite-or rather, because of-the consistency of his doc-
trine, from the philosopher's scathing judgment that "in reality there 
has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross" (ibid.). 
Pascal represented for Nietzsche not only the last, and most intel-
lectual, expression of the Christian tradition, but also the prophet of 
the new age of nihilism. Pascal's remark that without God man is "a 
monster and a chaos" (131) is applied to the development that was 
brought by the erosion of Christian faith in the nineteenth century, 
and that was diagnosed by the modern Pascal, Schopenhauer, in his 
life-negating writings (WM, sec. 83; WKG, VIII-2, 109). Both these 
thinkers intensified Nietzsche's awareness of the challenge presented 
by the modern rise of nihilism and disorientation, which he sought 
to overcome with a purely anthropocentric philosophy. 
Perhaps the most revealing tribute to Pascal as a kindred strong, 
skeptical mind of genius, whose fatal infection by Christianity was 
only the result of historical circumstance, is paid in an analysis of the 
profundity possessed by apparently unlikely figures. Among these 
Nietzsche counts Pascal, "who died only thirty years too early to 
laugh at and scorn Christianity from the depths of his furious and 
magnificent soul, just as he did earlier, when younger, with the Jesu-
its" (WKG, VII-3, 190). One senses that Nietzsche felt Pascal to pos-
sess all the qualities that go to make up the ideal free spirit-incisive 
intelligence, uncompromising honesty, and the personal strength to 
bear the acutest pessimism-only to be led by some chance influence 
or impulse into the spiral of self-destruction through religion. 
Pascal's Provincial Letters indicting the Jesuits rival the best of Nietz-
sche's polemical writings in masterly use of cutting irony, rigorous 
logic, and devastating rhetoric. It is perhaps also due to this powerful 
and aggressive skepticism that Nietzsche recognizes himself in the 
Frenchman. The historical irony of Pascal's life lies in his double role 
not only as the most formidable postmedieval representative of the 
Christianity of Paul and Augustine, but also as an innovative thinker 
standing on the threshold of an age of science, reason, and skepti-
cism-values that would have been epitomized in his both analytical 
and intuitive genius if he had not felt compelled to use weapons from 
this very arsenal to defend an increasingly vulnerable religion. Pas-
cal's tragedy, in Nietzsche's eyes, consisted in the mortal conflict be-
tween religious and freethinking tendencies, in the course of which 
the latter, and with them the vast potential of his proud and creative 
character, were slowly and cruelly annihilated, when it would have 
taken little to tip the balance the other way to a unique flowering of 
the human mind and personality. 
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It has already been suggested that much of Nietzsche's increasing 
hostility toward Pascal is attributable to unconscious identification 
with traits in the other's character that he rejected in himself. This 
may be especially relevant in his attitude toward the austere asceti-
cism of Pascal. In Nietzsche's later works Pascal is presented more 
and more as the supreme example of the Christian self-chastiser who 
abuses both mind and body. The German's distaste at the spectacle 
of Christian self-abnegation cannot, however, mask the fact that his 
own way of life was strictly ascetic in character, requiring the renun-
ciation of comfort for a hermitlike existence, and the most rigorous 
self-discipline in his habits, to overcome ill health and dedicate him-
self to his writing. There are also decidedly ascetic strains in his phi-
losophy itself, which demands unsparing pursuit of the often cruel 
truth before one enters into the joy of free knowledge, and on the 
moral level denial and overcoming of the lower self to achieve subli-
mation of the passions. There is thus a certain similarity between the 
high aims and uncompromising demands of his philosophy and the 
self-denying severity of the Christian saintly life, a fact that he partly 
recognizes in The Genealogy of Morals when he describes religious as-
ceticism as a major, if misguided, form of the will to power (GM, III, 
sees. 1, 28). 
Despite this suppressed sense of kinship, Nietzsche's overall atti-
tude in a highly complex relationship, tempered as it is by a certain 
amount of sympathy and identification, seems to be acute revulsion 
at the profound and often unimaginative denial of the worth of life 
that religious asceticism, in his view, involves. Anticipating later 
psychological theories of drive frustration, Nietzsche defines asceti-
cism as a "defiance of the self," the turning of a need for violence 
and tyranny in on oneself in the absence of other objects (MA, I, 
sec. 137). The ascetic makes it easy for himself, he claims, by subject-
ing himself to an external will, and thus escaping boredom without 
the painful excitement of his own will and passions (MA, I, sec. 
139). Nietzsche undoubtedly saw Pascal's resolution of the oppres-
sive problem of the restless will as a similar avoidance of the issue. 
Pascal might certainly be seen as incorporating the dialectic between 
pride and self-contempt discerned by Nietzsche in the saint and the 
ascetic (M, sec. 69). Equally applicable to Nietzsche's picture of Pascal 
are other passages where the ascetic and the martyr are seen as the 
ultimate expressions of paradoxical Christian pride and domineer-
ingness (cf. MA, I, sees. 137, 142).5 
5. Cf. The Genealogy of Morals: "For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here rules a 
resserztiment without equal, that of an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to 
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Nevertheless, as Nietzsche himself admits, his analyses of the as-
cetic in Hummz, All-Too-Human are based on the lowest common de-
nominator of the species (MA, I, sec. 144), and inevitably there are 
more appealing examples. Nietzsche's attitude toward Pascal is con-
stantly marked by great respect, if also by increasingly violent dis-
agreement, and it is apparent that he places him on a higher level of 
asceticism than that of the crude and unintelligent men of religion 
of former times to whom he usually seems to refer with this term. 
Nietzsche's assessment of the ascetic ideal was far more differenti-
ated than his criticism of the psychology of the Christian version 
might suggest. His work abounds in prescriptions of a "personal re-
gime" in the conduct of life demanding restraint, sobriety, and self-
denial (cf. M, sec. 553). Later he was to suggest that the scientific 
spirit-which had dominated him on one level at least during his 
middle period, and which had then been presupposed and, at last, 
transcended in his later nihilistic skepticism-is itself a manifesta-
tion of the ascetic spirit (GM, Ill, sec. 23). In his notes for the pro-
jected Will to Power he even proclaims his wish to renaturalize asceti-
cism, with the emphasis on strengthening instead of denying the 
will: asceticism represents a positive principle that was unfortunately 
ruined by the Church (WM, sec. 916). Pascal probably offered Nietz-
sche the best example of this misplaced capacity for self-discipline. 
Indeed, Pascal's opposition to the pleasure principle and his stress 
on mastery of the self show obvious correspondences with Nietz-
sche's doctrine that the most urgent task is to "give style to one's 
character" (FW, sec. 290). The criticism of human weakness that 
comes to the forefront particularly in Zarathustra and the later works 
is anticipated by Pascal's dismay at man's giving way to his animal 
nature and wasting his potential. Although he does not envisage 
the superman in Nietzsche's sense, Pascal, too, wishes man to fulfill 
the dignity demanded by his unique status in nature and to become 
again "the most excellent of creatures" (430) by realizing his inher-
ent greatness. Both the atheist and the Christian aspire to transcend 
a merely biological existence of pleasure-seeking by rejecting crude 
materialism for an ideal of perfection. The following Pensee on self-
mastery, for example, is in a way a harbinger of Nietzsche's heroic 
moral philosophy: "There is no shame in man giving in to pain, but 
it is shameful for him to give in to pleasure .... In pleasure it is man 
who gives in to pleasure. Now, glory comes only from mastery and 
control, shame only from subjection" (795). These are essentially the 
become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its most profound, 
powerful, and basic conditions" (GM, III, sec. 11). 
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same ideas that are expounded, in more polemical form, in the Pro-
logue to Zarathustra. 
Although Nietzsche accused Christianity of destroying the vital 
passions, at more than one point Pascal expresses opinions resem-
bling the German's central doctrine of the harnessing and sublima-
tion of the instincts: " ... the righteous man takes nothing from the 
world or its applause for himself, but only for his passions, which he 
uses like a master, saying to one 'Go' and [to another]'Come.' Thou 
shalt rule over thy desire. 6 Thus mastered his passions become virtues; 
avarice, jealousy, anger, even God ascribes these to Himself. And 
they are just as much virtues as mercy, pity, constancy, which are 
also passions" (603). 
Pascal, too, takes a fresh look at the conventional moral concepts 
of good and evil, the topic later treated in such exhaustive detail by 
Nietzsche, when he comments, for instance, that "A certain sort of 
evil is as hard to find as what is called good, and this particular evil 
is often on that account passed off as good. Indeed it takes as much 
extraordinary greatness of soul to attain such evil, as to attain good" 
(526; cf. 783, 813, 905 for further analyses of the inextricable nature of 
good and evil), an observation that incidentally shows that Nietz-
sche's justification of the great man's evil was by no means an un-
precedented notion. Pascal has a similar awareness to Nietzsche's 
of the realities of the master mentality and the struggle for power 
(d. 97, 597, 828), although, proceeding from the standpoint of Chris-
tian humility, he makes no attempt to idealize these phenomena, as 
Nietzsche does. Perhaps most revolutionary of all, in the orthodox 
tradition, is a passage where Pascal, imbued with the true spirit of 
Christian faith and charity, transcends the narrow, Pharisaic legalism 
often associated with Catholicism and hints at his own revaluation of 
values: " ... morality has no time for morality. In other words the 
morality of judgment has no time for the random judgment of mind. 
For judgment is what goes with instinct, just as knowledge goes with 
mind" (513). These explorations were, however, all directed toward a 
reanimation of Christian values, and not their abolition. 
It is on the level of their intentions that the Christian moralist 
and the atheist approach each other most intimately. Both are in-
tensely earnest philosophers dissatisfied with the empty, materialis-
tic life led by the majority of mankind, and with apostolic zeal both 
propose higher ideals either to fulfill or to restore man's greatness. 
Nietzsche himself recognized this shared sense of dedication: "Com-
6. Matt. 8:9. 
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parison with Pascal: Does not my strength also lie in self-overcom-
ing, as his does? His in the service of God, mine in the service of 
honesty?" (WKG, V-1, 702). The very intensity and tension of their 
thought may have been what eventually led to their breakdowns, 
collapsing as they did at the prime of their productive lives and leav-
ing behind crucial works in tantalizingly incomplete form. Nietz-
sche's horror at Pascal's fate has in retrospect a strangely prophetic 
tone of identification, just as his boast that he had more endurance 
than Pascal and would not burn out like a candle7 was invested with 
the deepest tragic irony. It could be argued that both were the vic-
tims of their obsessive convictions. 
Their belief in the potential grandeur of man, encouraged by a 
spiritual dialogue with a few chosen higher minds, is in dialectical 
antithesis to their misanthropic disgust with the animality and pur-
poselessness of the mass of mankind. 8 They were equally aware of 
the special status of man in nature: animals do not suffer spiritually 
from their condition, but man, with his consciousness of his pre-
dicament, experiences dissatisfaction and wretchedness. Each might 
have accused the other of resorting to mythological solutions in his 
effort to provide human fate with dignity. There is even a similarity 
in the structures of these "mythologies." Beyond the palpable limita-
tions of human life, an awe-inspiring perspective opened up for each 
of them: the possibility of eternal damnation or salvation for one, 
or of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same for the other. Ironically, 
the Antichrist Nietzsche invented his own religion, with the prophet 
Zarathustra and the god Dionysus to announce the good news of 
this Eternal Recurrence. 9 
Their solutions to the problem of the human predicament were as 
opposed as their basic presuppositions: for Nietzsche the superior 
man's good was to be created from his own resources, while Pascal 
could rescue human nature from contradiction and despair only by 
7. "We are less embittered than Pascal, and also less vengeful toward the world; we 
have less strength at any one time: on the other hand we do not burn out too quickly 
like candles, but have the strength of endurance" (WKG, V-1, 702). 
8. Frequent comments in the works of both stress this aspect of human nature, e.g., 
"Man is properly speaking wholly animal" (664); "Man as a species does not represent 
any progress compared with any other animal" (WM, sec. 684); "Man's nature is en-
tirely natural, wholly animal" (630); "Man is both beast and superanimal; the higher 
man is both monster and superman: that is the way things go together" (WKG, VIII-2, 
90). 
9. Nietzsche's warning against misinterpretation, "There is nothing in me of a 
founder of a religion-religions are affairs of the rabble" (WKG, Vl-3, 363), is to be 
understood in a more literal context. 
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postulating a supreme being both immanent and transcendent. Pas-
cal envisages the rehabilitation of man through Christ's intervention 
with divine grace, while Nietzsche preached the miracle of man's 
becoming his own god. The urgent necessity of overcoming and per-
fecting human nature was, however, the central concern of both. 
The spiritual destinies of Pascal and Nietzsche converged when they 
found themselves unable to accept worldly compromises, and felt 
impelled to signpost the way to a nobler life for man regardless of 
sacrifice or risk. 
X. Lessing and Nietzsche: 
Views on Christianity 
Diana Behler 
Although separated by a century in time and considerable differ-
ences in intellectual milieu, moral outlook, and temperament, Les-
sing and Nietzsche shared the kind of keen intellectual acumen, criti-
cal audacity, and stylistic elan that have drawn attention to their 
roles as "modern" critics of their own heritages of Christianity. 1 Les-
sing's avowed perspective as an "admiring amateur" rather than a 
professional theologian and Nietzsche's unfettered stance of a "free 
spirit" whose intellectual curiosity recognized no inviolable "truths" 
placed them in the position of outsiders whose perspectivistic out-
looks and existential loneliness, deemed by Nietzsche a prerequi-
site for critical thinking, drove them to raise issues that threatened 
orthodox positions and seemed to betray their own Protestant edu-
cations. 
Their intimacy with Christian theology, coupled with its cardinal 
virtue of "truthfulness" honed to its ultimate refinement and aided 
by intellectual courage and stylistic virtuosity, made them subjects of 
indignant outrage-Lessing among his contemporaries, and Nietz-
sche posthumously. 2 Lessing, motivated by concern for the moral 
education of humanity as a whole, remained well within the circum-
1. Nietzsche is quoted from the KSA. Most translations are my own, although vari-
ous works by Nietzsche contained in the following translations have been consulted: 
Walter Kaufmann, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (New York: Viking, 1954), The Birth of Tragedy 
and the Case of Wagner (New York: Vantage, 1967), The Portable Nietzsche (New York: 
Viking, 1968), and Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: Random House, 1966); with R. 
J. Hollingdale, The Will to Power (New York: Random House, 1967); R. J. Hollingdale, 
Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961); Francis Golffing, The Birth 
of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals (New York: Doubleday, 1956). 
2. In his book Lcssings C/zristentum (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980) 
Arno Schilson points to the lack of unified opinion among scholars and notes that 
hardly another modern thinker has experienced such contradictory interpretations as 
Lessing in his attitude toward Christianity (p. 7). Critics along the lines of 0. Mann 
and H. Thielecke conclude that in the final analysis, Lessing wished to serve orthodox 
Christianity, whereas J. Schneider, B. Bothe, M. Bollacher, and E. Heftrich claim that 
he broke decisively with Christianity in an unparalleled radicality. Mediating between 
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ference of rational enlightenment, however, whereas Nietzsche, with 
a shriller voice and in sharp defense of individual potential, burst the 
confines of nineteenth-century convention. 
Nietzsche valued Lessing's clean intellectual tenacity and polemi-
cal drive, seeing in him a "universality of spirit" that strained at 
the boundaries of his narrow bourgeois German existence (KSA, I, 
183). In Beyond Good and Evil he praised Lessing's "free thinking," his 
"galloping tempo," "cheerful mood," and paradoxical style that chal-
lenged long and dangerous thoughts with stylistic grace and speed 
befitting a Machiavelli. Indeed, he sensed the "dry, fine air of Flor-
ence" in Lessing's "mischievous artistic feeling" and admired him 
as a philological and theological polemicist, while glossing over his 
other role as dramatist and aesthetician. Lessing, as the "most hon-
est theoretical person," had even dared to annoy his contemporaries 
by announcing that he was "more interested in the search for truth 
than truth itself" (1, 99). Such an "excess of honesty" (first mani-
fested in the figure of Socrates) may suffer from the illusion, how-
ever, that thinking itself can not only comprehend, but also correct 
existence-a function Nietzsche reserves to art. Theoretical thinking 
must necessarily turn over into art when it has reached its limita-
tions, Nietzsche claims here, an insight Lessing certainly displayed 
when he brought his message of religious tolerance and plurality, his 
moral perspectivism cloaked in parable and dialogue, onto the stage 
with Nathan the Wise. 
A recognition of the primacy of art over theory reveals an underly-
ing sense of kinship in cognitive perception and stylistic expression, 
traits that are actually constitutive elements in Lessing's and Nietz-
sche's critiques of Christianity. Both question the objectification of 
knowledge that takes place in the historical process and then solidi-
these two extremes are critics such as G. Fittbogen, G. Pons, G. Rohrmoser, and L. 
Wessell, who interpret Lessing's criticism of Christianity as one of "Doppelbodigkeit" 
based on his high regard for the "Vernunftgehalt" of Christian "Glaubenswahrheiten" 
and ethics. Wessell stresses that Lessing's actual philosophical speculations about 
God, which occupy only a few pages, utilize Lutheran phraseology in the "letter" of 
his discourse, irrespective of what he may have meant esoterically, and claims that 
Lessing took "Christian supernaturalism very seriously in his attempt to integrate 
history and rationality" ("G. F. Meier and the Genesis of Philosophical Theodicies of 
History in 18th-Century Germany," Lessing Yearbook, 11 [1979]. 64, and G. E. Lessing's 
Theology: A Reinterpretation [The Hague: Mouton, 1977]). Schilson provides a bibliogra-
phy organized according to various facets of theological problems in Lessing scholar-
ship. See also my article "Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred Thoughts," Nietzsche Stu-
dien, 8 (1979), 157-81, for additional aspects of intellectual links between these two 
thinkers. 
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fies into orthodox belief, for such objectification of a singular experi-
ence into a general belief fundamentally denies the spirit of free in-
quiry that both sought to further. Lessing and Nietzsche polemicized 
against established, orthodox Christianity in its coercive forms for 
the sake of achieving greater authenticity and maintaining the pro-
cess of speculative discourse rather than coming to a specific conclu-
sion to the argument, for any such "result" would contradict the goal 
of widening the field of debate. It is not my intent to formulate any 
evolution of religious thought here or to discuss the manifold differ-
ences between these two thinkers, but to highlight some analogous 
features of their critiques of Christianity and their modes of com-
municating them. Lessing and Nietzsche engaged in "hermeneutic 
readings" of the Gospels to arrive at a possibly original view of Je-
sus through the optics of necessarily flawed and distorted historical 
transmission of experience: Lessing through his dealings with the 
Reimarus fragments, and Nietzsche chiefly in The Antichrist. Inherent 
in this distinction between the "original" and the "copy," the "spirit" 
and the "letter" of religion is the Kierkegaardian skepticism about 
whether historical accidental "truth" with all its proofs and the force 
of longevity has any relationship whatsoever to the qualitatively al-
together different realm of what he termed eternally real, unadul-
terated authenticity. 3 In other words, their main quarrel with Chris-
tianity was with its claim to exclusivity in truth and the resulting 
implication of authority to determine individual conscience based on 
"belief."4 For Lessing the consequence of a relativization of church 
3. Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and 
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). In his "Introductory Re-
marks concerning the Objective Problem" of the Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard 
states that the "truth of Christianity must be determined through a critical examina-
tion of the various sources" when viewed as historical (p. 23), but in the first chapter 
dealing with the "Historical Point of View" he states that since "anything historical is 
merely an approximation ... essentially incommensurable with an infinite personal 
interest in eternal happiness" (pp. 24-25), scholarly critical theology and philology are 
inadequate tools to evaluate Christianity (p. 27). Religion is an "infinite personal pas-
sionate interest" which precludes historical objectivity (p. 28). Faith and not proof is 
the determining factor for Christianity, which in Kierkegaard's terms is essentially 
spirit, inwardness, and subjectivity (p. 33). In a chapter devoted to Lessing, he denies 
objective truth, which he considers to be "personal appropriation" (p. 71), and sees 
double reflection as the appropriate mode for communicating the "secrets" not con-
veyed by ordinary communication ("Attributable to Lessing," p. 73). 
4. While varying in their specific assessments of the degree of distortion and mis-
construction inherent in the temporal process of history, Lessing and Nietzsche utilize 
the same driving force of intellectual probing and ironic shift of perspective in an 
attempt to grasp the reality from which history separates us. It is an essential aspect of 
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authority was to establish a more rational basis for human moral 
action, whereas for Nietzsche it was to attack the foundations of one 
of the pillars of the sociopolitical structure of European civilization, 
to destroy it in the expectation of a moral anarchy that he hoped 
would generate a new kind of individual. With Lessing human au-
tonomy would stem from an inculcation of moral values beyond the 
necessity for external coercion or religious codes; for Nietzsche, au-
tonomy would come from a self-affirmative power and concentration 
on individual potential irrespective of societal consequences or exter-
nal ethical imperatives. 
Nietzsche's Antichrist is a compact and strident depiction of what 
the "discipline for truth ... a triumph achieved finally and with 
great difficulty by the European conscience," sublimated and trans-
formed from Christian into intellectual conscience (III, 600), has 
reaped in its effort to strip away layers of historical reception of 
what Jesus really was and how he lived. The heretical title appears 
at first to be the product of an irreverent, even atheistic will to 
truth, "where the intellect is strong, mighty, and at work without 
counterfeit today" (V, 409), divested of any guiding ideal. Nietzsche, 
however, recognized this as the last consequence of Christian mo-
rality stripped of all extrinsic factors, the Christian virtue of truthful-
ness turned against itself to arrive at the authentic reality of the "re-
deemer type," upon whose supposed teachings a world-historical 
religion was founded. 5 His antithesis is seen emerging not prior to 
their critique of Christianity because it reflects what both perceive to be the paradoxi-
cal condition of man, in Friedrich Schlegel's terms "a finite being conceived in terms 
of the infinite," or in Kierkegaard's formulation for Plato's Eros of the Symposium, 
"the child born of the finite and the infinite" (Kritische Fricdrich-Schlegel Ausgabe, ed. 
Ernst Behler, Jean-Jacques Anstett, and Hans Eichner [Munich: Schoningh, 1958-), II, 
"ldeen" No. 98, p. 266; Kierkegaard, Unscientific Postscript, p. 85). 
5. In his Positives Antichristentum: Nietzsches Christusbild im Brennpunkt nachchristlicher 
Anthropologie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962) Hermann Wein emphasizes the anthropologi-
cal significance of Nietzsche's assessment of God's death and its positive meaning for 
immanence, concluding: "Nietzsche nimmt Christus als Zeichen, als Gelegenheit zum 
Gleichnis vom nicht verleumdenden, vom Ja-tuenden Menschen, der nicht Richter 
sein will" (p. 114), whereby the rule of priestly teachings as the standard of morality 
has been broken. Dieter Henke's Gott und Grammatik: Nietzsches Kritik der Religion 
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1981) analyzes reason, morality, and decadence in religion as well 
as what remains after Nietzsche's criticism of religion with regard to mankind, and 
provides a fine bibliography of the relevant scholarly literature. In a chapter on "Nietz-
sche und das Christen tum" (pp. 137-60), in his book Zeitliches und Ewiges in der Philoso-
phic Nietzsches und Schopenhauers (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977), Otto Most 
highlights not only the distinction Nietzsche makes between Jesus and Christianity, 
but also his evaluation of Jesus as a figure of decadence (p. 138), and maintains that 
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the final judgment, but in the first historical rendering of his signifi-
cance, the entire Christian "truth" that Nietzsche terms "idle false-
hood" and "deception," the opposite of what inspired the Christian 
movement in the beginning. Precisely that which is Christian in the 
ecclesiastical sense is anti-Christian in essence, Nietzsche claims: 
"things and people instead of symbols; history instead of eternal 
facts; forms, rites, dogmas instead of a way of life" (XIII, 162). Christ 
denied "everything that is today called Christian" (XIII, 517), and for 
this reason a true Christianity, not bound to dogma, might still be 
possible as a practice, as a "means to being happy," but not as an 
article of faith. One should take heed not to confuse Christianity as a 
historical reality with the source called to mind by its name, for such 
decadent manifestations as "Christian church," "Christian faith," 
and "Christian life" are seen as "an unparalleled misuse of words." 
The Jesus of The Antichrist is shown as depicting how one should live 
to feel "divine," "blessed," "in heaven," and does not point to tran-
scendence, but to life as a "condition of the heart" (VI, 205-6; XIII, 
154). As the great symbolist and master of sign language, semiotics, 
and metaphors, Jesus carried the "glad tidings" within himself and 
made them manifest in his actions, abrogating all concepts of sin, 
guilt, reward, and punishment-and all other connotations for the 
distance separating man and God (VI, 205). Jesus' essence, which 
defied formulation, was to signify that there were no longer any 
opposites, and he constituted a "new way of living, not a belief." 
the history of Nietzsche's mind, his works, and his illness can be found in his attempts 
to find a replacement for his "verlorenen Gott in den verschiedenen Formen der 
Selbstvergottung" (p. 144). In his article on "Nietzsche's Mitigated Skepticism," Nietz-
sche Studien, 8 (1980), 260-67, Bernd Magnus discusses the basic problem of "knowl-
edge" as that of reconstructing a text in much the same way as I view Nietzsche's 
attempts to reconstruct his image of Jesus. See also Jochen Kirchhoff, "Zum Problem 
der Erkenntnis bei Nietzsche," Nietzsche Studien, 6 (1977), 16-44; and Konrad Hilpert, 
"Die Oberwindung der objektiven Giiltigkeit," Nietzsche Studien, 9 (1980), 91-121, for a 
discussion of truth as process ("etwas, das zu schaffen ist und das den Namen fiir 
einen ProzcfS abgibt" [p. 105]), rather than a static reality. Peter Koster, in his study 
"Nietzsche Kritik und Nietzsche-Rezeption in der Theologie des 20. Jahrhunderts," 
Nietzsche Studien, 10/11 (1981-82), 615-85, discusses the problems inherent in viewing 
Nietzsche's theological polemics as a hidden affinity to and support for Christianity 
in the vein of Karl Jaspers; he concludes that the theological reception of Nietzsche 
has its center in a "Krisis des Christlichen, die in ihren Ursachen kaum zureichend 
erfafSt werden kann" (p. 619). See also Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative 
(Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 13-21, for a discus-
sion of Nietzsche's views on morality and Christianity; and John T. Wilcox, Truth and 
Value in Nietzsche (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 67-97, 
where the critique of Christianity is utilized as a test case for Nietzsche as a cognitivist. 
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Nietzsche sees him as eschewing the word, for "the word kills, ev-
erything fixed kills" (VI, 204), and as neither denying nor seeking to 
prove by exhortation, Scripture, or the sword, but constituting his 
own proof, his "kingdom of God" (VI, 203). Thus for Nietzsche the 
"Son of God" refers not to an historical person, but to an "eternal" 
reality in every moment, a state to which any individual, but never 
an entire society, can aspire at any time, in every epoch. 
God is seen as nothing other than this immanent practice, 
whereby the "life," "truth," or "light" of which Jesus spoke are not to 
be taken literally, but as expressions of the "innermost," defying the 
limiting, fatal concretization of the word. All else-nature, reality, 
language itself-is merely symbolic, signs of inner feelings of joy and 
self-affirmation independent of any religion, cult, history, politics, 
psychology, books, or art. Nietzsche interprets Jesus as a living de-
nial of the entire theological apparatus that has held mankind hos-
tage to the promise of future happiness through the coercion of mo-
rality (VI, 204-6). His death signified that there was no transition to 
something else: "The 'Kingdom of God' is nothing to be anticipated: 
it has no yesterday and no tomorrow, it does not come 'in a thousand 
years' -it is an experience within a heart; it is everywhere; it is no-
where ... "(VI, 206, 207). By holding out false promises beyond this, 
Nietzsche writes in the posthumous fragments, Christianity inevita-
bly promotes nihilism in European civilization, for disappointed ex-
pectations lead to despair and defeat (XIII, 296). 
Jesus-whether naive, sovereign, or "idiot," as he is variously pre-
sented by Nietzsche-represented undialectical instinct without de-
nial, resistance, or resentment, whose death was the natural conse-
quence of his "being/' and Nietzsche views the disciples, especially 
Saint Paul, as having altered this death into a banner of martyrdom 
for their own political ends. Their inability to accept the tragic as-
pect of existence made Jesus' death a great puzzle for them, but they 
used this symbol to set in motion an entire system of sin and re-
demption, reward and punishment, eternal happiness or damnation 
-these "forms of systematic cruelty"-out of a sense of revenge and 
resentment against the ruling class of Judaism who had killed their 
"Messias." Thus instead of truth, error became the motivating princi-
ple, and conviction a powerful means of oppression and enslave-
ment to their will (VI, 210). The newly powerful Christian priests 
misunderstood Jesus' essential message, his superiority over any 
feeling of resentment, and embraced the unevangelical feeling of re-
venge, transforming their "redeemer" into a theologian (VI, 240) to 
promote the coercive "thou shalts" to the masses (VI, 216). 
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For Nietzsche the subtle fragility of such types as Jesus is always 
destroyed in every age by rationalist philologists of the letter and 
not the spirit, "dysangelists" with political goals and tyrannical in-
tentions who distort the elegant simplicity of the symbol to a flat 
and lifeless abstraction for purposes of propaganda and self-aggran-
dizement (XI, 201, 202). Such a manipulative priestly psychology 
seeks to prevent individual understanding and tame inquisitive man 
by means of the moral world-order, the instrument for man's tor-
ture, he claims: "Man shall not look beyond himself, he shall look 
down within himself, he shall not look prudently and cautiously into 
things in order to learn, he shall not see at all: he shall suffer" (VI, 
228). Sin, the greatest "self-violation" of man, was invented to ren-
der every knowledge, every culture, every nobility of man impossi-
ble (VI, 228-29), and the shift of emphasis from this world to the 
hereafter deprives actual existence of its intrinsic value. Instead of 
earthly fulfillment, this priestly psychology promises heaven, and 
instead of knowledge, belief. The story of creation in Genesis was 
promulgated to drive home the moral that man should not think, 
and original sin, Eve's arrogance in attempting to share in that godly 
quality of knowledge, is punished by the loss of Paradise and the 
correlative hardships, all "nothing but expedient means in the battle 
against knowledge! Misery does not permit man to think" (VI, 227), 
Nietzsche concludes. In other words, the immanent possession of 
blessedness symbolized in the figure of Jesus is seen as having been 
perverted through historical religion to its opposite-suffering and 
resentment, loss and alienation. Love, the quality Nietzsche deems 
Christianity's "finest artistic device" and source of its lyrical and 
universal appeal, becomes an absurdity when contrasted with Paul's 
depiction of Jesus as sending to hell everyone who didn't believe 
in him. Paul appears as a contradictory psychological type whose 
"goodness," the "feeling of making judgments against everything 
beautiful, rich, powerful," his hatred against the laughing ones, 
made him rather the "wickedest of all people."6 This paradox had 
assumed an ironically comic side in Human, All-Too-Human, when 
6. K, pp. 83, 343. In "Dionysus versus the Crucified One" (see Chapter VI above) 
Jorg Salaquarda discusses Nietzsche's recognition of Paul's historical "greatness" as 
the essential promoter of the decadence movement heralded by Christianity. While 
perceiving God on the cross as the ultimate symbol of decadence and decline, Nietz-
sche attributes this cultivation of the value-laden name "Jesus Christ" entirely to Paul. 
In this sense, Paul was for him no "idiot," but rather a man of genius (p. 294). See also 
Salaquarda, "Der Antichrist," Nietzsche Studien, 2 (1973), 91-136, for a discussion of the 
meaning of the term "Antichrist" and its ramifications. 
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Nietzsche portrayed Paul as "God's persecutor" (II, 591). Just as ab-
surd as the "hellish fear" that panicked God into driving out Adam 
and Eve from Paradise in his fear of rivals to his omniscience, as 
portrayed in Nietzsche's Antichrist (VI, 226), is the thought that God 
would establish the moral world-order of heaven and hell in order to 
satisfy his own vanity. This thought gains a more serious note when 
Nietzsche insinuates in a Feuerbachian anthropomorphic vein that 
the very cruelty projected into the Godhead must actually have been 
the incitement to the concept: "What a cruel and insatiable vanity 
must have flickered in the soul of whoever thought up such a thing, 
by himself or with another! Paul remained Saul-God's persecutor." 
Nietzsche goes so far as to make Christianity responsible for the 
death of God and the demise of true morality, claiming in his unpub-
lished manuscripts that "God suffocated from theology; and morals 
from morality."7 Christianity represents in The Antichrist the revolt 
of the disappointed and embittered who, in their absolute misun-
derstanding of the type and dissatisfaction with immanent reality, 
sought "justice" by a revaluation of the very values Jesus embodied, 
producing the herd mentality, the modern antithesis to what he had 
actually symbolized. 8 They turned a great ahistorical symbol into an 
historical vain and petulant God, a living reality into a false literary 
abstraction, an individual God into a tyrannical generalization: "De-
cay of a God. God became the thing in itself" (VI, 184).9 The histori-
cal success of Christianity, its tenacity and longevity, do not prove 
anything about the greatness of its founder, "but would rather testify 
7. K, p. 337. 
8. This is the central argument of The Genealogy of Morals (KSA, VI, 247ff.), of course, 
especially Book I, in which Nietzsche presents the revaluation of values or the slave 
revolt in morals (p. 268) brought about by those resentful of the autonomy of the 
ruling class. Jesus certainly represents another kind of autonomy, which expresses 
itself neither in ruling nor in reactive power in Nietzsche's portrayal, but in the free-
dom of existence that seeks no confirmation or denial. For this reason, Nietzsche can 
call him, "with some tolerance," a "free spirit," whose "symbolics par excellence" 
remains external to any religion, any specific experience or knowledge (VI, 204). 
Nietzsche's understanding of the type seems to rest on his comprehension of this 
symbolic representation, a perception or intuition beyond philosophical proof. 
9. Throughout The Antichrist Nietzsche expresses his disdain for anything that re-
mains fixed, any attempts to display validations or proofs because of an alleged philo-
sophical or historical permanence rather than remaining subject to the constant test of 
reason (pp. 234-36). Thus Kant's imperatives appear as sacrifices to abstraction, a 
relinquishing of one's personal choice in morals to a concept of duty itself, a "recipe 
for decadence" (pp. 177-78). All easy generalizations fall into this fatal category for 
Nietzsche, but especially those having moral implications for human behavior of a 
regulative nature. 
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against him" (I, 320, 321). 10 In a "world-historical irony" (VI, 208) 
Jesus, the "bold anarchist," became a tool for the propagation of 
oppressive dogma (VI, 198), and modern man, in his insistence on 
the security of the word, the letter, has succumbed to the easy tyr-
anny of "belief": "The formula of our happiness: A Yes, a No, a 
straight line, a goal ... " (VI, 169). 
Thus Christianity has become for Nietzsche, from his perspective 
of "the heights," a religion visible only in its negative components, in 
those detrimental to life-a mere "spectacle for the gods" serving to 
enslave mankind and paralyze action, a vivid incorporation of life-
denying decadence (VI, 211-12)_11 Nietzsche's portrayal of the figure 
of Jesus, however, is that of a life in which opposites were reconciled 
and death accepted with equanimity, a symbolization of the merging 
of dissonances within life rather than a promise of future happiness. 
The semiotics and imagery of Jesus were artistic rather than theologi-
cal, representational rather than regulative, accepting rather than 
denying of earthly life, Nietzsche insists, but his unreflective posses-
sion of godliness was thwarted to a codified repressive system of 
moral imperatives alienating mankind from itself and corrupting his 
natural state. 
During the period of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche considered 
the crucial metaphysical activity of man as art and not morality, pos-
tulating that only the "metaphysics of the artist" could decipher and 
embrace the chaos of being, a spirit that fundamentally denied the 
"moral interpretation and significance of existence" (I, 17). Although 
10. Such success may be attributable in part to the martyrdom of Jesus and his 
followers, but Nietzsche denies that this has any relation to truth, that the cross is any 
argument (KSA, VI, 234-35). His basic view of historical Christianity is that it takes a 
stand against reason and intellectual independence, emphasizing intellectual pride as 
the greatest sin, whereas the ancients believed in the divine origin of reason and 
independence of mind as the highest virtue. See KSA, X, 26. Its worldly success may 
also be a result of the transformation of its God into a cosmopolitan deity "for every-
one," an "anchor for all those drowning in sin and sickness," a reflection of man's own 
decadent state (VI, 183-84). 
11. Here Nietzsche seems to continue a tradition of thinking in German literature 
in which the poet or philosopher assumes an elevated perspective and gives his as-
sessment of the historical significance of an event or phenomenon by virtue of the 
"height" of his perception, his "distance" from the event or position as a late-comer 
within an era; e.g., Lessing's stance in The Education of the Human Race, "from a hill 
from which he believes he surveys more than the prescribed path of his present day," 
and Navalis's "Die Christenheit oder Europa," where the poet is "high enough to be 
able to smile back upon those above-mentioned earlier times." Cf. my article on "Les-
sing's Legacy to the Romantic Concept of the Poet-Priest," Lessing Yearbook, 4 (1972), 
72. 
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Nietzsche's early purely aesthetic justification of existence was soon 
to be surpassed by a more comprehensive and profound acceptance 
of being in all its contradictoriness and admixture of pain and joy in 
his tragic vision of life, his posthumous writings during the period of 
The Antichrist evidence his repeated recourse to aesthetic terminology 
to depict the state of man faced with the dilemma of modernity, 
when past "philosophical" and "moral" truths have unmasked them-
selves as impotent, even retarding, forces. These explanations of the 
world appear as hurdles to be overcome rather than as guideposts to 
be respected. Philosophical decadence, which signaled the decay of 
Greek instincts, was followed by moral decadence, which promul-
gated Christian "virtue" while lacking any methodical means to test 
these "truths," and Nietzsche heralds a third stage of an "aesthetic" 
grasp of life overcoming the nihilistic decadence of its predecessors 
(XIII, 296). Indeed, the aesthetic condition is the source of language 
and communication; it represents the "power of suggestion" involv-
ing psychological and physiological dimensions, whereby the mod-
ern artist may even exhibit a form of "neurosis" in his heightened 
sense of perception and suggestibility (a condition, however, attrib-
utable to the inhospitable environment of "modernity" rather than to 
the type itself) (XIII, 298). "Pleasure is a feeling of power," Nietzsche 
claims here, noting that "reason" and "intoxication" are opposites 
that are nevertheless inextricably necessary to each other (XIII, 311). 
Here too Nietzsche's tragic perception is cloaked in aesthetic terms 
when he wistfully points to the fleeting duration of any kind of 
beauty, a transitoriness that should not serve to negate life in the 
Schopenhauerian vein, but rather should impel us toward exultation 
and embrace (XIII, 317). 
Christianity with its moral world-view is consistently regarded 
as the nihilistic antithesis of the artistic world-view, but Jesus, who 
used sign language, semiotics, and images, "was no theologian" (VI, 
203), Nietzsche asserts in The Antichrist. Nietzsche's image of the re-
deemer type is rather that of an effortless reconciliation of life's dis-
sonances, with death accepted as a kind of seal on the transitory and 
fragile nature of life (VI, 203). This is not to say that he was lacking 
his usual ambiguity in his evaluation of the type he recognized in the 
historical figure of Jesus; as with all types he distilled from historical 
reality, Nietzsche was chiefly interested in utilizing Jesus as an illus-
tration of something contrary, as a foil for exemplifying a basic flaw 
he perceived in a cultural tradition or value. The more positive aura 
that Jesus assumes in The Antichrist says less about what Nietzsche 
really thought of him than about what he thought of institutional-
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ized religion, and what better way to hurl invectives against the edi-
fice of Christianity than to demonstrate the absolute otherness of its 
cornerstone? By denying the authenticity of the founder's image, 
Nietzsche drew his sharpest weapon, and although he also terms 
Jesus a decadent lacking any will to power in his passivity, the great 
"indifferent" whose psychological reality should have been plumbed 
by a Dostoevsky (XIII, 180, 409; also VI, 202), one should be careful 
not to heap all those termed "decadent" into one barrel. As with 
most of his designations, the term "decadent" gains various shades 
of meaning and tone depending on the point the label is used to 
make. In both The Antichrist and the posthumous writings Nietzsche 
is careful to reject the heroic interpretation of Jesus according to Re-
nan, and mocks any attempt to make him into a more complex or 
ironic figure (VI, 199-202). Faced with the poverty and "pinched exis-
tence" of the Jewish culture into which he was thrown by the acci-
dent of birth, Jesus chose to call his reality "good" instead of "bad" 
by choosing an "inner reality" that contrasted with his external his-
torical frame (XIII, 296). His lack of concern for tomorrow or yester-
day, his quiescent static existence, which Nietzsche variously associ-
ates with Buddhistic attitudes and Saint Francis of Assisi (XIII, 162, 
160), belied any notion of progress and certainly failed to fulfill the 
role assigned to him as savior or political leader. 
There is no element of destiny in Nietzsche's portrayal of Jesus in 
the posthumous fragments, and in one instance he terms him the 
"opposite to a genius," an "idiot" because of his inability to compre-
hend reality, who remains within the confines of his "world," his 
"truth," a stranger to the rest (XIII, 237). Kant too had been termed 
an idiot by Nietzsche, as one who did not face up to the reality of 
his times, an antirealist-and thus the term itself is subject to in-
terpretation. Nietzsche probes rather sharply into the possible psy-
chological causes for such a type as Jesus, attributing his childlike 
behavior to perhaps an arrested adolescence, a failure to mature, 
resulting in an inability to understand anything intellectual, "an idiot 
in the midst of a very clever people," the cleverest of whom was Paul 
(XIII, 237). This projection of characteristics is secondary, however, 
to Nietzsche's main thrust of anti-Christianity, for which the type 
serves him well. One should remember too that in Ecce Homo Nietz-
sche referred to himself as both a decadent and its opposite (VI, 266), 
and that while penning sharp and strident critiques of late nine-
teenth-century Christian culture, the "reality" of his own environ-
ment, he was slipping ever more into the unreality of isolation and 
madness, a poignancy that has not escaped notice by critics--among 
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them Giorgio Colli, in his postscript to the volume containing The 
Antichrist (Vt 452ff. ). 
It is important to note here that despite his castigation of Chris-
tianity in The Antichrist and the fragments relating to it, Nietzsche 
credits this religion with two significant contributions to modernity: 
the legacy of antiquity, and the refinement of thought to a high level 
of self-reflection. Both are elements of much of his later thinking 
concerning the emergence of a new type of individual combining 
the insights of antiquity with contemporary refinement, the quali-
ties of "nobility" with the power of the mind. He saw Christianity 
as contradicting not only Jesus' life, but also the entire heritage of 
antiquity. In heathendom he found the "type of spirit that absorbs 
and redeems internally the contradictions and questionable aspects 
of existence" (XIII, 266), whereas he regarded Christianity as a nega-
tive interlude and a retarding force. Despite spoiling the glorious 
spontaneity of heathen Greek culture, however, Christianity simulta-
neously preserved and transmitted it to us in an imperfect and dis-
torted image, which must be carefully reconstructed to its original 
state by the discerning mind. Not a return to antiquity is envisioned, 
but rather a surpassing of Christian civilization, "to overcome every-
thing Christian by something super-Christian and not just cast it 
aside" (Xt 682), a dialectical process reminiscent of Navalis's vision 
(in his Christenheit oder Europa) of a new age reflecting the past as "a 
mirror image of its father" and encompassing all stages leading to its 
flowering. 12 
One is to discover the south again, Nietzsche says, and "spread 
out a bright, glittering southern sky above oneself to reconquer the 
southern health and hidden power of the soul." Step by step this 
recapturing of the amoral spirit of antiquity is to unfold and surpass 
the confines of ancient Greece to become "more supranational, Euro-
pean, supra-European, more Oriental, and finally more Greek-for 
the Greek was the first great union and synthesis of everything Ori-
ental and with that the beginning of the European soul, the dis-
covery of our 'new world'-" (XI, 682). This will perhaps bring about 
a new day and may even produce an individual surpassing the "per-
fected Christian" and the "perfected artist of the Romantic ideal," the 
noblest types Nietzsche had encountered previously, both elements 
of his own past. Thus Christianity assumes the contours of a transi-
tional stage with a specifically educational value, and even Nietzsche 
12. Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), Schriften, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, Richard 
Samuel, eta!. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960-), III, 519. 
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is proud of his Christian heritage with its rhetorical subtleties, con-
sidering it an honor to derive from a family stock that in every sense 
of the word took its Christianity seriously (X, 382). 
It was of course the "semblance of Greek serenity" that had raised 
the hackles of the "profound and formidable natures of the first four 
centuries of Christianity." The life of the immediate present rather 
than a preoccupation with the past and future-"the moment, wit, 
and levity" of the Greeks--was envied by the slave mentality of 
Christianity, but this too, ironically, was a false image of Greek antiq-
uity, "that pale red color of serenity" steadfastly maintained by the 
tenacity of Christian conviction and canonized by Winckelmann and 
German Classicism. As they had "misread" Christ, so too did they 
misconstrue antiquity and selectively omit the Greece of the sixth 
century B.C., with its birth of tragedy, mysteries, art, Pythagoras, 
and Heraclitus (1, 78). Modern man, however, now lives suspended 
between the values of two realms of his historical heritage-ancient 
Greece and Christian Europe, both in need of authentic reconstruc-
tion-between an intimidating Christianized morality and a similarly 
dispirited dilettantish emulation of antiquity by scholars. Christian-
ity had placed its ideals on such a high and unattainable level that 
the virtues of antiquity and the naturalness they radiated were out-
done, even to the degree that this spontaneity appeared repugnant 
and dull. "Later on, hov:ever, after one had indeed recognized that 
which was better and higher, but could no longer aspire to it, one 
could no longer return to the good and noble, to that virtue of antiq-
uity, as much as one may have wished to" (I, 345), Nietzsche contin-
ues in The Birth of Tragedy. 
Compounding the perplexity of man's modern soul is the fact 
that both of the images-that of ancient Greece and that of Jesus--
transmitted through history and impacting him, are distortions. Je-
sus was not transcendent, nor was Greek culture superficially happy; 
both were complex entities cloaking inner realities by means of artis-
tic representation. "Christ and Christianity-Dionysus and Winckel-
mann's Greece: these are the two comparable world-historical antith-
eses that have confounded modern man and led him to a low moral 
ebb, unfruitful and unhappy," Nietzsche claims, a state from which 
man must recover (I, 345-46). 13 The ancients became susceptible to 
13. While it might seem inimical to link the figure of Christ with that of Dionysus 
and see in his traits of passive acceptance any similarity to the dynamic and ascen-
dant Dionysian life-forces, Nietzsche does present them here analogically as misrepre-
sented entities, whose distorted images have brought about decline. Furthermore, in 
their significance as Nietzschean types both demand symbolic, rather than literal, 
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the charms of Christianity only after they themselves had become 
soft and decadent, when it was a "blessing to meet those creatures 
who were more souls than bodies, ... timid, flitting, chirping, well-
disposed characters with a prospect of the 'better life' and because 
of that so modest, so proudly patient!"; but for the barbaric peoples, 
it was poison to their heroic, childlike souls. Here again, however, 
we see Nietzsche's shifting perspective, his capacity for seeing more 
than one side of a phenomenon, even one so roundly chastised as 
Christianity, when he turns the coin over and asks: "To be sure: with-
out this weakening what would we still have of Greek culture? what 
of the entire cultural heritage of humanity? for the barbarians, un-
touched by Christianity, knew how to make a clean sweep of old 
cultures." If the lens of history causes distortion, then it is still to 
be preferred to complete obliteration of the past, and with the de-
mise of Christianity diagnosed by Nietzsche from his modern histori-
cal standpoint, a good portion of antiquity has also become unintelli-
gible, especially the entire religious basis for life (II, 478-79). For this 
reason too, it would be a false tendency to attempt an imitation of 
antiquity, to turn back the historical time clock and traverse the path 
of history into the past (II, 586). Christianity may have spoiled the 
glorious spontaneity of heathen Greek culture, but it simultaneously 
comprehension. In The Birth of Tragedy, Dionysian music incites man to "strain his 
symbolic faculties to the utmost" and "express the very essence of nature symboli-
cally," to tear asunder the Mayan veil of illusion in order to effect a "total emancipation 
of all the symbolic powers" of musical dynamics and recognize the unity of nature, an 
activity requiring that one reach the same level of self-expression manifested by these 
powers themselves (I, 33-34). Just as the Apollonian Greek with his unsymbolic logi-
cal orientation must have gazed upon the Dionysian entity with "awed surprise" (I, 
34), so too did the disciples "misread" the symbol of jesus, for they and their aims 
were qualitatively different from what he actually constituted. Symbolic understand-
ing indeed becomes the key to perceiving figures such as Jesus and Dionysus in their 
essential reality beyond time and space, and for the discerning, although historically 
distant, reader, they contain within their own typologies that very demand for her-
meneutic deciphering which their historical transmissions would obliterate. Symbols 
such as Jesus, Dionysus, and Zarathustra have a universal, eternal dimension, which 
in Nietzsche's grasp of the totality of existence emerge within an historical age and 
shimmer through the distortions of temporality, accessible only to those who com-
prehend symbolic representations, neither demanding nor permitting philosophical 
proofs of existence. Paul Ricoeur recognizes the creative aspect of modern man's "deci-
phering of illusions of religious consciousness," for in this process of demythologiza-
tion, the "semantic charge" is virtually inexhaustible: "With symbolic language, we are 
in turn faced with a language which says more than what it says, which says some-
thing other than what it says and which, consequently, grasps me because it has in its 
meaning created a new meaning" (The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Charles E. Reagan 
and David Stewart [Boston: Beacon Press, 1978]). 
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preserved it and transmitted it to us, just as Nietzsche's attempts to 
"overcome" Christianity serve to underscore its significance for mod-
ern man. 
Christianity also contributed the very quality Nietzsche so splen-
didly employs in his own analysis of the past in The Gay Science, 
namely, moral skepticism (III, 478), which certainly deprived man 
of his self-understood "virtues" and security, but permitted "free 
thinkers" to exist to show us the errors in history! Thus one cannot 
know "if God should be more grateful to the Devil or the Devil to 
God that everything has occurred as it has" (II, 479-80). Even Saint 
Paul is credited by Nietzsche for having given Christianity the lin-
guistic depth and finesse without which it would have died of intel-
lectual poverty (II, 322). Had Christianity lacked the "complexities 
and storms of such a mind, such a soul," we would hardly have 
heard of this small Jewish sect whose master died on the cross (III, 
65), and had Paul not been such a tortured personality suffering 
from the fixed idea of the fulfillment of the Judaic code, Christianity 
might not have fared so badly in its historical transmission. There 
seems to be in Nietzsche's analysis, however, a certain necessity 
about the course of history with its biases and errors, with all the 
fallibility of its recorders, and in this sense, it serves a function simi-
lar to historically revealed religions in Lessing's Education of the Hu-
man Race. There is, in other words, an intimate connection between 
"truth" and "error," an implicit interrelationship denoting the im-
possibility of conveying any "truth" directly (or, as Michel Foucault 
notes in his essay on Nietzsche and genealogy, referring to Nietz-
sche's speculations in The Gay Science, perhaps truth is merely the 
"history of error," "the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it 
was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of 
history"). 14 The underlying "truth" remains inaccessible and inex-
pressible in the realm of historicity except through the indirect means 
of parable and symbol-and with Lessing, precisely through error. 
There is furthermore the tendency in both Lessing and Nietzsche 
to view history in terms of successive stages in triads, whereby one 
stage is seen as necessary to the flowering of the next, which then in 
turn both negates and carries forward the essential quality of its pre-
decessor until a third, critical level is reached-either a utopian view 
of human potential or, as is often the case with Nietzsche, a crucial 
14. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Inter-
views, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977), p. 144. See also p. 146 for Foucault's definition of genealogy and Nietzsche's 
method. 
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stage of cultural degeneration demanding reversal. With Nietzsche, 
however, such schematized speculations are quite tentative and illus-
trative rather than attempts to depict any linear development; they 
are shortcuts to lengthier explanations. In Aphorism 25 of The Anti-
christ, for instance, Nietzsche reveals this tendency toward triadic 
thinking in his compressed analysis of the degeneration of the con-
cept of God, where the thundering god of revenge, Jahweh, is sup-
planted by the milder version for sinners, and then reduced to a 
complete moral abstraction (VI, 193-94). In the posthumous writings 
nihilism is seen as residing in a vain promise for more than one can 
actually deliver, a discrepancy resulting in disappointment. Thus Je-
sus is not nihilistic, but Christianity is. Nietzsche delineates this cul-
tural movement as an initial stage of philosophical supremacy and 
degeneration with the decay of Greek instincts; a second reign of 
morality with Christian virtues as the dominant force, until its bank-
ruptcy in the hypocritical reaction to the disappointment of unful-
filled expectations in contemporary European civilization (XIII, 296); 
and a third stage of aesthetic freedom is envisioned, promoting in-
dividual autonomy along with enhanced communicative ability, an 
aesthetic condition he terms "will to power," since art always "wants 
more." This "will to power" generally expresses a will to change in 
the posthumous fragments, even a will to "lie," meaning here a rec-
ognition of the need for dissimulation, gesture, symbol-in short, a 
will to art in order to promote life, which is dependent on artifice or 
the veil of illusion for sustenance and growth. Above all, such a will 
requires antitheses, opposition (XIll, 260). Thus the task of the mod-
ern intellect is that of good reading of the text of history, which with 
an achievement of greater veracity could establish a basis for promot-
ing a new internalized form of freedom, an emancipated individual 
not unlike that of Lessing's prophetic ideal in his Education of the 
Human Race. 15 
Lessing's analyses of Christianity are certainly more ambiguous 
and tentative than Nietzsche's, and commentators still disagree as to 
whether he was a firm believer in its main tenets such as transcen-
dence. Certainly the hide-and-seek game he had to play with the 
15. Sees. 25, 26, 31, 38, and 42 of Tlze Anticlzrist are examples of Nietzsche's thesis 
that our perception of Jesus is distorted by falsifications and a denaturalized reading of 
his essence. In sec. 42 (KSA, VI, 218) he cautions that one cannot read the Gospels 
enough because of the difficulties residing behind every word, the artistry utilized in 
words and gestures communicated to falsify, for which reason they can be read as 
"just literature." The art of reading consists in reading things without falsifying them 
through interpretation, however (sec. 52; p. 233). 
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censors, the sensitivity of his immediate public to such massive criti-
cism of prevailing religious beliefs, the controversy surrounding the 
publication of the "anonymous" Reimarus fragments, and the fierce 
battle with Pastor Goeze, along with the ensuing withdrawal of the 
freedom from censorship and the simultaneous publication ban, pro-
vide obstacles to a clear picture. 16 Just such considerations impelled 
him to be circumspect in his pronouncements, to mask his true in-
tent and radical views with an esoteric language of semiorthodoxy 
(as Henry Chadwick claims of the Education of the Human Race), even 
ostensibly to choose sides with his orthodox opponents rather than 
ally himself with newer, more liberal groups. The mask of orthodoxy 
was also useful as a smoke screen for being on closer guard against 
his secret enemies: "I get along with my public enemies in order to 
be on even better guard against my secret ones," he wrote to his 
brother Karl in March of 1777. 
Lessing's intellectual honesty is coupled with his renowned stated 
preference for the pursuit of truth above its possession in his Rejoin-
der, not merely because of his humility before the uniquely godly 
prerogative of omniscience and the practical considerations of threat-
ened censorship, but, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, precisely 
because he wished to continue the discourse and maintain the possi-
bility for further debate in the world. 17 Thus Lessing states: 
The worth of a man does not consist in the truth he possesses, or 
thinks he possesses, but in the pains he has taken to attain that 
truth. For his powers are extended not through possession but 
through the search for truth. In this alone his ever-growing perfec-
tion consists. Possession makes him lazy, indolent, and proud. If 
God held all truth in his right hand and in his left the everlasting 
striving after truth, so that I should always and everlastingly be 
mistaken, and said to me, "Choose," with humility I would pick 
the left hand and say, "Father, grant me that. Absolute truth is for 
thee alone."18 
16. See Schilson, pp. 18-20; and Lessin:{s Theological Writings: Selections in Translation, 
trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), in his introduc-
tion, pp. 105f. 
17. Gotthold Ephraim Lessings siimtliche Schriften, ed. Karl Lachmann and Franz 
Muncker, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart/Leipzig: 1886-1924), XVIII, no. 546, pp. 226-27 (hereafter 
cited as LM); Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1968), p. 27. 
18. LM, XIII, 23-24. For Nietzsche the search for truth was preferable to its posses-
sion because a certain amount of illusion is necessary for the maintenance of life. 
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The optics of perspectivism inherent in the famous parable of the 
three rings that is central to Lessing's drama Nathan the Wise conveys 
not only the message of human tolerance, but also that of the impos-
sibility of human perception of one single truth valid for all at any 
time. It is a difficult task for the critic to make any definitive assess-
ment of Lessing's personal beliefs in terms of Christianity precisely 
because of what Sr<nen Kierkegaard called Lessing's evasiveness, his 
ability to "carry himself circumspectly ... while achieving the still 
more difficult task of keeping silent through speaking." It was Les-
sing's merit that he prevented direct admiration, says the ironic Kier-
kegaard, and that he did not become "world-historical and system-
atic," so that he isolated himself within his own subjectivity focused 
solely on the religious and God and not men, and his religious sensi-
bility had no result at all! Thus he had seized upon the Archimedean 
point of the religious life and was an "essential individual ... of 
decisive subjectivity" who maintained his dialectical insights within 
himself to prevent their diversion into the hands of some merely 
external possessor. 19 Kierkegaard emulates and illustrates Lessing's 
bilevel hermeneutic style by ironically stating that he lacked "serious-
ness and dependability," and by chiding him for not having stated 
outright: "I defend Christ." He was one of those religious subjects 
with the "remarkable trait that it [religion] comes into being for the 
individual and closes behind him," Kierkegaard claims, although 
one could argue that Lessing left this door sufficiently ajar to allow 
us to ponder just what he actually thought. He was such a remark-
able teacher for Kierkegaard because he defied any objectification 
and evaded the "stupid attempts of fanatics to enroll him in the ser-
vice of positive social ends" as well as their "presumptuous attempts 
to exclude him." Not slogans or systems, but artfulness marks the 
style that complements the sensibility, whereby jest and earnestness 
confound each other and the emphasis "is often placed upon the 
indifferent, so that the initiated may precisely in this manner best 
grasp the dialectically decisive point, while the heretics get nothing 
to run with."20 
Lessing's prose functions on two levels, confiding to the reader 
"sub rosa" that he keeps up with the thought and managing to con-
vey to others a truth, whose chief feature it is that it is intensely 
personal and cannot really be transmitted, "that one must be alone 
about it." This paradoxical communication-indirect, ironic, Socratic, 
19. Kierkegaard, Unscientific Postscript, p. 71. 
20. Ibid., pp. 61-65. 
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and elusive-requires creative activity on the part of the reader in 
his historically advanced position, a kind of contemporaneity de-
spite historical distance, which "excludes every historical illusion 
... every perverse objective falsification." Lessing as a teacher never 
made appeals, never coerced, never pronounced doctrine, for that 
would have contradicted the very essence of his intellectual position. 
Thus he does not attack or defend Christianity, but always changes 
the letter of his discourse to maintain the spirit. He solved the prob-
lem Kierkegaard saw as germane to the modern religious sensibility 
by living the paradox and communicating the incommunicable, by 
refusing the objectification of a profoundly subjective experience. He 
was free and wished to make all others free in relation to himself, 
was secure without binding others to his security, and engaged in 
the kind of double reflection that emancipates the recipient by com-
municating with him artistically and eschewing the need for majority 
approval or the certainty of witnesses, these "town criers of inward-
ness," these disciples who invert the message of their teacher. 21 
Kierkegaard's reception of Lessing is significant in this context, not 
especially for its uniqueness in presenting this product of the En-
lightenment in bourgeois German society as a model existentialist 
religious thinker, but because what he says about Lessing and his 
mode of thought and communication is so applicable to the herme-
neutic problem at the core of Nietzsche's critique of Christianity: the 
distinction between Christ and the religious structure he unwittingly 
generated. It parallels the underlying insight that the best religion, 
the most effective teacher, forgoes convictions, proofs, doctrines, 
claims to historical objectivity, paralyzing ritual, and promises for the 
future. 
Nietzsche's complex will to truth (III, 575-77) is tempered by the 
recognition that our perceptions are constantly subject to a variety 
of shifting perspectives and the filter of subjective values, that there 
are no absolute truths that enjoy universal validity (a view compati-
ble with Lessing's). He thinks that man will never exhaust the pos-
sibilities for interpreting existence, and he can therefore state that 
"nothing is true and everything permitted" (V, 398-401; XI, 88, 155; 
IV, 340). Nothing should be exempt from the process of continual 
testing and experimentation (III, 415-16). The only form of "truth" 
Nietzsche admits is that of symbolic or metaphoric expression, sub-
ject to interpretation-but these too, however, may easily become 
"illusions about which one has forgotten that they are illusions," and 
21. Ibid., pp. 67-71. 
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"a sum of poetized and rhetorically exalted human relations" may 
experience such embellishment and long tradition that they eventu-
ally appear as canonical beliefs (I, 880-81). The will to truth is not 
only experimentation, but also manifests itself as a temptation to 
seek security, to ascertain and force transitoriness into the framework 
of permanence. Truth is only a label for a process, a "processus in 
infinitum," an ever-active determination rather than a consciousness 
of something stable and definitive (XII, 384-85), and language may 
be ultimately an inadequate expression of reality (I, 878). 
Thus the imperative of "belief" so central to the Christian religion 
is for Nietzsche a weakness, an illness, the condition of unwilling-
ness to maintain the unending pursuit of truth. The doctrine of per-
sonal immortality is nothing more than a comforting human prefer-
ence for the illusion of a beautiful lie (VI, 225, 232-34, 229-30), and 
belief is still only belief, the enemy of knowledge. Intellectual hon-
esty demands strength, sacrifice, and a noble soul. The conviction 
that God is interested in our personal welfare may be heartening, but 
it is an abuse of godly dexterity to interpret the "finger of God" as a 
power that will cure a cold or hold off the rain until we have safely 
entered the coach! Indeed, any god so constructed would be an ab-
surdity, an errand-boy or postman, a negative factor of belief, and 
that is what Christian philology has produced! (VI, 232-33). It is 
indeed human, all-too-human, to cling to such convictions, to expe-
rience "miracles and being born again," to "hear the voices of an-
gels!" (III, 551). 22 
When we hear church bells on a Sunday morning, Nietzsche says, 
this is a reminiscence of the crucifixion of one who long ago claimed 
to be the Son of God, but "the proof for such a contention is com-
pletely lacking" (II, 116-17). Martyrdom is ineffective as a proof, 
and Nietzsche questions whether anything is changed about a mat-
ter simply because someone sacrificed a life for it. Truth is not some-
thing one person has and another does not, and martyrdom has 
perhaps better served the cause of error. "Today one needs only the 
crudest persecution of an ordinary sect to give it an honorable name" 
(VI, 234-35). But perhaps the greatest danger in the drive for the 
certainty of belief is not that of false hope or security, but rather 
fanaticism. Convictions are but prisons, means for keeping individu-
22. See also sections 109, 121, 319, and 347 of The Gay Science for examples of Nietz-
sche's ideas about belief as a desire for something definitive that is, however, mere 
belief and not truth. "But we, we other ones, thirsty for understanding, want to look 
our experiences straight in the eye, hour by hour, day by day! We ourselves want to be 
our own experiments and guinea pigs!" (KSA, III, 551). 
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als dependent, subject to control, and alienated from themselves (VI, 
236-37). 23 The objectification of knowledge that takes place in this 
historical process and forms the basis for belief in orthodox Chris-
tianity fundamentally denies the spirit of free inquiry that links Les-
sing to Nietzsche's intellectual process. 
Kierkegaard had recognized a similar cognitive mode in Lessing's 
deliberate evasiveness in matters of belief and his desire to forgo 
being understood by everyone. Stupidity is the prerequisite for such 
success, whereas subtle religious meaning-or the attempt to "win 
disciples to the doctrine of not having disciples," as Lessing had 
done-is another matter entirely and requires infinite patience and 
an understanding of the "secrets" of artistic communication. Lessing 
thus reflects the paradox of expressing the conviction "that it is not 
the truth but the way which is the truth, that is, that the truth exists 
only in the process of becoming, in the process of appropriation, and 
hence that there is no result."24 For Nietzsche, too, this remained the 
last virtue, the last remnant of Christian morality, and it is central to 
the similarly elusive style of his prose and the relentlessness of his 
inquiry. 
Upon publication of the Reimarus fragments that postulate a rela-
tionship between Jesus and the evangelists surprisingly like that 
depicted in Nietzsche's Antichrist, Lessing foresaw that his motives 
would be misconstrued. "I take the risk that my intentions will be 
misunderstood and my suggested goals misinterpreted," he wrote, 
and he cautioned against identifying Reimarus's theory with his 
own views. 25 Yet Reimarus's "proof," illustrated by contradictory pas-
sages from the Gospels stating that Christianity is a falsification and 
Jesus of Nazareth was a person different from the Son of God, pro-
vided Lessing with a welcome stimulus for debate about the relation-
ship between revealed truth and human understanding. Such proofs 
have little value other than that of attacking the letter, but not the 
spirit, of religion, whose claim to "truth" lies outside the realm of the 
written word of the Bible-which is not necessarily the word of God, 
as Lessing assures Goeze in his Axiomata. Religion existed before 
evangelists and apostles wrote a single word of the Bible, which in 
any case can never encompass the entire truth of the Christian reli-
23. Fanatics such as Savonarola, Luther, Rousseau, Robespierre, and St.-Simon suf-
fer from a pathological optical restriction according to Nietzsche, but because they are 
picturesque and humanity would rather see gestures than listen to reason, they are 
quite effective with the masses (KSA, VI, 236-37). 
24. Kierkegaard, Unscientific Postscript, p. 71. 
25. LM, XIII, Eine Ouplik I, p. 21. 
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gion. 26 Lessing seeks to maintain the distinction between religion 
and its history, disdaining the "myopic hermeneuts" with their theo-
logical explanations and proofs. 27 Furthermore, the subjective realm 
of religion, which Goeze fears is impaired by exposure to the Rei-
marus fragments, is for Lessing something insusceptible to any ex-
ternal corruptive influence, for it is "the disposition of the human 
heart with respect to religion," involving the most internal religious 
spirit.28 
Lessing's posthumous fragments, "The Religion of Christ," delve 
further into the separation of Christ and Christianity and give con-
vincing testimony to his personal view of Jesus as one who lived and 
practiced a religion that could be shared by all individuals according 
to their own assessments of the nobility and worthiness of Jesus as a 
person, while the Christian religion made Jesus more than a man 
and the object of adoration. Whereas the religion of Christ is mani-
fested in the Bible, that of Christianity is ambiguous to such a de-
gree that it is "incomprehensible" that both religions could exist si-
multaneously in this figure. 29 Lessing reiterates his assessment that 
26. LM, XIII, Axiomata V-VII, pp. 116-21. 
27. LM, XIII, Axiomata X, p. 134. Lessing distinguishes between "inner" and "her-
meneutic" truth when he chides Goeze for testing inner truth by means of the herme-
neutic, concluding: "Als ob die innere Wahrheit eine Probe noch brauchte1 Als ob nicht 
vielmehr die innere Wahrheit die Probe der hermcneutischen sein miiBte!" (p. 128). 
Kierkegaard refers to Lessing's essay "Uber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft" 
(LM, XIII, 1-8) to support his own thesis that the "attempt to create a quantitative 
transition to a qualitative decision" must fail, and cites Lessing's attack on the "direct 
transition from historical trustworthiness to the determination of an eternal happi-
ness" (Kierkegaard, Unscientific Postscript, p. 88). In this essay Lessing makes a clear 
separation between the power of the "original" acts of prophecy and miracles and that 
of the accounts of such miracles transmitted by the apostles: the power of the former 
resided in the immediacy of the witnessing, whereas the subsequent reporting of the 
events has only the reliability of all historical truths; he concludes: "Wenn keine histo-
rische Wahrheit demonstriert werden kann: so kann auch nichts durch historische 
Wahrheiten demonstriert werden. Das ist: zufallige Geschichtswahrheiten konnen der 
Beweis von notwendigen Vernunftswahrheiten nie werden" (LM, XIII, 5). See also 
Klaus Bohnen, Geist und Buchstabe. Zum Prinzip des kritischen Verfahrens in Lessings litera-
turiisthctischen und theologischen Schriften (Koln: Biihlau, 1974), for a discussion of Les-
sing's distinction between the letter and the spirit of communication as it relates to his 
Education of the Human Race. 
28. LM, XIII, "Anti-Goeze III," p. 155. Here Lessing states unequivocally that he 
would publish the controversial Reimarus fragments again even if Goeze should damn 
him to the deepest abyss of Hell. 
29. LM, XVI, "Die Religion Christi," nos. 1-8. Schilson points out that Lessing 
strives to maintain the separation of religion from its history and that the rock of 
Christ is seen as faith and not the written word (Schilson, Lessings Christentum, p. 24). 
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"Christ was simply a teacher inspired by God." The brief posthu-
mous fragments motivate Claus Trager to conclude: "Lessing was a 
heretic. It was not the Christian religion, but rather the religion of 
Christ with which he identified .... The dominant ideology natu-
rally falls apart when confronted with the impression of a human 
example that man makes for himself out of the religious founder."30 
If one agrees with Lessing's own description of a heretic as "a person 
who at least wants to see with his own eyes," a title that has its "very 
good aspects" and in certain centuries constitutes "the best recom-
mendation that a scholar can bestow upon future generations," then 
this is a label he wore with ease.31 
The specific image of Jesus conveyed by Lessing is not as central to 
our topic as the nature of his dispute with the orthodoxy that main-
tained the validity of the letter of the evangelists' interpretation, a 
literal validity doubted by Lessing and vehemently denied by Nietz-
sche. The question of whether or not Lessing believed the details of 
Reimarus's "primary assault upon the Christian religion" is irrele-
vant to the issue of the letter and the spirit of Christianity, that dis-
crepancy existing between the figure of Jesus historically transmitted 
through the written word and imprinted on mankind by means of 
theological proofs and historical validation and the type perceived 
hermeneutically beneath the accretions of the historical church by his 
spiritual contemporaries. It is precisely this quality of contemporane-
ity in spirit with the past that so indebted Kierkegaard to Lessing 
and that Nietzsche in unstated fashion assumed as his own basis for 
interpretation. It is a subjective quality, a trust in one's individual 
perceptive capacity, which makes it possible for such critics to rattle 
the structure of historical edifices for the sake of a better understand-
ing of the great types who originally inspired them. There is perhaps 
no area as sensitive toward its claims to validity as religion, which in 
Christianity is seen by Lessing and Nietzsche to have objectified the 
elusive spirit of its unwitting founder and thus turned into his an-
tithesis. Authenticity and ideology are rendered incompatible. 
To be sure, Lessing's Education of the Human Race has been inter-
preted as his attempt to reconcile the Christian concept of revelation 
30. Claus Trager, "Lessing-Kritik und Historizitat," Sitzungsberichte der siichsischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig: Philologisch-historische Klasse, Band 121, Heft 5 
(Berlin, 1981), p. 9. 
31. LM, XI, 62-63. Otto Best, in his article "Noch einmal: Vemunft und Offenba-
rung. Oberlegungen zu Lessings 'Beriihrung' mit der Tradition des mystischen Ratio-
nalismus," Lessing Yearbook, 12 (1980), 123-56, takes up the question of Lessing as 
"Ketzer" (pp. 123-24) as a point of departure for his study. 
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with the Enlightenment ideal of human understanding, the super-
natural with the reasonable, the eternal with the temporal. Lessing 
projects the historical process as a progressive enlightenment of 
mankind through piecemeal revelation, represented in past religions 
and leading to a third stage of development when Judaism's system 
of immediate retribution and Christianity's doctrine of rewards and 
punishments in the hereafter are abandoned because the moral good 
has become completely internalized, automatic, and instinctive. 32 
Published as a balance to Reimarus's hypothesis, the first fifty-three 
paragraphs of the Education seek to defuse the arguments against the 
validity of revealed religion, against the error of inconsistency of bib-
lical transmission, by presenting even error as a rational means of 
education, a tool in the hands of a providential deity of infinite pa-
tience with man's still-limited receptive capacities. In such a scheme, 
where miracles serve as educational devices and the "inner purity of 
the heart" characterizing Jesus reflects man's own goal, progress is 
seen as a "large, slow cycle," which by means of "smaller, faster 
cycles ... brings the human race closer to its perfection."33 Abso-
lutes thus become relativized in history, and error justified. The 
"truth" of revelation is purposeful, and Lessing's skepticism toward 
revealed religion grows with the strength of its claims to knowledge. 
Citing the hero of his drama of tolerance, Lessing states that "Na-
than's attitude to an· positive religions has long been mine."34 All 
differences of opinion can be harmonized in the shared recognition 
that truth is piecemeal, hidden, conditional, and ultimately unknow-
able to mankind, and Lessing concludes in his fragment entitled 
"The Christianity of Reason" that man as a moral being has but one 
choice: "Act according to your individual perfections." Noting that 
"in the series of beings there cannot possibly be a jump," he specu-
lates that there "must also exist beings who are not sufficiently 
clearly conscious of their perfections," a thought underscoring both 
the need for progression in Lessing's basic approach and the individ-
ualistic nature of this human development. 35 
Although many passages in The Antichrist and in others of Nietz-
sche's speculations present a skeptical, even negative, view of that 
idea of progressive human development toward a higher goal which 
is so germane to Lessing's Education, others reveal a fervent expecta-
tion of a self-overcoming and emancipated form of human existence 
32. LM, XIII, "Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts," nos. 1-100, pp. 415-36. 
33. LM, XIII, no. 61, p. 428; no. 92, pp. 434-35. 
34. LM, XVI, 399-400, 444. 
35. LM, XIV, 175-78. 
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unparalleled in history and surpassing its limitations. While claiming 
that "future development" is not necessarily progress, heightening 
and strengthening, and that humanity does not represent develop-
ment toward a something better (VI, 171), Nietzsche provides an-
other reading of mankind's future in the Genealogy of Morals and Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. It is my contention that beneath the surface of de-
spair about the declined state of human affairs, behind the words of 
anger at what Christian morality has wrought, there resides within 
his thought more than a glimmer of hope for individuals willing to 
see and exchange the "false optic" of belief-the "mental cobwebs" 
of abstract moral imperatives-for personal choices, and to reject 
vain hopes of projected heavenly bliss in favor of one's immanent 
fate (VI, 175, 177-78). Christianity, castigated on the one hand as a 
decadent will to decline directed against the very instinct for life and 
growth (VI, 172-75), is recognized as still possible as an "intensely 
private form of existence" -a paradox only if one does not distin-
guish the subjective, individual option from that of political Chris-
tianity (XII, 532). 
In its negation of sensuality and procreation Christianity seems 
antithetical to life (II, 130), a corruption of everything natural by its 
impression of sin upon mankind, an inversion of morality in order 
to create an artificial need for redemption. Its goal for man may not 
be "that he become increasingly moral, but that he feel as sinful as 
possible" (II, 134-37). Even the Enlightenment, with its emphasis 
upon human reason, may have worsened the sorry lot of man by 
applying stark rationality to human problems and giving them a pes-
simistic note. "Around 1770 one could notice a decline in joyfulness," 
Nietzsche claims, and he sees superficial optimism as the culprit, the 
beautiful belief that glosses over suffering, but cannot eliminate it 
from man's consciousness: man "alone suffers so deeply, that he had 
to invent laughter" (XI, 571). 
Progress may be mere illusion, and mankind may reach a lower 
ebb in the future (III, 51, 52). But seen from the perspective of one 
who views life not as an ascending progression toward a utopian 
ideal, as Lessing did, but rather as an anarchic and dynamic well-
spring for ever-new forms of human potential, these ups and downs 
(the low point symbolized in Christianity) may be positive and nega-
tive stimuli to renewal and change. Out of the enormous ruins of 
history, "where some things still tower, where much remains de-
cayed and dismal," where the belief in God has become incredible 
and ascetic ideals are on the wane, there may emerge something 
more powerful and vital (III, 602). Like Novalis's assessment of his 
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contemporary age, these "beautiful ruins" may constitute the pro-
ductive anarchy for a new emergence of mankind in which the sub-
tleties and intellectual refinements of Christianity, its self-doubt and 
questioning will to truth, will be preserved and made fruitful to pro-
duce an autonomous and authentic human existence cleansed of bad 
conscience and external coercions. 
To be sure, Nietzsche will not admit even a symbolic guiding hand 
of Providence through revelation in his reflections, for even as a 
pedagogical device, such a God appears too ridiculous for belief. A 
God who sacrifices himself for human sin out of love for his debtor 
taxes credibility (V, 330-31), and all the means that have been uti-
lized to render man moral, were "basically immoral" (VI, 102). Fur-
thermore, historical experience has taught Nietzsche to be wary of 
projecting God into the accidents of history: "If human affairs seem 
wild and disorderly, I certainly don't believe that God had a purpose 
for this or permits it," he admonishes. "Such thinking robs chance of 
its innocence!" (VI, 194). A false belief in Providence has enabled 
man to justify the ways of history, to absolve himself from personal 
responsibility. The conviction that God "who, although he loves the 
dark and crooked paths, in the last analysis still leads everything to a 
'marvelous end'" is a fable, and one should question "whether the 
tile that falls from the roof is really thrown off by 'divine love.'" 
These means are not God's, he suggests, but ours: "And our own 
nets are torn apart by ourselves just as often and just as clumsily as 
by the tile. And not everything is a purpose that is labeled as such" 
(III, 120-22). Providence is a term that makes things easy for us, and 
accidental events cannot serve as proofs for it. Furthermore, it is 
highly questionable to assume that this chaos of life, "this whirlpool 
is reasonable and has a reasonable purpose,"36 or to interpret nature 
as a "proof of God's goodness and care" (III, 600). Thus, while Les-
sing in the Education of the Human Race utilizes the letter of orthodox 
Christianity to convey his hopes for mankind's eventual release from 
error and growth to autonomy, Nietzsche rejects not only any com-
forting idea of a providential hand in the process, but even the likeli-
36. This posthumous passage is quoted from K, II, "Wir Philologen," no. 158, 
p. 584. Here Nietzsche muses that the only understanding we possess is the "little bit 
of understanding of the human being," and it is always to one's own disadvantage to 
relegate anything to "Providence." He highlights the intuitive, artistic quality of "un-
derstanding" (Vernunft) and considers the artist as the individual who possesses this 
faculty to the highest degree and therefore derives a special happiness from his work. 
If a work is created through consciousness, there is perhaps an even greater feeling of 
"understanding and happiness" to be achieved, Nietzsche speculates. 
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hood of reason or goals in history. Lessing's spiral of development 
tends to reach progressively higher levels, whereas Nietzsche's pro-
jection is one of cyclical emergence and retreat, augmentation and 
decline, in which entire cycles may rise and fall, but remain dy-
namic. There is one particular pattern he discerns in a cycle, which 
he illustrates through Christianity, but everything in the course of 
history is seen as the result, not of divine guidance or reason, but of 
man's own actions. 37 
Just as Nietzsche had been able to view Christianity as both the 
reaction against and the preserver of antiquity, so does he present 
this religious phenomenon in the Genealogy of Morals as the begin-
ning of another cycle moving from man's condition of external moral 
compulsion to one of a potentially new innocence that emerges by 
way of an intermediary second stage of human rebellion against 
moral domination (V, 293-97). As an animal who can make promises, 
man has had to learn to resist the natural impulse toward forgetful-
ness by creating memories for himself, "a proper memory of the 
will," in order to repress immediate desires. He must alter the in-
stinctive urge for momentary gratification to that which is "calcula-
ble, regular, and necessary," in order to be able to keep promises for 
the future (V, 292). Such is the history of human responsibility, the 
tremendous task of "the morality of mores," which seeks to trans-
form and tame the sovereign individual through the inculcation of 
bad conscience, guilt, and sin by the cruelest rituals common to reli-
gious cults and ideals (V, 294). Brutal punishments of man's sensual 
and spiritual existence are inflicted by religion to drive him to asceti-
cism and painful self-reflection and thus to impress memory upon 
him: "Ah, reason, earnestness, mastery over the affects, this entire 
dismal thing called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces 
37. In his "New Education of the Human Race" (III, 26), Nietzsche disputes the 
interpretation of "cause and effect" as necessarily that of "cause and punishment," 
whereby even existence itself has been construed as the punishment. He exhorts all 
well-meaning individuals to help eradicate the concept of punishment, which has 
spread like a weed throughout the globe. Clearly referring to the same kind of scheme 
Lessing drew upon for his Education of the Human Race, Nietzsche chides the simplistic 
Christian theologians who explain the concept of God as developing from the "God of 
Israel," the "folk" God, to the "Christian God," and ultimately to the quintessence of 
everything good (VI, 171). He evaluates this alleged "progress" as a reduction of the 
godly to an anchor for the drowning, to a god for the multitude, a democratic cosmo-
politan. Taken literally, Lessing's Education would thus have to be rejected as another 
"false Idea," but as I have tried to show, Lessing's "letter" of discourse often betrays its 
subversive spirit, and the affirmation of human potential should be understood sym-
bolically within the context of his epoch. 
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of man: How dearly they have been bought! how much blood and 
horror lies at the bottom of all 'good things!'" (V, 296-97). 
The cruelest form of memory-making, however, is man's own con-
sciousness of being indebted to God: "The feeling of guilt toward the 
divinity has not stopped growing for thousands of years," Nietzsche 
claims, and it increases in proportion to the strength of the concept 
and reverence for God on earth. The emergence of the Christian God 
as the "maximum-God" has also created the maximum of guilt, an 
apex for which the inevitable decline, even reversal, is already visi-
ble. Along with this decline in the belief in God, one can even an-
ticipate a concurrent waning of human feelings of guilt, and a "com-
plete and definitive atheism might even free mankind from this 
whole feeling of indebtedness toward its origin, its causa prima," for 
atheism and a kind of second innocence go hand in hand (V, 329-30). 
Just as in Zarathustra's tale of the "Three Metamorphoses" the 
camellike existence of the "herd" man who suffers the humiliation of 
the imperative "Thou shalt" is followed by the rebellious and power-
ful lion, only to be supplanted by the third symbol of the child born 
into a new innocence and characterized by playfulness, so too does 
Nietzsche envision an emergence of a new human being out of the 
two previous stages of morality (IV, 29-31). Punishment meted out 
by an autonomous power for transgressions against it, wherein the 
spirit and the letter of the retribution are one, is refined through 
Christian conscience to the internalized agony of guilt, self-doubt, 
and torment. This self-inflicted punishment for one's perceived sins 
against a self-defined God reaches a feverish pitch until the propel-
ling force of the Christian moral imperative to truthfulness is driven 
to its utmost power and turns on its own premises. Dogma becomes 
subversive to its own authority and is capable of self-annihilation. 
Christian truthfulness and the internalization brought about by bad 
conscience have the potential to lead human reflection to the last 
stage of doubt-atheism, out of which man's new innocence is born 
and the autonomous individual emerges. 
This history of "responsibility" concludes its cycle of development 
from oppression to freedom, from domination to sovereignty, by 
means of the same force that initiated it, and when Nietzsche gazes 
down upon the final stage from his perspective he can place himself 
"at the end of the tremendous process, to that place where the tree 
finally bears ripe fruit." Morality and social convention are only the 
means of a previous stage in the process, whose "ripest fruit on the 
tree is the sovereign individual who is equal only to himself," having 
reached complete autonomy as a "supramoral individual." Such a 
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person has surpassed the previous stage of morality, which is mutu-
ally exclusive to autonomy, to become his own independent will car-
rying in every muscle a consciousness of power and freedom, "a 
feeling of the perfection of mankind as a whole." This individual is 
envisioned by Nietzsche as superior by virtue of an achieved sover-
eignty and self-mastery and is the "free individual," the possessor of 
a long and unbreakable will requiring nothing external to itself and 
capable of maintaining itself against all misfortune, "even against 
fate" (V, 293-94). Responsibility has become instinct in the conscious-
ness of freedom. 
Thus, in Nietzsche's analysis, the last consequence of Christian 
morality must be the emergence of the autonomous individual, who 
has internalized the entire system of inducements to moral behavior 
to such a degree that what was first impressed from without to curb 
natural instinct is later refined to self-conscious reflection. Driven to 
its ultimate peak, reflection returns man to a new freedom, instinct 
raised to a higher power. This of course does not mark a reversion 
to either a previous amoral state of barbarism or the natural sponta-
neity of Greek heathendom, but is the result of a painfully devel-
oped refinement of conscience and consciousness-a classical idea 
reminiscent of Schiller's reconciliation of freedom and necessity and 
Kleist's return to graceful innocence through the cyclical movement 
of heightened consciousness. 
Viewed from the perspective of utopian idealism, Lessing and 
Nietzsche both appear as thinkers who absorbed the subtlest ramifi-
cations of their religious heritages and made them fruitful for their 
own speculation, whereby the spirit of Christianity as symbolized in 
the figure of Jesus surpassed and obliterated its letter. Just as Les-
sing had called for a third gospel for mankind, and the Romantics 
for a new Bible, so did Nietzsche exhort free thinkers to make the 
old scriptural gospel superfluous through new words and deeds: "a 
new Bible should emerge through you!" (II, 418). Not faith-that 
"leap" to something qualitatively different which Lessing humor-
ously avoided in his famous excuse of legs too feeble for its accom-
plishment-will bring mankind to its fulfillment, but a realization of 
what is within human potential. The "realm of grace" is not to be 
found elsewhere for Nietzsche: "Is love of fellow man a grace? Is 
your sympathy a grace? If this is possible, then go one additional 
step: love yourself out of grace, then you won't need your God any 
more, and the whole drama of original sin and redemption plays 
itself out within yourself!" (III, 77-78). 
XI. Nietzsche, Heine, and 
the Otherness of the Jew 
Sander L. Gilman 
I. The Problem 
Nietzsche's works are full of false dichotomies. Of these, the most 
problematic politically has been his distinction between the Greek 
and the Jew. Indeed, if this is a polarity, the very labeling of Plato 
as the quintessential anti-Hellene and Semite must force the reader 
to ask exactly what Nietzsche understood by the generalized terms 
"Jew" or "Semite" or "Hebrew."1 
Nietzsche perceived three moments in the natural history of the 
Jew: the Jew as the prophet of the Old Testament, serving the angry 
and holy Jehovah; the Jew as the archetypal wandering Christian 
(Saul), weak and destructive; and the Jew as contemporary, the an-
tithesis of all decadence, self-sufficient and incorruptible. 2 All three 
of these images serve as stereotypes incorporating qualities that 
Nietzsche wishes to present as either positive (as in the first and last 
cases) or negative. All of these moments are, in the last analysis, 
negative, in that they reduce the perception of a group of single 
individuals to the generalities of a class. The search for the source 
1. All references to Nietzsche's works are to KSA (here, XIII, 114), which is at pres-
ent the most complete and accurate edition of all of Nietzsche's works; translations 
have been taken from Walter Kaufmann. The question of the false dichotomy between 
the Hebrew and the Hellene may rest on the reading of Nietzsche's thought in the 
light of "Max Stirner's" faulty distinction between "Die Alten" and "Die Neuen," 
which is itself riddled with anti-Semitic references. In general on the question see 
Werner J. Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1974). 
2. KSA, III, 45-46; VI, 246-47; VI, 192-93. The following recent titles are of inter-
est for the present essay: Gerd-Giinther Grau, Christlicher Glaube und intellektuelle Red-
lichkeit: Eine religionsphilosophische Studie uber Nietzsche (Frankfurt am Main: Schulte-
Bulmke, 1958), pp. 201-39; Hermann Wein, Positives Antichristentum: Nietzsches Chri-
stusbild im Brennpunkt 11achchristlicher Anthropologie (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 89-
93; Wiebrecht Ries, Friedrich Nietzsche: Wie die "wahre Welt" endliclz zur Fabel wurde (Han-
nover: Schluter, 1977), pp. 62-64; J. P. Stern, A Study of Nietzsche (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979). 
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and structure of these images of otherness forces the reader to the 
foundation of Nietzsche's own sense of self, for it is in terms of his 
sense of otherness that the boundaries of his own self were drawn. 
The most evident place of departure for an examination of Nietz-
sche's understanding of the Jew is that oft-quoted passage from 
Beyond Good and Evil-oft-quoted, at least, by a number of Jewish 
writers and anthologizers of the fin de siecle who wished to see 
Nietzsche as the ultimate philo-Semite, in contrast to Elisabeth For-
ster-Nietzsche's propagation of his image as the philosopher of 
proto-fascist anti-Semitism. 3 In the chapter on "Nations and Father-
lands" ("Volker und Vaterlander") Nietzsche praises the Jews as the 
purest race in Europe: 
I have not met a German yet who was well disposed toward the 
Jews; and however unconditionally all the cautious and politically-
minded repudiated real anti-Semitism, even this caution and 
policy are not directed against the species of this feeling itself but 
only against its dangerous immoderation, especially against the 
insipid and shameful expression of this immoderate feeling-
about this, one should not deceive oneself. That Germany has am-
ply enough Jews, that the German stomach, the German blood has 
trouble (and will still have trouble for a long time) digesting even 
this quantum of "Jew" -as the Italians, French, and English have 
done, having a stronger digestive system-that is the clear testi-
mony and language of a general instinct to which one must act. 
"Admit no more new Jews! And especially close the doors to the 
east (also to Austria)!" thus commands the instinct of a people 
whose type is still weak and indefinite, so it could easily be 
3. Of the early attempts to categorize Nietzsche as a philo-Semite the most interest-
ing works are: josef Schrattenholz, ed., Anti-Semiten Hammer (Dusseldorf: E. Lintz, 
1894); Anon., "Friedrich Nietzsche iiber die Juden," Allgemeine lsraelitische Wochen-
schrift Teschurim, 29 March 1895; Anon., "Friedrich Nietzsche iiber die Juden!" General-
Anzeiger fUr die gesamten Interessen des Judentums, 30 October 1902; Achad Ha'am, 
"Nietzscheanismus und Judentum," Ost und West, 2 (1902), 145-52, 242-54; Samuel 
Jankolowitz, "Friedrich Nietzsche und der Antisemitismus," Israelitisches Wochenblatt 
(Zurich), 13 November 1908; Anon., "Wie klein mancher GroBe ist ... ,"Deutsche So-
ciale Blatter, 12 December 1908; Josef Stolzing, "Friedrich Nietzsche und Judentum," 
Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), 10 January 1909; Eberhard Kraus, "Wie Friedrich Nietz-
sche iiber das judentum urteilte," Deutsche Zeitung (Berlin), 1 January 1909; and Gus-
tav Witkowsky, "Nietzsches Stellung zum Zionismus," Judische Rundschau, 2 May 1913. 
On Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche's anti-Semitism see H. F. Peters, Zarathustra's Sister: The 
Case of Elisabeth and Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Crown, 1977). See also Alfred D. 
Low, Jews in the Eyes of the Germans: From the Enlightenment to Imperial Germany (Phila-
delphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979). 
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blurred or extinguished by a stronger race. The Jews, however, are 
beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race now 
living in Europe: they know how to prevail even under the worst 
conditions (even better than under favorable conditions), by 
means of virtues that today one would like to mark as vices-
thanks above all to a resolute faith that need not be ashamed be-
fore "modern ideas"; they change, when they change, always only 
as the Russian Empire makes its conquests-being an empire that 
has time and is not of yesterday-namely, according to the princi-
ple, "as slowly as possible." (KSA, V, 193) 
This passage is clearly linked to Nietzsche's later statement in The 
Antichrist[ian] that the Jews are the antithesis of all decadence: 
Psychologically considered, the Jewish people are a people en-
dowed with the toughest vital energy, who, placed in impossible 
circumstances, voluntarily and out of the most profound prudence 
of self-preservation, take sides with all the instincts of deca-
dence-not as mastered by them, but because they divined a 
power in these instincts with which one could prevail against "the 
world." The Jews are the antithesis of all decadents: they have had 
to represent decadents to the point of illusion; with a non plus ultra 
of histrionic genius they have known how to place themselves at 
the head of all movements of decadence (as the Christianity of 
Paul), in order to create something out of them which is stronger 
than any Yes-saying party of life. (KSA, VI, 192-93) 
Nietzsche wrote both of these seemingly positive passages about 
the Jew at a very special moment in the history of the Eastern Euro-
pean Jew. After the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, exten-
sive anti-Semitic pogroms drove literally millions of Eastern Euro-
pean Jews toward the West. They spilled through Central Europe on 
their way to England and the United States. Their presence was 
viewed as a threat to the false sense of cultural homogeneity felt both 
by the European nationalists and by those communities of Western-
ized Jews who had already been assimilated (at least in their self-
perception) for a number of generations. Thus the influx of Eastern 
Jews became the enemy, in nuce, threatening to disrupt the fabric of 
European society as had the Turks centuries before. 
The Western European mind needed to create a mental structure 
through which to cope with the movement of the Eastern Jews. Here 
was a class of individuals readily recognizable not only through their 
dress and appearance, but also through their language and rhetoric. 
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This was the Other par excellence, the reification of the anti-Semitic 
caricature of the Jew in the West. Indeed, they were living proof of 
one of the basic tenets of late nineteenth-century popular thought. 
These Eastern Jews were clearly degenerate: one could sense it in 
their dirty, smelly, barbaric essence; one could hear it in the decayed 
mock German and their crude, loud, and boisterous love of argu-
ment. For the Western mind this was proof enough of the true nature 
of the Jew as degenerate; the Westernized Jew, on the other hand, 
was presented with the fearful specter of that which he feared he 
had been-the Eastern Jew seemed to be the embodiment of the 
image of the Jew fossilized in the bedrock of Western myth. 
It was not, however, merely within the popular mind that the 
Jew was categorized as the degenerate Other. Here Nietzsche's com-
ments on the nature of the Jew as the antidecadent can be under-
stood. For the common ground of all Nietzsche's examples of deca-
dence (and decadence is but a subclass of the concept of degeneracy) 
is the morose, mad figurtc'-Poe, Kleist, Leopardi, Gogo!, the mad-
man as degenerate. 4 Late nineteenth-century medicine certainly sup-
ported Nietzsche in his linking of exactly such figures with degener-
ate madness, but it also saw the decadence of the Jew in a very 
special light: the Jew, more than any other outsider in the West, was 
perceived as having a special tendency toward madness. The giants 
of nineteenth-century German psychiatry-Emil Kraepelin, Richard 
Krafft-Ebbing, and Theodor Kirchhoff-all agreed that the Jew was 
inherently degenerate. 5 Theodor Kirchhoff's view is representative: 
"Perhaps the Jews exhibit a comparatively greater predisposition to 
insanity, but this may be explained by another peculiarity apart from 
race, viz., the fact that the Jews intermarry very often in close family 
circles, the crossing is insufficient, and heredity thus gives rise, by 
in-breeding, to a rapidly increasing predisposition to insanity."6 
Kirchhoff's etiology for the prevalence of insanity among the Jews 
is inbreeding. But Nietzsche, as with his understanding of the nature 
of the physiology of the Black, inverts this accepted wisdom concern-
4. KSA, V, 224. See especially Annemarie Wettley, "Zur Problemgeschichte der 
'degenerescence,'" Sud!wffs Archiu, 43 (1959), 193-212. 
5. A detailed survey of this was undertaken by Alexander Pilcz, "Geistesstorungen 
bei den Juden," Wiener klinische Rundschau, 14 (1901 ), 888ff. and 908ff. That this was 
not merely a question of esoteric medical interest can be seen in a popular essay on 
this topic, "EinfluB der Rasse auf pathologische Erscheinungen," Proschaska's illustrirte 
Monatsbiinde, 8 (Hl9o), 198-201, which contains much the same information about 
Jews and insanity. 
6. Quoted from the contemporary English translation, Theodor Kirchhoff, Handbook 
of Insanity for Practitioners and Students (New York: William Wood and Co., 1893), p. 23. 
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ing the Other. 7 For the very condemnation of the Jew as degenerate 
by the accepted authorities of Western society gave Nietzsche the 
fulcrum he needed to move the world: he simply turned it on its 
head. If the anti-Semites need to see the Jew as the essence of decay, 
Nietzsche, placing himself in the role of the opposition per se, must 
see in the imposed isolation of the Jew a source of strength. Nietz-
sche is thus not a philo-Semite but rather an anti-anti-Semite. His 
sense of the contemporary Jew is colored by his personal opposition 
to the self-assumed role of the anti-Semite (including his brother-in-
law Bernard Forster) as the guardian of the truths of Europe in oppo-
sition to the invading Eastern hordes. Nietzsche's antiestablishment 
view could never accept this; as he became more and more alienated 
from this view he came to identify himself with the outsider: the Pole 
in Germany, the Easterner in the West. 
II. Jews and Christians 
If Nietzsche found that he must defend the contemporary Jew from 
the attacks of the anti-Semites in the West, he had no such compunc-
tions about the Christian, for the Christians were the powerful ma-
jority against which he wished to define himself. However, he saw 
the softness and weakness of Christianity, its degeneracy, as lying 
specifically in its Jewish roots. The strength of the Old 1estament 
became the smothering "love" of the New Testament. Nietzsche was 
writing about texts, about books, about language. This becomes clear 
when, in The Antichrist[ian], he contrasts the primitive law of Manu 
with the New Testament: 
Ultimately, it is a matter of the end to which one lies. That 
"holy" ends are lacking in Christianity is my objection to its 
means. Only bad ends: poisoning, slander, negation of life, con-
tempt for the body, the degradation and self-violation of man 
through the concept of sin-consequently its means too are bad. It 
is with an opposite feeling that I read the law of Manu, an incom-
parably spiritual and superior work: even to mention it in the 
same breath with the Bible would be a sin against the spirit. One 
7. See my essay "The Image of the Black in the Works of Hegel and Nietzsche," 
German Quarterly, 53 (1980), 141-58. The concept of Otherness, which is rooted in the 
nature of projection, is discussed in the first chapter of my Seeing the Insane (New York: 
Wiley, 1982) as well as throughout my Introducing Psychoanalytic Theory (New York: 
Brunner/Mazel, forthcoming). 
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guesses immediately: there is a real philosophy behind it, in it, 
not merely an ill-smelling Judaine of rabbinism and superstition; it 
offers even the most spoiled psychologist something to chew on. 
Not to forget the main point, the basic difference from every kind 
of Bible: here the noble classes, the philosophers and the warriors, 
stand above the mass; noble values everywhere, a feeling of per-
fection, an affirmation of life, a triumphant delight in oneself and 
in life-the sun shines on the whole book. All the things on which 
Christianity vents its unfathomable meanness--procreation, for 
example, woman, marriage-are here treated seriously, with re-
spect, with love and trust. (KSA, VI, 240) 
The laws of Manu are positive, strengthening the nature of man in 
the world; the New Testament is destructive of life. 
Nietzsche's understanding of the nature of the New Testament is 
important, for he sees it as an "ill-smelling Judaine of rabbinism and 
superstition" ("Judaine" is Nietzsche's neologism for the evil essence 
of Jewishness). The entire phrase points not to an image of the Jews 
of the New Testament, but to the rhetoric of late nineteenth-century 
anti-Semitism with its stress on the false logic, the rabbinical sophist-
ries, and the superstitions of the Jews linked to their appearance 
and smell. The latter was associated by anti-Semites such as Theodor 
Fritsch with "their uncleanliness and use of garlic."8 The synesthesia 
of smelling the illogic, of dirty sophistry, reappears in The Antichris-
t[ ian] in a much more specific context: "What follows from this? That 
one does well to put on gloves when reading the New Testament. 
The proximity of so much uncleanliness almost forces one to do this. 
We would no more choose the 'first Christians' to associate with than 
Polish Jews-not that one even required any objection to them: they 
both do not smell good" (KSA, VI, 223). The first Christians were 
really just Eastern Jews. They contaminated through their very pres-
ence. Their presence, however, is felt through the word, through 
their language, through their rhetoric. It is the mode of discourse of 
the New Testament that Nietzsche is attacking, as much as its con-
tent. The common ground of the New Testament and contemporary 
rabbinic tradition lies in their shared lying and corrupting rhetoric. 
But Christianity is the rhetoric of power with which, whether he 
wishes it or not, he is condemned to be linked. His attempt at exor-
cising the Christian demons that lurk within his self-perception, his 
violent parodies of the style of the New Testament in Thus Spoke Zara-
8. Fritsch was a contemporary of Forster. Cited here from Theodor Fritsch, Handbuch 
der Judenfrage, 38th cd. (Leipzig: Hammer, 1935), pp. 27-28. 
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thustra, only heighten his self-awareness of his existence as a repre-
sentative of the most dominant of all groups, of the most powerful, 
of the most frightening: the German Christians. 9 Yet even when he 
attempts to vilify the rhetoric of that which he hates most within 
himself, he accepts the rhetoric that labels the Eastern Jew as the 
epitome of Otherness. Nietzsche acknowledges, if but as a reflex, his 
role as a member of the dominant society in condemning that so-
ciety. He is, for the moment, the self-conscious Antichrist damning 
the Christians as merely Eastern Jews. 
Thus, Nietzsche invests with the most anger those otherwise inar-
ticulate hatreds that reflect his inner fears. To no little extent these 
fears are associated with Christianity. We might speculate that his 
concept of Christianity is loaded with the anger and disappointment 
felt by the young Nietzsche at the death of his father, who not only 
represented the Church in his role as a minister but also held the 
same patriarchal position in the youthful Nietzsche's world as does 
the Church in the philosopher's mental universe. When Nietzsche 
addresses the question of Jews qua Jews, he sees a problem that is 
the direct result of this paternalism and he is able to condemn anti-
Semitism as a social evil; when he strives to characterize the incon-
stant nature of Christianity, he falls back upon that rhetoric which 
for him (as a German Christian) and his time possessed the great-
est negative force, the rhetoric of anti-Semitism. Thus the Jews can 
be both a positive and a negative image within Nietzsche's system: 
positive, when seen as the objects of Christian anti-Semitism (a fact 
that reveals the true nature of Christianity as evil and destructive); 
negative, when used as the most accessible analogue for that which 
Nietzsche feared most within himself-the German Christian. The 
result is a complex form of self-hatred, a self-hatred that draws upon 
anti-anti-Semitic rhetoric as well as anti-Semitic rhetoric for its articu-
lation. Yet his rhetoric is not unique even in this very specific context: 
it has an analogue in an earlier writer's sense of self and his use of 
the image of the Eastern Jew. 
III. Analogue and Paradox 
Nietzsche's sense of the Otherness of the Jew, typified by his reac-
tion to the Eastern Jew, would be merely an informative corrective 
9. See Donald F. Nelson, "Nietzsche, Zarathustra and jesus redivivus," Germanic Re-
view, 48 (1973), 175-88. 
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to the false dichotomy of "Greek" and "Jew" if it did not have a 
striking historical analogue within the works of the emblematic (at 
least from the standpoint of the Germans) Jewish writer in Germany, 
Heinrich Heine. Nietzsche's fascination with Heine has been amply 
documented but little understood. 10 One of the more common ob-
servations in modern discussions of the use of "Hebrew" and "Hel-
lene" as aesthetic paradigms in the nineteenth century is that Heine's 
contrast between "Greek" and "Nazarene," art and spiritualism, is 
the major forerunner of Nietzsche and Arnold. 11 Heine observed in 
Shakespeare's Girls and Women (1838): "This old, implacable rejection 
of the theater is but one side of the enmity that has existed for eigh-
teen centuries between two completely heterogeneous manners of 
perceiving the world, one of which stemmed from the dry earth of 
Judea, the other from flowering Greece. Yes, this resentment be-
tween Jerusalem and Athens, between the Holy Sepulcher and the 
cradle of art, between the life in spirit and the spirit in life has lasted 
eighteen centuries."12 Like Nietzsche's complex understanding of 
the Jew, Heine's seemingly clear antithesis is illusionary. More than 
Nietzsche, Heine has a complex, shifting image of the Jew, which 
reveals his own attempts to define himself through identification 
with-or in opposition to-the European images of the Jew and 
those that evolved within German Jewry in the generations following 
emancipation. 13 
Heine perceived himself as the absolute outsider. Unable to as-
sume a position within the dominant society, he isolated himself 
from it. Unlike Nietzsche, who achieved more or Jess everything 
that the European bourgeoisie could hope for itself-status, posi-
tion, acceptance, and thus power-Heine achieved none of these. In 
10. For a summary of the literature on Nietzsche and Heine, see my chapter on 
these authors in my Nietzschean Parody: An Introduction to Reading Nietzsche (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1976), pp. 57ff. 
11. David J. DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1971). 
12. Heine's works are cited to the ed. by Ernst Elster (Leipzig: Bibliographisches 
Institut, 1887-90); here, V, 384. Where volumes of the new critical editions exist, the 
texts have been checked against them; except where otherwise noted, the translations 
are my own. 
13. For many years the only major study of Heine's "Jewishness" was Israel Tabak, 
Judaic Lore in Heine (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948). In recent 
years there has been a series of studies that complement Tabak: Hartmut Kircher, 
Heinrich Heine und das Judentum (Bonn: Bouvier, 1973); Ruth L. Jacobi, Heinrich Heines 
judisches Erbe (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978); and Ludwig Rosenthal, Heinrich Heine als Jude 
(Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1973). 
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no little measure this conflict was the cause of his sense of isolation. 
For German society is dominated by the sense of the Jew as the 
outsider, as the essential Other; in accepting the language and rheto-
ric of this society, even ironically, Heine chose to write with a con-
taminated pen. How German society viewed the sense of the Jew can 
be seen in Karl Gutzkow's autobiography. In attempting to recon-
struct his understanding of the Jew when he was a young man he 
recalls: " 'Christian-Germanic' anti-Semitism was already present in 
the fraternity system (Burschenschaften). In school I got to know the 
Jew as a traitor and braggart. What was feared by all was a hunch-
backed monster from Poland, as vengeful as Shylock." 14 This image 
of the Polish Jew, of the Eastern barbarian, dominated the negative 
image of the Jew in Germany. How easy it was for the emancipated 
German Jew living in the Free Hanseatic city of Hamburg to accept 
the view that this image had little to do with himself!-indeed, that 
it was the very antithesis of himself. Heine was first confronted 
with the reality of the "Eastern" Jew when, in 1815, he journeyed 
to Frankfurt and saw the Frankfurt Ghetto. 15 He felt himself trans-
ported back to the Middle Ages, back to the horror of the physical 
isolation of the Jew before emancipation. 
Heine traveled to the Prussian province of Poland under the influ-
ence of the "Society for the Culture and Science of the Jews," a group 
that (according to one of its founders, Eduard Gans) wished to de-
stroy the wall separating the Jew from the Christian, the world of the 
Jew from the European world. 16 His report on this trip, "On Poland" 
(1822), devoted a much longer segment of the book to the Polish 
Jews than their presence in the population would have seemed to 
warrant. Heine's basic tenet seems to be that if the Jews and the 
peasants were better treated, then the Jews would become peasants 
toiling on the land. This idyllic image of the Jew as farmer played a 
role in many nineteenth-century attempts at colonizing the Eastern 
Jew outside of Europe. But Heine's generally positive image of the 
Eastern Jew has a number of strikingly negative aspects, at least 
some of which seem to be independent of his sense of political and 
economic causes of the Jews' hardships: 
14. Karl Gutzkow, "Riickblicke auf mein Leben," in his Werke, ed. Peter Muller 
(Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, n.d.), V, 65. 
15. Cited by Kircher (above, n. 13), p. 99. See also his references to Yiddish on 
pp. 97 and 111. 
16. The best discussion of this question is to be found in Walter Kanowsky, Vernunft 
und Geschichte: Heinrich Heines Studium als Grundlegung seiner Welt- und Kunstanschauung 
(Bonn: Bouvier, 1975), pp. 182-89. Kanowsky cites Cans's description of the goals of 
the "Verein." 
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A sense of horror overcomes me when I remember how, beyond 
Meseritz, I first saw a Polish village inhabited mainly by Jews. The 
Wadzeck Weekly Newspaper, cooked into a real porridge, could 
not have nauseated me more than these ragbag figures of dirt; and 
the high-minded speech of a third-former enthusiastic about gym-
nastics (Turnplatz: a reference to the nationalism of Turnvater Jahn) 
and Fatherland could not have martyred my ears so excruciatingly 
as the Polish Jew-Jargon (Juden-Jargon). However, this disgust was 
soon replaced by pity, after I had observed these individuals at 
closer range and saw the pig-sty-like holes in which they lived, 
spoke bad German (mauscheln), prayed, haggled-and were miser-
able. Their language was a German sprinkled with Hebrew and 
decorated with bits of Polish .... But they evidently did not pro-
gress with the rest of European culture and their spiritual world 
sank into a morass of unedifying superstition, which was forced 
into them by a sophistic scholastic in a thousand miraculous 
forms. . .. I still prefer the Polish Jew with his dirty fur, with his 
lousy beard and his garlic breath and his bad German (Gemau-
schel), to many others in their state-paper majesty. 17 
The Polish Jews not only speak a false, degenerate language but also, 
like the German-nationalists, have a false rhetoric; they have degen-
erated from the poetry of the Bible to a primitive, scholastic rhetoric 
(which Heine is constrained to find better than that of the assimi-
lated Jews who have become completely Germanized); and lastly, 
they smell. Heine set out to write a defense of the Eastern Jew as 
possessing the potential for improvement. But his positive image 
was still haunted by Gutzkow's image of the deformed Eastern Jew-
the Jew as freak-as the true reality of all Jews, in contrast to the 
mask of the assimilated individual Jew. 
Later, in The Baths of Lucca, Heine repeated this striking contradic-
tion. In attempting to sketch the portrait of the Jew as one with the 
world through his religion, Heine stresses the corruption of the lan-
guage of the Jew as well as the odor of garlic permeating him: 
Thus an old Jew with a long beard and a torn cloak, who cannot 
speak an orthographic word and is a bit mangy, feels himself hap-
pier than I do with all my education. There lives in Hamburg .. 
a man called Moses Lump [Lump = rascal], also called Moses 
Liimpchen or, in short, Liimpchen. He runs around during the 
entire week through wind and weather with his pack on his back 
in order to earn his couple of marks. When he comes home on Fri-
17. Heine, Werke, VII, 194-95. 
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day evening he lays down his bundle and all his cares, and sits 
down at table with his misshapen wife and even more misshapen 
daughter, partakes with them of fish cooked in a tasty garlic 
sauce, sings the most splendid psalms of King David, rejoices 
wholeheartedly at the exodus of the Children of Israel from Egypt, 
rejoices also that all the miscreants who behaved wickedly toward 
them died in the end, that King Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, Ha-
man, Antiochus, Titus, and all such people are dead, while Lump-
chen is still alive and partaking of fish with his wife and child-
And I tell you, Herr Doktor, the fish is delicious and the man is 
happy, he does not have to worry about culture, he sits wrapped 
contentedly in his religion and green dressing gown like Diogenes 
in his tub, he gazes cheerfully at his candles .... 18 
The Eastern Jew is not defined by his geographic locus, for Moses 
Lump lives in neither Hamburg nor Poland. Rather, he inhabits the 
netherworld of myth. For Heine it is a world projected from his own 
self-perception. 
Heine spoke and evidently wrote Yiddish (one anecdote has him 
translating bits of Homer and Ovid into Yiddish as a joke). 19 He had 
more than a slight familiarity with the modes of rabbinic discourse, 
with the pilpul as a mode of the presentation of argument. Yet no 
matter how deep his knowledge of rabbinics was, and this is not a 
matter of importance for the present argument, he understood how 
one presented an argument. He saw himself as one who had moved 
from the ghetto with a mangled nonlanguage, with a barbaric mode 
of discourse, to the world of a civilized language and an acceptable 
manner of discussion and analysis. Indeed, one can understand the 
entire motivation of the "Society for the Culture and Science of the 
Jews" in this light. The religion of the Other becomes acceptable 
when cast in acceptable language and rhetoric, at least according to 
the assimilationists. 
When Heine's works depicting Jews are examined, it can be seen 
that this striving for an acceptable mode of discourse is perceived 
retrospectively in the myth of the Jew. The Rabbi of Bacharach and 
his beautiful wife speak a German carved out of the marble of Isaac 
of York's English. Only when they flee to the Frankfurt Ghetto is the 
shadow of the future of the language of the Jews cast upon the work 
by Jackel the Fool. 20 The world of myth is distanced: it can exist in 
18. Ibid., III, 328. The translation is adapted from S. S. Prawer, Heine. The Tragic 
Satirist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 192. 
19. Kircher, p. 97. 
20. Heine, Werke, IV, 474. 
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the Middle Ages, but exists especially in the Golden Age of Spanish 
Jewry, when the Jews existed as equals to all within the world of 
myth. One can turn to those problematic three poems, the Byronic 
"Hebrew Melodies,'' written by the late Heine-a Heine who had 
moved from a type of philo-Semitism to a mode of atheism, and then 
back to some type of reconciliation with the ethics of the Jew (or so 
the common wisdom would have us believe). 
What is most puzzling about these poems is the numerous "mis-
takes" in them, which everyone has been at pains to point out. 
They all have to do with Heine's "knowledge" of Judaism and have 
been used to show his ignorance. But as Leopold Zunz observed, 
"who learns history from Heine?"21-perhaps no one, but what can 
be learned from him is the creation of the world of myth and its 
undermining. 
"Princess Sabbath," Heine's poetic reworking of the tale of Moses 
Lump, is the tale of the "little Jew," and yet it begins with the thou-
sand and one nights of Arabia. It recounts the tale of the little Jew 
who has been condemned to a dog's life except on the Sabbath when 
he becomes again the Prince of Araby. This magical transformation 
is heralded by his singing of the Sabbath hymn written by Jehuda 
ben Halevy, "Lecho daudi lekras kalle" -"Come, my friend, meet 
the bride." It closes with the Havdallah and the shaking of the ritual 
spice container, Bessamim, exuding the aroma of the Orient. The 
ritual lamp is extinguished and the Sabbath is gone. 
The error has been noted almost from its first publication: the 
hymn does not happen to be by Jehuda ben Halevy. Why then men-
tion him after citing the opening line of the hymn in Hebrew? Be-
cause Jehuda ben Halevy is one of the very few figures of the mythi-
cal age of Spanish Jewry whom even the least knowledgeable reader 
would have automatically associated with the Golden Age. (The 
Golden Age, at least within the mythology of the German-Jewish 
Enlightenment, the Haskala, was bounded by Jehuda ben Halevy and 
Salomon Ibn Gabirol in the eleventh century and Maimonides in the 
twelfth. It was seen as the age in which Jews were able to live as 
equals among Christians as well as among Moslems in Spain. This 
idyll ended with the rise of anti-Semitism in Christian Spain during 
the late fourteenth century and the final expulsion of the Jews from 
Spain in 1492.) If Heine had mentioned the actual author, the six-
teenth-century Galilean poet Salomon Alkabets, who would have as-
21. Leopold Zunz, cited by E. R. Malachi, Mekubolim in Eretz Israel (New York: n.p., 
1928), p. 83. Zunz is also the source of the myth, repeated in Heine, that all German 
Jews spoke perfect German until the seventeenth century; see his Haderashot biYsrae/, 
ed. H. Albeck (Jerusalem, 1954), pp. 202ff. 
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sociated his name with any specific world of myth? Heine was in fact 
working from an actual source, Michael Sachs's 1845 history of the 
religious poetry of the Jews in Spain, 22 but the introduction of the 
figure of Jehuda ben Halevy was quite consciously in contradiction to 
his source: this figure links the world of the synagogue with the 
greater tradition of Spanish Jewry, with the integrated and meaning-
ful myth of the Golden Age. Here Heine's gustatory comments on 
the Sabbath cholant and his contrapuntal evocation of the aroma of 
the Havdallah spices contrast the reality of the daily life of the Jews 
with the mythic image of the Golden Age. 
It is not really surprising that the second of the poems of the "He-
brew Melodies" is devoted to Jehuda ben Halevy, for Heine stressed 
the function of Hebrew as the pure language that, like the aroma of 
the spices, evokes the lost world of the mythic past, in contrast to the 
street stench and the linguistic barbarisms of the ghetto Jews. Thus 
Jehuda ben Halevy becomes the epitome of the Jew as holy poet. In 
a mock hagiography Heine tells of the poet's journey to Jerusalem 
and his death at the hands of an Arab while singing the opening 
phrase of his hymn "Lecho daudi lekras kalle." The poem to this 
point has had an ironic undertone. Heine wants to believe in the 
magical world he has begun to conjure for us in "Princess Sabbath," 
but it is a world of myth, too pure, too willing to have its great poets 
accepted and honored in their own time. The language of this world 
is represented either by exquisite German translations from the He-
brew or by the Hebrew itself, never by Yiddish or Yiddish-accented 
German. Indeed, when Heine, in passing, used a Yiddishism in the 
poem, he deleted it in the published version. 23 The contemporary 
Jew thus intruded into the world of the myth of the Golden Age. The 
Yiddish-speaking ghetto inhabitant, hidden within the poet, sneaks 
into this world of myth, contaminating it. The final extant section of 
the poem turns inward, not into the world of myth, but to the daily 
realities of Paris and Germany. Heine comments on his wife's read-
ing of the poem, and on the assimilationist tendencies of German 
Jews such as Julius Eduard Hitzig. His critique of Hitzig leads in a 
convoluted manner to the one Yiddishism actually contained in the 
poems, one that suddenly assumes a life of its own: for Heine begins 
to spin out a mock etymology for the Yiddishism "Schlemiel," seeing 
its origins in the Old Testament, and the Jewish poet as the true 
schlemiel. This intrusion of the world of daily reality into the world 
of myth leads then to Jehuda ben Halevy, and the poem, a paean to 
22. Cited by Rosenthal (above, n. 13), pp. 290ff. 
23. Prawer (above, n. 18), p. 193. 
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the myth of the true poet without the supposed conflicts of the pres-
ent, ends as a fragment, a metacommentary on the nature of poetic 
expression. 
The reader has thus moved from the world of the little Jew in the 
opening poem to the seemingly self-contained world of the myth of 
Spanish Jewry. He has moved from the daily life of the German Jew 
with his potentially contaminated language and rhetoric (present un-
der his mask of assimilation, according to the anti-Semite), to the 
Golden Age, to the final world, the world of the "Disputation." This 
poem concludes not only the mythic world of the "Hebrew Melo-
dies," but also the entire volume of the Romanzero; yet despite its vital 
position in the volume it has been little discussed. 24 It is a problem-
atic poem because it seems to be a break from the earlier works. It is 
set in Christian rather than Moorish Spain, after the Golden Age, but 
before the Inquisition was in complete control. A debate is to be held 
between a Brother Jose, a Franciscan monk, and a Rabbi Judah of 
Navarre. It is to be held before Pedro IV, "The Horrible," and his 
exotic wife Donna Blanca, the former Blanche de Bourbon, to deter-
mine which is the true religion. The party lines are drawn, each 
group awaits its victory. The mendicant preacher begins with a pros-
elytizer's invective against the Jew, one which would echo down the 
centuries to Heine's own time: 
"Juden, Juden, ihr seid Saue, 
Paviane, Nashorntiere, 
Die man nennt Rhinozerosse, 
Krokodile und Vampire, 
"Ihr seid Vipern und Blindschleichen, 
Klapperschlangen, gift' ge Kroten, 
Ottern, Nattern-Christus wird 
Eu'r verfluchtes Haupt zertreten." 
["Jews, Jews, you are swine, 
Baboons, long-nosed beasts 
Which one calls rhinoceroses, 
Crocodiles, and vampires, 
24. See Gerhard Sauder, "Blasphemisch-religiose Korperwelt: Heinrich Heines 'He-
braische Melodien,'" in Wolfgang Kuttenkeuler, ed., Heinrich Heine: Artistik und En-
gagement (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977), pp. 118-43; and Helmut Koopmann, "Heines 'Ro-
manzero': Thematik und Struktur," Zeitsclzrift fUr deutsche Philologie, 97 (1978), 51-70. 
See also Jiirgen Brummack, ed., Heinrich Heine: Epoche-Werk-Wirkung (Munich: Beck, 
1980), pp. 281-85. 
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"You are vipers and snakes-in-the grass, 
Rattlesnakes and poisonous toads, 
Adders, serpents-Christ will 
Crush your damned heads."] 
The answer by Rabbi Judah echoes the gustatory sense of "good 
taste"25 that Heine had used from the beginning of Die Harzreise. 
Good taste is the mark of the refined, nondisputatious observer. The 
rabbi describes how the Leviathan will be prepared on the Day of 
Judgment: 
"In der weiBen Knoblauchbriihe 
Schwimmen kleine Schabchen Rettich-
So bereitet, Frater Jose, 
Mundet dir das Fischlein, wett ich!" 
["In the white garlic sauce 
Swim bits of radish-
Thus prepared, Brother Jose, 
I'm sure you'll enjoy the fish!"] 
The contrast between the raging, angry rhetoric of the monk and the 
tempting, cajoling argument of the rabbi could not be more striking. 
This ironic contrast continues until the monk is forced to reply: 
Aber welche Blasphemie 
MuBt er von dem Monche horen! 
Dieser sprach: der Tausves-Jontof 
Moge sich zum Teufel scheren. 
[But what blasphemy 
he had to hear from the monk! 
The monk spoke: the "Tausves-Jontof" 
Can go to the Devil.] 
The Rabbi's reaction to this is at first angry puzzlement, but then he 
begins to vituperate his opponent: 
"Da hort alles auf, o Gott!" 
Kreischt der Rabbi jetzt entsetzlich; 
Und es reiBt ihm die Geduld, 
Rappelkopfig wird er plotzlich. 
25. See especially chap. 2, "A Most Superior Mass of Broth," in Jocelyne Kolb, 
"Wine, Women, and Song: Sensory References in the Works of Heinrich Heine" (Diss., 
Yale, 1979), pp. 93ff. Professor Kolb was also kind enough to provide me with her 
unpublished talk on "Literary Decorum or the Absence of Taste," in which the aesthet-
ics of taste in the nineteenth century is related to broader aesthetic problems. 
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"Gilt nichts mehr der Tausves-Jontof, 
Was soli gelten? Zeter! Zeter! 
Rache, Herr, die Missetat, 
Strafe, Herr, den Dbeltater!" 
["That is the limit, 0 God!" 
The Rabbi shrieked horribly; 
And, his patience ended, 
Suddenly became enraged. 
"If the 'Tausves-Jontof' has no meaning, 
What then will have? Help! Help! 
Revenge, 0 Lord, this evil, 
Punish, 0 Lord, the evildoer."] 
What has caused this radical turn in the rabbi's rhetoric? What is 
the "Tausves-Jontof"? As early as the first critical editions of Heine's 
work, the editors have been at pains to point out that here, too, 
Heine erred. For the Tosefot Yom Tov is an amended edition of the 
Mishna, not really a detailed commentary but a series of footnotes 
contributed by Yom Tov Lipmann Heller (1579-1654), a rabbi in Vi-
enna, Prague, and Cracow. As each editor of Heine's works is con-
strained to explain, this work appeared some three or four centuries 
after the debate depicted in the poem (depending on whether one 
takes Heine's date or the date of the actual debate upon which it was 
modeled). 26 No one has asked the obvious question: Why does the 
mere mention of this tractate alter the rabbi's rhetoric, why does it 
raise it from its "gustatory" reasonableness to a pitch of anger remi-
niscent of the monk's diatribe? It is clear that Heine is satirizing the 
"scholastic" nature of Jewish legalistic argument. Once an authority 
is attacked, no authority is safe, even if the authority under attack is 
the most minor one. For Heine the idea of footnotes to a commentary 
on a fragment of Holy Scripture must have seemed an ironic au-
thority, especially if it stemmed from a pen wielded by an Eastern 
Jew, rather than by one who came from the world of the Golden Age. 
The autobiography of Lipmann Heller had appeared in German in 
1836. Heine certainly was aware of the provenance of Heller's com-
mentary, even if he had been unaware of its detailed content (which 
of course is never mentioned and has absolutely no bearing on the 
poem). Here the reader is returned to the world of Moses Lump and 
the little Jew in the "Princess Sabbath," but through the back door of 
the world of myth. It is the Eastern Jew with his barbaric rhetoric 
26. Heine, Werke, I, 464-77. 
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who suddenly appears in the "Disputation" in the guise of the Span-
ish Rabbi of Navarre. 
The reaction of the audience caps the poem, for Pedro and his 
exotically described wife must judge the disputation. Out of Donna 
Blanca's "ruby, magical lips" is to come the decision: 
"Sagt mir, was ist Eure Meinung? 
Wer hat recht von diesen beiden? 
Wollt Ihr fur den Rabbi Euch 
Oder fur den Monch entscheiden?" 
Donna Blanka schaut ihn an, 
Und wie sinnend ihre Hande 
Mit verschrankten Fingern druckt sie 
An die Stirn und spricht am Ende: 
"Welcher recht hat, weiB ich nicht-
Doch es will mich schier bedunken, 
DaB der Rabbi und der Monch, 
DaB sie alle beide stinken." 
["Tell me, what is your opinion? 
Which of them is right? 
Will you decide for the rabbi or 
For the monk?" 
Donna Blanca looked at him, 
And, as if thinking, pressed her hands 
With interlaced fingers against her forehead 
And finally spoke: 
"I do not know which one is right-
But it appears to me 
That the rabbi and the monk, 
They both stink."] 
Both Jew and Christian stink! Here the implication of the very choice 
of the verb is vital, for Heine has not prepared us for quite such 
a "rank" -to use S. S. Prawer's extraordinarily well-chosen word-
conclusion of the poem. 27 The erotic lips of Blanche de Bourbon ut-
ter this grotesque and crude conclusion because, indeed, both par-
ties do "stink." Heine's synesthesia is striking. For what "stinks" is 
their rhetoric, especially the disputatious rhetoric of the aggressive 
disputants. 
27. Prawcr uses this term twice in his discussion of the poem (pp. 194, 199). 
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The image of the "good" Jew in contrast to the "bad" Jew had 
begun to be established in the Enlightenment. 28 The good Jew was 
nondisputatious; he thus avoided confrontation with those who 
wished to convert him (and who were, by definition, disputatious). 
He employed only "good" rhetoric, that is, argument within the ac-
cepted bounds of the philosophical discourse of Enlightenment. He 
was clean while the Other was dirty. He created; the Other seemed 
only to exist. He was accepted into the world of the intelligentsia; 
the Other was condemned to the irrationalities of scholastic trivi-
ality. The Other quickly assumed a specific locus within the world of 
myth: he was the Eastern Jew. He spoke badly, both in his language 
and in his rhetoric; he was disputatious, dirty, trapped in his own 
mode of argument. Here Heine's first impressions of the Eastern Eu-
ropean Jew as non-Western Jew were again reified, but within the 
world of the myth of Spain. 
The jarring movement back to the world of the streets, the world 
of confrontation, rather than the world of the private ritual of "Prin-
cess Sabbath," is rooted in the idea of disputation. For it is not just 
the Jew who is condemned, who "stinks," who is enclosed in the rot-
ting atmosphere of decaying logic, but also the disputatious Chris-
tian. This is a pox not merely on both houses, but on the idea of 
disputatiousness in and of itself. Here the stereotype of the disputa-
tious Jew is extended quite rationally to the image of the aggressive, 
irrational Christian, and the linkage of the two images is through 
their odor. The true meaning of the scholastic stench of the Middle 
Ages is perceived: in their rotting scholasticism Jew and Christian are 
truly identical. Heine's use of the term "scholasticism" in his very 
early essay "On Poland" is the leitmotiv of his perception of the 
corruption of the Eastern Jew. It is the "medieval" rather than the 
"modern," the non-Western rather than the Westernized Jew who is 
the link to the barbaric world of myth of the Christian Middle Ages, 
with its Inquisition and autos-da-fe. Heine's Moses Lump, with his 
privatized world of liturgical quietude, with his stress on Hebrew 
poetry and liturgy, is weekly removed from the world of the streets, 
from the world of the Jew as haggler and scholastic. Heine's world of 
the myth of the Jew, the world of the "Hebrew Melodies," begins 
with the odor of the "manure and garbage" (Kat und Kehricht) of the 
streets and concludes with the rank stench of scholasticism. These 
are aspects of the Otherness of the Jew, an Otherness that Heine 
wished to exorcise from his own tormented self-image through pro-
jection onto the world of myth. 
28. See my essay "Moses Mendelssohn und die Entwicklung einer deutsch-jiidi-
schen Identitiit," Zeitschrift fiir deutsche Philologie, 99 (1980), 506-20. 
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lV. Similarity and Contradiction 
It is the stench of Otherness that the Christian has in common with 
the Jew. Both reek of the falsity of their textuality. For Nietzsche the 
communality of the Polish Jew with the early Christian, their com-
mon stench, is the cloying nature of their text, of their false mode of 
argument, of their illusionary and scholastic attempt to disguise the 
realities of human existence through their text: 
Really, how can one put a book in the hands of children and 
women which contains that vile dictum: "to avoid fornication, let 
every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own 
husband .... It is better to marry than to burn"? And how can 
one be a Christian as long as the notion of the immaculata conceptio 
christianizes, that is, dirties, the origin of man? 
I know no other book in which so many tender and gracious 
things are said to woman as in the law of Manu; those old grey-
beards and saints have a way of being courteous to women which 
has perhaps never been surpassed. "The mouth of a woman"-it 
is written in one place-" the bosom of a girl, the prayer of a child, 
the smoke of the sacrifice, are always pure." Another passage: 
"There is nothing purer than the light of the sun, the shadow of a 
cow, the air, water, fire, and the breath of a girl." A final passage-
perhaps also a holy lie: "All apertures of the body above the navel 
are pure, all below are impure. Only in the girl is the whole body 
pure." (KSA, VI, 240) 
For Heine it was the disputatiousness of the Christian as proselytizer 
that created the analogy with the Otherness of the Jew. On the sur-
face these two images seem parallel, and yet they stem from quite 
disparate sources. Heine sought to link two sources of anxiety that 
he himself perceived as the Outsider: the aggressive proselytizing of 
the Christian world, which stressed his position outside the main-
stream of European culture even after his conversion; and his need 
to assign to the Other those negative qualities ascribed to the stereo-
type of the Jew by this dominant society. This Other then becomes a 
projection of the qualities that the European anti-Semite viewed as 
non-Western onto the world of myth. The myth assumes the geo-
graphical and religious form of the Eastern Jew even though, of 
course, it has little or nothing to do with the reality of the Eastern 
Jew. 
Nietzsche begins his confrontation with Heine in seeing him as 
the classic farceur, unable to take anything seriously-and thus as 
Nietzsche, Heine, and the Otherness of the few 225 
being totally destructive (KSA, VIII, 281). Because Heine was sensi-
tive to the inherently contradictory nature of writing with the rhe-
torical and linguistic resources of a culture that viewed the Jew as 
unable to become truly Western, Nietzsche's sense of Heine's de-
structiveness was quite correct. As Nietzsche himself grew more and 
more to doubt the values of Western society in its present dress, and 
as his physical debilities increased (and brought to him, as to the late 
Heine, the distancing effect of illness), he became more and more 
alienated from the common rhetoric of Western society (KSA, VI, 
286). Nietzsche began to perceive himself as an outsider, but, unlike 
Heine, he had to create this role for himself: in background and 
breeding he was quintessentially mainstream. He thus began to pro-
ject onto his persona the qualities of the outsider. He fashioned him-
self into the Pole, into the Eastern defender of the Jew (KSA, VI, 
268). But all through his argument is the awareness (as opposed to 
Heine) that he will never truly be the outsider-at least never an 
outsider to the extent of his double, Heine. Heine's anguish gener-
ated a world of myth in which the double image of the "good" and 
"bad" Jew is seen in part through the eye of the Jew as outsider, and 
in part through the eye of the European alienated from the culture in 
which he functions. 
Nietzsche's condemnation of the early Christians, especially Paul, 
thus has a clear, contemporary overlay that can help the reader to 
understand why the dichotomy between Hellene and Jew is at heart 
false. For just as Nietzsche's idea of the Greek is permeated with 
contemporary images having little or nothing to do with classical 
Greek culture, so too is Nietzsche's understanding of the Jew colored 
by both his contemporary situation and his literary experience. 
XII. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 
Gerd-Giinther Grau 
(Translated by Wendy Rader) 
I. Nietzsche's Idea of Self-Dissolution 
1. Thesis and General Conception 
One might be tempted to view Nietzsche's passionate attack on 
Christianity as the result of a highly personal, albeit deeply heartfelt 
and spiritual, encounter.* As such, this encounter would attain the 
rank and appeal of a sensitive spirit's intensive rejection of the claims 
and promises of the Christian faith, which he felt to be totally un-
suited to, even fatal to, the solution of the problem of human exis-
tence. At the same time, however, the impact of this dissolution of 
Christianity and the significance of its rejection would be reduced to 
the personality of the thinker whose vehement attack on traditional 
values could easily be explained psychologically by the course of his 
life and sufferings. 
This view, expressed often enough by defenders of the faith, over-
looks the fact that the philosopher felt his own destiny to be the 
consequence of a thoroughly disastrous development of the Western 
spirit. He even considered himself to be a "destiny," in that he saw 
his vocation as the task of communicating the deeper reasons for 
such an unfortunate development and introducing a change: "The 
discovery of Christian morality is an unparalleled event and a genu-
ine catastrophe. Whoever illuminates this matter is a force majeure, 
a destiny .... "1 Thus, Nietzsche's attack on Christianity attains to 
*This chapter represents a shortened English version of an essay first published in 
Nietzsche Studien, 1 (1972), 297-333. The essay contains a summary of the author's two 
books, Christlicher G/aube und intel/ektuelle Redlichkeit: Eine rcligio11sphilosophische Studie 
iil>er Nietzsche (Frankfurt am Main: Schulte-Bulmkc, 1958) and Die Selbstaufliisung des 
christlichen Glaubens: t:ine religionsphilosophische Studie iiber Kierkegaard (Frankfurt am 
Main: Schulte-Bulmke, 1963). 
1. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 8. All translations from the German are by 
Wendy Rader. 
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a general philosophical significance that not only transcends his 
own personal involvement, but also contains it as an exemplary ex-
perience. Nietzsche experiences and learns in Christianity-still the 
"best part of an ideal life" that he "had ever known,"2 the represen-
tative of an absolute claim that is incapable of overcoming the human 
condition and is doomed to destroy itself. 3 That is, this claim is not 
destroyed from the outside-as, for example, through the critique 
of its dogma and values-but rather from an inner "self-destroy-
ing" factor: "intellectual honesty," demanded by its own historical 
development, and even by faith itself. Thus Nietzsche's basic thesis 
postulates the "self-destruction of all great things" in the sense 
of a "self-overcoming" of all human, all-too-human assumptions 
and precepts through a will to truth that increasingly sees through 
their mere meaning-giving function and, in the end, displays the 
"ultimate virtue" of intellectual honesty by renouncing them: '~11 
great things destroy themselves through an act of 'self-overcoming': 
that's the law of life-the law of necessary 'self-overcoming' in the 
nature of life-the lawgiver himself eventually receives the call: pa-
tere legem, quam ipse tulisti."4 
From this previously overlooked perspective, Nietzsche's confron-
tation with Christianity contains a general and basically ideological-
critical aspect that can, in fact, be extended to every absolute claim. It 
does this all the more in that it simultaneously takes over, by means 
of an alternation of historical and systematic views, that meth-
odological Hegelianism-or better, a view of the historical destruc-
tion of faith as the explication of its systematic dissolution-which 
movements based on faith so like to invoke in order to reconcile their 
total relativizing of earlier currents of history with their own claim 
to eschatological absoluteness. For, according to Nietzsche's way of 
thinking, the "coming-to-consciousness of the will to truth" is also 
historical-although basically by means of its temporal development 
it merely explicates the systematic "advent of nihilism," which, ac-
cording to the idea of self-destruction, alone remains and always 
emerges with particular zeal when mankind has once again "thought 
through to the end" its absolute values and ideals. "For why is the 
advent of nihilism necessary from now on? Because our previous val-
2. Letter to Peter Gast, 21 July 1881. 
3. Cf. Gerd-Giinther Grau, "Realisierter oder sublimierter Wille zur Macht," Nietz-
sche Studien, 10/11 (1982), 222-53. 
4. GM, III, sec. 27. 
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ues are themselves that which drew the final consequences-because 
nihilism is the logical conclusion of thinking out our values and 
ideals to the end."5 
It is at this point that the comparison of Nietzsche's and Kierke-
gaard's general philosophy of religion deserves our interest. If we 
can show that the latter falls victim to the logic of his values on the 
very issue of a self-dissolution, that is, in the attempt to present a 
rational confirmation of its claim as well as the historical proof for its 
validity, then the agreement of the two thinkers would be weighty 
proof for the inner coherency of Nietzsche's argument. That applies 
above all to the idea of self-destruction which, as the term implies, is 
released through the self-enforced critical reflection on its founda-
tions and is in no way introduced by an attack from a position out-
side the system. Christianity, according to Nietzsche's original and 
genuine theme, would succumb then, not to the ancient and ever-
repeated conflict of knowledge and faith, but to the intellectual hon-
esty of faith itself-and in such a way that faith has to be increasingly 
sacrificed to the extent that it is unable to justify itself before the 
will to truth of knowledge, which faith itself demanded and devel-
oped. "We can see what actually triumphed over the Christian God: 
Christian morality itself, the ever stricter concept of truth, the father-
confessor sophistication of the Christian conscience, translated and 
elevated to a scientific conscience, to intellectual cleanliness at all 
costs."6 
The translation, as it were, of this systematic self-dissolution into 
the historical formation of its development occurs by way of the in-
evitability of a historical destruction that is plainly the opposite re-
sult of ever-renewed restorative efforts to get to a profounder basis 
of the expression of faith and its practical demands. Every attempt to 
impede the dissolution of Christianity in history has only succeeded 
in accelerating the self-destruction through it, "but what is most curi-
ous is that those who have exerted themselves the most to maintain 
Christianity are the ones who have become its best destroyers--the 
Germans."7 Nietzsche speaks of the Germans in this way because he 
is thinking primarily of the Reformation and the Protestant philoso-
phy resulting from it, in which Christianity "as morality" is sup-
posed to have "expired" at the hands of its "ultimate virtue"-intel-
5. WM, Preface, sec. 4. 
6. FW, sec. 357; cf. GM, III, sec. 27. 
7. FW, sec. 358. 
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lectual honesty, to which Nietzsche himself appeals. However, from 
this standpoint, the Reformation merely draws the consequences of 
a medieval Catholicism that had already failed "as dogma because of 
its morality" -the moral demand for a foundation based on reason. 
That this Catholicism tore itself apart from the inside through Scho-
lasticism from Thomas to Duns Scotus and Occam (up·:m whom the 
Reformers then based their cause) is clear to see, for example, in the 
case of Averroes's thesis of a "double truth" -a concept that, in Nietz-
sche's estimation, aptly expressed the intellectual situation of the reli-
gious man. In other words, just as "Christianity as dogma," that is, as 
a comprehensible system of interpretation and its corresponding or-
der of life, "collapsed" with the dissolution of medieval Scholasti-
cism, so will contemporary Protestant philosophy also cause "Chris-
tianity as morality" to collapse as a result of the absoluteness of its 
claims to theoretical and practical validity. It is quite possible that 
one may recognize the final, "strongest inference" of Christian verac-
ity toward itself in the establishment of a secularized cultural and 
state Protestantism, or even in the "breaking down" of precisely its 
"strongest souls" in order to demonstrate the genuineness of Chris-
tian faith. "In this way Christianity as dogma perished of its own 
morality: in the same way must Christianity as morality also perish . 
. . . After the truthfulness of Christianity has drawn one inference 
after another, it must, in the end, draw its most striking conclusion-
against itself."8 
It would fall outside the scope of this essay to point out in de-
tail the cooperation of consciously intended restoration and uncon-
sciously motivated destruction of the Christian faith in history by 
all the separate thinkers (which could, in fact, be reconstructed 
from scattered texts of Nietzsche's). 9 Suffice it to say briefly that Leib-
niz already reveals, with his proposal of a theodicy, an endangered 
faith, while at the same time the discovery of profound "uncon-
scious ideas" (Vorstellungen) makes the inner destruction, which it is 
supposed to relieve through the rationalization of faith, even more 
profound. 10 In contrast, Kant's "philosophy of the back doors," in 
its postulates of practical reason, may nevertheless have opened up 
afresh a "secret path to the old ideal" for the "Tiibinger seminar-
ians," which his theoretical criticism of theological ideas had de-
8. GM, III, sec. 27. 
9. Cf. the corresponding chapter in the author's Christlicher Glaube. 
10. FW, sec. 357. 
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strayed. However, his criticism, which even in its title indicates 
destruction, can in fact now only establish transcendentally the Prot-
estant version of the credo quia absurdum, which "German logic" had 
so willingly made use of previously in order to shield its "wishful 
thinking" from any further criticism. Yet this escape appears too arti-
ficial to impede the skepticism of an intellectual honesty that, in the 
last analysis, cannot be satisfied with "begging the question." 11 
Nietzsche finds the climax and the change from a critical restora-
tion to a destruction-oriented criticism, from the preservation of the 
moral-Christian claim in spite of criticism to a claim by means of it, in 
Hegel-who, ambiguously enough, could guarantee the "preserva-
tion" of faith only by absolutizing it through philosophy. At first 
sight it may even seem that the philosopher had succeeded in mak-
ing Christianity an absolute according to the principles of reason, "in 
accordance with the grandiose attempt he made, with the help of the 
sixth, the 'historical sense,' in the end to convince us of the divine 
nature of existence."12 But it is finally only the total relativizing of the 
absolute in history with which faith seeks to hide, rather than to 
hinder, its ultimate dissolution by means of it. "This history, under-
stood in Hegelian terms, has contemptuously been called the so-
journ of God on earth-which God, however, is himself first created 
by history." 13 This ambiguous preservation (Aufhebung) of Christian-
ity becomes particularly apparent in the transposition of Christian 
eschatologically oriented politics, where it reappears in the degener-
ated form of secular totalitarianism-most notably in socialism. It 
is no accident, then, that Nietzsche's "madman" simply announces 
what the young Hegel had already recognized as "the feeling on 
which is based the religion of modern times, the feeling that God 
himself is dead." 14 
In the final stages of this development Schopenhauer's honest 
atheism points the way for Nietzsche's intellectual honesty. For that 
development, only a transformation of the "pessimism of the weak" 
into a "pessimism of the strong" was necessary to overcome the last 
obstacle to insight into the inevitability of nihilism by means of its 
most extreme radicalization. 
11. A, sec. 10; G, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," sec. 16; GM, III, sec. 25; M, 
Preface, sec. 3. 
12. FW, sec. 357. 
13. U, II, sec. 8. 
14. Cf. FW, sec. 357, and Hegel's early essay "Faith and Knowledge" (1802). 
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2. Foundation through the Philosophy of History 
Until recently, Nietzsche's interpreters had barely recognized-let 
alone respected-his obviously fundamental, or at least easily de-
monstrable, total conception, in their irritation at the aphorismlike 
arrangement of his texts. Thus, this total conception has never been 
applied systematically to the understanding of his critique of religion 
or to his attack on and critique of Christianity. What is of concern 
here-especially if we undertake the expanded version mentioned 
earlier and only hinted at by Nietzsche-is one of the most pregnant, 
because it is one of the most radical, of answers to the question of the 
possibility of a Christian philosophy versus the possible absurdity of such 
a concept and all attempts to realize it, which had been debated since 
the conscious take-over of Greek philosophical theses by the Chris-
tian thinkers of the second and third centuries. On the one hand, 
Paul hints at a thesis (Rom. 1:2) of the fundamental comprehensibil-
ity of the main religious facts and demands, upon which the doctrine 
of natural theology is based and which almost every philosopher from 
Augustine to Descartes has quoted to maintain and to construct a 
Christian philosophy. On the other hand, there was never a time 
that lacked the voices of theology speaking in favor of the second 
alternative. Tertullian's original formula of the credo quia absurdum, 
which was not so much a paradoxical proof as it was a rhetorically 
justified paradox, marks the beginning of this tendency and has 
since been applied again and again, explicitly or implicitly, admit-
tedly or unadmittedly-up to Kierkegaard's paradoxical-dialectical 
"leap" of faith. To sum up: for Nietzsche the second answer is, in 
accordance with the historical rather than a purely logical develop-
ment, the consequence of the experience of failure of the first. In-
deed, for him, Christianity as Catholic dogma comes to its end with 
the Renaissance, only to be revived by Luther as a dialectical the-
ology on the basis of the "German logic" of the credo quia absurdum. 
But just as in the case of the first answer, where the pretension of an 
intelligible access to "theological truth" is increasingly given up by 
the Augustinian-Anselmian school of Scholasticism--credo ut intelli-
gam-through Scotism and Occamism, and on to Cartesian skepti-
cism, so this development is repeated, as it were, on the basis of the 
second answer. Nietzsche speaks about this in detail, showing that 
here-quite unlike the first answer-the pretension of "philosophical 
truth" is increasingly forced to put restrictions on the inaccessible 
absolute claims, because it wants to preserve its legitimacy or even to 
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confirm a new one. Here, as with the first answer, it is the religious 
situation of a "double truth" that escalates the development to a 
recognition of the thorough discrepancy of their two realms. 
A. The Nonappearance of the "Parousia"15 
With the disclosure of this self-dissolution, seen as the final result 
of its own criticism, Nietzsche's anti-Christian argument becomes ex-
tremely radical as to the question of the possibility of a Christian 
philosophy. This radicalness lies in his endeavor to prove the nega-
tive answer to be the result of a movement that grew out of Chris-
tianity itself from an originally opposite intention, in order to show 
how the impossibility of a Christian philosophy proved the philo-
sophical impossibility of Christianity. This is an impossibility for the 
intellectual honesty of the philosopher, which cannot allow him to 
content himself with the religious interpretation of faith projected 
into everyday life. The impossibility becomes evident for the philoso-
pher likewise in his demonstrated inability to be satisfied with over-
hasty solutions, the projections of self-assurance, or the compensa-
tions of involuntary modesty, and is evident as well in the believer's 
latent "dissatisfaction with Christianity" that betrays itself in the 
contorted apologetics, the "stubborn" clinging to the "authority" of 
its sources. In both cases it is no longer possible at the end of "a 
two-thousand-year training in truth" to suppress the question in 
which "the awe-inspiring catastrophe" is fully expressed: "Should 
you wish, however, to escape this your displeasure with Christianity, 
then take into consideration the experience of two thousand years 
of Christianity, which, if clothed in the form of a humble question, 
would be: If Christ really intended to redeem the world, did he not 
then fail?'d 6 
Yet Nietzsche even goes a step beyond proving the quid facti of the 
failed redemption and offering it as the quid juris of his denial, 
"which ultimately prohibits the lie of believing in God": he wants to 
know the reasons for this failure insofar as it represents a kind of 
nihilism-a nihilism not only sprung from a dominant Christian con-
sciousness but, what is more, raised to full consciousness through 
faith itself. Christianity, far from "abolishing any kind of crisis" or 
redeeming man externally from his suffering, has instead burdened 
him additionally with a permanent internal crisis of "sin." As if it 
15. By which we mean Christ's rising from the dead. 
16. MA, Ill!, sec. 98. 
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were not enough that the transcendent meaning of the Christian in-
terpretation of life and the world can in no way be proved or even 
made comprehensible, the Christian demands themselves are also 
found to be unprovable and therefore limitless. In this way, however, 
man, in direct correlation to his honesty, is at the mercy of the ineluc-
table dialectic of a moral law whose illimitable heights he raises all 
the higher; faced as he is with the alternative of the nonappearance, 
or at least the unprovability, of redemption, obedience to the law is, 
ultimately, his only legitimate religious action for it is the only possi-
ble way to break through the irreligious invariability of time, while at 
the same time each hasty reduction of the demand must arouse the 
suspicion of being arbitrary self-liberation. Given this point of view, 
it becomes in turn immediately clear that (and why) for Nietzsche 
real Christianity is bound to stand under the sign of plain inhuman-
ity if, and insofar as, it has to accept the consequences of its theo-
retically given, irreconcilable double truth. The philosopher can 
therefore ultimately accept and take seriously as an opponent only a 
Christian faith that continues to reiterate its absurd demand arising 
from a belief that it admits to itself to be paradoxical-in other 
words, the extreme radical Protestantism (in Kierkegaard's sense) or, 
at any rate, its Catholic predecessors from Tertullian to Pascal (whose 
theoretical skepticism tended to produce their moral rigor). 17 
It is well known that Nietzsche attributes responsibility for the 
tendency inherent in the Christian faith to testify to a Gospel of Bad 
News ("Dysangelium") rather than Good News ("Evangelium") to 
the Apostle Paul, while tending to exclude Jesus to a great extent 
from his attacks and invectives. Nietzsche concedes to Jesus, despite 
the latter's "morbid" way of thinking and acting, the actual realiza-
tion of a redemption in the "heavenly kingdom of the heart"-"a 
new practice," which requires neither an articulated faith nor a law 
explicating the implicit negation of the world. "What does 'Good 
News' mean? True life, eternal life, has been found-it is not being 
promised, it is here, it is in you: as a life in love, without detractions 
and exclusions, without distance. Everybody is the child of God." In 
contrast, "formula, law, faith, dogma" become necessary only at the 
moment where this immediacy has been lost and an interpretation of 
the world has taken its place, an interpretation to whose establish-
ment and conservation a conceptualized faith and a law expressed 
as dogma are necessary in their turn. A "psychological symbol re-
deemed from the concept of time" thus has become the "instrument 
17. GM, III, sec. 27; A, sec. 62. 
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of torture" of a realm of theological concepts-concepts like "the life 
to come," "the last judgment," "immortality of the soul" -as they are 
required for and explained by the notion of a redemption removed to 
"the end of time" and a "life beyond" reality. A psychologically intel-
ligible flight from reality, justifiable personally "even today," has in-
tensified and crystallized as an "instinctive hatred of any reality." 
This transformation is brought into being-more precisely: is forced 
on us--by the death of Jesus, which, according to Nietzsche, was at 
least initially totally unexpected by his disciples. This death (which 
for Jesus rather embodies the "proof of his teaching") gave rise in 
Paul, attempting an "interpretation" and misinterpreting the tempo-
ral "kingdom of the heart" as an actualized "immortality," to the 
"downright terrible, absurd answer" of the atoning death of a "son 
of man" who at the end of time would establish the "reign of God"-
as a "judgment over his enemies," but also as a promised "reward" 
for the faithful. With that, however, precisely that concept of "guilt" 
which Jesus himself had abolished became for the first time the basic 
principle of Christian life. Moreover, its center of gravity was re-
moved to an afterlife in such a way that instead of a realized blessed-
ness, a realized damnation-ever to be testified to or even to be 
established by man himself-became the precondition of a faith not 
only removed from, but hostile to, life: "To live so as to render life 
meaningless now becomes the 'meaning' of life." 18 
The thought of eternal pain was totally remote from the early 
Christians, they thought themselves redeemed "from death" and 
from day to day awaited a transformation rather than a dying ... 
Paul had nothing better to tell of his redeemer than that he had 
opened up the access to immortality for everybody-he did not 
yet believe in the resurrection of the unredeemed ... , immor-
tality was then only just beginning to open its doors .... 19 
The catastrophe of the gospel was decided by His death, ... it 
hung on the "cross" .... Only His death, this unexpectedly terri-
ble death, ... only this most awful paradox brought the disciples 
up against the essential enigma: who was this? what was this? 
From now on, step by step, was added to the type of the redeemer 
the doctrine of the last judgment and the second coming, the doc-
trine of [Christ's] death as a death of sacrifice, the doctrine of the 
resurrection, with which the entire concept of "blessedness," the 
18. A, sees. 28-42. 
19. M, sec. 72. 
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entire and essential reality of the gospel, is conjured away-in fa-
vor of a state after death .... Paul made this point of view ... 
logical. ... And suddenly the gospel had turned into the most 
despicable of all unrealizable promises, the brazen doctrine of a 
personal immortality. ... Paul himself taught it as a reward!20 
It is apparent that Nietzsche established the turning of the faith of 
the early Church to historical Christianity-while dividing the for-
mer into the lived practice of Jesus and the theoretical belief of the 
Apostle, which only after the death of the founder was built up into 
the believed theory of the latter-at exactly the point at which for 
Albert Schweitzer the consciousness of a historical Christian faith has 
to begin if Christianity, carried by precisely the "will towards truth" 
that enabled the "research into the life of Jesus by the Protestant part 
of Christianity" to attain its results, is to persist in the face of the 
"difficulties created for faith by a knowledge of history." 
Nietzsche the philosopher was also proud to have been the first to 
have touched upon "the problem of the origin of Christianity," to 
have illuminated the "real history of Christianity," that is, to have 
uncovered the "misunderstanding" underlying the "word," if this is 
meant to designate a historical movement and a movement founded 
for history-a misunderstanding that theologians are unable to ex-
plain other than by reinterpreting Jesus' "altogether eschatological" 
into "Jesus' altogether uneschatological way of thinking." Even if the 
philosopher's analysis is guided a priori by the opposite tendency of 
the negation of Christian theology, whose eschatological regenera-
tion implies the desideratum of the negation of its historical legitima-
tion, his intellectual honesty is still akin to that of a theology that 
ultimately considers itself unequivocally "negative," just as, for ex-
ample, the destruction of the tradition transmitted through the de-
velopment of the Christian faith itself appears to be forced on it by 
its "historical problems": "This picture has not been destroyed from 
without but has collapsed upon itself, shaken and split by its histori-
cal problems .... "21 
B. The Job-Situation 
The thesis of a "Parousia," an event repeatedly delayed at first and 
eventually accepted as definitely not having taken place, is de-
20. A, sees. 40f. 
21. Albert Schweitzer, Geschichte der Leben-Jesu Forschung (1913; reprint, Bonn: Go-
desbergcr Taschenbuchverlag, 1966), pp. 42, 31, 620; cf. also A, sees. 24 and 39. 
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manded altogether compellingly by Nietzsche's analyses and texts-
even to the almost literal agreement of Paul's role as an intermedi-
ary between Jesus' "Kingdom-of-God piety" and the entirely Helle-
nistic "piety of redemption.',zz Such a thesis would also appear the 
only one capable of making intelligible the self-dissolution shown 
above by an intellectual honesty promoted and developed by faith 
itself, whose ultimate question concerning the "failed redemption" it 
would answer directly. For if this failure ultimately is founded in and 
made apparent by the fact that man is expected to accept, theoreti-
cally and practically, the double truth of a redemption that took place 
and yet cannot be proved, which is given and is ever to be acquired 
afresh-a redemption that calls into question man's worldly reality 
without telling him whether his hopes beyond this world can be 
realized, by referring him to a given meaning without freeing him of 
the necessity of giving meaning himself in the area at his disposal-
then the thesis mentioned above would meet and explain precisely 
the historical situation of a faith directed originally toward the sudden 
end of history and now referred to an end that is totally unpredictable. 
Founded in the "tension" of an immediate presence of redemption, a 
Christianity of Kierkegaard's "instant" would then not be directed 
toward, and accordingly would not be equipped for, guiding or di-
recting a life in time as either a doctrine or a law. In the existing 
situation of the early Church any relativization of temporal condi-
tions could unquestionably be defended and any moral restriction 
undoubtedly considered reasonable, provided that one felt oneself 
exonerated from an orientation toward and for life on earth, and 
that one felt one did not have to exist for too much longer with the 
practical consequences. However, the transformation, so to speak, 
of the vertical of a finite time into the horizontal of an endless time 
will cause faith to break down in the face of the very problem of mean-
ing for whose solution it has been evoked and sought throughout 
history. 
Ever since Reimarus-whose (albeit politically distorted) analy-
ses, like those of Nietzsche, also move Paul into a position opposite 
Jesus-and his editor Lessing, for whom "Christ" was no more a 
historical Christian than he was for Nietzsche, via Nietzsche's con-
temporaries StrauB and Overbeck, and up to Unamuno, all relevant 
modern investigations of Christianity that grew out of the intellectual 
22. See Albert Schweitzer, Die Mystik des Aposte/s Paulus, 2nd ed. (Tiibingen: Mohr, 
1954); English ed.: The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, trans. William Montgomery (New 
York: Macmillan, 1955). 
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honesty of religious endeavor not only emphasized this eschatologi-
cal "misunderstanding" of the early Church but also based on it the 
"agony of Christianity" in and through history. This agony, as we 
may now define it more precisely, manifests itself mainly in such a 
way that nihilism represents a condition for faith and for a renunci-
ation of that faith as well, while-or because-conversely, the Chris-
tian message is always in danger of being felt to be an interpreted 
lack of an answer rather than an interpreting answer. In any case, 
however, man is burdened with the load of, as well as the guilt for, a 
miscarried redemption should he fail to recognize, in the uninter-
rupted immutability of meaningless events, the demands of a God 
whom he is not able even to perceive as a discernible being whom he 
could address. 
We have called this situation the Job-situation of relixious thinking and 
have characterized it as the state of a redemption that is not so much 
practically intangible as theoretically unintelligible, and one that man 
cannot identify as either an affirmative assent or a determining direc-
tive. It describes the situation of a historical Job in which Nietzsche, 
together with the scriptural Job, not only refuses to accept as "guilt" 
the external"misfortune" of his created being, which is not changed 
by the Christian message, but is also incapable of recognizing the 
Christian interpretation of his "suffering" as God's answer to his ques-
tion-"the cry of the question, why suffer?" Nietzsche is angered not 
by the fact of suffering, but by the meaninglessness of suffering, culmi-
nating in a meaningless death that is not eliminated by Christianity. 
He doubts the logic of its values only after despairing over the inva-
lidity of its logic. 23 
The idea of God taken to its logical conclusion, by virtue of the 
attribution of omniscience, makes the notion of an existential test 
(which in essence belongs to the Old Testament) appear meaning-
less. If a test with a necessarily foregone conclusion-the notion of 
proving oneself before an omnipotence whose intervention could 
easily avoid any failing of such a test-must appear meaningless, 
then the notion (which belongs to the New Testament) of a plan for 
redemption that can neither be made factually effective nor even be 
made unequivocally known in its factuality, or at least unmistakably 
brought to certainty, must appear completely absurd. 
Nietzsche's intellectual honesty asks its ultimate question out of 
the inescapable recognition of this situation. This insight had already 
moved Kant, whose attention had been directed by Lavater to the 
23. GM, Ill, sec. 28. 
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only remaining eschatological aspect of death, "to stop short, along 
with Job, of the crime of flattering God and making inward protesta-
tions which perhaps fear had forced and to which the soul did not 
freely in faith assent."24 Nietzsche's question is the same as the one 
asked intrepidly by the scriptural Job, impressed by the "force" of his 
vulnerability, and taken back only at the very point of Yahweh's an-
swer-a question that in the face of an answerless secular history 
cannot be held back any longer and cannot forcibly be referred back 
by its theological interpretation to man's own guilt: the question of 
"God's honesty." 
The honesty of God. A God who is omniscient and omnipotent 
and who does not even insure that his intention is understood by 
his own creatures-is that supposed to be a benevolent God? A 
God who allows the numerous doubts and reservations to persist, 
throughout centuries, as if they were immaterial for mankind's sal-
vation, and who yet holds out the prospect of the direst conse-
quences for the violation of truth? Would he not be a cruel God 
who possessed the truth and were capable of watching mankind 
agonize over it?25 
Know now that God hath overthrown me, and hath compassed 
me with his net. Behold, I cry out of wrong, but I am not heard: I 
cry aloud, but there is no judgment .... I cry unto thee, and thou 
dost not hear me: I stand up, and thou regardest me not .... Oh 
that one would hear me! behold, my desire is, that the Almighty 
would answer me, and that mine adversary had written a book. 
(Job 19:6-7; 30:20; 31:35) 
II. Kierkegaard's Fulfillment of the Self-Dissolution 
1. Personal Development 
Only those who fail to recognize in Nietzsche's arguments the ulti-
mate "failure of all philosophical attempts in the theodicy"26-so far 
as they essentially represent an "answer to Job"27 -will be able to 
24. Letter to Johann Caspar Lavater, 28 April 1757. 
25. M, sec. 91. 
26. Cf. Kant's essay "Uber das Mil3lingen aller Versuche in der Theodizee" (1791), 
which contains a reference to Job as "conscious of his intellectual honesty." 
27. Cf. C. G. Jung, Antumt auf Hiob (Zurich: Rascher, 1952); English ed.: Answer to 
Job, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge & Paul, [1954]). 
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overlook their ultimately religious motivation. Only those who re-
fuse to recognize in Nietzsche's renunciation the dissolution of faith 
founded on the "immorality of the deus absconditus" itself will be 
able to overlook the deep resignation behind its apparent hubris. 
Anyone who would deny, however, the fundamental significance of 
Job's situation for religious thinking would have to ignore not only 
its implicit recurrence in Nietzsche's texts but also its explicit reiter-
ation by a "religious writer" for whom "Job's significance ... lies in 
the fact that the border skirmishes against faith have been fought in 
him." For Kierkegaard, "Job represents as it were the entire substan-
tial accusation on the part of man in the great case between God and 
man."28 
Nevertheless, the author has been heavily criticized, on the part of 
a committed theology as well as on that of a theologically committed 
philosophy, for wanting to prove the self-dissolution of Christianity 
on the basis of Kierkegaard's dialectical struggle for the "genuine 
essence of Christianity," insofar as this struggle results from the his-
torically unremedied situation of Job and from the faith destroyed 
by an immanent honesty that is compelled by a reflection of its "his-
torical point of departure," the result of the failed "Parousia." It 
would be well to mention here that the manifold and often astonish-
ingly literal parallels between the two ancestors of the modern phi-
losophy (and theology!) of existence have long been known and ac-
cepted in the academic world, at least since the time of Jaspers's 
Groningen lectures on "Reason and Existence" and Lowith's early 
works from the thirties; yet the Danish historians of philosophy 
and literature respectively, Hoffding and Brandes, had already intro-
duced this point by the end of the last century. Brandes even tried 
to draw Nietzsche's attention to his compatriot-even if too late for 
a meeting of the minds to be possible-before Nietzsche's illness 
broke out. 
Even so, these early studies only scratched the surface of an un-
derstanding of the similarities between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard as 
regards both the general and the more specific approaches to their 
philosophical interpretation. Most importantly, these studies failed 
to take into consideration the significance of the relationship of the 
28. Kierkegaard citations are taken from the Samlede Vaerker, ed. A. B. Drachmann, 
J. L. Heiberg, and H. 0. Lange, 14 vols. (Copenhagen: Gyldendahl, 1901-6), and the 
Kierkegaard Papirer, ed. P. A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr (Copenhagen: Gyldendahl, 1909-
48); the Roman numerals indicate volume numbers and the Arabic numerals page 
numbers. The letters A, B, C refer to sections of the above works, and the indices (for 
example, X1) to partial volumes. The reference here is to Repetition, III, 243f. 
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two thinkers as articulators of the religious-philosophical problem of 
Christianity. This significance becomes clear when we notice how 
exactly Kierkegaard's explicit desire to have only "honesty" in his 
faith corresponds to Nietzsche's notion of the "honest Christian"; 
indeed, it corresponds to the fears that Nietzsche felt for "the one 
who has come off badly" (as he himself had), should he attempt, 
with the help of the Christian faith, to face the existential hopeless-
ness that had become especially clear to him. Nietzsche could not 
have helped but feel supported in his notion of "the birth of Chris-
tianity from a movement of resentment" by the existential weakness, 
be it universally or personally experienced, expressed by a theolo-
gian who considered his "thorn in the flesh" the real reason for his 
faith. And when he, as we have seen, finally became an anti-Chris-
tian, driven by that religion of "cruelty against man" which delivers 
man to the permanent inner state of crisis, how could he have failed 
to refer to the assertion of his opposite that at times Christianity 
had seemed to him "the most inhuman cruelty"? If Kierkegaard him-
self, unsure whether he was an "extraordinary" Christian or even a 
"Christian" at all, could not determine "if this defense of Christianity 
taken to such lengths was not just the cunningly clothed form of an 
attack," then it indeed appears obvious to presume in his argument 
and interpretation the completed act of self-dissolution, which is fi-
nally averted by virtue of the fact that, with the "communication" 
that has finally become "immediate," even "what is interesting" re-
garding the possible ambiguity of such a mediation is lost. 29 
It might at first seem that Kierkegaard's confirmation of an "abo-
lition" of Christianity links up with the Christianness of Nietzsche's 
words "God is dead" only in the secularized form of the "everyday 
Christian," whom both considered a "pitiable figure"-" assuming 
there is any faith at all." The actual congruence lies, rather, in the 
very genuine Christianity of that faith for which arbitrarily caused, or 
arbitrarily confirmed, nonredemption has become the unique crite-
rion for redemption. To Nietzsche's "modest question" of whether 
the redemption could perhaps have been a "failure," Kierkegaard 
would hardly allow for a clear, undialectical answer-not even in the 
"edifying," then "religious," and finally "Christian discourses," in 
connection with whose positive content the thinker knew himself to 
be "without authority," while at the same time their dialectical con-
sistency seemed to betray a "carefully weakened tinge of humor." 
29. The Instmll, XIV, 52; For Self-Examination, XIII, 564, 576. Cf. WM, sec. 179; Ecce 
Homo, "Why I Am So Wise," sec. 6. 
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The factual influence of these self-assurances in Kierkegaard's faith, 
driven to ever-greater rigorousness, was, then, so superficial that 
Nietzsche, who simply refused to "swallow" the "torment" of a mere 
"supposition" of the idea of God, would have been hard put to find a 
better representative for Zarathustra's sayings: 
They would have to sing better songs to make me believe in their 
Redeemer: his disciples would have to look more redeemed. 
(Nietzsche) 
Given such pain and covertness, it depends on the differences in 
the individual in which direction he goes, whether this lonely in-
ner suffering finds its expression and satisfaction in the demonic 
hatred of man and cursing of God, or in their opposite. 
(Kierkegaard)30 
It is understandable why one of the experts and important biogra-
phers of Kierkegaard, Eduard Geismar, so sharply formulated the 
dilemma that he saw facing the Christian as a result of the writings 
of his countryman: "He will scare certain people from Christianity 
for good. They believe that he has given Christianity the only logical 
form, and this Christianity is impossible for them to accept. ... On 
the other hand, there are people who have found spiritual nourish-
ment in his profound Christian cepth ... and they have, as well as 
they could, exposed the alleged misleading interpretation. One has 
to be able to approach this from both sides ... because in any case it 
cannot seem very honest for the church-oriented person to appropri-
ate from Kierkegaard what he can use without taking into account 
how that can be reconciled with the latter's attack on the Church."31 
Strangely and significantly enough, this alternative has been seen, 
up till now, only from the Catholic side, which has always recog-
nized in Kierkegaard the representative of the self-dissolution of 
Protestantism-that is, a Kierkegaard "whose final purgative goal" 
was to "return to the Mother Church.'132 This line of thought was all 
the more supported by his inflamed confrontation with the Church, 
which ended in an open attack on Danish State Protestantism, and 
his occasionally vehement tirades against the Reformer. Yet despite 
30. Z, II, "On Priests" (cf. MA, I, sec. 116); For Self-Examination, XIII, 566. 
31. Eduard Geismar, Semz Kierkegaard: Seine Lebensentwicklung zmd seine Wirksamkeit 
als Schriftsteller, trans. E. Kruger (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1929), Intro-
duction. 
32. Erich Przywara, Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards (Munich/Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1929), 
p. 76; the same tendency is represented by John Henry Newman and Theodor Hacker. 
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the fact that he repeatedly praised the merits of Catholicism vis a vis 
Protestantism and, if not specifically advocating a return to the for-
mer, at least encouraged new "respect" for its institutions, he gave 
from the very outset an unambiguous answer to these ecclesiastical-
political speculations: "To join the Catholic Church on that account 
would be an overhasty step that I would not want to be guilty of, 
which, however, one might expect since we have entirely forgotten 
what Christianity means."33 Once again, then, it is the question of 
the "essence of Christianity" that determines his attitude and deci-
sion. His total agreement with Nietzsche on this point is further con-
firmed in their common attitude toward the Reformation-not only 
with respect to the important point of such an irrevocable and irre-
versible development, but also with respect to the ambiguity of this 
final "event" in and for the history of Christianity. On the other 
hand, both thinkers were also very much aware that one could not 
exactly conclude that a religious position was un-Christian simply 
because it was "untenable." In fact, it is rather the other way around, 
for, as we have seen, Nietzsche maintains that "those who have 
struggled the most to sustain and preserve Christianity have be-
come its best destroyers." This would be the historical self-dissolu-
tion not so much of Protestantism as of the Christianity in it-which 
itself had been preceded by the historical failure of Christianity as 
Catholicism. 
An important guiding principle in this study is the extraordinary 
fact that Kierkegaard's Catholic counterparts understood this disso-
lution in a way opposite to Kierkegaard's own understanding. From 
the perspective of the Catholics it is primarily an extreme life-
denying rigorism that, like the absurd basis of its paradoxical faith, 
is supposed to reveal the merits of the Catholic system, which is 
secure against degeneration in both the practical and theoretical 
spheres. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, considers the actual degen-
eration of Christianity to be grounded in the Protestant seculariza-
tion-whereby, to be sure, he overlooks the fact that this is basically 
but a repetition of the "traffic in indulgences" that had appeared at 
the end of the Middle Ages, which he had already branded as an 
expression of the necessary change pursued by the Apostle Paul: 
from "Christianity in the interests of God, to one in the interests of 
man." In connection with the erection of a "power-hungry clergy," 
this generally overlooked criticism of Catholicism had sufficiently re-
vealed to him to what extent Catholicism had represented an actual a 
33. The Instant, XIV, 47. 
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priori "offense against the New Testament" through its concealing, by 
means of the class division, the necessity for an "imitation of Christ" 
among the mass of the faithful, while at the same time preserving 
the possibility for some individuals to demonstrate their "extraordi-
nariness" to the world. 
It is through this perspective of an origin-related evaluation of 
faith that Luther's appearance was at first praised as a renewal of 
the seriousness of the original Christian claim as well as of evangeli-
cal freedom from a Church-instituted religion of laws; in such a way 
the recovery of the latter was justified by means of the necessary 
consideration of the historical distance to the early Christian "ideality 
of the disciple," resulting in the Protestant ideal of "masculinity" 
having to give faith priority over any notion of an "imitation of Christ." 
It was merely the deterioration of the historically indispensable Lu-
theran "corrective" into the Protestant "correction" of the monastery 
that brought about Kierkegaard's increasingly violent disapproval; 
here again, however, he failed to see in this the self-dissolution of 
his own arguments (the reflection of an inner contradiction of a tem-
porally fixed religion of eternity: "Christ's appearance contained a 
polemic against existence ... ") and that he is reproaching the Re-
former for a "lack of dialectic" when he is in fact the victim of a lack 
of dialectical faith himself-a faith that commands him to defend 
himself both against the monastery and against the "riotousness" 
in Luther's anxious religiosity, insofar as both all too clearly betray, 
whether externally or internally, the merely compensated-for "inse-
curity of dread." As a result of this, and out of the fear of betray-
ing the absolute telos, he remains no less skeptical of evangelical "sin-
cerity" than he is of Catholic indulgences, and is thus enabled to 
achieve the dissolution of the notion of the forgiveness of sins. 
In this way, Kierkegaard's destruction of historical Christianity 
gains the dimension of a historical destruction of Christianity; in it Lu-
ther appears as a "turning point in the development of religiosity," 
beyond which point Christianity cannot go back-if only because its 
double destruction in Protestantism was, first and foremost, the re-
sult of its destroyed duplication in Catholicism. However, since Prot-
estantism only explains as the "result" that which was clearly im-
plied in the collapse of Catholicism, Kierkegaard has to admit in the 
end that it was necessary to "eliminate eighteen hundred years" of 
Christianity completely if the "fundamental confusion" of Christen-
dom was at all to be found in the concept "Church." We remember 
how Nietzsche posits the basic "misunderstanding" of Christianity 
in the fact that it places into temporal existence an ideal based upon 
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the end of historical time, which for that very reason cannot fulfill 
the meaning-giving function that men search for in the historical 
situation-men who hope in vain that an explanation of their suffer-
ing will bring them relief. Hence, it is particularly helpful, and actu-
ally the goal of this comparison, to follow up the point of how, for 
Kierkegaard, this ideal ultimatdy collapses in its total unverifiability, 
allowing him to renounce a redemption that is as wrongly placed in 
the monastery as it is in a religiosity manifested in the concept of 
"dread"-for, after all, redemption is as little able to be attained in 
a naturalism legitimized by Catholicism as it is in a secularized Prot-
estantism. 34' 
2. The Doctrine of Stages as Proof of the Unfulfilled "Parousia" 
What has been thoroughly overlooked is that the "telos" of Kierke-
gaard's "religious movement" was also primarily the solution to the 
immanent problem of the meaning of human existence; and to pro-
tect mankind against the danger of the "aesthetic" nihilism that 
clearly bears the characteristics of Nietzsche's existential despair, it 
required a Christian reflection on the transcendent. Indeed, the first 
"either/or" presented to the reader is the one of a temporality fulfilled 
in a Christian way, culminating in the marriage sanctified by Chris-
tianity as the only possibility of "achieving history" (that is, of giv-
ing it meaning) and in the temporal fragmentation of the aesthete, 
who pays for the meager "instants" of fleeting "highs" with a loss of 
"continuity''' or the hesitation to commit himself "ethically" to the 
experience of his own temporality-in the form of "boredom." Nev-
ertheless, at the end of his journey of faith Kierkegaard will be forced 
to proclaim this very "instant" Christian as well, and he will have to 
pay for this regression with the admission that the synthesis of finite 
and eternal. which had at one time appeared verified to him only in 
Christian faith, is indeed unattainable. 
It would take too much time to detail here the dissolution of the 
intended synthesis of "absolute" and "relative" telos as it is so ex-
actly described in the central work of the writer-his "doctrine of 
stages."35 In this doctrine Kierkegaard describes, as we know, the 
religious development of the individual from "aesthetic" to "ethi-
cal," and then to the "religious" stage, from whose division a final 
34. Journals, VI, A, 108; VIII, 403; X2, A, 207; X\ A, 28, 266, and 305. Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript II, vii, 347ff.; A, XIV, 48 and various catchwords. For a detailed 
treatment see the author's Christlicher Glaube, pp. 176-224. 
35. Concluding Unscientific Postscript II, vii, 436. 
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step leads upward to Christian existence. Intermediate between 
these main stages are "irony" and "humor"-border areas (confines) 
in which continuation in the lower stage, that of aesthetic immediacy 
or an immediate middle-class morality, is seen to be unthinkable, but 
in which at the same time doubt exists as to whether existential de-
spair can be overcome through a forced commitment, be it for an 
ethical immanence or for a religious transcendence. Without ques-
tion Kierkegaard was thereby presenting, after the fact, the path to 
becoming Christian (which he had himself passed over) as the neces-
sary result of the gradually deepening insight into the demands of 
the Christian "ideal." This ideal, in its systematic explanation of the 
rejection of both religious confessions by means of the duplication 
of their dialectical method of disputation, not only condemned an 
aesthetic despair without allowing for an ethical Christianity (mid-
dle-class Catholic conservatism), but also endangered a (Protestant-
based) Christian ethic through the continuous use of the "teleologi-
cal suspension" in favor of the absolute commandment. 
As already mentioned, the philosopher overlooks (as do all his 
interpreters) the fact that corresponding to the believer's necessary 
denial of all religious orientation in and for the world, this "faith 
movement" is in no way concerned with a strictly goal-oriented de-
velopment, but is rather one that from the very outset presents a 
circularity in which the linear destruction of the "ethical" is built into 
the destructive circle of existence impelled from the aesthetic despair 
of the moment to the despairing religiosity of the moment. It mani-
fests itself as the self-dissolution that against the will and better judg-
ment of the believer, who clearly recognized the danger of a total 
disavowal of redemption through a Christianity that is its own per-
manent proof of its unverifiability, is forced upon him by virtue of his 
intellectual honesty. This development, on the other hand, thereby 
becomes the historical image of the above-mentioned historical de-
struction of Christianity, in that it is accomplished through an inter-
nalization of the problem of temporality in religious existence-an inter-
nalization that in the final analysis merely provides for the extension 
in time of the instant of the immediate expectation of redemption. 
This last parallel offers even further concrete evidence for Nietz-
sche's hypothesis concerning the true origin of historical faith, to 
the extent that it can be shown fairly conclusively on the basis of 
personal development to be the consequence of an unfulfilled divine in-
tervention. Kierkegaard, indeed, had obviously hoped for the possi-
bility of a "repetition" of his engagement-sanctioned by Christian-
ity-to Regine Olsen as the reward, as it were, for the "obedience" 
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involved in breaking it off. It is the point of his analysis in Fear and 
Trembling of the story of Abraham, who is spared the sacrifice of 
Isaac, that the "father of faith" had the courage to believe in "this 
life," that is, to expect to receive concrete proof for his faith in the 
here and now. Only after this failed "absurd intervention" through 
which Kierkegaard would have been spared the consequences of his 
paradoxical faith, but which leaves him instead to fall back into 
unrelieved aesthetic despair, does the intervention of the absurd 
become the only challenge to an "unending resignation"-earlier 
viewed literally as only a "surrogate for faith"-that finds itself con-
fronted with the unsolvable paradox that "in the temporal world de-
cisions [have to be] made about the eternal salvation of the indi-
vidual." Yet this change is the consequence of a reflection of faith-
forcing the transition from the dialectical deism of "Religiosity X' to 
the Christian dialectic of "Religiosity B"-on the basis of a "historical 
approach" in which "the eternal" could, as Kierkegaard remarks, not 
only become, but in some incomprehensible way also remain merely 
historical against its own nature. For if the "repetition" is tantamount 
to an "imitation" about which the believer must be ready to decide 
anew at any "instant," then that instant can hardly have had cru-
cial importance for the succeeding history that prohibits man any 
arbitrary repetition of time. And if that which should originally 
have held true as a legitimate verification of redemption is suddenly 
thrown to the winds as "ridiculous anticipation," then the believer 
must ask himself where faith gets legitimate derivation-a derivation 
that allows him only to verify his nonredemption, especially consid-
ering the fact that the transferral of hope from an intervention of the 
eternal in history to the beginning of eternity after history remains 
for its part an anticipation as long as that intervention is constantly 
contradicted by the unbroken movement of time. 36 
We see that Kierkegaard experienced, in fact, exactly that transfor-
mation of faith in the historical situation on whose maxim "to live so 
as to render life meaningless" Nietzsche, who was himself in need of 
a timely relief from suffering, based his ultimate rejection of faith-a 
maxim whose unwilling generation in Kierkegaard again very clearly 
confirms the historical transformation of faith that is repeated in it. 
This is the transference of a redemption manifested at the end of 
history-at any rate, historical more in the sense of a psychological 
36. Fear and Trembling in general, especially III, 17ff., 85ff.; Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript II, 504ff. and 435 (revocation of Fear and Trembling!). 
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verification as Nietzsche projects it onto Jesus, or as Kierkegaard 
expects from heavenly intervention into the "history of his engage-
ment"-to its only theoretically hoped-for realization at the end of 
history. In that Kierkegaard's doctrine of stages anticipates this pro-
cess by confirming the self-dissolution of the notion of redemption in 
confrontation with the circle of the unbroken experience of nonre-
demption, he can be seen as a witness to Albert Schweitzer's thesis 
of the unfulfilled "Parousia." After all, he himself is more than aware 
of the difficulty in attempting to capture the genuine "Christ-like 
life" when "the return of Christ is prophesied as close at hand and 
yet has not come about." The only thing he does not see in this 
regard is how much, in fact, this accepted unverifiability of a regen-
erated faith in the end of history proves the unverifiability of a Chris-
tianity that believed itself to be at the end of history. But his admis-
sion, "Have you seen anyone among us who, you would say, had the 
qualities of a Christian? I haven't," corresponds exactly to Nietz-
sche's view that the actual"misunderstanding" of Christianity is that 
"there was only one Christian-and he died on the cross."37 
Kierkegaard too had apparent difficulty in reconciling the impen-
etrable "incognito" of Jesus, particularly of his suffering and death, 
with the Christian statement that God had allotted to man the ulti-
mate "condition" if not for actual redemption, then at least for the 
understanding of his lack of redemption. Nevertheless, at the end of 
one of his Unscientific Postscripts he was forced to return to the thesis 
that subjectivity is the only truth, in order to defend the claim of his 
faith to objectivity. Thus, the principle of interpretation is never dis-
rupted, the Socratic ignorance is in no way laid aside; the interpreta-
tion of sins remains as arbitrary as the invocation of forgiveness, and 
the "dread" evoked by the nothingness of human existence remains 
as unmitigated as the fear of its destruction in the Sickness unto Death. 
The appeal to the "instant"-otherwise condemned as the structural 
instant of a sensual life of pleasure-only points to the circle of an 
existential surge, showing why often the very person despairing of 
the meaning of his mortal, temporal existence cannot escape into faith. 
Should such a person, like Nietzsche, secretly sense that this reli-
gion was really created only for the instant and correspondingly is 
incapable of guiding a life in time or of directing it by way of com-
mandments? Or, looking at it from the other side, should he have 
experienced the boredom of his empty existence in time, like Kierke-
37. A, sees. 39, 43; Journals, X1, A, 447; X4 , A, 618. 
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gaard, so profoundly as to refuse to be deceived by the hopelessness 
of a repetition of the eschatological situation? ("We destroy eternity 
through a succession of instants.")38 
And, on the other hand, should not each interpretation attempt to 
test precisely how and on what points just this very approach of the 
philosopher to the question of faith is shattered-an approach whose 
validity again and again is considered trivial not only as support of, 
but also as proof for, the necessity of a "theology in the shadow of 
nihilism?" Perhaps then it would become clear that (and how) this 
interpretation mistakes the deeper reasons for the lack of resonance 
of modern nihilism in the face of the Christian message, just as it 
does the religious unpretentiousness of Christianity-whether theo-
retical-philosophical, middle-class-practical, or even practical-politi-
cal-which it alone is capable of proclaiming. 
3. The Job-Situation 
Our study has now come full circle, in both general and specific 
terms. If we were initially compelled to introduce a self-reflection of 
faith on the basis of its own dubiousness as the presupposition for a 
genuinely religious discussion, indeed for any Weltanschauung, then 
the reflection stimulated by faith itself on the powerlessness of Chris-
tianity to afford an answer-or any conception of the world based on 
faith-now becomes apparent as the ultimate precondition for a re-
jection of it. On the other hand, we have specifically characterized 
that religious situation which is the common basis for despair in faith 
and the lack of faith chosen in despair as the Job-situation in religious 
thinking. Indeed, we have seen this as the situation of a historical Job 
in which Nietzsche, like the biblical Job, not only refuses to accept as 
guilt the external "misfortune" of man's humanity unaffected by the 
Christian message, but also is unable to accept the Christian inter-
pretation that God's answer is Job's own "inwardness." However, as 
we have already mentioned, those are the very reasons why, for 
Kierkegaard, Job is no "hero of faith," but does attain significance 
in that "the border struggles against faith are fought out in him." 
Job's argumentation contains, as we have seen, "as it were the entire 
weighty accusation on the part of man in the great case between God 
and man." 
These words stem from that early work of Kierkegaard in which, 
parallel to the analysis of Abraham in Fear and Trembling, he further 
38. The Concept of Dread, IV, 418. 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard 249 
explores the new concept of "repetition"-whereby we may note that 
the second document is already very much affected by his own ex-
perience of a total unverifiability of that category. In this way the 
"young writer," incapable of "realizing" his engagements against 
the conditions of his historically given nature, waits for Job's "thun-
derstorm" -that is, for some proof, verifiable only in temporal exis-
tence, of a possible intervention of the eternal in the natural course 
of an unvarying history, which will make him able to marry. He 
must, however, ultimately accept the "thunder" of a forced renunci-
ation, which he later declares to be the actual goal of his faith-filled 
hope and which he is capable of stylizing as a satisfactory "answer" 
to his question. He thereby not only renounces his earlier "frank-
ness," with which he felt himself to be called by Job's example, "'in 
the bitterness of his soul' to stand up and fight against God," but he 
also refuses, as did Nietzsche, to ascribe his development to his own 
"guilt," a development as factually unavoidable as it was inexplica-
ble. "If we have to accept existence as it is, wouldn't it be better if we 
knew how it is? 'Guilt'-what does that mean? Isn't it more or less 
put upon me? Isn't it all a great coincidence? What kind of power is it 
that takes my respect and pride from me and in such a senseless 
way? Who is responsible for this ... ? Why doesn't anyone answer?" 
Beyond that, however, the basing of the Job-situation on the unful-
filled Parousia, the grounding of the "quarrel with God" on a guilty 
verdict, becomes immediately clear, indeed philologically demonstra-
ble. For the indictment of a practically unbroken natural develop-
ment in time, such a verdict can offer only the penurious "compen-
sation" of a theoretical "elevation" in eternity. If the waiting for the 
storm reflects clearly enough the anticipation of eternity in the origi-
nal Christian situation, then in the same way the enthusiasm of the 
young man for the deepening of his writing shows itself to be en-
tirely a question of mere compensation for the frustration of his origi-
nal wish. "Or is my compensation that I have become a writer? I 
forbid myself all compensation; I demand my rights .... I didn't 
pray to become a writer and I don't want to be one at this price."39 
The dogmatism of Job-which was at the "core" of Kierkegaard's 
idea that "the passion of freedom is not snuffed out for him nor 
quieted by an unfortunate expression" -ultimately allows Nietz-
sche's extremely stringent honesty to turn, in view of the lack of an 
answer in the "storm" of his mortal existence, to the question of the 
"honesty of God": "Would he not be a cruel God who possessed the 
39. Repetition, III, 23lff. 
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truth and could watch man agonize over it?" This brings us, then, to 
the crucial point of our comparison of the two antipodal thinkers. 
At the same time, it is the profoundest proof for the fundamental 
significance of their kinship when Kierkegaard also ultimately gives 
vent to his astonishment that it has as yet "not occurred to anyone to 
complain about God, who as eternal spirit from whom all other spir-
its derive, should be able to communicate the truth directly to these 
derivative spirits." To be sure, this observation is a significant slip of 
Kierkegaard's precisely in the above-mentioned "unscientific" reflec-
tion about the "offense" that could be caused by a possible "misun-
derstanding of the instant" in which "the historicity" of the appear-
ance of Jesus was the "occasion" for faith and simultaneously the 
only thing confirmable about the "absolute fact" on which it sup-
ports itself. It is a "paradox" by which the distinction between the 
"contemporaneous" and the historical "disciple at second hand" is 
completely canceled, but which thereby conjures up the danger that 
the intention of God completely fails. He could not have taken on 
the "form of a servant" "in order to make sport of mankind; his 
intention cannot ... be to go about in the world in such a way that 
not a single man recognizes it." "To grasp the full extent of the mat-
ter: Christ's whole life on earth would have become a farce had he 
gone through it incognito and fully unnoticed-and yet the truth of 
the matter is: he actually was incognito."40 
Thus, the project of the Philosophical Fragments resolves itself into 
an attempt to prove that the "coming down" of the "teacher" (in-
stead of raising up the "learners" to his level) is the only way in 
which God's love can make contact with mankind-insofar as the 
"learners" are "basically unhappy," not so much because in their lack 
of similarity "the loving ones cannot possess one another" as for 
the fact that "they cannot understand one another." The young man of 
the Job-argument must, however, presuppose a minimum of "knowl-
edge," even as regards the validity of the category with whose help 
Christian dogma seeks to compensate for the loss of the repetition in 
time through its interpretation as an endlessly repeated test. Still, if 
this category-in its application by Job's theological friends--"aims 
toward canceling out and suspending all of reality by claiming it to be 
a test with respect to eternity," such an extension of its scope attests 
only to the suspension of its actual meaning, which it alone had as a 
"provisional category" and as which it should have been "canceled" 
(aufgehoben)Y 
40. Plzilosoplzica/ Fragments, IV, 218, 163, 222; For Self-Examination, XIII, 525. 
41. Plzilosoplzical Fragments, IV, 184ff., esp. 194; Repetition, III, 243ff. 
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Without this cancellation, a dogma remains that exhausts itself in 
postulates, or rather that can only express itself in that way and re-
mains only a postulate. Far from protecting man from the crisis of 
internal and external pressures, it betrays man's "self-defense" just 
as clearly as it hides the arbitrariness of its formulations through 
necessary unarbitrariness: "in this way indeed God becomes a postulate," 
but in such a way that the postulate is far from being arbitrary but 
rather is "self-defense." God is, therefore, not a postulate, but the 
fact that the existing God postulates-is a "necessity." Yet, the word 
upon which this necessity metaphysically as well as metaphorically 
supports itself, functions far more as an interpreted answerlessness 
than as an interpreting answer. That theological dialectics does not 
pause even before Job (that is, before the dissolution of his revela-
tion) in its regression from the situation of Job to the Job-situation, is 
the final mark of its self-destruction. "Therefore the weak point in the 
plan of the Book of Job is that God reveals himself in the clouds and 
at the same time announces himself through his speaking."42 
42. Concluding Unscientific Postscript l, vii, 190; Stages on Life's Way, VI, 295. 
XIII. Language and the Critique 
of Language in Nietzsche 
Josef Simon 
(Translated by James C. O'Flaherty) 
Philosophy is, from a certain point of view, thinking according to 
strict concepts by means of which sentences are formed, which in 
turn are supposed to fit together in a consistent system with the 
greatest possible coherence. However, even a glance at Nietzsche's 
writings reveals that there philosophy is not understood in this way. 
For Nietzsche it is "something childish or even a kind of deception, if 
a thinker today offers a cognitive whole, a system; we are too well 
schooled not to respond with the profoundest skepticism concern-
ing the possibility of such a whole. It is enough if we agree on a 
system of presuppositions concerning method-on provisional truths, 
according to whose guidance we intend to operate."1 That is just as 
true for the natural sciences as for philosophy. The reason for this 
is to be found in Nietzsche's reflection on the nature of concepts 
in general. Concepts are supposed to refer to identical things. It 
can further be said that one starts from the assumption that certain 
words are concepts-that is, they always refer to "the same thing," 
namely, something common to a certain class of things, or they pur-
port to refer to a class of things that can or cannot exist in this man-
ner. Nietzsche interprets this ontological thesis as the moral "de-
mand to see things just this way and not otherwise." For him identity 
does not subsist in the "essence" of things, but in a "special power of 
the mind" (WKG, VII-3, 224); it finally derives from a will to see 
things in a certain way, namely, as identical things. Such a will is a 
will to engage in a methodical establishment of things conceptually 
which do not exist in just that way. For Nietzsche there is no onto-
logically superior method; such a method is a product of the imagi-
nation. The requirements of method are necessarily "one-sided," and 
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari, II (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), 128ff. Translations from the German are by 
James C. O'Flaherty. 
252 
Language and the Critique of Language in Nietzsche 253 
precisely in that fact lies their strength. In the "one-sided require-
ment" of a method for determining identical things the knower is 
really concerned with his own identity, with his self-assertion, and to 
this extent the concept of a thing is always an opinion or an interpre-
tation. There are no identical things, and accordingly no things at all 
in the sense of traditional metaphysics, but only interpretations. Meta-
physical representation, of course, sees a contradiction in this view, 
for it presupposes that there can be interpretation only if there is 
something to be interpreted. Interpretation is supposed to say what 
something is. It is supposed to make its truth manifest. On the other 
hand, things as such are, in Nietzsche's view, presuppositions inher-
ent in the effort of thinking that is designed to make the world com-
prehensible. 
According to Nietzsche, what is true of concepts is also true of 
their syntactical connection in the form of judgments (Urteile). 
"'Knowledge is judgment!' But judgment is faith that something is 
this way or that! And not knowledge!" The legitimacy of faith in 
knowledge is always presupposed, just as the "legitimacy of the feel-
ing accompanying a judgment of conscience is presupposed. Moral 
ontology is the prevailing prejudice here" (WKG, VIII-1, 273). The onto-
logical claim of the judgment is based, on the one hand, on the 
identity of concepts, and, on the other hand, on the grammatical 
form presupposed in it, a form in which it unites the concepts. The 
basic form of this union is that of "subject" and "predicate," and it is 
ontologically reflected, as Aristotle recognized, in many ways: as the 
relation of substance and accident or of thing and property, as the 
relation of thing and species or of species and genus. In such a way 
the underlying ontological forms or categories are coordinated with 
the grammatical surface forms. This becomes especially clear if a fur-
ther distinction is made (as it must be, according to Aristotle) be-
tween an accidental property or an accident and a necessary property 
or a "proprium." What Nietzsche says about concepts is thus con-
firmed. Just as they spring from a will to interpretation when inter-
preted as concepts of identical things, so now language is interpreted 
as the designation of ontological relations. 
The distinction of necessary and accidental properties makes it 
possible to speak of a "substance" that perdures amid its changes of 
appearance. According to Nietzsche the concept of substance is "in-
dispensable for logic, although, strictly speaking, nothing real corre-
sponds to it" (WKG, V-2, 150). Nothing that has life, he maintains, 
can be understood in terms of this category; nevertheless, it is neces-
sary from the perspective of a living being. "No living beings would 
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survive if the ... inclination to affirm rather than to suspend judg-
ment, to err and to engage in fictions rather than to wait patiently, to 
agree rather than to contradict, to judge rather than to be just, were 
not cultivated to an extraordinary degree" (ibid.). It is when life is 
opposed to life in self-assertion that the concept of substance has its 
function; but when Nietzsche says that the concept of substance has 
its "root ... in language" (WKG, VII-1, 692), he does not intend to 
say that "language" as such "seduces" thought (as analytical lan-
guage philosophers, who would oppose a logical language to lan-
guage as it is, would argue). Rather, it would be correct in Nietz-
sche's case to say that the concept of substance results from a specific 
interpretation in the sense of a specific grammar. A grammar purports 
to understand the sequence of words or their aesthetically distinct 
surface within the framework of a systematic set of rules. It seeks 
to identify linguistic structures just as the concept seeks to identify 
things, and to oppose permanent structures to the changing surface 
appearances. Thinking that involves the category of substance does 
not simply follow language, nor is it seduced by it, but wills to ac-
complish something with its help. It desires to understand language 
in a specific sense-for example, to be able to understand itself as 
substance. ''That-which-exists-outside-us" (ibid.) is not interpreted 
here as something identical, but a language structure is so inter-
preted in order that "consciousness," in opposition to all "that-
which-exists-outside-us" or in opposition to the change of its "con-
tents," can understand itself as identity, and only in that way as 
"something." 
We interpret not only in language. We also interpret language 
when we speak of our speaking, because we interpret this theme 
when speaking of something that we allege to ourselves in linguistic 
form. It is always true that we have only an idea of language as the 
result of an interpretation in whose justification we "believe." From 
such an interpretation we derive the categories, including the cate-
gory of causality. In thinking in terms of this category we are, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, by no means seeking "for causes, but for what 
is known" (WKG, VIII-3, 68). If we connect with this assertion of 
Nietzsche's the further thesis that "the popular belief in cause and 
effect" is "based on the presupposition that free will is the cause of 
every effect" (WKG, VII-1, 694), the following idea results: in causal 
explanations we attempt to attribute what is unknown to what is 
familiar to us, that is, to equate the two in order thus to be able to 
maintain the interpretation of reality that has hitherto stood the test. 
The attempt is made to assert that the world as it is already fabri-
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cated in our consciousness is the true world. When we do this, con-
sciousness maintains itself in precisely the identity in which it desires 
to remain-in "its" identity. It undertakes this by means of a particular 
explanation, that is, one that is possible for it, which is always the one 
that explains something to itself and is also accepted by others as an 
explanation. It is the explanation in which the problematical nature 
that something poses for it is taken care of at the same time as its need 
for the agreement of others, for such is the meaning of the attempt to 
explain causality (consciousness is "developed in social intercourse" 
[WKG, VIII-2, 310]). 
Thinking in traditional categories, as for example in the categories 
of substantiality and causality, therefore results not directly from lan-
guage but from a specific interpretation of language that we believe to 
be justified. This is the "belief in grammar" with which, as is well 
known, Nietzsche associates belief in God. 2 Whoever "believes" in 
the ontological relevance of the categories of substantiality and cau-
sality will necessarily "believe" in a highest substance of all sub-
stances and in a cause of all causes. Nietzsche does not say that 
this belief is overcome, but he fears we would "not get rid of God, 
because we still believe in grammar" (WKG, VI-3, 72; my emphasis). 
Grammar is an interpretation of language from which all metaphys-
ics arises, and this is true even of modern natural science as "the 
most recent of all philosophic methods" (WKG, IV-2, 19). The fact 
that we believe in grammar makes possible even the belief in "our-
selves" -that is, in the idea that we have of ourselves, for example, 
as an identical consciousness throughout our life. In this concept of 
ourselves (as "res" or "substantia cogitans") we are something sub-
stantial, something perduring; we are the "I think, which must be 
able to accompany all my representations" (Kant), and are therefore 
their "subject." To be sure, Kant had seen that this can be only a 
transcendental presupposition and not a substance in an objective 
sense. But he had also seen that it is a presupposition that we must 
make, if we are to be at all capable of thinking that the connection of 
representations in the form of such categories as "substantiality and 
accidentality," or "cause and effect," is to have objective validity. 
It was Kant who held that we cannot have objective knowledge of 
ourselves as a thinking substance, but that we must conceive of our-
selves as identity amid all changing representations-and therefore 
as the unifying element in them-in order that our thought-se-
quences according to the categories in general can be conceived as 
2. Cf. Josef Simon, "Grammatik und Wahrheit," Nietzsche Studien, 1 (1972), lff. 
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objective and in this sense as "true" knowledge. One could say with 
Nietzsche that the "belief" in ourselves as in "something" having 
identity or substantiality is the basis of the belief in substance and 
causes in an objective sense, or rather of the interpretive starting-
point of the talk about objective truth. By means of the belief in 
ourselves we maintain the belief in substances and causes. It is a 
belief that serves life in that it reduces other life to objective concepts 
and thus ignores it as life. Life lives on the fact that it imagines other 
life according to its possibilities, that is, as potentially dead, which is 
the same as representing to itself life in general. We cannot stop 
proceeding in this way without ceasing to live ourselves. 
This means also that when we speak "of" substances-when we 
say, for example, that we persist unchanged as speaking substance in 
all of our speaking-we already have a definite concept of language 
deriving from our belief in a grammar that misrepresents language. 
These misrepresentations are reductions of language's possibilities to 
the framework of specific grammatical structures. Language is richer 
than our consciousness of it is permitted to know for its own sake. All 
categorical thinking is interpretation, and all interpretation is "reduc-
tive procedure" or the thought that simplifies (WKG, V-2, 182). In 
such a way language, which to begin with is not "there" only for the 
individual and his purposes or only for certain interest-groups, can 
be utilized and made to serve one's own life as opposed to life in 
general; and thus it becomes an instrument (Organon). "An instru-
ment cannot criticize its own fitness; the intellect cannot itself deter-
mine its limits, not even whether it is in a condition of having turned 
out well or ill" (WKG, VIII-1, 131). It remains impenetrable to itself, 
for basically it cannot view itself as a problem. 
Nietzsche speaks of rational thought as "interpretation according 
to a scheme" of thought, "which we cannot throw off" (WKG, VIII-1, 
198)-a "final, indiscussible ground." We can just barely imagine 
that we are thinking in terms of a scheme, but even so the scheme is 
not overcome to the extent that we are moving toward an absolute 
truth. For a Hegel the insight into this necessity amounted to the 
liberation from it. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees in it further a 
deception that promotes life: "We think that, because something has 
become transparent for us, it can no longer offer us resistance-and 
are astonished that we can see through it, but cannot pass beyond it" 
(WKG, V-1, 274). If we should reflect on the nature of human under-
standing (as Locke and Leibniz, for example, undertook to do) we 
are then concerned with imagining this "nature," and if in so doing 
we obtain results that are enlightening or that can be regarded as 
Language and the Critique of Language in Nietzsche 257 
"explanations" this occurs from a perspective that, in turn, we can-
not determine. All explanations and elucidations are reductive: they 
follow a scheme, which also holds true for exhaustive reflection on 
the scheme. For every critique of our cognitive powers the judgment 
must also be made that implies its falsity: to every proposition be-
longs its counterproposition. Only in this way can the scheme be 
overcome. 
Precisely the feeling that something is completely transparent for 
us is the ground of the deception that makes up our consciousness 
and that maintains itself in a subjective, imperturbable way primarily 
by means of a plausible, to say nothing of an evident, concept of 
itself. Our consciousness universalizes itself in this concept so that 
it becomes the concept of consciousness in general, and it can imag-
ine itself as an individual only in the negation of this judgment about 
itself. The positive concept is always the general concept: by con-
ceiving myself in terms of it I conceive all consciousness in terms of 
it. I can become clear or transparent to myself only to the extent 
that, in this generalization, I remove myself from myself, and also 
from others as individual persons. For Nietzsche, therefore, philo-
sophical systems are interesting only as the works of persons. Their 
generalizations are personal creations whose purpose is to under-
stand themselves and others (as well as everything else possible) 
from their own standpoint, and, if a scheme is necessarily required, to 
understand themselves as personally fulfilling it. "Of systems that 
have been refuted only the personal element can still be of interest to 
us, for that is the eternally irrefutable element" (WKG, III-I, 297). In 
Nietzsche's sense one may add that even when it is a matter of refut-
ing systems only the personal interest obtains, namely, opposing to 
their generalizations one's own. What is one's own, what is new, is 
interesting, especially if it appears as absolute truth to its author. To 
consider something true is an affect. It is a passion of strong person-
alities to consider true only what they themselves have thought out; 
if they do not identify with a rationale opposed to the prevailing 
ideas in a positive sense, they nevertheless identify emotionally with 
the force behind the project. 
To the general grammatical notion, according to which the attempt 
is made to reduce language in its living function to concepts, there is 
opposed its individual use, which is, for its part, not to be reduced to 
concepts. Speech, in which persons express themselves in a way that 
cannot be subordinated to semantic or grammatical rules, is, accord-
ing to Nietzsche, metaphorical speech. Every word with which persons 
express themselves is, in its original use, a metaphor; for in express-
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ing themselves in language individuals express something that is 
not susceptible of reflection in concepts, that is, something that can-
not be equated with other concepts that are considered universally 
comprehensible. Words are already concepts also, to the extent that 
every person must make use of ordinary language to express him-
self: "Every word immediately becomes a concept precisely insofar as 
it is not supposed to serve simply as a reminder of the unique and 
entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; 
but rather a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously 
must fit more or less similar cases-which means, strictly speaking, 
cases that are never equal, but always unequal. Every concept origi-
nates from the equation of unequal things" (WKG, III-2, 373££.). 
Here we arrive at the central point of Nietzsche's philosophy of lan-
guage. In the quotation it is asserted that the word must simulta-
neously fit countless cases; that "must" and that "simultaneously" 
are the decisive terms for an understanding of this philosophy of 
language. 
First of all it must be said that the word must fit equal cases be-
cause it is supposed to fit them. Nietzsche speaks of a making equal 
(Gleichsetzen). This is an activity of the individual who is capable of 
expressing himself in the isolated individuality of his "original expe-
rience" while also generalizing himself in it. To do this, he must 
express himself in such a way that others not only accept his expres-
sion as expression, but also see truth in it. Consider poetic expres-
sion: Generalization is thus willed simultaneously with the expression 
of the individual experience, in the will to express oneself in the com-
mon language and to use the concepts of this language so that they 
serve that purpose. The affect itself aims at it, and individual style 
is by no means intended to be manneristic as mere idiosyncrasy, but 
rather to use language in such a way that what is individually ex-
perienced appears as universal truth. The shift to the universal is in-
tended, for only in that way can anything be asserted over against 
already existing universal truths. 
To this extent the metaphor must become a concept. It is meaning-
ful only as a concept in the making, that is, when it is understood by 
others. Its meaning consists in its "becoming hard and rigid" (WKG, 
111-2, 377)! It disrupts the prevailing system of concepts, which de-
fine themselves in mutual terms, only by itself becoming a concept 
that attains to their universal dignity; otherwise, it remains indi-
vidual and meaningless. A concept "is" only (as meaning) what it is. 
A metaphor is in that it becomes (concept), and "becoming" is, as we 
know, more than being according to Nietzsche: the meaning of be-
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coming is not implied in being, but in becoming the meaning of 
being is implied. Whoever is in command of a language as it is, 
participates, by virtue of that fact, in a definite power (in which he 
believes). But whoever changes a language gains power over this 
power and thereby also over those who participate in it. Because he 
is not merely a participant, he brings his individuality to bear on it: 
not irrationally over against the predominant standard, but, rather, 
making it known and recognized by means of that standard. One 
should therefore not label Nietzsche as the founder of a modern 
irrationalism, as Lukacs has done. 3 We have to do here rather with a 
rationality that is to be distinguished from a positivism according to 
which only that is real which can be reduced to allegedly unproblem-
atical"truths" or to evidences that can be "explained."4 
This view of the metaphor as a concept in the making makes it 
understandable how Nietzsche can speak of a conceptual scheme 
that we indeed recognize as a scheme, but that we nevertheless can-
not throw off. In using language to express ourselves individually we 
fulfill the scheme, and we can-and we will to-express ourselves 
only through fulfillment of the scheme. "Here is a barrier: our very 
thought involves that faith (with its differentiation of substance and 
accidence, doing and doer, etc.); to abandon it means no-longer-be-
ing-able-to-think" (WKG, VIII-1, 325). Belief in the truth of these 
categories as belief in a deeper grammar of language, and therefore in 
logic as the doctrine of relations between fixed, identical concepts of 
identical things, is for Nietzsche the same as the "belief in the ego as a 
substance, as the only reality, according to which we ascribe reality 
to things in general!" (ibid.). One cannot think without it, but it is 
not therefore true. 
We cannot conceive of ourselves apart from willing to fulfill the 
scheme in question, that is, we attain to a consciousness of our-
selves, to self-consciousness, only by expressing in language "the 
unique and entirely individualized original experience" in such a way 
that it appears merely a particular instance of something universal. 
Otherwise there is no consciousness of ourselves. We must think of 
ourselves as something universal, as "ego," as that which all desig-
nate themselves, if we are to think of ourselves at all; and if we 
3. Cf. Georg Lukacs, "Nietzsche als Begriinder des Irrationalismus der imperiali-
stischen Periode," in Die ZerstOrun~ der Vernunft (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1954), 
chap. 3. 
4. Cf. further Alfred Schmidt, "Uber Nietzsches Erkenntnistheorie," in Nietzsche, 
ed. Jorg Salaquarda, Wege der Forschung, no. 521 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1980), pp. 124-52. 
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would be conscious of ourselves as speaking beings, we must think 
of ourselves as interchangeable speakers of a language that has be-
come concrete for us as a specific language by way of its conceptual 
version in a grammar. In other words, only by sacrificing individual-
ity can an individual express himself in language and come to con-
sciousness of himself. Only in this self-abandonment is self-conscious-
ness realized, and only in this way does it gain power over others 
who do not have the courage necessary for it. One can say further: 
it is realized only insofar as it is realized for others and only insofar 
as it understands how to express itself in language so that others 
likewise see its "truth." It has power over others to the extent that it 
makes itself the subject of a determination in which they likewise 
appear simply as instances of something universal, as poetic users 
of language in which all individualities disappear in a universal aes-
thetic "agreement" exhibiting the same mood. Only in this activity 
does it assert itself in contrast to others who are passive. It deter-
mines itself as an instance (Fall) whereas the others are determined as 
instances or rather allow themselves to be so determined without 
contradiction. 
Nietzsche criticizes the equation of man with his consciousness. 
He speaks of a "ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of 
consciousness," which to be sure has "resulted in the great useful-
ness ... that its all-too-rapid cultivation has been prevented" (WKG, 
V-2, 57). Thus the human being could become accustomed to the 
consciousness of being "consciousness." He could cling to that idea, 
despite the fact that consciousness is only a superficial part of him. 
It does not, in Nietzsche's view, "really belong to the individual 
existence of the human being" (WKG, V-2, 274), and it is allied to 
thought insofar as it is expressed in language: "The development 
of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason, 
but only the becoming-self-conscious of reason) go hand in hand" 
(ibid.). To that extent, consciousness is an achievement of its self-
expression in language. One cannot say, according to Nietzsche, that 
man is a "subject"-he only appears as a subject to the extent that he 
successfully expresses in language a theory of himself as a subject in 
such a way that it appears to others as a veridical theory of the hu-
manness of all human beings and is therefore accepted by them. 
Thus it is not a matter of the truth of this theory in an absolute sense, 
but of whether others also subsume themselves under it, believing 
that in so doing they come to an understanding and certainty of 
themselves. Like the originator of the theory, they believe that they 
become thereby transparent to themselves, which means indeed to 
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become conscious. Consciousness and self-consciousness relate thus 
to the universal concept of the human species, as "theoretical con-
cepts" in a theory accepted as definitive, with the aid of which man 
distinguishes himself, for example, from the animals. It follows from 
the status of this theory of consciousness that there cannot be simply 
one theory that accomplishes this task: it is not its truth that is deci-
sive, but only the historical fact that men believe that they become 
conscious of themselves by virtue of it. As individual persons men 
remain "impenetrable" for themselves and others precisely by virtue of 
that fact-as Hegel also sees. 5 
Hegel and Nietzsche agree to a great extent in their philosophical 
evaluation of consciousness. Hegel states the matter thus: "Only 
pure knowledge, the spirit, which has freed itself from its appear-
ance as consciousness, has also free, pure being as its beginning."6 
Only this spirit is no longer bound to the representation of being 
"consciousness" according to a definite image of itself. It is open to 
its own (unconscious, impenetrable) being. But for precisely that rea-
son it will have to create a conscious picture of itself again and again 
in order even to attain to a conception of itself as the element of a theory 
of knowledge, according to which it can defend itself against skepti-
cism or be certain of its capacity for truth. When it has freed itself 
"from its appearance as consciousness" it becomes aware of the ne-
cessity of this appearance and of its falsity, and then it can express in 
language other dimensions of itself-for example, itself as instinct 
and affect or as something else, and over against the self-conscious-
ness of being "conscious" as something new. It regains the capacity 
for becoming and for the renewal of its concept of itself, on the basis 
of which it had indeed even earlier understood itself as "conscious-
ness." Theories of the significance of the "unconscious" are, for ex-
ample, a result of such possibilities as have been opened up, but 
even they are naturally not "truer" than the older theories just be-
cause they are newer. Only an individual mind (Geist) expresses itself 
anew in language, but precisely in a language in which it immedi-
ately transforms itself into concepts again. Even a theory concerning 
the significance of the unconscious in comparison to the restricted 
area of consciousness renders its content conscious. 
In this connection there appears immediately the contradiction 
of the form in relation to the intended content, and one must be 
5. G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Gesammelte Werke, ed. Johannes Hoffmei-
ster, XII (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968), 236. 
6. Ibid., XI, 34. 
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warned against "allowing himself to be deceived" (WKG, VIII-1, 
217). Only in this way can one see through the lack of seriousness of 
such a new science-of which its originator must have been aware, 
when he was able to free himself from the traditional axioms in gen-
eral and to arrive at these new perspectives. Only a knowledge that 
can free itself from identification with its "appearance" (Erscheinung), 
for example, from the appearance of being consciousness, and that 
has freed itself from its assumed identity, is enhanced in the "will to 
power." But there must also be renewed faith in the new perspec-
tives as if they were the absolute method of attaining truth. The new 
theory must announce its absolute claim to truth and must will to 
become universal. After the lack of seriousness prevailing during the 
period of transition, the new values must again be taken seriously; 
otherwise, they are no values. Any contradiction of form and content 
regarding them makes no difference; their strength derives from the 
fact that they perdure. For all consciousness is a contradiction in that 
it considers itself to be true consciousness of things outside us, about 
which it actually has knowledge only insofar as they are present in 
consciousness as "appearance." 
According to Hegel only the spirit that has freed itself "from its 
appearance as consciousness" is a free spirit. That is the spirit which 
no longer identifies itself with what is ordinarily considered to be 
"identity of consciousness" beyond life or through life; it is the free-
dom to understand even itself differently, for example, as noniden-
tity of consciousness. In that case identity is freed from its conceptu-
alization, or rather, man no longer understands himself under the 
aspect of an identity persisting throughout life in the sense that one 
can say anything about it in terms of a theory. According to Hegel, 
but also according to Nietzsche, the concept of freedom is to be un-
derstood along this line: being free from a fixed, positive concept 
of oneself or of "what" one should be and according to which one 
should orient himself in order to fulfill his concept. 
This concept of freedom from a fixed, positive concept of oneself 
must, as such, always be a general concept. According to Kant it 
must even be the most general concept of man, under which all 
men can subsume themselves (or have already done so) by virtue of 
having presupposed themselves to be "rational" only. Whatever is 
thereby considered rational can no longer be an object of possible 
differences of opinion. Therefore it must constitute the supreme rule 
of rational thought itself, that is, the freedom from contradiction in 
the moral concept of itself, if it is generalized in an unlimited way. 
Accordllng to Nietzsche, however, the test of freedom from contra-
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diction is not without presupposition: it presupposes identical con-
cepts. But because we can only act as if we had identical concepts-
for we are not acquainted with their actual usage in the language of 
all peoples, certainly not beyond the limit of individual languages-
this presupposition amounts to the assumption that all men use 
words with the same meanings as our own, and that even we always 
use them with the same meanings. We return here to Nietzsche's 
point of departure: whoever introduced the concepts used them really 
as an individual. Others subsume themselves under this usage, that 
is, they exert themselves to act in accordance with it in that they 
"form" or "conduct" themselves within this framework. 
Kant's "categorical imperative" is thus called into question on the 
basis of a critique of language. The attempt to formulate a universally 
binding concept of humanness is revealed as the flash of originality 
of an individual who so formulates his subjective maxim of behavior 
that it can be elevated to the level of universal legislation without 
thereby becoming involved in contradiction. In so doing he proceeds 
on the basis of how he himself understands his maxim. The whole 
background experience of his individual life is involved here, from 
which he arrives at the formulation of his maxim that he now desires 
to test. If the maxim is: Thou shalt not kill, he necessarily starts from 
what he himself understands by "killing"; likewise from what he 
himself understands by "life," which would be terminated by this 
"killing." At this point it is necessary to determine when life begins 
and ends, and further, whether only human life is meant, whether 
borderline cases such as self-defense are supposed to fall in this cate-
gory, and so on. One can only expect that others will agree or "con-
cur," for without the presupposition of the fixed identity of the con-
cepts present in the maxim there is no way of testing whether it can 
be generalized into a universal law without contradiction. 
Freedom in Nietzsche's view is primarily the dispensing with such 
uncertain presuppositions, and, what is more, for reasons arising 
from his critique of language. If the concurrence of others is not 
considered necessary, owing to the lack of fixed linguistic usage or 
equivalent concepts, but is a "presumption" arising out of one's 
own subjective conviction, even Kant would speak of an aesthetic 
condition. Now Nietzsche takes this step in that he concedes to a 
morality that understands itself in this way the subjective appearance 
of truth, but not the moral absoluteness that it claims. "Only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon are existence and the world eternally justified" 
(WKG, III-1, 43). Whereas Kant regarded religion only as morally 
justified, Nietzsche employs the theological concept of "justifica-
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tion" consciously for the notion that claims to truth "get stuck," as it 
were, at the aesthetic level. They are, he maintains, always mere 
fictions by which we orient ourselves, words claiming to represent 
concepts, while in reality they only take the place of concepts. There-
fore all systems possess only an apparent freedom from contradiction, 
and the consciousness oriented in them can only be "appearance," 
that is, it too can only be understood as an aesthetic phenomenon. 
Supposedly logical distinctions obtain only as illusion (Schein) by 
the grace of aesthetic distinctions-that is, as a result of the fact 
that individuals understand one another as such, or are so well ac-
quainted with the language that, without recourse to the rules, they 
can express themselves so that others give assent. The goal of all 
speech is the other individual, and the temporal or even epoch-mak-
ing illusion of "fundamental" truths (e.g., concerning the nature of 
human consciousness as the basis of all other truths) is actually due 
to the assent of the individual. According to Nietzsche there are, in 
reality, no privileged concepts: the fact that "a metaphor becomes 
hard and rigid is by no means a guarantee of its necessity and exclu-
sive justification" (WKG, III-2, 378). The condition in which all meta-
phors are still possible, and in which the success of a certain one 
means nothing regarding the success of further metaphors or exten-
sions of the language, is the free aesthetic condition. In that condi-
tion the possibility of expressing something in language does not 
depend on the fact that something distinctly diiferent could be ex-
pressed in language. For in that case one would be already caught 
up in foundational thinking, that is, thinking in terms of substantial-
ity. Consciousness would then be understood as the principle of the 
unconscious. 
But how is this freedom of the aesthetic condition to be more pre-
cisely determined? We have already noted that for Nietzsche all 
causal explanation as reduction of the unknown to the known has its 
real basis in the idea "that the free will is the cause of every effect" 
(WKG, VII-1, 694). Thus an assumption is involved. The free will be-
comes the cause of every effect by virtue of the fact that it is the 
cause of all causes: it is that which allows something to be regarded 
as a "cause" by virtue of the fact that it accepts that something as 
such, if the explanation or naming of the cause seems to make the 
matter sufficiently clear. Otherwise there would be further inquiry. 
The "substantiation" depends on its appearing to be true for the one 
who had inquired about it, not on its being true. For only if one 
knew everything, could he call something a cause with a good con-
science. The presupposition that free will is the final cause of calling 
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something a cause is the same as the insight that one can only think 
in terms of a scheme. To be sure, one can relativize consciousness by, 
for example, attempting to explain all conscious processes as effects 
of physiological processes. Even Nietzsche considers progress in this 
regard possible. But he also says that even the complete success of 
this attempt would not eliminate the presupposition of free will-for 
even such an "explanation" of consciousness would be an achieve-
ment of the (free) will. It would then indeed constitute the truth 
about "consciousness," but not the absolute truth; it too would be 
only a successful theory, that is, another interpretation. 
The fact that there is no final truth for Nietzsche, but only inter-
pretations that are considered to be true, is identical with the ines-
capable presupposition of freedom. It results from the experience 
that we can, without further explanation, put our "selves" or "what" 
we are in the place of physiological causes, for example, when we 
crook a finger. We are free in that we assume as a cause nothing 
other than ourselves, and that is to say literally nothing that is quali-
tatively or conceptually definite. For then we take the responsibility 
for it ourselves without backing off from it "by way of explanation" 
and ascribing it to something else outside of us. In that case we remain 
for ourselves that which is simply unexplained. But we are also re-
sponsible for all theories in which we explain something other than 
ourselves as the cause of anything. Strength in Nietzsche's view con-
sists essentially in enduring this responsibility as the renunciation of 
"true" explanations. That is his positive interpretation of nihilism. 
The interplay of aspects of the word as concept and metaphor is the 
basic thought of Nietzsche's philosophy of language. It is not a mat-
ter of a juxtaposition of words that are concepts and other words that 
one would have to call"metaphors" because of some image-content, 
but of two views of the same thing: a word is a concept when it is to 
be understood as a name for a species of identical things; a word 
with which an individual attempts to express himself or "a completely 
individual original experience" (Urerlebnis), is a metaphor. Because 
whatever is individual is "ineffable" as long as the expression of it 
fails to signify anything for others also-that is, it fails to make such 
an impression on others that they recognize themselves in it, and 
also find themselves expressed in it-the linguistic expression of an 
individual "original experience" above all amounts only to an exert-
ing-oneself for expression or for a language not yet existing, but in 
the making; it is uncertain whether the expression is understood. 
What Nietzsche calls a metaphor is in Hamann's language "a conflu-
ence of ideas and sensations," syntactically understood, a "group of 
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small islands for whose community life the bridges and ferries of 
method" are lacking. 7 It is a venture in language as over an unstable 
bridge to another individuality, a venture in which there still exists 
no normative binding force of language so that individuals are aware 
of a mutual freedom in it. 
In the moment of acceptance when the expression signifies "some-
thing" to others, the common object in question is constituted, 
"about" which it is possible to speak further. Here belong primarily 
the basic concepts of philosophy such as "substance," "idea," etcet-
era, all of which were once introduced into philosophical language by 
someone (for example, by Aristotle or Plato) with the intention of 
being able to say "something" in this way which, if they had not 
been introduced, could not have been said. Because these "neolo-
gisms" were accepted by the philosophers' guild, they became con-
cepts representing "something," about which it was possible to dis-
course further, as something "given," even if they had meaning only 
in the language of philosophy. At the moment of their acceptance 
there arose the idea of something existing (das Seiende), for which 
they were supposed to stand. Later, from about the time of Des-
cartes, the concept of consciousness was added. Previously it had, as 
"consciencia," only the meaning of conscience; if it was now to sig-
nify consciousness, it was primarily a matter of "transferred mean-
ing," hence a metaphor. But as soon as it was accepted in philosophy 
and then also in other fields with the new meaning, even conscious-
ness had become "something," namely, something like a human char-
acteristic or capacity. One could now say all sorts of things "about it" 
and establish whole sciences dealing with it, and people believed 
that they had or even were "such a thing": they understood them-
selves now as a composite of body and consciousness. Earlier mod-
els of human self-understanding were displaced by this one, and 
belief in the truth of these representations of "identical things," all of 
which were to be subsumed under the concept of consciousness, was 
so strong that one would have been regarded as insane if he had 
ventured to deny that he "had consciousness." Having consciousness 
seemed, from naw on, as natural as having a head. Precisely this ex-
ample makes it plain that even we, for the most part, continue to 
cling to this entrenched belief. As a consequence, Nietzsche's warn-
ing against the "overestimation" of consciousness (WKG, V-2, 40) 
hardly impresses us, even though modern anthropologists assign 
7. Johann Georg Hamann, Siimtliche Werke, ed. J. Nadler, II (Vienna: Herder, 1950), 
61. 
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to the concept only a stopgap function, while awaiting future prog-
ress in brain research. Belief in consciousness is so firmly entrenched 
that it seems unworthy of us to deny it; to do so would seem a 
violation, as Nietzsche would say, of a "moral ontology" -although, 
as we know from the history of philosophy, the need for a concept of 
consciousness was not even felt before the modern period. "Soul" 
means something different, and it is chiefly the supplanting of the 
concept of the soul by the concept of consciousness that makes it so 
difficult for modem man "still" to comprehend statements about the 
"soul," its immortality, and so forth. In this connection the idea of 
the necessity of consciously being-also-present inevitably suggests 
itself as a consciously experienced identity of the self. 
The historical view of the matter caused Nietzsche to say that 
such instances of the hypostatizing of concepts as basic concepts of 
human thought about the world and about itself have always had 
"their time," and will probably continue to have their limited time. 
He maintains, for example, that the idea "that a kind of adequate 
relation obtains between the subject and the object-that the object 
is something which, seen from within, constitutes the subject-is a 
pleasant invention, which according to my notion has had its time" 
(WKG, VIII-2, 299). The subject-object relation, in whose validity we 
also, to judge by our language, continue to believe, is called "a pleas-
ant invention." On the other hand, Nietzsche asks whether it is not 
permissible "by this time to be a bit ironical concerning subject as 
well as predicate and object? May not the philosopher rise above 
faith in grammar? All respect for the governesses, but isn't it time for 
philosophy to renounce faith in governesses?" (WKG, VI-2, 50). The 
epistemological subject-object relationship is derived from the gram-
matical. As a matter of fact, the concept of "hypokeimenon" ("the 
substratum of matter or essence" [Webster]), which is oriented to the 
subject of a sentence, has, since Aristotle, been a "given" in philo-
sophical language; it is only in the modern period that the subject-
object antithesis has obtained. 
In the passage quoted above Nietzsche also considers "the time" 
of this basic orientation of thought to be over. That which has passed 
during this time for the concept of "something" is again to be seen 
in its merely linguistic character as the expression of a time that is 
itself, in a certain sense, also something individual. We must again 
recognize that these apparent "concepts of something" were origi-
nally metaphors. Thus, as concepts they are again immersed in their 
origins and lose their absolutized meaning. But can one still say that 
they lose their "meaning"? Or hasn't the concept of "meaning" also 
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come under fire? Even that, according to Nietzsche, must be a ques-
tion of the times. It appears as if precisely this is a question for our 
times, which seems to be posing a crisis for philosophy. In agree-
ment with Nietzsche one can say, in any case, that a crisis threatens 
all concepts, and that new ones will take their place. The universal 
insight that the history of ideas is the ossuary of philosophical con-
cepts, and indeed of any concepts affording a world-view, is of no 
avail here. One can also say that it does no harm. The recognition of 
change makes no difference: we are and remain dependent on such 
basic orientation in our thought, if we will to think at all, and if we 
will to think, we also will to believe in the validity of such concepts. 
We cannot cast off any schema, if "the time" for discarding it is not 
ripe. No thought can extricate itself from "its time." Nietzsche al-
ways includes here his own position at any given time: "And there-
fore! Therefore! Therefore! Oh, do you understand me, my brothers? 
Do you understand this new law of ebb- and floodtide? We too have 
our time" (WKG, V-2, 46.) Everything that, in his language, is to be 
understood as the expression of truth, has "its time," and cannot, 
even as a result of insight into this "law of ebb- and floodtide," of 
coming into being and perishing, escape its time-for to do so it 
would have to lose its individuality. The threefold "therefore" under-
scores the full consequence of this basic concept of Nietzsche's. This 
"law," remaining eternally the same and eternally repeating itself, is 
demonstrated in the sensibility of the aesthetic insofar as it is not 
yet reduced to identical concepts. It is demonstrated by the concrete 
word, which in being used shifts from one meaning to another, and 
which is understood precisely in so doing, that is, without a general 
rule. It is understood precisely by virtue of the fact that it loses "its" 
meaning in individual usage, which, as an isolated concept, it may 
have reflected. 
It is all the more certain, therefore, that there can be no "high-
est" concepts. That a concept attains in any philosophy the rank of 
highest concept is due to a linguistic construction with which an 
individual has attempted to express his "dominant thought" (WKG, 
VI-1, 77), and in which other individuals also found themselves ex-
pressed. When that is no longer the case-that is, when such con-
ceptuality is no longer useful in confirming others in their conscious-
ness of what they themselves are-the concept loses its meaning. 
From this particular standpoint Nietzsche could not really have ob-
jected to proofs of the existence of God. But proofs, he could have 
argued, presuppose faith in the reality of certain concepts, and such 
faith always endures for a limited time. No time-mysticism can, how-
Language and the Critique of Language in Nietzsche 269 
ever, be derived from this position. "The time into which we are 
thrown" (geworfen) is the "time of great decline, growing ever worse . 
. . . Collapse, hence uncertainty, is the characteristic of this age: 
nothing stands on a firm footing and certain faith in itself" (WKG, 
VII-2, 8). As far as its orienting concepts are concerned, a strong 
faith obliterates the feeling of living in a certain time; whenever it is 
self-conscious, it knows itself to be anchored in eternity. Only inse-
cure ages of transition give rise to the feeling of temporality and of 
being-thrown-into-the-world (Geworfenheit); accordingly, they spawn 
relativistic and decadent philosophies, whose contradictions are ob-
vious--whereas strong philosophies are aware of no contradiction. 
In the case of theories that are actually believed in, ideas have the 
potential of being interpreted in such a way that they do not contra-
dict one another, as long as men have not lost the strength for such 
an interpretation. 
However much the individual is identified with his time, that time 
is also precisely "his" time, that is, that which he, in an age of declin-
ing belief, is capable of experiencing as an individual who participates 
in that decline. "Being" and "time" are, according to Nietzsche, re-
lated to each other in such a way that time reveals the difference of 
being (Sein) from existence (das Seiende), which is supposed to corre-
spond to concepts, while time itself is present as a countermove to the 
"truth" of concepts or as the quintessence of the nothingness of that 
which is comprehended in them. That everything has its time, which 
(according to concepts) is "something" definite, means that every-
thing that we are able to grasp in concepts has its end-rather than 
just that which was originally, according to its concept, conceived as 
"something finite." Thus, even that which is conceived as true, as 
infinite, has "its time," precisely because of its nature as conception; 
language passes beyond it, times change. 
From this vantage point one can also determine what "criticism" 
means in terms of Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche cannot mean 
being able to criticize "the times" or the Zeitgeist from any sort of 
"higher" or truer standpoint, for that would presuppose the subject-
object antithesis all over again. Only that which belongs to a past 
time can really be criticized, that is, decadence that manifests signs 
of decline in and of itself. Such signs are: waning faith in itself, and 
corresponding attempts at apology-above all as attempts to ground 
itself on logic or as reflection on the "conditions" of its own possi-
bility. Such attempts, as indeed all "epistemological critiques," in 
Nietzsche's view, have something absurd about them: precisely as 
attempts at self-justification, they reveal their inherent contradiction. 
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"How can the instrument criticize itself, if it can only make use of 
itself for such criticism?" (WKG, VIII-1, 103). "One doesn't write the 
critique of a world-view at all, but one simply comprehends it or 
not .... Anyone who doesn't smell the fragrance of a rose will cer-
tainly not be able to criticize it; and when he smells it----d Ia bonheur! 
Then he will have no desire to criticize it" (to Paul Deussen). 8 One 
comprehends a world-view insofar as one has it, that is, insofar as 
one adopts the perspective that renders it harmonious. In that case 
one can gloss over its contradictions without losing the "pleasure" in 
doing so; one discovers contradictions in the positions of others, but 
then out of "malice," so to speak. One refutes these positions to the 
extent that they themselves no longer possess the strength to set 
anything in opposition. This strength is not something conscious: 
" ... it is our strength that has the mastery of us" (WKG, VII-2, 258); 
it expresses itself, for example, in the "pleasure" of criticizing alien 
positions. Like all strength that expresses itself in language, criticism 
is always emotionally tinged and not a purely theoretical matter. 
Nevertheless it is possible to speak of signs or indeed of a logic 
of decline to which criticism can address itself. This logic is the logic 
of the imagined world of things subsisting in themselves. Here be-
long all forms of reflection upon the absolute foundations of one's own 
thought in their inherent contradictoriness, and therefore all logical 
attempts at establishing and justifying them. The hallmark of deca-
dence consists in the fact "that life no longer resides in the whole. The 
word becomes sovereign and springs out of the sentence; the sen-
tence encroaches upon and obscures the meaning of the page; the 
page takes on life at the expense of the whole-the whole is no 
longer a whole" (WKG, VI-3, 21). That means that there is no longer 
a will behind it which is certain of itself. The transmutation into 
concepts, that is, into words taken to be significant in their own right, 
and therewith the transmutation into the representation of things 
subsisting in and of themselves as the objective correlates of the 
words themselves, has already taken place. Logic is now supposed 
to hold together the whole in a way that is universally established and 
is divorced from the will. This cohesion is to be rendered universally 
transparent or validated purely theoretically, although precisely this 
position presupposes an unquestioned faith in the objective relevance 
of a particular language with its historically developed references to 
reality. It has to do with a language that no longer has any confi-
8. Friedrich Nietzsche, Briefwechsel, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 1-2 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 328. 
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dence in its own historical rudiments and therefore tries to give itself 
the appearance of unconditioned universal validity. According to Witt-
genstein's grounding of logic in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, one 
must, in order to presuppose at all that individual sentences have a 
specific value of truth, that is, for the sake of the basic presupposi-
tion of formal logic, assume that "the world divides into facts."9 This 
"atomism" was already for Nietzsche the chief characteristic of a 
logic of decay. Formal-logical argumentation relates per se to a logic 
that expresses decadence and, to that extent, touches upon an aes-
thetic question of style. 
In order not to misunderstand this as irrational, however, we must 
remember that even for Nietzsche one cannot think without logic. 
But he maintains that it is a question of whether one wills to think, 
and if one wills it, of whether it is willed in a consistent way. It is also 
necessary to allow sufficient mobility to concepts to enable a dis-
course to appear consistent in the face of criticism, that is, to give to 
words the meaning that a particular context justifies, and not to yield 
to a "universal" meaning, divorced from the acts that give them their 
significance. The alleged universal meaning of a word is always and 
necessarily a specific one. It is always the one given in a particular 
usage, and it is only a question of whose will to expression governs 
the dialogue. Of course, a mode of exposition is not, in Nietzsche's 
view, to be criticized because it is logical, but because the logical 
element is the factor that is supposed to validate its truth. By virtue 
of that fact, it essentially criticizes itself. 
One must add that the listener accepts a particular expression as 
formulated by a speaker because he also sees himself expressed in it. 
He accepts it necessarily in his own sense; even the allowing-some-
thing-to-be-said-to-oneself is an individual and productive attitude. 
There can be no criterion by which to judge whether two human 
beings understand "the same thing" when hearing it. According to 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, 10 all language belongs "necessarily to two" 
-and that two people understand anything in the "same" way, can 
never be more than an experimental, hypothetical presupposition. 
One must, of course, always make such a presupposition when 
speaking with another, but to every "risked" attempt of this kind a 
"new one" must, according to Humboldt, be joined. 11 Finally, the 
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1958), p. 30, 1.2. 
10. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Ki:inigliche Preussische Akade-
mie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Behr, 1903-36), VI, 180. 
11. Ibid., p. 160. 
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question remains open as to whether the presupposition of identical 
meaning is realized or not. The idea of a realized presupposition is 
an axiomatic condition of linguistic science upon which the talk of a 
fixed relationship between a sign and "its" meaning is based, and 
without which there would not be the smallest linguistic units. 
Such reflections are not foreign to Nietzsche, according to whom 
there "belongs to every soul a different world; for every soul, every 
other soul is an afterworld" (Hinterwelt; WKG, VI-1, 268). Indeed, as 
we have seen, everyone is, as an individual, opaque even to himself. 
"The individual is something absolute, all actions completely his 
own .... At least the interpretation of the formulation is personal, 
even though he creates none; as interpreter he is always acting cre-
atively" (WKG, VII-1, 705). With this evaluation of the individual, 
Nietzsche actually stands within the Christian tradition, as opposed 
to the platonizing (i.e., in his view, moral-ontological) interpretation. 
But above all he proceeds from the idea that one "soul" wills to 
prevail over the other, and that each attempts to become for the 
other that which is universal and sovereign. Each one raises a claim to 
the truth on his awn authority. But would he not, in Nietzsche's view, 
be compelled out of philosophical insight to raise this claim as if he 
were not raising it? If one knows that even his own doctrine has its 
"time," then the will to generalization that should prevail over all 
other individuality seems to be repressed, at least as subjective will. 
Nevertheless, the Nietzschean concept of the will can no longer be 
understood as "subjective" will. It can only be thought of along with 
the counterconcept to the concept of a subjective will, that is, along 
with the "tragic" concept of the hopelessness of conceptual thinking. 
Individuality is no longer "subjectivity." It remains without concept-
that is, as "something absolute" in its value, inestimable and infinite 
from the standpoint of "universal" moral and ontological representa-
tions and judgments. It has the absolute right to posit itself over 
against moral demands. Therein consists the justice that, "in its ge-
niality," "avoids" everything "that blinds and confuses the judgment 
of things; it is therefore an opponent of convictions, for it desires to 
render to each his own, and to this purpose it must understand it 
in a cleanly manner [i.e., without a moral representation of what 
it should be]; therefore, it places everything in the best light. Finally 
it will grant even to its opponent, blind and shortsighted convic-
tion, whatever belongs to conviction-for the sake of truth" (WKG, 
IV-2, 373f.). This justice vis a vis the truth of individuality is also 
called "love with seeing eyes, which bears not only all punishment, 
but also all guilt," and which "absolves everyone except those who 
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judge" (WKG, VI-1, 84). The Christian overtones are obvious. But 
they are opposed to the moralizing features of Christianity, which 
subsume the individual under universal moral claims. 
This justice is decisive even for Nietzsche's concept of language. 
True speech allows the other to be free in his understanding; it 
thereby allows "justice" to be done to him, as especially Levinas has 
emphasized from the standpoint of the Jewish tradition. For Levinas, 
"language" is "justice."12 Heidegger, on the other hand, has always 
seen in Nietzsche's concept of justice the "lawgiving, authoritative 
ground" of the "imperious character," of "human knowledge," and 
of the "fictional character of human reason"13 as "the highest kind 
of the will to power." "All representations of justice stemming from 
Christian, humanistic, enlightened, bourgeois, and socialistic mo-
rality" are to be ruled out in understanding this concept. 14 Certainly 
all these moral representations of justice are to be ruled out, and 
therefore also the Christian moral representation. But justice is the will 
to power insofar as even the moral representation of pawer, by which 
power wills to set itself above other individuality with a claim to 
universality, cancels itself. It is the will that "wills" only individual-
ity, its own as well as that of others, and thereby allows itself and 
others to be free or to be as opposed to whatever they are supposed 
to be on the basis of any universal representations or authoritative 
claims. Nietzsche's concept of justice is "absolving" justice. It entails 
no "imperious character," but the recognition of the individuality of 
the other as the absolute spirit of human speech. 
12. Emmanuel Levinas, Totalite et Infini (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), p. 188. 
13. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), I, 647. 
14. Ibid., II, 325. 
XIV. The Intuitive Mode of 
Reason in Zarathustra 
James C. O'Flaherty 
Herbert W. Reichert in memoriam 
"My concept of the 'Dionysian' was 
here realized as the supreme deed." 
-Ecce Homo 
According to Nietzsche there are essentially two ways in which the 
will to power may impose cognitive order on the chaos of the uni-
verse: the rational and the intuitive.* Thus, in his early, unfinished 
treatise On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense, he writes: "There are 
ages in which the rational man and the intuitive man stand side by 
side, the one in fear of intuition, the other with scorn for abstraction. 
The latter is just as irrational as the former is inartistic. They both 
desire to rule over life ... " (my emphasis). 1 In its purest form ratio-
nality-that is, abstract or discursive reason-issues in scientific dis-
course, intuitive reason in myth. The two modes of reason are never, 
of course, present in their pure form in any philosophy or world-
view. Nevertheless, one or the other usually predominates in any 
plausible philosophy. Rationality, however, may function in one of 
*The present chapter is a fuller and somewhat modified version of a paper read at 
the North American Nietzsche Society, 26 March 1982, in Sacramento, California, and 
published in International Studies in Philosophy, XI-2 (Summer, 1983), 57-66. 
1. "On Truth and Lie in a Nonmoral Sense," in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from 
Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic High-
lands, N. J.: Humanities Press; Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979), p. 90. Cf. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Siimtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Mon-
tinari, I (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), p. 889. Most quotations from Nietzsche will be from 
this edition, hereafter referred to as KSA with the volume and page number. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. 
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two ways, the one involving low-degree abstraction, the other high-
degree abstraction, 2 and herein lies a crucial distinction. We may, 
with certain important qualifications, equate what Nietzsche calls the 
"Dionysian" element in knowledge with intuition or intuitive rea-
son, and what he calls the '~pollonian" and the "Socratic," taken 
together, with rationality. 
In regard to rationality, however, a very important distinction must 
be made at the outset: in its Apollonian function reason is creative 
and may unite creatively with the Dionysian element, 3 but in its 
Socratic function reason suffers from "a superfetation of logic" (KSA, 
I, 90), which renders it analytical, critical, and uncreative, and hence 
incapable of uniting with the Dionysian (KSA, I, 82, 90). Further, 
since it is parasitical upon life, 4 it cannot create genuine order. Its 
proper discourse is the syllogism, 5 and in its most refined form it 
becomes mathematico-logical symbolism. 6 Since we are dealing with 
a text that Nietzsche himself characterized as quintessentially Diony-
sian, we are justified in excluding Socratism as a basic cate?ory here, 
however important it may be from another perspective. The fact 
that we are then left with a dyadic rather than a triadic set of catego-
ries should not be surprising, for Nietzsche is uncomfortable with 
2. Nietzsche refers to "the highest concepts" as "the most general, the emptiest 
concepts" (KSA, VI, 76); in discussing Kant's philosophy he castigates the worship of 
"the Moloch of abstraction" (KSA, VI, 177). Cf. Jorg Salaquarda, "Der Antichrist," in 
Nietzsche Studien, 2 (1973), 133. 
3. KSA, I, 139-40. Dionysus may learn to speak in the idiom of Apollo and vice 
versa, but Dionysus may never learn to speak in (Socratic) syllogisms! 
4. Socratism is seen as a "life-consuming" force (KSA, I, 153). Its embodiment is the 
"Alexandrian man," who is "the eternal starveling, the critic without joy and strength 
... basically a librarian and proofreader, miserably blinding himself with the dust of 
books and typographical errors" (KSA, I, 120; cf. KSA, VI, 265). For an epistemological 
approach to the problem of Socratism, see my "The Concept of Knowledge in Ha-
mann's 'Socratic Memorabilia' and Nietzsche's 'Die Geburt der Tragodie,'" Monatshefte, 
64 (1972), 334-47; rpt. in abbreviated form in Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradi-
tion, University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures, 
no. 85 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976; 2nd ed., 1979), pp. 134-
42. See John T. Wilcox, Truth and Value in Nietzsche (Washington, D.C.: University Press 
of America, 1974), for an excellent study of Nietzsche's epistemology in general. 
5. KSA, I, 94; cf. ibid., 101. 
6. Thus he repudiates "that hocus-pocus of mathematical form with which Spinoza 
armored and masked his philosophy as if in iron ... " (KSA, V, 19). 
7. Nietzsche saw in Socratism a world-historical force (albeit an unfortunate one), 
however contradictory it may seem that feckless "Alexandrian man" could so function 
(KSA, I, 97, 100). 
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triadic thinking, and rapidly shifts perspective when it suits him in 
order to introduce a new pair of conceptual opposites. 8 
However, the later Nietzsche not only assimilates Apollo to Diony-
sus, but also, when he comes to create his countermyth to the Gos-
pels, Also sprach Zarathustra, largely abandons his professed ideal of a 
"fraternal union" or communicatio idiomatum between Apollo and Dio-
nysus. 9 For Zarathustra is cast in a form that is Semitic rather than 
Hellenic, biblical rather than Greek (whether Sophoclean or even 
Platonic). In a fragment from the Nachlaj3 Nietzsche writes: "The 
language of Luther and poetic form of the Bible as the basis of a 
new German poetry-that is my invention! Imitation of the ancients, 
rhyming-all false, and does not speak profoundly enough to us, nor 
even the alliteration of Wagner" (KSA, XI, 60). His claim to this "in-
vention" is of course not valid because both Hamann and Herder 
had anticipated him, and many of their ideas had long since been 
realized in the literature of the Sturm und Drang. Since my concern in 
the present study is to demonstrate the operation of a mode of rea-
son, the emphasis is primarily epistemological; but since the demon-
stration involves the analysis of a literary work, the method is her-
meneutical. The combination of these usually disparate approaches 
-required by the underlying philosophy of language-will be seen 
to offer important advantages. 
Zarathustra, though couched in poetic form, is essentially a philo-
8. The dualities vary greatly, depending on Nietzsche's perspective at a given time. 
In addition to the well-known and definitive opposite~Dionysus-Apollo, Dionysus-
Socrates, Dionysus-The Crucified-there are numerous others. The Birth of Tragedy, in 
particular, teems with antitheses of varying degrees of clarity and importance. All in 
all, I have identified over forty of them that may be categorized under the rubrics of 
metaphysics, epistemology, literature, art, politics, and ethics, but that by no means 
exhausts the list. In any event, Nietzsche's thought is essentially dialectical whatever 
the antithesis adopted. Cf. Alfred Schmidt, "Uber Nietzsches Erkenntnistheorie," 
in Nietzsche, ed. Jorg Salaquarda, Wege der Forschung, no. 521 (Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), p. 125. 
9. In Nietzsche's later works the Apollonian is subsumed under the Dionysian or 
simply drops from view. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-
christ, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 281-82, 410; also 
Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (1965; reprint, New York: Macmillan, 1970), 
p. 64. The abandonment of the Apollonian may, however, not be complete, for, as Eric 
Blondel says: " ... Dionysus without Apollo would lead to nothingness" ("Nietzsche: 
Life as Metaphor," in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation, ed. David 
B. Allison [New York: Dell, 1977], p. 162). Undoubtedly Nietzsche has given us clues 
as to how the Apollonian may be unconsciously present in the Dionysian in the Nachlafl 
of the early year~but this is not the place to pursue that subject. 
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sophical work. Since that is true, it must perforce be informed by 
reason. 10 However, it is clear that it is not informed by discursive 
reason. The question arises then as to what mode of reason charac-
terizes it, and the answer to this question can be found by identify-
ing the method of reasoning that Kant once imputed to Hamann, 
namely, "anschauende Vernunft" or "intuitive reason,''11 a method 
that the latter consciously derived from the Bible. 12 Before proceed-
ing to demonstrate the use of this mode of reason in Zarathustra it is 
necessary to specify the linguistic categories that are its hallmarks. 
We shall see that all of these categories are utilized to varying degrees 
in the work. Not only do they inform Zarathustra but they also consti-
tute the means by which Nietzsche imposes a kind of order on the 
work. 
The distinction between the two disparate kinds of reason with 
which we are concerned actually revives an age-old tradition in 
Christian theology, namely, the distinction between ratio superior and 
ratio inferior made by Peter Lombard13 and Meister Eckhart14 in the 
10. That Nietzsche characterizes the intuitive individual as "irrational" (quotation 
on p. 274 above) should not mislead one into acceptance of such an ambiguous term. 
Cf. his statement that Dionysus and other "gods also do philosophy" (my emphasis; 
KSA, V, 238). 
11. Kant once asked Hamann's help in interpreting a passage from Herder, request-
ing, however, that the reply be "if possible, in human language. For I, poor mortal, am 
not at all organized for the divine language of intuitive reason (anschauende Vernunft). 
What can be spelled out for me in common concepts according to logical rules I can 
understand well enough" (Kant's emphasis; letter, 6 April 1774: Johann Georg Hamann, 
Briefwechsel, ed. W. Ziesemer and A. Henkel, 3 [Wiesbaden: Insel, 1957], 82). Al-
though Kant is here engaging in a bit of raillery, the term anschaucnde Vernunft is a 
felicitous one to describe Hamann's mode of thought. 
12. The categories are derived from the thought of J. G. Hamann, but freely 
adapted. See my "Language and Reason in the Thought of Hamann," in Creative En-
counter: Festschrift for Herman Salinger, ed. L. R. Phelps and A. T. Alt, University of 
North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures, no. 91 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), pp. 86-103, or my Johann Georg Ha-
mann, Twayne World Authors 527 (Boston: Hall, 1979), chap. 5. 
13. Peter Lombard taught that ratio superior characterized Adam, and ratio inferior, 
Eve. Ratio superior involves thinking in concepts, that is, logically; ratio inferior involves 
thinking in images, and is associated with a "sensual impulse of the soul" (sensua/is 
nzotus animae). He held further that "the higher part of reason is suited for contempla-
tion or consultation of the eternal reasons; the lower part is turned aside toward gov-
erning temporal things." The Fall resulted from Adam's failure to use his more logical 
reasoning and allowing himself to be persuaded by Eve's kind of reasoning. Peter 
Lombard, Sententiarunz tiber ll, distinctio xxiv, cap. 6, 7. 
14. See Benno Schmoldt, Die deutsche Begriffssprache Meister Eckharts (Heidelberg: 
Quelle & Meyer, 1954), esp. pp. 18-19, 22, 79. 
278 James C. O'Flaherty 
Middle Ages, and taken up by Lessing in the eighteenth century. 15 
But none of these thinkers gives us the full set of linguistic criteria by 
which the two modes of reason may be clearly distinguished. Both 
Hamann and Nietzsche, of course, reverse the traditional evaluation 
of the two modes: for them, reasoning in images is not ratio inferior. 
Nietzsche makes it quite clear that only a poetic style is really ap-
propriate for expressing his vision of the world. Commenting on The 
Birth of Tragedy many years after its appearance, he wrote: "It should 
have sung, this 'new soul' -and not spoken. What I had to say then 
-too bad that I did not venture to say it as a poet ... " (KSA, I, 15). 
In accordance with this principle, when he set about to compose his 
most important work he did adopt a poetic form. Despite the unfold-
ing of his thought in the years between the appearance of The Birth of 
Tragedy and that of Zarathustra, his world-view did not essentially 
change. What did change was his decision to adopt a different style, 
to couch his philosophy in poetic language. This fact has implica-
tions of fundamental importance for his thought. 
The categories that we may identify are six in number, and each 
has its counterpart in the abstract or discursive mode of reason. They 
are all derived from language, not from empirical thought (Aristotle) 
or pure thought (Kant). 
From the following table we see that abstract reason, after mak-
ing its initial assumption, alters course, so to speak, and proceeds to 
deal in nonmetaphorical (logical) terms as far as possible; intuitive 
reason, however, does not alter course but continues to deal in meta-
phor (analogy) as far as possible. For abstract reason, initially as-
sumed metaphors are mere crutches to be dispensed with as soon as 
possible; for intuitive reason, however, they are of the essence. Thus, 
to say that the physical or abstract sciences are also intuitive is to 
assert a partial truth, whereas to say that poetry is intuitive is to 
assert a whole truth. In any case, wherever the six linguistic catego-
ries are present, one may assume that a particular mode of reason is 
at work. The language of "B" in the table may always be transformed 
into mathematico-logical symbols, and even reduced to the binary 
scale of computers; the language of "/\' may not. Or, in Nietzschean 
terms, we may say: the Apollonian may "superfetate" as extreme 
Socratism; the Dionysian may not (cf. KSA, I, 485-86). 
15. Jiirgen Schroder maintains that Lessing accepted Peter Lombard's distinction, 
agreeing with him that there is a moral obligation to heed ratio superior rather than 
ratio inferior (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: Sprache und Drama [Munich: Fink, 1972], 
pp. 82ff.). 
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Categories of Intuitive and Abstract Reason as Reflected 
in Language16 
A. Intuitive Reason 
Principle of Unconscious Selection* 
I) Image (description) 
II) Metaphor (analogy) 
III) Paradox (cf. oxymoron) 
IV) Multivalence (cf. Quadriga) 
V) Parataxis (coordination) 
VI) Affective language 
Notes on A.* 
1) Underlying the intuitive mode 
is either the oneiric or the organic 
root-metaphor. 
2) Discourse nonreductive. 
3) Open to the infinite (since 
there is no limit to what things 
may be likened). 
4) Results in open form 
(cf. Romanticism). 
5) Characterizes the structure 
of myth. 
6) Equivalent of Peter Lombard's 
ratio inferior. 
1. Image (Bild) 
B. Abstract Reason 
Principle of Conscious Selection* 
I) Concept 
II) Logic 
III) Nonparadoxicallanguage 
IV) Univalence 
V) Hypotaxis (subordination) 
VI) Nonaffective language 
Notes on B.* 
1) Underlying the abstract mode 
is either the architectonic or 
mechanistic root-metaphor. 
2) Discourse reductive. 
3) Observes limits (since we 
delimit when we define). 
4) Results in closed form 
(cf. Classicism). 
5) Characterizes the structure of 
scientific discourse. 
6) Equivalent of Peter Lombard's 
ratio superior. 
In Nietzsche's view the image represents a closer approximation to 
reality than does the abstract concept. 17 Thus in The Birth of Tragedy 
he writes: " ... we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian 
chorus that constantly discharges itself anew in an Apollonian world 
16. Principles and annotations marked with an asterisk are not explicit but implicit 
in Hamann's observations on language. 
17. As Harold Alderman trenchantly says: "For Nietzsche, the world is more like a 
metaphor (i.e., indefinite and soft-edged) than it is like a logical theorem (i.e., definite 
and hard-edged)" (Nietzsche's Gift [Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977], p. 15). 
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of images" (KSA, I, 62). These lines are crucial to an understanding 
of Nietzsche's use of imagery in Zarathustra. Although the "image" 
belongs essentially to the "Apollonian world" of plastic art as op-
posed to the intangible, nonimagistic world of music, Dionysus must, 
if he would speak at all, appropriate such images as his primary linguistic 
medium (d. KSA, I, 139-40). Nietzsche makes this abundantly clear 
in another case: that of Archilocus and lyric poetry in general, where 
"an unequal and irregular image-world" prevails. Though it is a (Di-
onysian) image-world "basically in opposition to the Homeric" (KSA, 
I, 49), it is just as dependent on its particular use of imagery as is the 
Apollonian epic, where the poet is described as merely "absorbed in 
the pure contemplation of images" (KSA, I, 44) and therefore as hav-
ing the deeper purpose of neither the lyricist nor the philosopher. 
A failure to note carefully Nietzsche's shift of perspective from the 
world of the plastic arts and music to the world of literature would 
lead one hopelessly astray. In other words, the Dionysian-Apollo-
nian duality means one thing in the nonverbal realm of art and an-
other thing in the verbal realm of literature. We shall see that Nietz-
sche's "unequal and irregular image-world" of the Dionysian lyricist 
is also a felicitous phrase to describe the style of Zarathustra. 
It is importarit in our discussion to distinguish between the image 
as description and the image as metaphor (Gleichnis). It is unfortu-
nate that Nietzsche himself does not do this, especially in The Birth of 
Tragedy, where the basic outlines of his subsequent thought are laid 
down or at least anticipated. Undoubtedly this is one of the areas 
where, as he confessed years later, the work suffers from a lack of 
"logical cleanliness" (KSA, I, 14). His characterization of Zarathustra 
in Ecce Homo is, however, not necessarily at odds with the distinction 
between the two functions of imagery: "What is closest to us and 
most everyday, here speaks of unheard-of things ... the most pow-
erful capacity for metaphors [Gleichnisse] that has existed so far is 
poor and only child's play compared with this return of language to 
the nature of imagery [Bildlichkeit]" (KSA, VI, 344). It is thus impor-
tant that his analogies be as replete with the imagery of everyday 
human experience as possible. If one substitutes, in the passage just 
quoted, for the word "metaphors" the term "analogies" or "paral-
lels," the statement poses no problem. That the distinction between 
the two functions of images is basic we shall also see in our discus-
sion of multivalence. It is true that Nietzsche held, in another con-
text, that all language is metaphorical, but a discussion of the prob-
lem posed by that idea does not fall within the scope of this study, 
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where his practical distinction between metaphor and concept is 
basic. 18 
It must also be noted that there are two types of descriptive imag-
ery: pure or straightforward imagery, and metonymy. Although the 
latter is a trope, it does not involve analogy, and is therefore fun-
damentally different from that most important of tropes, the meta-
phor.19 In Zarathustra Nietzsche employs the metonym or synecdo-
che much less frequently than pure description, and more often 
than not his usage in the narrative passages is commonplace. Occa-
sionally Nietzsche's metonymical expressions are striking-as when 
Zarathustra, having been rebuffed by the people of the marketplace, 
says to himself: "I am not the mouth for these ears,"20 or when we 
are told that "for a long time Zarathustra slept, and not only dawn 
passed over his face but the morning too" (25)-but most, if not 
downright commonplace, are not far from it: the jester's leap over 
the tightrope "made every mouth dumb and every eye rigid" (21); he 
confides "to his heart" that he will carry off and bury the corpse of 
the tightrope walker (23); "whoever still has ears for the unheard-
of-his heart shall become heavy with my happiness" (27); "the 
higher you ascend, the smaller you appear to the eye of envy" (81); 
on his sea-voyage "eventually his own tongue was loosened" (197). 
Although Nietzsche uses metonymy most sparingly its function is 
important, for, in combination with his impressionistic use of imag-
ery, it lends a poetic quality to his descriptions and matter-of-fact 
statements. In such a way he avoids a breach of style in the work as a 
whole. 
Imagery as pure description occurs, of course, in the narrative pas-
sages of Zarathustra, but, like the narrative framework itself, it is 
exceedingly meager. Thus we know: that the younger Zarathustra's 
eyes were "pure" (12); that there was no disgust about his mouth 
(12); that he walked like a dancer (12); that the town he entered after 
ten years lay on the edge of a forest (14); that the jester in the mar-
18. KSA, I, 878ff. Suffice it to say the following: to show that an abstract term is a 
dead metaphor proves something etymologically, but does not eliminate the functional 
(and fundamental) difference between the metaphor and the concept. 
19. The effective exploitation of this difference in another area is well illustrated 
by the structural anthropologists. Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, trans. 
George Weidenfeld (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), esp. pp. 204-8, 212-
13, et passim. 
20. I have cited Walter Kaufmann's translation (Thus Spoke Larathustra [New York: 
Viking, 1966]), but have changed "overman" to "superman" as a rendering of "Uber-
mensch." References to KSA, IV, appear parenthetically in the text (here, 20). 
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ketplace was dressed in "motley clothes" and had an "awe-inspir-
ing voice" (21); that moss grew under the tree in which Zarathustra 
placed the dead man (25); that there was a stone before his cave 
(300); that the two kings he met in the woods were "adorned with 
crowns and crimson belts and colorful as flamingoes" (304); that the 
last pope was "a tall man in black, with a gaunt face" (321); that at 
noon one day Zarathustra came to an old, crooked, knotty tree that 
was entwined by a grapevine with abundant yellow grapes (342); that 
"the ugliest man" once adorned himself with a crown and two crim-
son belts borrowed from the two kings (346); that his lion was a 
mighty animal with a thick warm mane (406); that doves sat on Zara-
thustra's shoulders and caressed his white hair (407); that the lion 
kept licking up the tears on his hands, and roared and growled bash-
fully (407); that Zarathustra left his cave glowing and strong like the 
sun coming out of dark mountains (408). 
Obviously some of the descriptions cited could also be construed 
as symboli..:, as for instance the last one. Conceivably, each of them 
might under certain circumstances be so interpreted. But it must be 
borne in mind that even the sparest of narratives cannot dispense 
entirely with imagery as pure description. In other words, one must 
find descriptive imagery somewhere in a given literary work if there 
is to be a narrative at all. Zarathustra is so replete with imagery in 
general that the thought becomes difficult to follow, but it is imagery 
as metaphor that causes the difficulty, not imagery as description. 
2. Metaphor (Gleichnis) 
The metaphor or parable ("Gleichnis" denotes both) is based on ana-
logical reasoning despite the fact that its grammatical form, unlike 
that of the simile, tends to mask the underlying analogism. If the 
descriptive imagery of Zarathustra is minuscule in comparison with 
the metaphorical imagery, it is because this is a philosophical, not a 
dramatic or epic, work. Metaphors never move the action forward, 
but are intended to illuminate their context (i.e., to convey mean-
ing). The metaphors of Zarathustra may for our purposes be divided 
into two classes: those that constitute symbols conveying the basic 
ideas of the work, and those that illuminate various lesser aspects of 
Nietzsche's thought. Some of the metaphors that rise to the level of 
important symbolism are: the sun = man's relation to superman and 
eternal recurrence (11-12); bridge = man (16-17); eagle = pride (27); 
serpent = wisdom (27); camel = learner (28); lion = overturner of 
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conventional values (30); dragon = guardian of values (30); child = 
a new beginning (31); tarantulas = secretly vengeful preachers of 
equality (128); the leech = scholarly specialization by the conscien-
tious in spirit (311). Lesser symbols are also quite striking: adder = 
enemy who unintentionally does one good (87); ropemakers = the 
old who, ripe for death, are living in the past (94); the devil's face 
in a mirror = Zarathustra's teaching distorted (105); cork = friend 
who keeps Zarathustra's dialogue with himself from sinking into the 
depths (71); bitch = hidden sensuality of the chaste (69); gravedig-
gers = pedantic scholars (234). Since the work teems with meta-
phors, one could make an exceedingly long list of them. Further, in 
an aesthetic analysis of the work, one could identify the tropes that 
are simple metaphors, effective mixed metaphors, similes, allegories, 
personification, synesthesia, etcetera. But the important fact here is 
that they are all based on analogy, and that the plethora of meta-
phors in Zarathustra establishes it as a prime example of analogical 
reasoning in concrete terms. 
Nowhere is the affinity of Zarathustra with the method of Jesus' 
discourse more evident than in the use of metaphor and parable. 
Matthew reports of Jesus' teaching that "without a parable spake he 
not unto them" (Matt. 13:34). In his discourse "On the Gift-Giving 
Virtue" Zarathustra says to his disciples: "All names of good and evil 
are parables: they do not define, they merely hint. A fool is he who 
wants knowledge of them. Watch for every hour, my brothers, in 
which your spirit wants to speak in parables: there lies the origin of 
your virtue. There your body is elevated and resurrected; with its 
rapture it delights the spirit so that it turns creator and esteemer and 
lover and benefactor of all things" (98-99; d. 128). Thus it is charac-
teristic of both Jesus and his archenemy Nietzsche-Zarathustra that 
they do not say what the most important values are but what they are 
like. It is the tertium comparationis of metaphor and parable, not the 
unfolding of the syllogism, that is at work here. And between the 
indirect, nonapodictic knowledge yielded by analogy and the direct, 
apodictic knowledge yielded by logic there is a great gulf. 
3. Paradox 
The very first hallmark of intuitive reason encountered in Zarathus-
tra is the paradox. Already in the subtitle of the work we encounter 
the paradoxical description: "A Book for All and None." Indeed, 
the work is studded with paradoxes. One investigator has identified 
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approximately three hundred such formulations;21 others will find 
more or less, depending on the criterion adopted. Here again the 
Bible, particularly the New Testament, is the primary model. A few 
examples will suffice: "I give no alms. For that I am not poor 
enough" (13); "I love those who do not know how to live except by 
going under, for they are those who cross over" (17); "I love the great 
despisers because they are the great reverers ... " (17); "One virtue 
is more than two" (17); "I love him who chastens his god because 
he loves his god ... " (18); "Living companions I need, who follow 
me because they want to follow themselves--wherever I want" (25); 
"Your very commanding should be an obeying" (59); "Physician help 
yourself; thus you help your patient too" (100); "To be the child who 
is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives 
birth and the pangs of the birth-giver" (111); "Deeply I love only 
life-and verily most of all when I hate life" (140); "It is the good war 
that hallows any cause" (307); "Man must become better and more 
evil" (359). 
Despite its appearance of contradiction we intuitively accept the 
paradox-and its contraction, the oxymoron-in ordinary language 
as quite meaningful, provided we are aware of the context. This is 
true to an even greater degree in poetic and religious language. If, 
on the other hand, the contradiction is stated in the univocal lan-
guage of discursive reason, we do not accept it as meaningful but 
seek to resolve the contradiction. In the former case, we have the 
so-called literary paradox, 22 and in the latter case the genuine antin-
omy. With paradoxes of the latter type we are here not at all con-
cerned. Nietzsche's paradoxes belong to the tradition of literary or, 
more specifically, religious paradoxes, whose genealogy is ancient 
and impressive-as exemplified most prominently in the language of 
the Apostle Paul, of the German mystics of the Middle Ages, of Jacob 
Bohme, of Angelus Silesius, and of Luther, as well as in the quasi-
religious paradoxes of the essay "Die Natur," which is traditionally 
ascribed to Goethe. Nietzsche's motivations in employing paradoxi-
cal language in Zarathustra are several: to parody the teachings of 
Jesus; to provide a shock effect; to invite reflection on the double 
meaning involved. However, we are concerned neither with the psy-
chological motivation for his usage nor with the aesthetic reasons for 
21. Karl Groos, "Der paradoxe Stil in Nietzsches Zarathustra," Zeitschrift fiir ange-
mmdte Psychologic und psychologische Sammelforschung, 7 (1913), 472. 
22. See Rosalie L. Colie, "Literary Paradox," in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 3 
(New York: Scribners, 1973), 76-81. 
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it; nor are we concerned with the question of whether his use of the 
paradox means that he was basically a paradoxical thinker, for, as 
Karl Groos reminds us, there are thinkers whose teachings are para-
doxical but whose language is not. 23 Rather, we are concerned here 
only with the fact that Nietzsche has employed his literary device so 
prominently in an essentially philosophical work. 
4. Multivalence 
Multivalence in language is of course closely related to the meta-
phorical aspect, since it is based on the fundamental distinction be-
tween the literal and figurative use of words. 24 But its distinctiveness 
lies in the fact that the metaphorical level is not introduced simply to 
clarify the literal meaning of a statement, but to shift the statement to 
another level of meaning, thereby conveying a different but parallel 
idea. The number of levels may vary widely, from merely two to 
almost any number in the case of fanciful exegesis. Thus, "the Tal-
mud, which is often Kafka's archetype, refers to the forty-nine levels 
of meaning which must be discerned in a revealed text."25 Medieval 
biblical exegesis was generally limited to the so-called Quadriga, that 
is, the fourfold sense of Scripture. One readily recognizes that Zara-
thustra is characterized by various levels of meaning, which is to 
say it may be read from different perspectives. Because the form of 
the work is quasi-biblical, one can expect it to be informed by con-
siderable multivalence. Despite the fact that the so-called allegorical 
method of Scriptural interpretation has been rejected by scholarly 
biblical critics since the eighteenth century-and that Nietzsche was 
always ready, whenever it suited his purpose, to use their findings 
against Christianity-we may have no qualms about applying it to 
the mythical, and hence multilayered, Zarathustra. 
In speaking of the literal level of a work one must distinguish be-
tween the immanent literal level, as intended by the author, and an 
extraneous literal level represented by hidden allusions to persons or 
events (as, for example, in a roman a clef). Although Nietzsche chose 
the name "Zarathustra" for his prophetic mask, it has little, if any-
23. "Der paradoxe Stil," p. 476. 
24. It is obviously quite important at times to determine whether Nietzsche is speak-
ing literally or figuratively, as for example when Zarathustra praises war (KSA. IV, 58-
60), or when Nietzsche speaks of the notorious "blond beast" (KSA, V, 275 et passim). 
25. George Steiner, After Babel (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 66. 
286 James C. O'Flaherty 
thing, to do with the historical Zoroaster. 26 Therefore, the literal level 
in the immanent sense may be ruled out, and insofar as this is true, 
we are dealing with pure myth. For pure myth is in no way depen-
dent on a literal historical level for its validity. Here a similarity to the 
gospels is lacking, since they purport to be literal history. Neverthe-
less, if we identify Zarathustra with Nietzsche, the work can then be 
said to have a literal level, for it can be shown to be somewhat auto-
biographical. Further, there are covert allusions to friends and ac-
quaintances of Nietzsche's in the work. 
Recently Richard Hayman has sought to demonstrate a surprising 
number of autobiographical references in Zarathustra. 27 For instance, 
Zarathustra's initial withdrawal to the mountains is a withdrawal not 
simply from men in general but specifically from Lou Salome and 
Paul Ree (Hayman, p. 255). In the section "On Self-Overcoming" the 
reader is confronted, according to Hayman, with the "cross-fire of 
Nietzsche's battle against himself" (p. 264). Or, again, in "The Danc-
ing Song" he is declaring, albeit obliquely and perversely, his love for 
Lou (p. 266). His nausea and weariness are symbolized by the snake-
episode in "On the Vision and Riddle" (p. 271). Zarathustra's disap-
pointment at not having better disciples in "On the Higher Men" is 
a symbol of Nietzsche's own disappointment at not having any dis-
ciples (p. 279). The autobiographical character of the book is certi-
fied, Hayman tells us, by Nietzsche himself: it "contains the most 
sharply focused image of me," he wrote to Overbeck, "as I am after I 
have fully unburdened myself" (p. 256); in a letter to Gast about six 
months later he declared that in the book there is "an incredible 
amount of personal experience and suffering, intelligible only to me. 
Many pages are bloodstained" (p. 266). On the other hand, Hayman 
observes that "Nietzsche must have been nervous that his friends 
would recognize themselves in the new book" (p. 286). 
The text of the "The Magician" in the fourth part of Zarathustra 
provides an instructive example of multivalence. The "magician" re-
fers not only to Nietzsche, but also to Richard Wagner; on another 
level, he is an allegorical figure for the artist who may imagine him-
self to be like that which he creates. The song of the magician is 
intended as the lament of both Nietzsche and Wagner, and also, as 
we know from extraneous sources, of Cosima Wagner. If we take into 
consideration the later version of the song, "Ariadne's Lament," yet 
another dimension is manifested, namely that of the Greek myth 
26. It has recently come to light that Ralph Waldo Emerson's reference to "Zarathus-
tra" (Zoroaster) probably prompted Nietzsche to adopt the name (KSA, XIV, 279). 
27. Richard Hayman, Nietzsche: A Critical Life (New York: Oxford, 1980). 
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involving Dionysus's love for Ariadne. There is nothing on the sur-
face of this section, however, to lead one to suspect the presence of 
references beyond that to the allegorical "magician." If the Quadriga 
as formulated by Nicholas of Lyre28 in the fourteenth century, in-
volving the literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical senses of Scrip-
ture, is applied to the exegesis of the term "superman," we find 
that it does indeed throw light on the matter. To be sure, the sparse 
information that Nietzsche gives on the nature of the superman is 
scattered throughout the text; however, the important fact is that 
whenever the term "superman" is used, it means all those things at 
once. On the literal level, Zarathustra flatly denies that the super-
man has ever existed: "Never yet has there been a superman .... 
Verily the greatest I found all too human" (119). On the second level, 
that of allegory-which, according to the Quadriga, concerns belief 
-the superman accepts the death of God and the consequent neces-
sity for a transvaluation of values (30-31). On the third, or moral, 
level, which proclaims what one should do, the superman is one 
who overcomes himself and becomes a creator of new values (90). 
Finally, despite Zarathustra-Nietzsche's denial of transcendence, the 
anagogicallevel, which has to do with the ultimate destiny of man, is 
very much present: for the superman is able to embrace wholeheart-
edly the idea of eternal recurrence, 29 indeed to cherish the idea of 
amor fati (291). Thus the anagogicallevel constitutes the metaphysical 
aspect of the work, and is the bearer of the doctrine that is of equal 
importance with the idea of the superman. 
Nietzsche's use of the verb "untergehen" and its related noun, 
"Untergang," is also a prime example of multiple levels of meaning 
in Zarathustra, and again the Quadriga furnishes a convenient means 
of distinguishing the levels. Although the word occurs throughout 
the book with different meanings, all four levels can readily be dis-
cerned in a few passages of Zarathustra's "Prologue." Thus, when he 
apostrophizes the sun, saying: "Like you I must go under," he is 
referring to the literal setting or going down of the sun as well as to 
his literal descent from the mountains into the nearby town. In his 
words: "I love those who do not first seek behind the stars for a 
28. Nicholas of Lyre (Lyra), d. 1340, is credited with the following lines: "Littera 
gesta docet, quae credas Allegoria, I Moralis quid agas, quo tendas Anagogia" (quoted 
in Frederic W. Farrar, History of Interpretation [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1961), 
p. 276). 
29. See Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington and London: 
Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. xiii, 32-38, for an enlightening discussion of the 
superman's relation to eternal recurrence. 
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reason to go under and be a sacrifice, but who sacrifice themselves 
for the earth, that the earth may some day be the superman's" (17), 
he has in this one assertion touched on both the allegorical and 
moral meanings of the word-for he esteems those who no longer 
believe in a transcendent world, but who are willing to sacrifice for 
the superman, "the meaning of the earth." The former attribute is 
termed "allegorical," because it involves belief; the latter is termed 
"moral,." because it involves what one should do, namely, sacrifice 
himself for the sake of the superman. An earlier statement in the 
"Prolog;ue" points to the anagogical or metaphysical level: "I love 
those who do not know how to live, except by going under, for they 
are those who cross over" (17). As becomes clear in the latter half of 
the book, "crossing over" can only refer to that substitute for tran-
scendence: the eternal return of the same. Followers of Zarathustra 
here are characterized, in a striking metaphor, as "arrows of longing 
for the other shore" (17). 
It is interesting to note that, whereas David Friedrich StrauB at-
tempted to demolish the credibility of the gospels precisely by dem-
onstrating their mythic character, for Nietzsche myth is the form par 
excellence for conveying truth. If in traditional biblical exegesis the 
whole superstructure of the fourfold sense of Scripture rested on the 
firm basis of the literal account of historical events, and was believed 
to stand or fall on the soundness of that basis, Nietzsche, in depict-
ing the superman, ironically subverts that idea, for he is explicit that 
the superman has never existed. For the traditional believing Chris-
tian, the idea that Jesus never existed, that he is merely an ideal, is 
utterly inadmissible. 
In calling attention to the multivalent character of Zarathustra, we 
should also stress that Nietzsche vehemently repudiates this method 
of exegesis when practiced by "the philology of Christianity" (KSA, 
III, 79). He severely indicts the priest's "incapacity for philology" 
(KSA, VI, 233); here he is making common cause with the rationalis-
tic biblical critics of his own day who rejected the allegorical interpre-
tation of Scripture in the interest of scientific philology: "The way in 
which a theologian, whether in Berlin or Rome, interprets 'a verse of 
Scripture' or an event-for example, a victory of the armies of the 
fatherland, in the higher light of the Psalms of David-is always so 
audacious that a philologist can only despair" (ibid.). But even when 
one concedes the abuse involved in such extravagant use of the so-
called allegorical method of biblical interpretation with its resulting 
fantastications, the fact remains that analogical reasoning is at the 
bottom of it, and insofar as a meaningful tertium comparationis is actu-
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ally present, the method may be justified. It is ironic that Nietzsche, 
who, in The Dawn and The Antichrist, aligns himself with the rational-
istic biblical critics who insist in effect that language must be uni-
valent, nevertheless chooses a vehicle for the expression of his most 
important thoughts that, though essentially lacking the literal level, 
is otherwise characterized by multivalence. 
5. Parataxis 
In the strict sense parataxis involves the coordination of clauses in 
a sentence, and is contrasted with hypotaxis, which involves the sub-
ordination of clauses. In the present discussion, however, both terms 
have not only their technical syntactical meaning but also an ex-
tended meaning. Thus, not only a single sentence may be character-
ized as paratactic or hypotactic, but also larger literary units such as 
paragraphs, or even whole works. In the extended sense, Nietzsche's 
literary "forms of eternity" (KSA, VI, 153), the aphorism and the 
apothegm, are essentially paratactic. Further, the two terms may be 
understood as referring to two different kinds of order, the intuitive 
and the rational. Parataxis may be said to refer to the kind of order in 
which the parts agree with the whole, but not necessarily with each 
other; hypotaxis, on the other hand, may be said to refer to the kind 
of order in which the parts agree with the whole and necessarily 
with each other, and such order lies at the basis of all systems. The 
first kind of order may be termed "intuitive," the second, "rational." 
Intuitive order is characterized by what Nietzsche calls "law in the 
strife of the manifold" (KSA, I, 831; d. VI, 152). We may further 
regard intuitive order as essentially Dionysian-and biblical; rational 
order, as essentially Apollonian-and Hellenic. 
It is necessary to make a distinction between two kinds of both 
parataxis and hypotaxis as they appear in literature. Although the 
former is universally characteristic of folk-literature, 30 one may not 
conclude that it always bespeaks a primitive mentality: it may be 
employed by quite sophisticated writers. On the other hand, hypo-
taxis may not always bespeak the predominance of rationality in a 
belletristic work: rather the opposite is true where its purpose is 
primarily rhetorical. Paradoxically, except in Zarathustra, Nietzsche's 
prose at its best is apt to be characterized, as shown by Stefan Son-
30. Wolfgang Kayser, Das sprachliche Kunstwerk, 9th ed. (Bern and Munich: Francke, 
1963), p. 143. 
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deregger, by a balance between parataxis and hypotaxis, the latter 
being employed for its rhetorical effect. 31 In that case there is some 
justification for asserting hypotaxis to be a "Dionysian" characteristic 
of Nietzsche's style. In the present usage, however, hypotaxis is re-
garded as essentially Apollonian, that is, as evidence that the ratio is 
at work, whether in belles lettres or in scientific prose; parataxis, on 
the other hand, is regarded as essentially Dionysian, that is, as evi-
dence that intuition is at work. 
In view of Nietzsche's earlier extravagant praise for the union of 
Apollonian with Dionysian elements in all great art, it is surprising 
that, in creating his masterpiece, he all but eliminates the Apollonian 
element, and is therefore left with essentially Dionysian form, a form 
that also turns out to be Semitic. But the shift is not simply due to a 
difference in the taste of the ancients and moderns-the former be-
ing aurally, the latter visually, oriented (that this cultural difference 
did indeed obtain is no doubt true, as Nietzsche maintains [KSA, V, 
190]). Rather, the matter has to do with the nature of the language 
that reflects an underlying world-view. 32 The language of the Bible 
and of a Luther not only conveys ideas, but "grows into" the heart 
(KSA, V, 191). In Zarathustra Dionysus speaks almost entirely alone, 
and parataxis is his natural mode of speech. As Otto Olzien says: "In 
Zarathustra there is scarcely one example of a complex periodic sen-
tence."33 Its aphoristic (hence, essentially paratactic) style is not only 
the hallmark of the work but also a warrant of its immortality (KSA, 
VI, 153). 
Nietzsche's style in Zarathustra is paratactic not only in the nar-
rower sense but also in the broader. This fact contrasts strangely with 
31. Stefan Sonderegger, "Friedrich Nietzsche und die Sprache," in Nictzs~he Studien, 
2 (1973), 26. 
32. Thorleif Boman has compared the Hebrew and Greek modes of thought as re-
flected in their languages: the former he considers psychological, the latter logical. Cf. 
also Claude Tresmontant: "From the very start Greek categories and the Hebrew forms 
of thought are heterogeneous"; Hebrew thought implies the metaphysics of the sensi-
ble (A Study of Hebrew Thought, trans. M. F. Gibson [New York: Desclee, 1960], p. 141). 
One writer suggests that the deconstructionist's approach may be helpful here. Thus, 
Herbert N .. Schneidau asserts that in "aligning Derrida and the Bible, we open the 
possibility of reviving the Hebraic-Hellenic distinction ... " ("The Word against the 
Word: Derrida on Textuality," Semeia: An Experimental journal for Biblical Criticism, 23 
[19821, 14). Incidentally, Derrida's ideas are quite in harmony with Hamann's idea of 
abstractions as "mere relations"; cf. my Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of 
Hamann, University of North Carolina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Litera-
tures, no. 6 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952; reprint, 1966), 
pp. 48-51. 
33. Otto Olzien, Nietzsche und das Problem der dichterischen Sprache, Neue deutsche 
Forschungen, no. 32 (Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt, 1941), p. 121. 
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his idealization of Greek tragedy's fusion of Dionysian and Apollo-
nian elements. Although he praised the ability of the Greek writers, 
especially the dramatists, to "dance in chains" (KSA, II, 612), the fact 
that he held up French neoclassical tragedy as a model is even more 
revealing. 34 But it should be remarked that, whereas Racine strove to 
achieve clarity with the least Apollonian means, Nietzsche strove to 
achieve depth with the least Dionysian means. 
The structure of Zarathustra is anything but architectonic. It may 
be, as Nietzsche maintained and others have confirmed, the ana-
logue of a musical composition. 35 In any case, the parts rarely follow 
any causal or logical sequence. Apart from the sketchy biography of 
Zarathustra, the proclamation of the doctrine of the superman early 
in the work, the will to power, and eternal recurrence later, there is 
scarcely any discernible structure. Many of the sections could be in-
terchanged without damage to the whole. Further, many passages 
could be deleted. As Walter Kaufmann has said, the work "cries out 
to be blue pencilled ."36 
Despite its lack of formal structure, Also sprach Zarathustra never-
theless possesses a kind of unity. The work is not decadent in Nietz-
sche's sense. 37 There is no "anarchy of atoms"; the individual word, 
sentence, or aphorism never becomes "sovereign," but always re-
mains subordinate to the principal theme or themes. Where there is 
any discord, it is between the parts. Just as in the case of the Bible, 
where the diversity and disharmony of the parts is sometimes very 
great, one nevertheless intuits an underlying unity. 
6. Affect 
The most pervasive of all the categories we have considered is that 
of affect. Nothing strikes the reader quite so forcefully from begin-
ning to end as the fact that one is confronted with a text that, though 
34. See Kurt Weinberg, "The Impact of Ancient Greece and of French Classicism 
on Nietzsche's Concept of Tragedy," in Studies in Nietzsche and the Classical Tradition 
(above, n. 4), pp. 89-108. 
35. Ecce Homo, KSA, VI, 335. Cf. Friedrich von der Leyen, "Friedrich Nietzsche: Die 
Sprache des 'Zarathustra,'" Literaturwissenschaftliches fahrbuch, ed. Hermann Kunisch, 
Neue Folge, 3 (1962), 238. 
36. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. xvii. 
37. KSA, VI, 27. For my criticism of Nietzsche's idea of decadence, see "Eros and 
Creativity in Nietzsche's The Birth of Traxedy," in Studies in German Literature of the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Festschrift for F E. Coenen, University of North Caro-
lina Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures, no. 67 (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 98-100. 
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primarily philosophical, is couched in a prose of extraordinary emo-
tional power. Its dithyrambic nature is such that one is not at all 
aware of any Stilbruch when the prose suddenly flows into pure po-
etry, as in, for example, "The Song of Melancholy," "Among the 
Daughters of the Wilderness," "The Drunken Song," and others. 
This lyrical aspect is counterbalanced by the dramatic, but, as Fritz 
Martini says: "If the pure form of either genre had been realized, it 
would have excluded the other. The mean between the extremes is 
prose, whose elasticity can embrace the lyric as well as the dramatic 
elements."38 With a hitherto-unheard-of virtuosity Nietzsche makes 
use of rhetorical and musical-especially rhythmical-means, com-
bining them with a verbal playfulness that at times only obscures his 
meaning. Illuminating studies of the language of Zarathustra have 
appeared for a number of years, 39 and doubtless will continue to 
appear, for, like any great work of art, the perspectives from which it 
can be viewed are innumerable. 
Here, however, we are concerned with the Zarathustran style 
not as an aesthetic matter but as the instrument of intuitive rea-
son. Therefore we must exclude the aspects of Nietzsche's language 
that senre as purely rhetorical devices employed to heighten the 
pathos or emotional appeal to the reader-such as interjections, ex-
clamations, imperatives, anaphoras, parallelisms, etcetera-many, 
of course, in imitation and parody of the Bible. Only those devices 
which are clearly basic instruments of intuitive reason are relevant 
to our purpose. Nietzsche's uses of the categories we have so far 
considered all contribute, in a sort of synergistic effect, to heighten 
the emotional impact of his language on the reader. 
In conclusion, however much Nietzsche in his early phase praised 
the "fraternal union" of Dionysus and Apollo (or, in our present 
terms, the fruitful union of intuitive and abstract reason), and how-
ever much some commentators may maintain that the Apollonian is 
not abandoned by the later Nietzsche, but only subsumed under the 
concept "Dionysian," the fact remains that conscious Apollonianism 
plays no part in Zarathustra. In Ecce Homo he wrote concerning that 
work: "My concept of 'the Dionysian' was perfectly realized here" 
(KSA, VI, 343). Dionysus has now ceased to speak the language of 
38. Fritz Martini, Das Wagnis der Sprache (Stuttgart: Klett, 1956), p. 16. 
39. Ferruccio Masini has compiled a thorough bibliography of such studies: see 
"Rhythmisch-Metaphorische 'Bedeutungsfelder' in 'Also sprach Zarathustra,'" Nietz-
sche Studien, 2 (1973), 276-77n. 
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Apollo, even though Nietzsche's earlier concept of the highest art 
required, as it were, a communicatio idiomatum of the two deities. Now 
Zarathustra speaks only the language of the biblical prophets, of the 
psalmist, of Jesus, and of the despised Apostle Paul. It is significant 
that the categories explicated in this study were originally derived by 
Hamann from the form of the biblical revelation, and that form may 
also, in Nietzsche's own words, be described as Dionysian. Nietz-
sche-Zarathustra has now learned to reason in the Semitic or Hebraic 
mode as the one in which he believed the will to power to be most 
effectively expressed. In his prose writings Nietzsche is a Greek, in 
Zarathustra he has become a Jew. 40 However much or little the He-
braic mode of thought requires a historical element, it is essentially 
mythic-and "myth is not," says Nietzsche, "the expression of a 
thought as the children of an overrefined culture imagine, but is itself 
a mode of thought";41 moreover, it is absolutely "disparate" in relation 
to the theoretical sphere (KSA, I, 485). 
Nietzsche chose the biblical style for Zarathustra because of its 
power to move the inner man, for in it deep calls to deep. But the 
mode of reason that informs the Bible is authoritative only because it 
is the vehicle of revelation: its authority stems from the "Deus dixit." 
Lacking that authority, Nietzsche's work is, from one point of view, 
only philosophy expressed poetically, and, from another point of 
view, only poetry with philosophical import. However intellectually 
convincing as philosophy, and however aesthetically pleasing as po-
etry, it is unable to create values and to move men in the manner of 
the sacred literature of the Bible or the Koran. For "God is dead" 
and it is only Zarathustra who "speaks." As a literary and philo-
sophical experiment, however, and as the expression of Nietzsche's 
own highly individual will to power, Also sprach Zarathustra is a most 
remarkable achievement; apart from the hyperboles he heaped upon 
it, Nietzsche was certainly correct in his judgment of its uniqueness. 
Ironically, Nietzsche has done his great adversary, Christianity, a 
notable service by vindicating its conception of the proper role of 
40. Nietzsche relegated his straight prose writings (where the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian are balanced) to second place in regard to Zarathustra. In a letter to Franz 
Overbeck, 7 April 1884, he wrote: "On reading the Morgenrote and Frohliche Wissen-
schaft, I happened to find that hardly a line there does not serve as introduction, 
preparation, and commentary to ... Zarathustra. It is a fact that I did the commentary 
before writing the text" (Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Christopher 
Middleton [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969], p. 221). Even his 
post-Zarathustra treatises may be so regarded. 
41. My emphasis; KSA, I, 485; cf. ibid., 58. 
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reason as exemplified in its Scriptures. For, as our analysis of Zara-
thustra has shown, he has demonstrated paradigmatically the sa-
lient features of biblical or Dionysian reason. Too long has the con-
flict between faith and (discursive) reason in Western Christianity 
obscured the nature and perennial power of another kind of reason, 
a kind that also issues, in the words of Levi-Strauss, in the "science 
of the concrete." It is further quite ironic that a rationalistic exponent 
of Christian morality like Lessing, who demythologizes Scripture in 
order to salvage its essential teachings, 42 may unwittingly do more to 
undermine its authority than even a Nietzsche-for Nietzsche and 
the biblical writers are at one in accepting the mythic form as the 
only authoritative one for the most important affairs of human life. 
On one occasion Zarathustra taught his disciples: "But if you have an 
enemy, do not requite him evil with good, for that would put him to 
shame. Rather prove that he did you some good" (my emphasis; KSA, IV, 
87). Though the follower of Jesus could not accept this inversion of 
the Saviour's teaching as binding, he might-with some irony-ac-
cept it in the case of Nietzsche's obeisance to the gospels in Zarathus-
tra: for that work is not simply a parody of the gospels but an un-
surpassed vindication of the mode of thought that informs them. 
By adopting that mode Nietzsche has demonstrated what no other 
"literary" philosopher has. Zarathustra thus proves to be-however 
unwittingly-a powerful ally in the unequal contest that has long 
prevailed in the West between discursive reason and anschauende Ver-
nunft, which is as congenial to Dionysian wisdom as it is to religious 
faith. This fact in no way diminishes Nietzsche's irreconcilable hostil-
ity to Judaism and especially to Christianity, but simply throws it 
into a new and illuminating perspective. 
42. In his Education of the Human Race Lessing essentially equates the unfolding of 
revelation in the Bible with progress from metaphorical or mythic thinking to concep-
tual thinking, that is, from the scholastic ratio inferior to ratio superior, thus betraying a 
profound distrust of intuitive reason. 
XV. Jesus, Christianity, 
and Superhumanity 
Bernd Magnus 
In this paper I shall not be concerned with the emergence, develop-
ment, and modifications of Nietzsche's opinions about Christianity 
and the Judaeo-Christian tradition.* I shall concentrate instead on 
certain conceptuaVstructural features of Nietzsche's critique of Chris-
tianity and the religious impulse generally, features that motivate not 
only his antichristianity, in my opinion, but his critique of morality 
and metaphysics as well. Put briefly, I am attempting to understand, 
however indirectly, Nietzsche's suggestive remark in Beyond Good 
and Evil that "Christianity is Platonism for 'the people' (fUr's 'Volk')."1 
To accomplish this I shall have to say something about his under-
standing of Jesus of Nazareth, "original" Christianity, Paul, and later 
Christianity, before attempting to relate that discussion to other 
themes in Nietzsche's philosophical arsenal of which I believe his 
religious discussion to be only one expression. Superhumanity, Uber-
menschlichkeit, shall serve as the contrast term for this attempt. 
The first important contrast to be marked concerning Christianity 
is Nietzsche's insistent separation of Jesus the evangel from the Pau-
line Christ. Put more generally, this distinction becomes roughly 
equivalent to his contrast between Jesus and Christianity. Although 
he himself may have put this contrast most pithily, as when he 
wrote, for example, " ... in truth there was only one Christian and 
he died on the cross,"2 Nietzsche was scarcely alone among the pre-
scient nineteenth-century thinkers for whom this contrast is so ba-
sic-the names of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky spring immediately 
to mind. Nor was Nietzsche's often violent prose rhetorically more 
extreme or severe than, say, that of Kierkegaard. Consider the in-
*This paper was made possible through the support of the Academic Senate of the 
University of California, Riverside; the National Endowment for the Humanities; and 
the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. I am grateful to each institution. 
I. Beyond Good and Evil, Preface. Whenever possible I will refer to the title, section, 
and/or aphorism number when I quote Nietzsche, for the reader's convenience. Only 
in the troubling case of material from the Nachlafi will this procedure be abandoned. 
2. The Antichrist (hereafter "/>;'), sec. 39. 
295 
296 Bernd Magnus 
flammatory lines written by Kierkegaard on the occasion of the suc-
cession of Bishop Martensen as Primate of the Church of Denmark. 
Bishop Mynster, the previous Primate of the Danish Church, had 
died only recently, and then-Professor Martensen had delivered the 
funeral oration, in which he referred to Bishop Mynster as "a genu-
ine witness to the truth." That phrase was to prove to be more than 
Kierkegaard could bear; for it deprived the notion of its martyrdom 
and apostolic purity. To be sure, Bishop Mynster had been a re-
spected, successful prelate; he had received every conceivable honor; 
he had been a learned humanist; but he was also a man of means, 
comfortable in and with the world. For Kierkegaard, to call such 
a person a witness to the truth mocks Christianity, slanders and 
usurps the Gospels; so he waited several months until Professor 
Martensen had in his turn succeeded Bishop Mynster as Church Pri-
mate, and then he seized the moment and published these remarks 
-extreme even for him-in the year before his own death: "A wit-
ness to the truth is a man who bears witness in destitution, in pov-
erty, in disgrace and humiliation, a man despised, detested, in-
sulted, outraged, flouted; a man who is beaten, tortured, dragged 
from prison to prison, and then at last ... crucified, decapitated, 
burnt at the stake, or roasted on a grille, and thrown on the trash 
heap by the executioner, without burial. ... In truth, there is some-
thing more contrary to Christianity than any heresy or any schism-
and that is to play at Christianity, to scamp its dangers .... "3 
If Nietzsche's often polemical hostility toward what passes for 
Christianity displays a marked resemblance to Kierkegaard's, as 
quoted above, his reasons for rejecting Christianity and any religious 
tradition generally are at a far remove from Kierkegaard's. Kierke-
gaard's indictment of Christianity is rooted in the contrast between 
the unconditional acceptance of the incomprehensible absurdity that 
is required of the knight of faith on the one hand-the leap of faith 
stripped of any taint of comfort or assurance-and the genteel social-
club security sought by typical Christian "believers," on the other 
hand. The primordial content of the religious experience had been 
buried and forgotten, Kierkegaard certainly thought; but it would 
never have occurred to him to challenge its absolute validity. Hence 
Kierkegaard's contemptuous dismissal of the shallow religious insti-
tutions and practices of his contemporaries. Yet it is precisely the 
unconditional validity of this primordial content, which Kierkegaard 
3. Denis de Rougemont, Love Declared (New York: Random House, 1963). 
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accepts, that Nietzsche rejects equally unconditionally-and this dif-
ference makes all the difference between the two thinkers. 
Nietzsche's perception of Jesus of Nazareth and Christianity is 
complex, therefore, and requires some explanation. For Nietzsche 
seems to reject wholesale the Pauline invention "Christ" and the in-
stitutions of Christianity that this fabrication made possible. His atti-
tude toward Jesus the evangel is more bivalent, on the other hand: 
there is a sense, Nietzsche acknowledges, in which Jesus' teaching 
and praxis of unconditional love does represent a successful attempt 
to overcome priestly domination, does represent a successful chal-
lenge to the ritualistic dependence upon law and theologico-juridical 
norms generally; but it remains a flawed attempt, in the final analy-
sis, one unalive to its own origins in the phenomenon of ressentiment, 
in reactive resentment. 
Jesus and Paul: Evangel and Dysangel 
Perhaps the clearest image of Jesus unburdened by Pauline trappings 
to be found in Nietzsche's writings occurs in sections 28 to 35 of The 
Antichrist. "This 'bringer of glad tidings' died as he had lived, as he 
had taught-not to 'redeem men' but to show how one must live. 
This practice is his legacy to mankind . . . to resist not even the evil 
one-to love him."4 Nietzsche insists repeatedly that what the histori-
cal Jesus bequeathed to humankind was not a doctrine of redemp-
tion, and certainly not salvation after death, but love as the uncondi-
tional form of life: 
It is not a "faith" that distinguishes the Christian: the Christian 
acts, he is distinguished by acting differently . ... He broke with 
the whole Jewish doctrine of repentance and reconciliation; he 
knows that it is only in the practice of life that one feels "divine," 
"blessed," "evangelical," at all times a "child of God." Not "repen-
tance," not "prayer for forgiveness," are the ways to God: only the 
evangelical practice leads to God, indeed, it is "God"! The deep in-
stinct for how one must live, in order to feel oneself "in heaven," 
to feel"eternal," while in all other behavior one decidedly does not 
feel oneself "in heaven" -this alone is the psychological reality of 
"redemption." A new way of life, not a new faith. 5 
4. A, sec. 35. 
5. A, sec. 33. 
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Everything one has typically come to identify with Christianity-
God as person, the son of God, the kingdom of heaven, salvation, 
the trinity, the immortality of the soul, sin, guilt, repentance, faith, 
and the power of prayer-all are for Nietzsche alien to the life and 
legacy of Jesus of Nazareth. So it follows for Nietzsche that 
The concept of "the son of man" is not a concrete person who be-
longs in history, something individual and unique, but an "eter-
nal" factuality, a psychological symbol redeemed from the concept 
of time. The same applies once again, and in the highest sense, to 
the God of this typical symbolist, to the "kingdom of God," to the 
"kingdom of heaven," to the "filiation of God." Nothing is more 
unchristian than the ecclesiastical crudities of a god as person, of a 
"kingdom of God" which is to come, of a "kingdom of heaven" 
beyond, of a "son of God" as the second person in the Trinity. All 
this is--forgive the expression-like a fist in the eye-oh, in what 
an eye!-of the evangel-a world-historical cynicism in the derision 
of syrnbols. 6 
But if "father" and "son," "the kingdom of heaven," and "the king-
dom of God" are not the crude ecclesiastical symbols they have gen-
erally been taken to be, what are they symbols of? What do they 
symbolize for the historical Jesus? Here, too, Nietzsche speaks un-
equivocally, speaks with a direct voice: 
... the word "son" expresses the entry into the over-all feeling of 
the transfiguration of all things (blessedness); the word "father" 
expresses this feeling itself, the feeling of eternity, the feeling of per-
fection .... The "kingdom of heaven" is a state of the heart-not 
something that is to come "above the earth" or "after death." The 
whole concept of natural death is lacking in the evangel: death is 
no bridge, no transition; it is lacking because it belongs to a 
wholly different, merely apparent world, useful only insofar as it 
furnishes signs. 7 
Perhaps Nietzsche's most startling but significant subtraction from 
the more standard picture is the elimination of the concepts of guilt 
and punishment from the psychology of the evangel as well: 
In the whole psychology of the "evangel" the concept of guilt and 
punishment is lacking; also the concept of reward. "Sin" -any dis-
6. A, SE'C. 34. 
7. Ibid. 
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tance separating God and man-is abolished: precisely this is the 
"glad tidings." Blessedness is not promised, it is not tied to condi-
tions: it is the only reality-the rest is a sign with which to speak 
of it .... 8 
True life, eternal life, has been found-it is not promised, it is 
here, it is in you: as a living in love, in love without subtraction 
and exclusion, without regard for station. 9 
It would be a mistake to infer, however, that Nietzsche's attempt to 
liberate the historical Jesus from subsequent ecclesiastical trappings 
is motivated by admiration. For Nietzsche, Jesus remains decadent. 
Indeed, in discussing the psychology of the Redeemer-type, he sug-
gests that Jesus' psychology is governed by an instinctive hatred of 
reality. Just as there is a pathological tactile state characterized by 
shrinking from physical contact of any kind, including grasping solid 
objects, so Nietzsche suggests that "One should translate such a 
physiological habitus into its ultimate consequence-an instinctive 
hatred of every reality, a flight into 'what cannot be grasped,' 'the 
incomprehensible,' an aversion to every formula, to every concept of 
time and space, to all that is solid, custom, institution, church; a 
being at home in a world which is no longer in contact with any kind 
of reality, a merely 'inner' world, a 'true' world, an 'eternal' world. 
'The kingdom of God is in you.' "10 Indeed, Nietzsche summarizes 
what he calls the two physiological realities out of which the doctrine 
of redemption arose in a very suggestive aphorism, number 30: 
The instinctive hatred of reality: a consequence of an extreme ca-
pacity for suffering and excitement which no longer wants any 
contact at all because it feels every contact too deeply. 
The instinctive exclusion of any antipathy, any hostility, any bound-
aries or divisions in man's feelings: the consequence of an extreme ca-
pacity for suffering and excitement which experiences any resis-
tance, even any compulsion to resist, as unendurable displeasure 
... and finds blessedness (pleasure) only in no longer offering 
any resistance to anybody, neither to evil nor to him who is evil-
love as the only, as the last possible, way of life. These are the two 
physiological realities on which, out of which, the doctrine of re-
demption grew. 11 
8. A, sec. 33. 
9. A, sec. 29. 
10. Ibid. 
11. A, sec. 30. 
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Nietzsche's image of Jesus, then, is almost that of Dostoevsky's 
Prince Myshkin-the "idiot" with whom Nietzsche identifies Jesus in 
aphorism 29 of The Antichrist-and Nietzsche expresses his regret 
"that a Dostoevsky did not live near this most interesting of all deca-
dents-! mean someone who would have known how to sense the 
very stirring charm of such a mixture of the sublime, the sickly, and 
the childlike."12 
Nietzsche's observation that even a deecclesiasticized, decon-
structed Jesus remains decadent is not argued for in The Antichrist. It 
is merely asserted there; and we shall have to look elsewhere to find 
Nietzsche's justification for such an ascription, justification for the 
view that despite its contrast with historical Christianity, original, 
apostolic Christianity too is nihilistic. Yet Nietzsche hints at the basis 
for such an evaluation quite early in The Antichrist: 
I have drawn back the curtain from the corruption of man. So 
much so that I experience this corruption most strongly precisely 
where men have so far aspired most deliberately to "virtue" and 
"godliness." I understand corruption, as you will guess, in the sense of 
decadence: it is my contention that all the values in which mankind now 
sums up its supreme desiderata are decadence-values . ... Where the 
will to power is lacking there is decline. It is my contention that all 
the supreme values of mankind lack this will-that the values 
which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are lording it 
under the holiest names. 13 
The following points need to be stressed here in a preliminary 
sort of way, since they will be mentioned again !later: Nietzsche, like 
Marx, really seems to have believed sincerely that his talk about 
decadence, corruption, nihilism, and the like is intended to be mor-
ally neutral. The justification for that claim will emerge later; for 
now, however, it may be worth pointing out that Nietzsche seems 
to have believed that his corruption-talk is nonnormative, much as 
Marx seems to have believed that much of his talk about oppression, 
capitalist plunder, shackles, chains, and exploitation is also descrip-
tive and, hence, not a rhetorical condemnatory device. A further 
point to observe is that Nietzsche identifies corruption with deca-
dence, and identifies both with humankind's highest values. Neither 
Jesus nor Christianity is picked out for exclusive censure; rather, the 
sustaining and informing values of humankind have all been deca-
12. A, sec. 31. 
13. A, SE'C. 6; my italics. 
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dence-values, Nietzsche asserts here. The history of our highest aspi-
rations is the history of nihilism. Finally, one should not take lightly 
Nietzsche's identification of nihilism with a sublimated instinct of 
self-destruction, nor his conclusion that the loss of an instinctual 
vitality reappears as a counterfeit "under the holiest names." The 
highest values hitherto-identified elsewhere by Nietzsche as "the 
ascetic ideal" -have been thanatological values dressed up in life-
affirming disguise. 
If Jesus of Nazareth, the deconstructed "idiot," is defined in part 
by an instinctive hatred of reality, he is also a "holy anarchist" -he is 
nevertheless a solution to the problem of the rule of the priestly 
class, of rabbinic domination: 
Jesus has been understood, or misunderstood, as the cause of a re-
bellion; and I fail to see against what this rebellion was directed, if 
it was not the Jewish church .... It was a rebellion against "the 
good and the just," against "the saints of Israel," against the hier-
archy of society-not against its corruption, but against caste, 
privilege, order, and formula; it was the disbelief in the "higher 
man," the No to all that was priest or theologian .... 
That holy anarchist who summoned the people at the bottom, 
the outcasts and "sinners," the chandalas within Judaism, to op-
position against the dominant order ... was a political criminal 
insofar as political criminals were possible at all in an absurdly un-
political community. 14 
If "that holy anarchist," that impertinent and unintentional cham-
pion of the rabble against all forms of authority, was to have a lasting 
impact, however, his life-which was his "glad tidings"-had to be 
remythologized. The apostolic anticleric had to be transvaluated if 
"Christianity would become master over beasts of prey."15 
In a clever series of steps Nietzsche argues that the notion of 
a "moral world order" had to be invented to reinstate priestly au-
thority: "From now on all things in life are so ordered that the priest 
is indispensable everywhere; at all natural occurrences in life, at 
birth, marriage, sickness, death, not to speak of 'sacrifices' (meals), 
the holy parasite appears in order to denature them-in his lan-
guage: to 'consecrate.' "16 And the most powerful instruments for 
the reascendancy of the priest are the notions of sin and guilt: "the 
14. A, sec. 27. 
15. A, sec. 15. 
16. A, sec. 26. 
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priest rules through the invention of sin."17 "Psychologically con-
sidered, 'sins' become indispensable in any society organized by 
priests: they are the real handles of power. The priest lives on sins, 
it is essential for him that people 'sin.' Supreme principle: 'God for-
gives those who repent:-in plain language: those who submit to 
the priest.' "18 Indeed, as Nietzsche reads post-Nazarene Christian-
ity, the entire scaffolding of its ideology, the entire redemptive 
drama, is designed to retain the power of the priestly class, born of 
ressentiment: "'Last Judgment,' 'immortality of the soul,' and 'soul' 
itself are instruments of torture, systems of cruelties by virtue of 
which the priest became master, remained master."19 So the history 
of Christianity, Nietzsche argues, is the history of an error-a misun-
derstanding in which the original symbolism of Jesus becomes trans-
valuated into a crude ecclesiastical tale, a tale that becomes as vulgar 
as the sllave's mentality that seeks revenge in and through it: "the 
history of Christianity, beginning with the death on the cross, is the 
history of the misunderstanding, growing cruder with every step . 
. . . The destiny of Christianity lies in the necessity that its faith had 
to become as diseased, as base and vulgar, as the needs it was meant 
to satisfy were diseased, base, and vulgar. In the church, finally, 
diseased barbarism itself gains power."20 
The figure most responsible for the emergence and triumph of 
Christianity as "diseased barbarism" is Paul, of course; and "Paul 
was the greatest of all apostles of vengeance,"21 says Nietzsche, for 
"in Paull the priest wanted power once again--he could use only 
concepts, doctrines, symbols with which one tyrannizes masses 
and forms herds."22 Of course, the soil had been prepared for Paul's 
revaluation by Jesus' disciples. Jesus' death on the cross-a punish-
ment typically reserved for "the rabble" -presented his disciples 
with the suspicion that Jesus' manner of death constituted a refuta-
tion of their cause. Since "a disciple's love knows no accident,"23 
as Nietzsche says, Jesus' life and death became transfigured in a 
world-historical misunderstanding. Nietzsche states the case nicely 
as follows: 
17. A, sec. 49. 
18. A, ''ec. 26. 
19. A, sec. 31\. 
20. A, sec. 20. 
21. A, sec. 45. 
22. A, sec. 42. 
23. A, sec. 40. 
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Evidently the small community did not understand the main 
point, the exemplary character of this kind of death, the freedom, 
the superiority over any feeling of ressentiment . ... After all, Jesus 
could not intend anything with his death except to give publicly 
the strongest exhibition, the proof of his doctrine. But his disciples 
were far from forgiving this death-which would have been evan-
gelic in the highest sense-or even from offering themselves for a 
like death in gentle and lovely repose of the heart. Precisely the 
most unevangelical feeling, revenge, came to the fore again. The 
matter could not possibly be finished with this death: "retribu-
tion" was needed, "judgment" .... Once more the popular ex-
pectation of a Messiah came to the foreground; a historic moment 
was envisaged: the "kingdom of God" comes as a judgment over 
his enemies. 24 
Jesus, as Nietzsche deconstructs him, had set aside notions of guilt, 
sin, and atonement; but the ludicrous image of Jesus crucified re-
quired, step by step, notions of sin and atonement once again, and 
of the doctrine of resurrection, above all. And Paul seizes on this 
resurrection requirement above all else. "Paul, with that rabbinical 
impudence which distinguishes him in all things, logicalized this 
conception ... in this way: 'If Christ was not resurrected from the 
dead, then our faith is vain.' And all at once the evangel became the 
most contemptible of all unfulfillable promises, the impertinent doc-
trine of personal immortality."25 
Thus, through Paul, Jesus the evangel is transvaluated, becoming 
the Redeemer, the dysangel. "On the heels of the 'glad tidings' came 
the very worst: those of Paul. In Paul was embodied the opposite type 
to that of the 'bringer of glad tidings' .... Haw much this dysangelist 
sacrificed to hatred! Above all, the Redeemer: he nailed him to his 
awn cross ... he invented his awn history of earliest Christianity ... he 
falsified the history of Israel that it might appear as the prehistory of 
his deed. . . . At bottom, he had no use at all for the life of the 
Redeemer-he needed the death on the cross and a little more."26 
The "little more" Paul needs to gain supremacy is the notion of the 
potential immortality of each and every soul, ultimate democratiza-
tion of and through the spiritual realm: 
24. Ibid. 
25. A, sec. 41. 
26. A, sec. 43. 
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That everyone as an "immortal soul" has equal rank with eveJy-
one else, that in the totality of living beings the "salvation" of every 
single individual may claim eternal significance ... such an inten-
sification of every kind of selfishness into the infinite, into the im-
pertinent, cannot be branded with too much contempt. And yet 
Christianity owes its triumph to this miserable flattery of personal 
vanity: it was precisely all the failures, all the rebellious-minded, 
all the less favored, the whole scum and refuse of humanity who 
were thus won over to it. The "salvation of the soul"-in plain lan-
guage: "the world revolves around me."27 
Many commentators have observed, quite rightly, that for Nietz-
sche democracy and socialism-as well as nationalism and world 
wars-would have had a different etiology without the triumph of 
Christianity as a Pauline invention. And throughout The Antichrist 
Nietzsche remarks repeatedly on the political consequences of the 
triumphal slaves' morality. For example, "The aristocratic outlook 
was undermined from the deepest underworld through the lie of 
the equality of souls; and if faith in the 'prerogative of the majority' 
makes and will make revolutions-it is Christianity, beyond a doubt, 
it is Chr.istian value-judgments, that every revolution simply trans-
lates into blood and crime."28 Further, Christianity ultimately under-
mines any distinction in rank or merit through a "tarantula" morality 
in which the base inveigh against nobility. "Christianity is a rebel-
lion of everything that crawls on the ground against that which has 
height: the evangel of the 'lowly' makes low."29 And, "The poison of 
the doctrine of 'equal rights for all' -it was Christianity that spread 
it most fundamentally . . . out of the ressentiment of the masses it 
forged its chief weapon against us, against all that is noble, gay, high-
minded on earth, against our happiness on earth. 'Immortality' con-
ceded to every Peter and Paul has so far been the greatest, the most 
malignant attempt to assassinate noble humanity."30 
Flattered, self-congratulatory conceit born in and nurtured by 
resentment finds expression in Pauline Christianity, mocks noble val-
ues and converts the "noble" into the "evil" ones. But this self-con-
gratulatory conceit veils itself as modesty, as humility, argues Nietz-
sche. "What really happens here is that the most conscious conceit of 
being chosen plays modesty: once and for all one has placed oneself, 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
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the 'community,' the 'good and the just,' on one side, on the side of 
'truth' -and the rest, 'the world,' on the other."31 In The Antichrist 
the distinction between life-affirming, noble, nondecadent values, 
on the one hand, and life-denying, base, decadent values is couched 
in the language of a contrast between "aristocratic" and "chandala" 
moralities. This contrast, in substance and form, mirrors Nietzsche's 
earlier contrast between "base" and "noble" moralities, adumbrated 
in Beyond Good and Evil and in Taward the Genealogy of Morals. As 
is well known, Nietzsche's portrait of the rise of moral valuations 
painted a "twofold early history of good and evil."32 This theme of 
Nietzsche's, that there is such a twofold early history of morals--and 
two fundamentally opposed moral perspectives that correspond to 
and arise out of this history-is basic. Mention of the two primary 
types of morality that he had discovered was first made explicit by 
Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil: he called them "master morality 
and slave morality."33 
The bare sketch of master and slave moralities presented in Beyond 
Good and Evil is amplified in Taward the Genealogy of Morals, where the 
concepts are deepened and rendered more systematic. For one thing, 
the notion of resentment, ressentiment, is given prominent display 
and functions as just precisely the sort of explanatory tool that is 
needed to account for moral attitudes and beliefs. The concept of 
resentment is then also used to explain why Christianity is slave 
morality sanctioned and incarnate. 
Nietzsche begins with two types, the aristocratic master and the 
servile slave, in a secular context. The master is, and his morality 
extols, autonomy, independence, power, self-control, pride, sponta-
neity, and passion. The self-directed master derives his values not 
from the community, not from "the herd," but from the abundance 
of his own life and strength. The slave, however, fears the strength 
and power of the master. He despises him. He is dependent, power-
less, without self-direction, discipline, or self-control. To seize con-
trol over his own psychic destiny, the slave must curb and tame his 
master; he must displace him, in a sense. And the method of "over-
coming" the master and his morality, the means to his displacement, 
is to render the values of the herd absolute and universal: "The re-
volt of the slaves in morals begins with resentment becoming cre-
ative and giving birth to values."34 The revolt of the slave in moral 
31. A, sec. 44. 
32. MA, I, sec. 45. 
33. J, sec. 260. 
34. GM, l, sec. 10. 
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matters is indeed creative and resentful. Powerless to effect a fun-
damental change in his condition, he wreaks vengeance against the 
master by converting the master's attributes into vices. And while 
master morality sanctions coexistence with inferior types and mor-
als-so long as the baser ones keep their assessments to their own 
kind-the resentment of the slave yearns for universality. Nothing 
may escape its moral clutches alive. Nietzsche does not suggest, of 
course, that the slave's resentment of and revenge against the master 
is either direct or conscious. Far from it. 
It is in this context, the context of moral-psychological imperialism, 
that the slave's resentment is to be understood. Since the slave can-
not displace the master in reality, he avenges himself symbolically, 
mythically. Enter the religion of the slave-Christianity. Whatever 
else Christianity may be for Nietzsche-and as I have argued above 
we should not forget that it is many things besides-it is first of all 
the ideology of slave morality. It expresses the slave's resentment 
against the attributes of master morality by vilifying them. The vir-
tues of the master become "sin." In place of power, it is said that 
the meek are to inherit the earth. Pride is sin. Humility is virtue. 
Charity, chastity, and obedience displace self-reliance, spontaneity, 
and autonomy. And it is said that it will be easier for a camel to pass 
through the eye of a needle than for a "rich" man to pass into the 
kingdom of heaven. 
The resentment of slave morality that finds expression in Chris-
tianity is at once virulent and fateful: virulent, because its moral im-
perialism is of unprecedented scope. Its "moral" dictates are meant 
to cover all men at all times. Denied the actual gratification of su-
premacy over the master, it condemns him symbolically-but for 
eternity. He is condemned to hell. The scope of the sanction is "eter-
nity." Apart from its virulence, Christian slave morality is fateful-in 
that it introduces into the Western psyche something virtually in-
eradicable: consciousness of sin and guilt. 
Superman: Ideal or Attitude?35 
Many commentators have observed that Nietzsche's rejection of Je-
sus and Christianity in The Antichrist presupposes what it needs to 
35. The discussion that follows appears in modified and enlarged form in my "Per-
fectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche's Uberrnensch," forthcoming in The Review of Meta-
physics. 
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show: that an instinctive hatred of reality coupled with a sublimated 
will to power lies at the root of both phenomena. This is particularly 
troublesome in the case of Jesus, as Nietzsche deconstructs him, be-
cause the ascription of decadence is never argued for. Thus many 
commentators, Walter Kaufmann for example, 36 have attributed to 
Nietzsche the view that Jesus' Myshkin-like innocence is simply na-
ive, a flight from reality in its fulsome and sometimes painful as-
pects. Jesus is typically contrasted unfavorably with Socrates: in 
such a scenario Socrates becomes health embodied, and an object of 
Nietzsche's unequivocal admiration. 
I find this view unhelpful; and I propose instead that we take 
Nietzsche's image of the superman as the contrast term, rather than 
Socrates. Thus, Nietzsche's failure to argue for his vision of "health" 
in The Antichrist before vivisecting Jesus and Christianity is a conse-
quence both of the fact that Nietzsche's image of nonnihilistic human 
beings is presupposed, and of the further assumption that Nietzsche 
always thought of his writings in contexts, thought that his readers 
would connect theses advanced in one book with those previously 
advanced in another. 
Let us approach the contrast between Nietzsche's Jesus and super-
man obliquely, then, by looking now at the notion of the superman, 
just as we concentrated on Jesus above. 
The standard construal of Nietzsche's superman has a long, some-
times lurid, history; only a few paradigm expressions of the "ideal 
type" reading-the reading that sees Nietzsche's superman as a hu-
man ideal, as the image of human perfectibility-need be cited here 
as a way of assembling reminders. And it may also be well worth 
remembering at the outset that Nietzsche himself entered an acerbic 
barb in Ecce Homo against those who would construe the concept 
denoted by the term Ubermensch as the embodiment of a type of 
higher species of human being: 
The word "Obermensch," as the designation of a type of supreme 
achievement, as opposed to "modern" men, to "good" men, to 
Christians and other nihilists-a word that in the mouth of a Zara-
thustra, the destroyer of morality, becomes a very thoughtful 
word-has been understood almost everywhere with perfect inno-
cence in the sense of those very values whose opposite Zarathus-
tra was meant to represent-that is, as an "idealistic" type of a 
higher kind of man, half "saint," half "genius" .... Those to 
36. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1950, 1969, 1974). 
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whom I said in confidence that they should sooner look even for a 
Cesare Borgia than for a Parsifal, did not believe their own ears. 37 
Yet despite Nietzsche's own cautions, the superman has generally 
been construed as a heroic ideal, as a higher type who must be bred 
by all-too-human humankind, as the great man, the superior indi-
vidual whose self-perfection-half genius, half saint-places him at a 
far remove from the mediocrity and stagnation of the crowd, the 
rabble, "the herd"; he has also been understood as the nonconform-
ing immoralist, and as the value-legislator whose values express his 
own authentic self-possession. 
Very early, indeed during Nietzsche's lifetime, he was beset by 
those who would breed a superman. His sister, for example, gives us 
the following account of her brother's intention, in her own 1906 
introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
The phrase "the rearing of the Ubermensch" has very often been 
misunderstood. By the word "rearing," in this case, is meant the 
act of modifying by means of new and higher values--values 
which, as laws and guides of conduct and opinion, are now to 
rule over mankind ... a new table of valuations must be placed 
over mankind-namely, that of the strong, mighty, and magnifi-
cent man, overflowing with life and elevated to his zenith-the 
Ubermensch, who is now put before us with overpowering passion 
as the aim of our life, hope, and will. And just as the old system 
of valuing, which only extolled the qualities favorable to the weak, 
the suffering, and the oppressed, has succeeded in producing a 
weak, suffering, and "modern" race, so this new and reversed 
system of valuing ought to rear a healthy, strong, lively, and cou-
rageous type, which would be a glory to life itself. Stated briefly, 
the leading principle of this new system of valuing would be: "All 
that proceeds from power is good, all that springs from weakness 
is bad." This type must not be regarded as a fanciful figure ... it 
is meant to be a possibility which men of the present could realize 
with all their spiritual and physical energies, provided they 
adopted the new values. 38 
37. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books," sec. 1. This reference to Cesare 
Borgia has often been taken out of context to argue that Nietzsche admired the Bor-
gias, even that he regarded (some of) them as supermen. Attention to context, of 
course, renders such claims dubious. Nietzsche's point here is that, among all of the 
implausible candidates, a Parsifal-like character is even more implausible than a Cesare 
Borgia. This is consistent with Nietzsche's view that there is no point in commending 
involuntary eunuchs for their celibacy, or cowards for their restraint. 
38. Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, Introduction to Thus Spake (sic) Zaratllustra in Tile 
Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: Random House, 1927), p. xxi. 
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It might seem trivial to quote these lines of the thoroughly discred-
ited Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche; but we ought to remind ourselves 
that such an interpretation of the superman-as a power-monger 
who legislates new values to humankind-is scarcely a thing of the 
past. Consider, for example, J. P. Stern's recent influential appraisal: 
He (i.e., Nietzsche) seems unaware that he is giving us nothing to 
distinguish the fanaticism that goes with bad faith from his own 
belief in the unconditioned value of self-realization and self-be-
coming-that is, from his own belief in the superman. We for our 
part are bound to look askance at this questionable doctrine. We 
can hardly forget that the solemn avowal of this reduplicated 
self-the pathos of personal authenticity-was the chief tenet of 
fascism and National Socialism. No man came closer to the full re-
alization of self-created "values" than A. Hitler. 39 
Prof. Stern's reading of Nietzsche as presented in his 1978 Modern 
Masters series Penguin book did not change when his 1979 Cam-
bridge University Press publication appeared: in A Study of Nietzsche 
he repeats these lines verbatim. 40 The Nietzsche who emerges from 
the latter monograph is a preacher of a doctrine of "heroic commit-
ment," of existential self-realization, of self-assertion without moral 
restraint or inhibition, and all this in opposition to the inherited 
Judaeo-Christian ontology and moral philosophy. Most distressing of 
all, perhaps, the Nietzsche here depicted is a proto-fascist ideologist 
(unwitting, to be sure)-the very distortion that Walter Kaufmann's 
pioneering work had successfully debunked. Consider, lamentably: 
"If there is anything in the recent 'Nietzschean' era that comes close 
to an embodiment of 'the will to power,' it is Hitler's life and political 
career."41 And then the coup de grace: "Indeed, the 'power' which is 
the will's goal need not be conceived in any such barbaric ways as 
the Italian and French fascists and the German national socialists 
conceived of it (though it cannot be denied that the intellectual superstruc-
ture of these political movements is as inconceivable without Nietzsche's 
ideas as these movements are without their superstructure)."42 While I read 
and reread these elusive and yet profoundly regressive lines, the 
image of Adolf Eichmann in the docket at Jerusalem-blurting out a 
vulgarized version of Kant's moral philosophy as his self-justifica-
39. J. P. Stern, Friedrich Nietzsche (Middlesex: Penguin, 1978), pp. 85-86. 
40. Approximately two-thirds o:f J. P. Stern's A Study of Nietzsche (London: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979) is a verbatim repetition of the 1978 Penguin book, Fried-
rich Nietzsche. 
41. Ibid., p. 120. 
42. Ibid., p. 122; my italics. 
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tion-haunted me like a shadow. The point is that reading Nietz-
sche's writings as the perhaps unwitting superstructure for fascist 
ideologies and practice has once again descended upon us, and not 
only in publications of distinguished university presses. If there re-
mains any doubt about this I recommend that you look at what 
sometimes passes for journalism these days: as in the 8 June 1981 
issue of Der Spiegel, for example, where editor Rudolf Augstein has 
written a lengthy article on Nietzsche and Hitler. The magazine's 
cover depicts Nietzsche in the pose of Rodin's "The Thinker" with 
Hitler rising from his head brandishing a pistol. The upper left-
hand corner carries the thematic article lead "Recurrence of a Phi-
losopher"; the lower right-hand comer conveys the point in large, 
bold italics: "Doer Hitler, Thinker Nietzsche." 
To be sure, there is a strain in Nietzsche that invites such readings. 
The apocalyptical facade and rhetoric of much of Nietzsche's perora-
tion about the superman does indeed appear menacing, especially 
when taken out of context, a fact with which more scholarly and 
sensitive commentators have had to contend. Consider, for instance, 
the tenor of this note from the Nachgelassene Fragmente from the pe-
riod 1885-86: 
From now on there will be more favorable preconditions for more 
comprehensive forms of domination, whose like has never yet ex-
isted. And even this is not the most important thing, the possi-
bility has been established for the production of international ra-
cial unions (Geschlechts-Verbiinden) whose task will be to rear a 
master race (Herren-Rasse) the future "masters of the earth";-a 
new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legisla-
tion, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-
tyrants will be made to endure for millennia-a higher kind of 
man who, thanks to their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, 
and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and 
supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so 
as to work as artists upon "man" himself. Enough: the time is 
coming when politics will have a different meaning. 43 
And in a note penned earlier, in 1884, one finds: 
I write for a species of man that does not yet exist: for the "mas-
ters of the earth .... " In Plato'sTheages it is written: "Each one of 
43. The Will to Pawer, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, cd. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), n. 960. 
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us would like to be master over all men, if possible, and best of all 
God." This attitude must exist again. 44 
The above passages are not cited to lend credibility to any right-
wing reading; as a rule, appropriate attention to the status (pub-
lished or Nachlafl) and context of Nietzsche's notes is sufficient to 
dispose of such interpretations. They are referred to primarily in or-
der to remind myself that what I am calling the "ideal type" reading 
of Nietzsche's superman need not always be benign. After all, mon-
strous crimes against humanity are, to my knowledge, never under-
stood in such terms by their perpetrators. Rather, as Stanley Cavell 
has observed, "someday, if there is a someday, we will have to learn 
that evil thinks of itself as good, that it could not have made such 
progress in the world unless people planned and performed it in 
all conscience."45 And that may perhaps be the most telling point 
against understanding the superman as a value-legislator who sim-
ply embodies a new, albeit a "higher," morality. For Nietzsche is not 
primarily intent upon erecting a new morality, a new set of values 
upon the ashes of the old tablets; rather, his philosophizing beyond 
good and evil means to deny not only morality but with it the basis 
for a contrast with immorality as well. To put this differently: it is 
the moral perspective itself, the foundation upon which distinctions 
between good and evil may be said to rest noncontextually, that 
Nietzsche has deconstructed. For Nietzsche denies morality much as 
he denies alchemy-not saying that there are no alchemists or that 
there have never been alchemical motives, but calling into question 
the presuppositions that make alchemy possible. And so it is with 
"morality." In the second book of Morgenrote (The Dawn) Nietzsche 
writes: 
Thus I deny morality just as I deny alchemy; that is, I deny their 
presuppositions; however, not that alchemists have existed who 
believed these presuppositions and behaved in terms of them. I 
also deny immorality: not that countless men feel themselves to be 
immoral, but rather that there be a foundation in truth that one 
should feel this way. I do not deny that which is self-evident-pre-
suming that I am no fool-that many acts which are called im-
moral are to be avoided and fought against, and that many which 
are called moral are to be done and encouraged. I do mean: the 
44. Ibid., n. 958. It has long been agreed that Theages was written not by Plato but by 
an imitator of Plato. 
45. Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 136. 
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one, as well as the other, but on other grounds than before. We must 
learn to transform our thoughts (umzulernen), in order at last, per-
haps very far from now, even more to reach the point at which we 
transform our feelings ( umzufuhlen). 46 
Fortunately, by no means all "ideal type" readings have stressed 
the alleged political consequences of Ubermenschlichkeit, of what it is 
like to be a superman. Perhaps the most popular interpretation of the 
superman is the one articulated so successfully in the English-speak-
ing world by the late Walter Kaufmann: 
The unphilosophic and inartistic mass remain animalic, while the 
man who overcomes himself, sublimating his impluses, consecrat-
ing his passions, and giving style to his character, becomes truly 
human or-as Zarathustra would say, enraptured by the word 
uber-superhuman.47 
The Ubermensch ... is the "Dionysian" man who is depicted 
under the name Goethe at the end of the Gotzendiimmerung (IX, 
49). He has overcome his animal nature, organized the chaos of 
his passions, sublimated his impulses, and given style to his char-
acter-or, as Nietzsche said of Goethe: "he disciplined himself to 
wholeness, he created himself" and he became "the man of toler-
ance, not from weakness but from strength," "a spirit who has be-
come free."48 
This construal of the superman as creative self-perfection has also 
been endorsed by philosophers of markedly differing temperaments 
and orientations. Consider the following assessment from Arthur 
Danto's pen: "The Ubermensch, accordingly, is not the blond giant 
dominating his lesser fellows. He is merely a joyous, guiltless, free 
human being, in possession of instinctual drives which do not over-
power him. He is the master and not the slave of his drives, and so 
he is in a position to make something of himself rather than being 
the product of instinctual discharge and external obstacle."49 
But precisely this reading of Ubermenschlichkeit, of what it is like to 
be a superman, defeats Nietzsche's originality in its triumph. For 
what we are left with is a most unoriginal formula of sorts: 
46. M, sec. 103. 
47. Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 312. 
48. Ibid., p. 316. Kaufmann's pioneering work has, ironically, only now been trans-
lated into German, by the Nietzsche scholar Jorg Salaquarda. 
49. Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 199-
200. 
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A sultry heart plus a cool head, minus the human-all-too-human. 
But this, divorced from the extravagant language and the rushing 
cadences of Zarathustra's singing, turns out to be a bland and all-
too-familiar recommendation, rather squarely in a moralistic tradi-
tion. It says only that we should seek to keep our passionate as 
well as our intellectual life in our command, not to deny one at the 
price of the other, and that we should not be petty and "merely" 
human. It is something of an irony that Nietzsche is least original 
where he has been most influential. Here is an ancient, vaguely 
pagan ideal, the passions disciplined but not denied, in contrast 
with the life and attitude of guilty celibacy which has been an offi-
cial moral recommendation until rather recent times. 50 
If we were to insist upon construing the superman as an ideal type, 
and at the same time wished to rescue Nietzsche from the charge of 
having overdramatized a cliche-namely, Aristotle's megalopsychic 
man-we could of course assimilate Ubermenschlichkeit to the notion 
of authenticity. While there may be something to recommend this 
maneuver, one suspects that everything depends upon how the no-
tion of "authenticity" gets spelled out. For, after all, Heidegger's own 
early political perception of authentic individuals is scarcely helpful. 
The main contrast I wish to mark in this section is between the 
"ideal type" reading and the attitudinal or diagnostic reading of the 
superman. This contrast is not as sharp, nor is it as clear, as one 
should like it to be; nor is it an ali-or-nothing affair. But what I have 
in mind when I refer to the attitudinal interpretation is that it does 
not necessarily emphasize the superman as an ideal of human per-
fectibility, an ideal that could be realized if only we were to do some-
thing or other-such as to sublimate our impulses, consecrate our 
passions, spiritualize our instincts, give style to our character, or 
live authentically-assuming all the while, of course, that we would 
know how to begin to do any of these things. Instead, I take the 
superman to be the nonspecific representation, the underdetermined 
embodiment if you will, of a certain attitude toward life and world-
the attitude that finds them worthy of infinite repetition. On this 
reading, then, the frequently voiced lament that the superman is left 
vague by Nietzsche and is never portrayed adequately is not a defect: 
it is, rather, the necessary consequence of the fact that what is being 
portrayed is not a set of character traits nor an algorithm telling us 
how, what, and when to choose. Indeed, if the concept of the super-
50. Ibid., p. 199. 
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man can be read usefully at all as a diagnostic rather than a prescrip-
tive concept, one would expect its embodiment to be radically under-
determined, just as a description of a Rorschach inkblot inevitably 
would be. 
This diagnostic reading has been defended in some detail, espe-
cially in my Nietzsche's Existential Imperative. 51 Perhaps one need re-
peat here only the minimum that is necessary in order to spell out 
the internal connection between the superman notion and eternal 
recurrence. Allow me, therefore, to repeat one thrust of the thesis 
concerning Nietzsche's remarks about eternal recurrence. Eternal re-
currence, in its principal sense, is offered by Nietzsche as an illustra-
tion of the attitude of Ubermenschlichkeit, of what it is like to be a 
superman: it illustrates the being-in-the-world-the basic attunement 
-of the Ubermensch. I do not mean to suggest that it is one possible 
attitude among many possible ones; it is the attitude simpliciter that 
Nietzsche wishes to portray if passive and active nihilism are to be 
overcome. This attitude toward life is the opposite of decadence, 
decline of life, world-weariness. It is the attitude of affirmation, of 
overfulness; the attitude that expresses ascending life, life as celebra-
tion, life in celebration. 
If the thought of eternal recurrence is called into service to tell 
us what a certain attitude is like, what celebrating life feels like, we 
must not forget Nietzsche's other point-that attitudes toward life 
are to be read as symptoms of the condition of the person having the 
attitude. Attitudes toward life are self-reference clues. This is stated 
with exceptional force and clarity in the frequently cited portion of 
Twilight of the Idols that deals with "The Problem of Socrates," espe-
cially section 2: "Judgments of value, concerning life, for or against 
it, can, in the end, never be true: they have value only as symptoms, 
they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms ... the value of 
life cannot be estimated." It is difficult to overestimate the importance 
of this point for Nietzsche, or at least for my reading of him. Increas-
ingly for me everything depends on reading Nietzsche bifocally: as 
committed to no particular world-version, or vision of human perfect-
ibility, in his metaphilosophical critique of philosophy, while at the 
same time urging particular versions and visions, and attacking par-
ticular idols. If one takes seriously Nietzsche's suggestion that the 
value of life cannot be estimated and that assessing it is, therefore, to 
be read only as a symptom, one gets both levels at once, I think. 
51. Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington and London: Indi-
ana University Press, 1978). 
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What Nietzsche affirms and denies is always radically historically 
conditioned, variable in principle on this reading-and self-referring; 
but the larger self-referential thesis is itself not variable in principle. 
Thus the attitude toward life captured in the eternal-recurrence vi-
sion is the expression of nihilism already overcome. The ecstatic atti-
tude expressed is the attitude toward life captured by the superman. 
Simply put, again, eternal recurrence expresses the attitude of Uber-
menschlichkeit and is the being-in-the-world of supermen. 
Concerning this question of attitude, then, one might usefully con-
strue diagnostically Nietzsche's statement that his teaching says the 
task is to live in such a way that one must wish to live again. No-
tice that Nietzsche does not appear to say or imply that recurrence 
should be thought of as true in order that we may accept our proper 
task. Live in such a way that you must wish to live again, he tells 
us simply. Whether or not one's life is worthy of infinite repetition 
here seems to become Nietzsche's principle of selection and redemp-
tion. But there are no spectators to decide these matters: I cannot tell 
you whether what you are and do is such that you must wish to be it 
and do it again, nor can you be my judge. Here, perhaps, the stron-
gest divergence from Kant's categorical imperative surfaces. A cen-
tral point of the Kantian thrust is to subsume judgments about indi-
vidual actions under rational, moral law; the moral law speaks no 
private language. Yet Nietzsche's eternal recurrence seems to be de-
liberately pluralistic: "My teaching declares: the task is to live in such 
a way that you must wish to live again-you will anyway! To whom 
striving gives the highest feeling, let him strive; to whom rest gives 
the highest feeling, let him rest; to whom ordering, following, obedi-
ence give the highest feeling, let him obey. May he only become 
aware of what gives him the highest feeling and spare no means! 
Eternity is at stake!"52 On the "ideal type" construal of Ubermensch-
lichkeit, what it is like to be a superman, to judge something or some-
one worthy of infinite repetition, is to prize and praise a specific 
something, a certain way of living, a specific trait or form of life. But 
Nietzsche does not seem to say that. Become aware of that which is 
worthy of infinite repetition in your life, whether that be striving or 
reposing, ordering or obeying, he tells us. The important thing is to 
become aware of what is worthy of infinity in our lives. And about 
these things we surely will differ. 
There is of course a sense in which Nietzsche's existential impera-
52. WKG, V-2, 403; aphorism II [164). This note was penned at about the time that 
the "discovery" of eternal recurrence occurred, in August 1881. 
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tive-live in such a way that you must wish to live again--does 
choose among types, does choose among lives and what have re-
cently come to be called life-styles. For even if we cannot distinguish 
life-affirmers from life-deniers by looking at what they affirm or 
deny, they may nevertheless be able to see whether they affirm or 
deny. Recall, if you will, Nietzsche's first published aphorism con-
cerning eternal recurrence, from The Gay Science: 
The greatest stress. What if one day or night a demon were to sneak 
after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you, "This life as 
you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more 
and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and ev-
erything immeasurably small or great in your life must return to 
you-all in the same succession and sequence .... "Would you 
not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the de-
mon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremen-
dous moment when you would have answered him, "You are a 
god, and never have I heard anything more godly." If this thought 
were to gain possession of you, it would transform you, as you 
are, or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, 
"Do you want this once more and innumerable times more?" 
would weigh upon your actions as the greatest stress. Or how well 
disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave 
nothing more fervently (urn nach nichts mehr zu verlangen) than this ul-
timate eternal confirmation and seal?53 
It is easy to see from this aphorism's hypothetical diction ("what 
if ... ") why the normative interpretation of Nietzsche's thought of 
eternal recurrence should have gained widespread currency. From 
a modified perspective, however, we need primarily to emphasize 
the conclusion of this aphorism. How well disposed would we have 
to become, have to be, toward life, toward our lives and the world, 
in order to affirm eternal recurrence? How life-affirming indeed 
would one have to be to crave nothing more fervently than eternal 
recurrence? 
On a superficial level, of course, it may be easy to say Yes to Nietz-
sche's demon. After all, given the alternative-death with no after-
life-who would hesitate? I think the right answer is that virtually 
all of us would or should give pause. For how many persons can 
assert without self-deception that they crave nothing more fervently 
53. FW, IV, sec. 341. 
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than the eternal recurrence of each and every moment of their lives? 
Moreover, to affirm, to appropriate eternal recurrence would not 
only require a nonselective affirmation of one's existence-present 
and past54-but by implication would commit its affirmer to prefer-
ring his or her life to any and all other possible lives. To crave noth-
ing, absolutely nothing, more fervently than the ultimate confirma-
tion and seal of eternal recurrence for one's life seems to exclude 
preferring the life of another. And my hunch is that just as each of us 
would affirm the eternal recurrence of our lives only selectively-
omitting this or that pain, regret, or humiliation-virtually none of 
us would fervently prefer our lives to all other possible lives. Who, 
for example, would not prefer to be God, if he were still alive? 
The point of these remarks may now be clearer. A superman-
and only a superman-would be so well disposed to himself and the 
world that he would crave nothing more fervently than the eternal 
repetition of his life, not even the life of God or the gods. What it 
would be like sincerely, non-self-deceptively, and nonpathologically 
to have such an attitude only supermen (and perhaps Nietzsche) 
know. I certainly don't. However, this confession should not be taken 
as a sign of paralysis, an indication that something has gone wrong 
with our analysis. For although we may not know what it is like to 
have the attitude of a superman as our most basic and defining dis-
position, and even though we cannot easily infer Ubermenschlichkeit 
from another's behavior, most of us have in fact experienced that 
tremendous moment of which Nietzsche's demon speaks in "The 
Greatest Stress." Virtually all of us have at one time or another expe-
rienced a tremendous moment whose repetition we would will unto 
eternity were this within our power, and for the sake of which we 
would exchange our lives for no other. Artists at work in every me-
dium have been known at one time or another to experience that 
enormous satisfaction when their work achieves (their standard of) 
perfection, when they would not trade places with gods. The mysti-
cal literature of East and West is full of descriptions of yearned-for 
ecstatic states that are perceived as the unique and irreplaceable 
goal of human longing. Less esoterically, it is said that the agony of 
the long-distance runner is sometimes replaced-after "the wall" 
has been "hit"-by an incredible sense of euphoria, well-being, and 
achievement, for which no other experience is an adequate substi-
tute. Most mundane of all, perhaps, human sexual satisfaction can 
54. The most forceful statement may be found in Z, II, "On Redemption" (Von der 
Erliisung). 
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sometimes be so intense and rewarding that one would will its eter-
nal repetition, and exchange lives with none at that instant. 
These illustrations are tricky, to be sure. Some may be inclined to 
argue that artistic, religious, athletic, and sexual peak experiences--
or "highs," if you prefer-are seldom if ever without self-deception 
or pathology. We need not enter that debate here, however; for the 
burden of the remark is not that we know what it is like to achieve 
iibermenschlichkeit, to achieve superhumanity, but only that we may 
on rare occasions perceive it as through a glass darkly. 
One thing is clear, however. If the value of life cannot be esti-
mated, if, that is to say, estimates of life's ultimate value and sig-
nificance function as the conceptual equivalent of the psychologist's 
Rorschach tests, then systematic world-views--religious, moral, 
metaphysical-must also be read as symptoms of the condition of 
the person who articulates cosmic estimates. And Nietzsche never 
doubted that the Christian prescription, when viewed in this self-
referring light, is incapable of the joyous self-affirmation of the su-
perman, because its dualism is born of resentful decadence. 
XVI. The Dionysian Theodicy 
Georges Goedert 
(Translated by Robert M. Helm) 
Since Leibniz, the term "theodicy" has denoted the justification of 
divine goodness in the face of arguments that deny it in giving an 
account of evil in the world.* Of course, Nietzsche had no inten-
tion of justifying a supraterrestrial being. For him, it was a matter 
of justification of life, of life in all its aspects, including the most 
frightful and the most depressing. Heinz Heimsoeth writes in this 
connection: 
For some time, it can no longer have been a question of theodicy 
for Nietzsche. But now there arose, in those years of the develop-
ment of his philosophy on the basis of his new thinking on the 
Greeks and Heraclitus, a metaphysical-existential need in Nietz-
sche for a positive evaluation of concrete being (das Seiende), a will 
to affirmation passionately pressing its way through and working 
in opposition to his life-threatening tendency toward negation of 
the world. And with that, cosmodicy became a new concern for 
him. 1 
There are, nevertheless, four reasons why we prefer the term "the-
odicy" to "cosmodicy." (1) Nietzsche himself, as we shall see, uses 
that expression in important passages. (2) He thus raises a major 
problem of German philosophy. Heimsoeth writes: 
Justification of becoming, the world "eternally justified," that is a 
new sound. It proceeds from the language of theodicy, in particu-
lar of that of the century and a half of German speculation from 
Leibniz to Hegel, interrupted only by the quickly forgotten objec-
*The present chapter is from Georges Goedert, Nietzsche, critique des valeurs chre-
tierznes (Paris, Editions Beauchesne, 1977). 
1. Heinz Heimsoeth, Metaphysische Voraussctzungen und Antriebe in Nietzsches "Immo-
ralismus" (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1955), p. 525. (Translator's note: Translations from the 
works of German writers are my own. Professor Goedert is responsible for italicization 
of words and phrases in the quotations from Nietzsche's writings, with the exception 
of a few that appear in the German text.) 
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tion of the late Kant, a period in which a metaphysical optimism 
with regard to the world (the claim to embrace all of nature, the 
human condition, and, finally, universal history) became estab-
lished on the basis of the postulate of the absolute goodness of 
God. It is precisely this transfiguration of the world, this "justifica-
tion," that Schopenhauer had rejected to the end, seeing in it a 
"wicked" misunderstanding and a disfiguring disguise of the true 
character of life and of the whole world. 2 
(3) In reality, the term "cosmodicy" is also in part inadequate to 
Nietzsche because, according to him, the universe is not a rationally 
ordered "cosmos," but a chaos. (4) The works of Nietzsche by no 
means exclude the possibility of making this chaotic becoming, justi-
fied in all its manifestations, appear as a sort of new divinity. Thus 
we read, for instance: "You call it the self-destruction of God. But it is 
only his moulting. He is shedding his moral skin. And we are going 
to see him again, beyond good and evil."3 It is only the God of Chris-
tian theology who is dead: "God suffocated from theology and mor-
als from morality."4 This parallel between theology and morality is 
highly interesting. Has not Nietzsche in effect developed a new mo-
rality on the ruins of the old? Why should he not at least have envis-
aged the elaboration of a new concept of God?5 
The problem is this: How can one legitimate life in the face of those 
who, like Schopenhauer, maintain that the negative element pre-
dominates in it and that, for this reason, it is preferable to deny the 
will to live? 
It may be maintained that the tragic wisdom of Nietzsche, after The 
Birth of Tragedy, entails a justification of life. Life is at the same time 
growth and decay, and where it is most thriving, it must also commit 
the greatest number of destructions. Also, for man, power is aug-
mented in proportion to suffering. It is in that fact that the latter 
finds its justification. 
Nietzsche thinks that in nature, man has encountered evil under a 
triple aspect: "the accidental, the uncertain, the sudden."6 In human-
2. Ibid. 
3. GOA, Xli, 329. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Concerning the analogy between various ideas of Nietzsche and the theology 
called "negative," in particular that of Saint Augustine, cf. Eugen Biser's work, "Gott 
ist tot": Nietzsches Destruktion des christlichen BewufJtseins (Munich: Kosel, 1962), 
pp. 293f. 
6. WKG, VIII-2, 133. 
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ity's attitude toward evil, he distinguishes three phases: (1) Man de-
fends himself against evil by conceiving it "as reason, as a power, 
even as a person": so he gains the possibility of putting it in some 
way under contract. Or indeed, "one interprets the consequences of 
the accidental, of the uncertain, of the sudden, as the result of good 
intentions, as full of meaning .... " Their evil and noxious character 
becomes, because of that, illusory. Or, indeed, one finally justifies 
evil by conceiving it as a chastisement. It is, then, a matter of three 
different ways of submitting to evil. And the writer adds: " ... every 
moral and religious interpretation is only a form of submission to 
evil-the belief that evil has a beneficial import amounts to giving up 
fighting it."7 (2) After the development of civilization, men learn to 
be satisfied with the moral and religious interpretation of evil: thanks 
to rational thought, indeed, they come to combat evil thereafter by 
abolishing it. But for Nietzsche, this stage could not be final. Indeed, 
the elimination of evil would mean, above all, the abolition of suffer-
ing as well: thus one would lose the indispensable ingredient of cre-
ative activity, the most important stimulus for anyone who creates. 
We know that already, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had rejected 
the optimism inherent in Socratic intellectualism because he took it 
for a symptom of "decadence." At that time, then, he had already 
interpreted the belief in the value of reason as a way of escaping 
suffering. On the other hand, however, he demonstrated in the same 
work that Socratic rationalism can be legitimated from the moment 
one believes that he takes thought to the frontiers where, illumi-
nated by new experiences, it finds the gateway to Dionysian wis-
dom. This surpassing of rational thought can also result, in fact, in 
man's beginning quite simply to have enough of the feeling of secu-
rity in which he revels as a result of the progress of rational knowl-
edge. "Yes, it is possible," says Nietzsche, "to come to a feeling of 
security, to a belief in laws and calculability, which produce in the 
consciousness a state of satiety;-one sees then the rising into view of 
the relish for the accidental, for the uncertain, for the sudden, appreciated 
as a stimulant .... "8 (3) The third phase commences at the moment 
when, suddenly, man acquires a taste for evil and recognizes that it 
constitutes a source of his greatest power. In the eyes of Nietzsche, 
this taste for evil is a "symptom of very high culture." The philoso-
pher calls it the "pessimism of strength."9 
7. Ibid., p. 132. 
8. Ibid., p. 133. 
9. Ibid. 
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Thenceforth, it is no longer evil, but good, that requires legitima-
tion. Such a change of tack clearly cannot surprise us from the mo-
ment we understand Nietzsche's judgment concerning "respectable 
people." Now good is legitimated by the fact that, in its essence, it 
belongs to evil. Likewise the philosopher sanctions the conservation 
of virtues in the traditional sense, and particularly the Christian vir-
tues, because he recognizes in them "a refinement, a subtlety, a love 
of gain and power."10 He sees in them, then, manifestations of a will 
to power! It does not matter that this is possessed by the weak. That 
does not keep it from serving as an adversary to the higher man. 
The philosopher writes: "This pessimism of strength leads ... to a 
theodicy, that is to say, to a total affirmation of the world, but for the 
same reasons that had formerly served to deny it: and in that way, 
to a conception of this world as the effective realization of the highest 
ideal."11 Schopenhauer had denied the world because of the suffer-
ings and conflicts inherent in it. Nietzsche wished to approve the 
world in its totality for the same reasons, that is to say, because the 
world includes conflicts and sufferings, because he judged that these 
are indispensable to the type of superior humanity. 
This theodicy constitutes the supreme and definitive rejection of 
Schopenhauer and of compassion. The pessimism of the strong con-
sists in the fact that they do not fly from evil with the suffering it 
brings on, but that, on the contrary, they seek it. That was already 
the lesson of The Birth of Tragedy. Suffering is too precious for one to 
combat it by altruism, charity, pity. Nietzsche writes: 
For us, it is not pity that opens the doors of the most distant and 
strangest kinds of being and culture. On the contrary, our open-
ness and lack of prejudice, far from "sympathizing," delight in a 
hundred things that formerly caused suffering (that revolted or 
agitated, or were regarded with hostility or indifference). Suffer-
ing in all its nuances is now interesting to us: we are certainly not 
sympathizers any more, even if the sight of suffering moves us so 
profoundly that the tears flow:-we are therefore, completely in-
disposed to be helpful. 12 
And nevertheless, the Dionysian theodicy of Nietzsche involves 
also the legitimation of the existence of a philosophy like Schopen-
hauer's--and then, of course, the existence of Christianity as well. In 
10. Ibid. 
11. WKG, VIII-2, 133-34. 
12. Ibid., p. 191. 
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the end, Nietzsche says yes even to the followers of nihilist philoso-
phy and religion. In fact, if decay is indispensable to life, if there is 
no new growth without the will to nothingness, then it is proper to 
take Christianity and its virtues of "decadence" seriously because of 
the function they fulfill in life. Accordingly, Dionysian affirmation 
not only involves a yes with regard to the most powerful and perfect 
phenomena of life, but also approves even the phenomena of "deca-
dence." Without "decadence" and nihilism, the idea of the superman 
would be nonexistent. That ideal is rightly, then, the justification of 
life in all its forms and of all judgments of value, these latter being 
always and everywhere the product of a fixed type of living beings 
for whom they serve as a means to the acquisition of power. 
So we arrive at a paradox that, at first sight, must appear incredi-
ble: the understanding that, in the end, the superman justifies Chris-
tian values as well. Dionysus ends by rallying to his cause the Cruci-
fied One too. Paul Wolff writes on this subject: "Nietzsche opposes 
Dionysus to the Crucified One, but he would like, nevertheless, to 
save the Crucified One for Dionysus, to see the Crucified One in the 
service of Dionysus."13 And this writer also speaks of "the immen-
sity of the enterprise to which Nietzsche puts his hand. Vanquished, 
but not annihilated, Christian values have to serve Dionysus."14 
The approval of life is more passionate in Zarathustra than in 
Nietzsche himself. Zarathustra proclaims: "But I myself am a blesser 
and a yea-sayer ... into all abysses I carry still my yea-saying which 
blesses. I I am become a blesser and a yea-sayer: and for that I fought 
for a long time and was a fighter so that I might one day get my 
hands free to bless."15 Nietzsche knows that his Zarathustra ap-
proaches more closely than he himself to the ideal of the superman. 
In fact, at the place in the Genealogy of Morals where he speaks of the 
"man of the future" who will free reality from "the anathema hurled 
against it by the ideal that has been in circulation up to now," he 
adds: "But what am I saying? Enough! Enough! At this point I ought 
to be silent: else I violate that to which only someone younger has a 
right, someone 'who belongs more to the future,' someone stronger 
than I am-Zarathustra, Zarathustra the godless."16 
Nietzsche's work involves the ruthless struggle against moral phi-
losophy and metaphysics, in short, against the whole Western tradi-
13. Paul Wolff, "Dionysus oder der Gekreuzigte," in Wolff, Denken und Glauben 
(Trier: Paulinus Verlag, 1963), p. 94. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Z, III. "Before Sunrise." 
16. GM, II, sec. 25. 
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tion. This polemic is indispensable to the definition of a new ideal. 
But it constitutes only one side of Dionysian wisdom-necessary, to 
be sure, but not the most important. In that wisdom, the approval of 
life in all its forms would seem to represent the essential element. 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche properly asserts that, in Zarathustra, his 
"concept of the 'Dionysian' became ... a splendid achievement."17 
There he places the supreme affirmation of life, as he says, in the 
mouth of "someone younger." He feels himself still too marked by 
the "degenerating, self-doubting present,'118 in which he lives and in 
which it is important first of all to free himself from the burden of the 
old ideal. That is why he is obliged to be more fighter than blesser. 
Nietzsche expresses the meaning of "Dionysian" briefly in this 
way: 
... a desire for unity, a surpassing of one's self, of daily life, of so-
ciety, of reality, an abyss of oblivion, a passionate and painful 
overflowing that is poured out in darker, fuller, more flowing con-
ditions, an ecstatic affirmation of existence in its wholeness, equal 
to itself across all changes, equally powerful, equally blessed; the 
great pantheistic participation in every joy and every pain, which, 
from the depth of an eternal will to procreation, to fecundity, to 
eternity, approves and sanctifies even the most dreadful and most 
enigmatic qualities of life: as a sentiment of the necessary union 
between creation and destruction. 19 
The "participation ... in every pain" recalls the "tragic compas-
sion": it is a matter of participation in the sufferings of all living 
beings, conceived as an ingredient of the joy that creative activity 
bestows. 
The Dionysian affirmation of life does not retreat before the vi-
tal forms and manifestations that, elsewhere, Nietzsche rejects and 
fights because he sees in them phenomena of "decadence." In this, 
there is no contradiction. In fact, it is only thanks to the Diony-
sian affirmation that the struggle against "decadence" fully finds its 
meaning and its justification. In this affirmation, the intuition tri-
umphs that life is made up of contradictions and that it would not be 
able to perpetuate itself if the contradictions were not maintained. 
Nietzsche says that it is in the "accessibility of what is most contra-
dictory" that Zarathustra experiences himself "as the supreme type 
of all beings."20 
17. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Thus Spoke Zarathustra, sec. 6. 
18. GM, II, sec. 24. 
19. WKG, VIII-3, 16. 
20. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Thus Spoke Zarathustra, sec. 6. 
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In Ecce Homo, we read also: "the psychological problem posed by 
the type of Zarathustra is how he who denies to an unheard-of de-
gree, in word and action, everything to which yes has so far been said 
can at the same time be the opposite of a nay-saying spirit .... "21 In 
the same work, Nietzsche also writes: "I contradict as no one has 
ever contradicted before and am nevertheless the opposite of a nay-
saying spirit. I am a joyous messenger such as there has never yet 
been .... "22 Nietzsche at the same time says yes and no to Chris-
tianity. He combats the Christian virtues of "decadence" in the name 
of an ideal of strength, but he recognizes that at the time in which he 
lives, Christianity is the adversary without which he would not feel 
himself impelled to search for a better ideal. The yes and the no 
complete each other and reciprocally justify each other. The affirma-
tion of life, as well as the affirmation of Christianity, is possible only 
through the struggle against Christian values; for the legitimation of 
the struggle contains also the justification of the adversary without 
which the struggle would not take place. The Nietzschean affirma-
tion of life presents an eminently tragic character. 
At the highest rung, Nietzsche's Dionysian wisdom is highly remi-
niscent of Hegel. In a posthumous fragment, we read: "The meaning 
of German philosophy (Hegel): to invent a pantheism in which evil, 
error, and suffering will not be felt as arguments against Divinity."23 
It can be seen that the Hegelian theodicy interested Nietzsche. Hegel 
had actually conceived his philosophy as a "theodicy." He was look-
ing for a reconciliation of Spirit with evil, chiefly on the level of his 
philosophy of history. He conceived universal history as a "rich pro-
duction of creative reason," while declaring that it is precisely in 
history that "all the mass of the concrete manifestations of evil is 
spread out before our eyes." According to him, the thinking spirit 
has here the possibility of reconciling itself with the existence of evil 
"by coming to understand the affirmative, in which the negative dis-
appears as something subordinate and overpowered, by the con-
sciousness, on the one hand, of what is in truth the final goal of the 
world and, on the other, by the consciousness that the final goal has 
been realized in the world and that the evil alongside it has not 
ultimately become effective."24 
Hegel appears, then, as a philosopher who affirms life in the same 
way as Nietzsche. But it is well to take into account that the relation-
21. Ibid. 
22. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 1. 
23. WKG, VIII-1, 111. 
24. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Siimtliche Werke, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 
1930), VIII, 24f. 
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ship between the two philosophers is only superficial. In general, it 
can be maintained that, despite a certain number of points in com-
mon--which it is clearly important not to underestimate-Nietzsche 
is in disagreement with Hegel on the fundamental matters. To the 
writers who interpret the affinity between Nietzsche and Hegel in 
too positive a manner, we oppose three arguments that appear to 
us decisive: (1) Hegel made the "logos" the very principle of becom-
ing. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, reason is no more than one ele-
ment among others, sprung from a profoundly irrational ground. It 
is a product of universal unreason. Those who believe in the val-
ues of reason-must we be reminded?-he takes for decadents. He 
holds that the true philosopher, one who is also a really strong 
man, conceives becoming as a chaos, destitute of rational order. Of 
course, like Hegel, he admits that contradiction performs its function 
as much on the ontological plane as on the level of human thought, 
but the significance that he attributes to it goes beyond the logical 
sense that Hegel conferred on it. 25 (2) Hegel speaks of a final end of 
the eternal wisdom, whereas Nietzsche, as did Spinoza before him, 
rejects, for the natural world, all idea of finality. (3) Nietzsche re-
proaches Hegel for having been, with Kant and Schopenhauer, "of 
moral origin."26 Karl Lowith pertinently writes that Nietzsche saw 
Hegel as an "artful theologian,"27 and he maintains that the former 
differs from the latter "by his radical criticism of Christian morality 
and philosophy, of which he recognizes the dominant influence also 
in the Hegelian philosophy of history."28 Indeed, one might say that, 
in assigning to religion an important place on a level with the mani-
festations of Absolute Spirit, Hegel had as his end not only the pres-
ervation of Christianity, but even the restoration of vigor to it. 
25. In any case, Walter Kaufmann is wrong in calling Nietzsche a "dialectical mo-
nist." In general, Kaufmann greatly exaggerates the influence of Hegel on Nietzsche. 
He writes: "Nietzsche's position is best elucidated by comparing it not with Scho-
penhauer's, as has generally been done, but with Hegel's" (Walter Kaufmann, Nietz-
sche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950], 
p. 206). The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze also has rightly recognized "the reso-
lutely antidialectical character of Nietzsche's philosophy"; but we cannot agree with 
him when he adds: "Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's philosophy like the 
thread of aggressiveness" (Gilles De leuze, Nietzsche et sa philosophic [Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 19621, p. 9)-Nietzsche's philosophy is not directed :n the first 
place against Hegel, but against Schopenhauer. 
26. WKG, VIII-1, 142. 
27. Karl Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1950), 
p. 193. Cf. Erich Rothacker, who maintains that the German idealism of Kant and 
Hegel is as apparent in Schopenhauer as in Nietzsche as "a camouflaged theology" 
(Erich Rothacker, Poetes et penseurs [Paris: Sorlot, 19411, p. 27). 
28. Lowith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, p. 197. 
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Now in the matter of his total legitimation of becoming, Nietzsche 
had another precursor in Germany much more important than He-
gel. This precursor was Goethe. At the outset, however, he formu-
lated with regard to Goethe a certain number of critical reservations. 
"But," Lowith writes, "when, later, Nietzsche had attained in the 
Zarathustra a sort of perfection, he silenced the reservations of his 
youth in order to appreciate Goethean existence all the more reso-
lutely."29 Moreover, it is necessary to remember that it was for the 
most part the reading of Schopenhauer that, in great measure, suc-
ceeded in inspiring in Nietzsche his veneration of Goethe. Ernst Ber-
tram writes on this subject: "And it is, above all, Schopenhauer's 
position on Goethe that determined almost wholly and for a long 
time Nietzsche's attention and attitude. We know how personal asso-
ciation for such a short time with the poet of color theory contributed 
to Schopenhauer's education and to an allegorical clarification of his 
thought; how his conception of genius, his cult of genius, indeed, 
almost his inner experience of genius always oriented him toward 
Goethe with proud and respectful regard."30 
It is interesting to note that, during his third period, Nietzsche 
attributes to the Goethe of the classical epoch some truly Dionysian 
traits. What he admires in him is "a return to nature ... an effort to 
lift himself to the naturalness of the Renaissance .... 31 Goethe also 
would have affirmed life in all its forms: "Such a liberated spirit stands 
at the center of the universe in a joyous and confident fatalism with 
29. Ibid., p. 195. 
30. Ernst Bertram, "Nietzsches Goethebild," in Festschrift fiir Berthold Litzmann, ed. 
Carl Enders (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1920), p. 320. Here again, Walter Kaufmann 
remains much too superficial when he writes: "Nietzsche's repudiation of Christian 
morality cannot be understood any more than can his critique of romanticism unless 
one keeps in mind that his own positive conception of the Dionysian was derived 
from Goethe's classical ideal-and not from the German Romantics" (Kaufmann, 
Nietzsche, p. 333). Nietzsche discovered his Dionysian ideal above all as a result of 
his study of the Greeks. However, he did not always greatly respect historical truth. 
As Alfred Baumler pertinently declares, Nietzsche himself acknowledged having in-
vented Dionysus (Alfred Baumler, Bachofen und Nietzsche [Zurich: Verlag der Neuen 
Schweizer Rundschau, 1929], pp. 33f.). It is the same with the antagonism between 
the Dionysian and Apollonian elements in The Birth of Tragedy: that opposition "is of a 
general order, it is not specifically Greek, and today, it is everywhere applied in that 
way" (ibid., p. 35). It was strongly marked by the Schopenhauerian distinction be-
tween will and idea (cf. Aloys Riehl, Friedrich Nietzsche. Der Kiinstler und der Denker, 4th 
ed. [Stuttgart: Frommann, 1901], p. 49). We repeat also what we have persisted in 
bringing to light throughout our study: Nietzsche conceived his Dionysian ideal as the 
exact opposite of the Schopenhauerian ethic of the negation of the will to live. That 
said, we shall not fail to recognize that Goethe himself also influenced Nietzsche. But 
the importance of that influence must not be exaggerated. 
31. G, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," sec. 49. 
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the faith that only that which exists in isolation is loathsome, and that 
everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole. He no longer de-
nies . ... But such a faith is the highest of all possible faiths. I have 
baptized it with the name of Dionysus."32 Nietzsche in some way 
associates Goethe with his Dionysianism. Bertram expresses this re-
lationship in his own way: "The classical Goethe becomes the com-
panion of fortune to the Dionysian Zarathustra. The Roman-German 
joins himself to the 'South' -German, the enemy of revolution to the 
hater of democracy, the adversary of romanticism to the enemy of 
Wagner, the 'decided non-Christian' to the Antichrist, the pupil of 
the Greeks to the disciple of the Greeks."33 There is, properly speak-
ing, no contradiction if, on the one hand, the philosopher continues 
to present himself as the fiercest adversary of Christianity, as the 
'~ntichrist," while, on the other hand, legitimating, in his Dionysian 
perspective, the existence of that against which he struggles with 
such fierceness. According to Nietzsche, the feeble and impotent 
themselves also aspire to power, and it is of the greatest importance 
that they remain powerful enough to be able to serve as adversaries 
to the strong. In a posthumous fragment, he writes: 
I have declared war on the anemic ideal of Christianity (and every-
thing related to it), not with the intention of destroying it, but 
only to put an end to its tyranny and to get a place free for new 
ideals, for more robust ideals .... The persistence of the Christian 
ideal is among the most desirable things there are: and even for 
the sake of the ideals that want to make themselves effective be-
side it and perhaps over it-they must have adversaries, strong ad-
versaries, to become strong?4 
With regard to the values of the weak, the philosopher likewise 
says: "It is senseless to set forth the hypothesis that all this victory of 
values is antibiological: One must try to explain it by reference to an 
interest of life .... the maintenance of the 'human' type through this 
method of assuring the supremacy of the weak and the disinherited . 
. . . " The "elevation of the type" may be "inauspicious for the con-
servation of the species." History shows us in fact that "the strong 
races decimate one another reciprocally," that they waste their powers 
rapidly and afterwards become, in consequence, "feebler, more apa-
thetic, more unreasonable than the average of the weak." Nietzsche 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie, 7th ed. (Berlin: Bondi, 1929), 
pp. 202.f. 
34. WKG, VIII-2, 189. 
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thinks that it may even be proven that the victory of the weak per-
mits the achievement of a "richer production of value" than that of 
the brief existence of prodigal races. He says: "We are in the presence 
of a problem of economy .... "35 He even goes on to declare: "The 
shrinking of man must for a long time serve as the only goal: because 
a broad base must first be established on which a more vigorous sort 
of man can stand."36 In a similar perspective, there would evidently 
no longer be a question of condemning "decadence" in the same way 
as the nihilism that it conveys. In another posthumous text we read: 
"Waste, decay, rubbish, are not condemnable in themselves: they are 
a necessary consequence of life, of the increase of life. The phenome-
non of decadence is as necessary as any other phenomenon of the 
ascent and advance of life. We do not have the power to suppress it. 
Reason, on the contrary, demands that we render it justice."37 
Nietzsche often complains that the will to nothingness propagates 
itself more and more, that men become ever "smaller." But, he asks 
himself at this point, is it not precisely there that the guarantee lies 
that one day the superman will be born? 
The instincts of decadence have become master over the instincts of 
ascent. ... 
the will to nothingness has become master over the will to live . .. 
-is it true? is there not perhaps a greater guarantee of life, of 
the species, in this victory of the weak and mediocre? 
-is it perhaps only a means to the total movement of life, a 
slackening of pace? a defense against something yet worse? 
-assuming that the strong were to become master in every-
thing, even in value-judgments: may we draw out the conse-
quences with regard to what they would think of sickness, suffer-
ing, sacrifice? A contempt of the weak for themselves would be the 
result; they would seek to disappear and be obliterated ... and 
would this perhaps be desirable? ... 
-and would we really like a world lacking in the traits shown 
by the weak, their delicacy, their kindness, their spirituality, their 
adaptability?38 
It appears, in fact, that the weak have at their command qualities 
that the strong do not possess--or at least not in the same degree-
qualities in the service of their will to power. In their turn, the strong 
35. This and the previous quotations, WKG, VIII-3, 161-62. 
36. WKG, VIII-2, 10. 
37. WKG, VIII-3, 47-48. 
38. Ibid., pp. 115-16. 
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would also have developed these qualities in order so much the 
more to exercise their dominion. The author writes: "The values of the 
weak are preponderant because the strong have adopted them in or-
der to direct the others."39 
In the very important posthumous writing entitled "Why the Weak 
Prevail," Nietzsche enumerates the traits that constitute the strength 
of the weak. He cites first compassion: "the sick and the weak have 
more compassion, are more 'human.' "40 Next, he mentions their 
"spirit," and asserts that they have "more spirit."41 They are more 
astute and artful than the strong. 42 "One must have need of spirit," 
he says, "in order to come to have spirit."43 In addition, they "have 
more fascination for one another, they are more interesting than the 
healthy .... "44 Then, in the same text, Nietzsche specifies that every 
man is in part a decadent. "And as for decadence," he says, "every-
one who does not die too early puts himself in that situation in al-
most every sense ... he also knows then from experience the in-
stincts that belong there ... : for nearly half his life, every man is 
decadent."45 Every human being ages from a certain moment on, 
and, from a physiological point of view, aging is decadence. Be-
sides, Nietzsche believes that it is, above all, women-quite half, to 
be sure, of humanity-who incarnate weakness and sickness: "Half 
of the human race is feeble, essentially sick, changeable, unstable; 
woman has need of strength, in order to hold fast to it-and of a 
religion of weakness that glorifies as divine debility, love, humil-
ity .... "46 To that, the writer adds, moreover, that the progress 
of civilization entails the growth of a number of morbid elements. 
Among them appear the "artiste" (der Artist), in whom he sees a 
"hybrid species": 
... the artiste [he says] removed from criminal action by the 
weakness of his will and his fear of society, not yet ripe for a luna-
tic asylum, but with his antennae stretched inquisitively in both 
spheres: this specific plant of civilization, the modern artist, 
painter, musician, above all, novelist, who uses for his manner of 
being the highly improper word "naturalism". 
39. Ibid., p. 249. 
40. Ibid., p. 157. 
41. Ibid. 
42. WKG, VIII-3, 96. 
43. G, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," sec. 14. 
44. WKG, VIII-3, 158. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Ibid. 
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The mad, the criminals, and the "naturalists" increase in num-
ber: signs of a growing and swiftly progressing civilization-that is 
to say, rubbish, waste, excrements gain in importance .... The 
downward tendency sets the pace . ... 47 
Finally, the writer makes the "social mishmash" responsible for the 
victory of the weak. He sees there the "consequence of revolution, of 
the institution of equal rights, of the superstition of 'the equality of 
men.'" That brings about prejudice against the elite: "There results a 
collective instinct against the select, against privileges of every sort, of 
such power and certainty, hard and cruel in practice, that in fact the 
privileged themselves soon submit to it."48 
But the strength of the weak also springs quite especially from 
their morality. We have seen that the energy of which this is evidence 
springs essentially from resentment. But given that superior men 
need to find a strong adversary facing them, they too have an inter-
est in having the morality of the weak powerful. The philosopher 
writes: "So we immoralists need the strength of morality: our instinct 
for self-preservation demands that our adversaries remain strong-
demands only to become master over them."49 He also writes more 
especially on the subject of the herd morality: "Beyond good and 
evil,-but we shall demand absolute respect for the herd morality. I 
We shall reserve for ourselves many sorts of philosophy which it will 
be necessary to teach; under certain conditions, pessimism in the 
guise of a hammer; might not a European Buddhism perhaps be 
indispensable?"50 
The usefulness of morality resides equally in the fact that it propa-
gates the practice of a certain discipline, of a certain askesis, 51 thus 
constituting a barrier against "letting go." Besides, morality would 
have been indispensable at a determined moment of the evolution 
of humanity "in order that man might triumph in the struggle with 
nature and the 'wild beast.' "52 Nietzsche then can speak of "the pro-
foundest recognition of everything that morality has done up to the 
present," but he adds that "at present, it is only a constraint, which 
could become fatal! It itself, as honesty, forces the denial of mo-
rality."53 Thus, we encounter afresh the theme of the "self-destruc-
47. WKG, VIII-3, 158-59. 
48. Ibid., p. 159. 
49. WKG, Vlll-2, 189. 
50. W, III, 450. 
51. Cf. WKG, VIII-2, 218 and 310; J, sec. 188. 
52. WKG, VIII-1, 212. 
53. Ibid., p. 210. 
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tion of morality," developed already in the course of the second pe-
riod. Nietzsche conceives his immoralism as being still founded in 
part on Christian morality. It is to Christian morality that he would 
attribute the honesty that leads to the critique of morality, a critique 
that could be considered, by virtue of that fact, as a phenomenon of 
the self-surpassing of morality. We read: "Honesty-supposing that 
this is the virtue from which we cannot free ourselves, we free spir-
its--let us cultivate it with all our malice and love and not grow tired 
of 'fulfilling' ourselves in our virtue, the only one left us .... "54 If 
Nietzsche is maintaining that what is at stake is the only "virtue" of 
free spirits, the term "virtue" must be understood in the traditional 
sense. Finally, the struggle of morality against the instincts of life 
would also have some importance in the fact that it bears witness 
to the universal immorality: "the history of the struggle of morality 
against the fundamental instincts of life is in itself the ·greatest immoral-
ity that has appeared on earth up to this day."55 
It is precisely the lessening of man that necessitates the instaura-
tion of a new ideal. The nausea that this spectacle arouses in supe-
rior men awakens new forces: "There is wisdom in the fact that 
many things in the world smell bad; even nausea creates wings and 
dowsing-powers! I Even in the best there is still that which nause-
ates; and the best is still something that must be surpassed."56 This 
nausea can be conquered only by the aspiration toward a new ideal 
and, besides, by the recognition of the function fulfilled by the "little 
people," which is precisely to make necessary the instauration of 
new values. The "little people" are indispensable also because it is 
through comparison with them that the ideal of the superman will 
have to acquire the attraction that it needs to have. 
According to Nietzsche, life will not end in nothingness, for it 
evolves in a cycle that will renew itself eternally. Everything that 
has once existed will recur eternally. This idea of eternal recurrence is 
the highest expression of the affirmation of life. It means that even 
that which is small, feeble, miserable, is going to come back eter-
nally. This last part is for Nietzsche the heaviest to bear. The chapter 
of Zarathustra entitled "The Convalescent" shows that it leads him 
dangerously into Schopenhauer's waters and the negation of the will 
to live. Zarathustra has fallen ill because of this idea: "Alas! Man 
comes back eternally! The small man comes back eternally!"57 Messer 
54. J, sec. 227. 
55. WKG, VIII-2, 93. 
56. Z, III, "Of Old and New Law Tables," sec. 14. 
57. Z, HI, "The Convalescent," sec. 2. 
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writes: "It is that experience which visibly made Nietzsche suffer 
most. It was the harshest temptation in his pursuit of the ideal. 
And, indeed, that experience whispers to us in effect: What is the 
use of all the aspirations, all the struggle with its privations and 
victories over the self: all that is truly good for nothing; men cannot 
be helped; they always remain the same!"58 The danger of falling 
prey through compassion and disgust to the lure of practical pessi-
mism attains here its culminating point. But, because the danger is 
so great, one is then witness also to an enormous growth of contrary 
forces: courage and toughness surpass every human norm at pres-
ent. The same author continues: "In the eternal recurrence of little 
people is included, so to speak, the problem of theodicy in the idea 
of the superman. Why aspire to that if the small always returns?" 
Messer gives Nietzsche's solution, formulated in abstract terms, as 
follows: "because only in the struggle with the small can the great be 
achieved, because only through opposition to nonvalue can value 
truly be actualized for us."59 The idea of "the eternal recurrence even 
of the smallest"60 becomes thus an indispensable stimulus for the 
creation of new values. Far from inciting to inertia, it is the ingredi-
ent with which no one who creates can dispense. Thus, the notions 
of "superman" and of "eternal recurrence" become truly correlative. 
Belief in the eternal recurrence of everything that exists is necessary 
in order that superman may be born, while the idea of superman, in 
return, permits the creative spirit to bear-without falling into the 
practical negation of the will to live-the idea that everything, abso-
lutely everything, even that which is quite small, will recur eternally. 
Practical pessimism is thus surmounted by men who, like Nietzsche, 
have enough strength to endure that highest suffering through the 
justification conferred on it by the supreme ideal. 61 
58. August Messer, Erliiuterungen zu Nietzsches Zarathustra (Stuttgart: Strecker und 
Schroder, 1922), p. 102. 
59. Ibid., p. 103. 
60. Z, III, "The Convalescent," sec. 2. 
61. The idea of "eternal recurrence" is therefore perfectly compatible with that of 
the "will to power." Alfred Baumler was wrong to reject the eternal recurrence because 
of the will to power. He writes: "It [the eternal recurrence] has no affinity with the 
concept of 'will to power'; indeed, if one took it seriously, it would shatter the unity of 
the philosophy of the will to power" (Alfred Baumler, Nietzsche, der Philosoph und 
Politiker, 3rd ed. [Leipzig: Reclam, 1937], p. 80). Heidegger, so far as he is concerned, 
does not see any contradiction between the two ideas (Martin Heidegger, "Wer ist 
Nietzsches Zarathustra?" in Vortriige und Aufsiitze [Pfullingen: Neske, 1954], pp. 116f.). 
Cf. also on this subject: Jean Granier, Le problhne de Ia verite dans Ia philosophic de 
Nietzsche (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1966), pp. 611-28; Karl Lowith, "Heideggers Vorle-
sungen tiber Nietzsche," in Aufsiitze und Vortriige (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971). 
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The eternal recurrence is conceived also as the supreme expression 
of universal necessity-of a necessity that, however, does not ex-
clude creative liberty but, on the contrary, favors it. Each moment is, 
in fact, a new beginning of futures that are repeated forever. Nietz-
sche writes in the Dithyrambs of Dionysus: 
Buckler of necessity! 
Highest star of Being! 
-which no desire attains, 
which no negation defiles, 
eternal yea of Being, 
eternally I am thy yea: 
for I love thee, 0 
eternity. 62 
Thanks to this affirmation, man is totally integrated into nature. He 
is the yea of nature, that is to say, the manifestation of its eternal will 
to power. The affirmation of life, at its highest level, is the affirma-
tion of eternity. This represents what is most contrary to the Scho-
penhauerian ethic of negation of the will to live. 
There are evidently truths here that transcend logical forms. The 
"pessimism of strength" is suited to a culture of the highest level, 
which permits man to renounce the support of reason. It is no longer 
a question here of combatting evil by means of reason. Man "savors 
evil (Ubel) pure and raw and finds absurd evil most interesting. If he 
formerly had need of a God, what delights him now is a world-
disorder without God, a world of accidents, the essence of which 
includes the terrible, the ambiguous, the seductive .... "63 
Reason, a crutch for the use of the weak! Belief in the rationality of 
existence, a symptom of "decadence"! For Nietzsche, all rationalism 
is fundamentally nihilistic and, like the Christian religion, contrib-
utes to the nihilistic condition into which modern man is plunged. 
We read: "The belief in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism-
we have measured the value of the world according to categories that 
apply only to a purely fictitious world."64 In the same way as happiness 
and traditional virtue, reason is, for Zarathustra, "poverty and or-
dure and wretched contentment."65 
Dionysian wisdom is fundamentally irrational. Nietzsche con-
ceives the real as a chaotic evolution, not as a rationally ordered 
62. WKG, VI-3, 403. 
63. WKG, VIII-2, 133. 
64. Ibid., p. 291. 
65. Z, Prologue, sec. 3. 
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cosmos. It is precisely therein that a new mark of strength must be 
seen: strong men are able to dispense with the convenience offered 
by order; they crave the difficulties that disorder entails. Chaos gives 
them pleasure, and confrontation with it augments their greatness. 
Zarathustra proclaims that "one must still have chaos in oneself in 
order to be able to give birth to a dancing star."66 It is necessary for 
the rational categories not yet to have dissolved disorder completely 
in the human spirit! This is the first of the preliminary conditions 
for the realization of a superior humanity. The creation of the new 
ideal from chaos is opposed to rational aspirations just as much as 
the will to power of the strong is opposed to the powerlessness of 
"decadence." 
In his study on the meaning of "chaos" in Nietzschean thought, 
the French philosopher Jean Granier shows how the disagreement 
between Nietzsche and the Western tradition is crystallized in this 
concept. He writes: 
To risk the formidable thought: the real is a chaos with no com-
mon measure with human requirements; it is necessary, then-we 
conjecture-to have traversed the desert of nihilism, to have expe-
rienced its agonies, its fears, its poignant deception. It is necessary 
to be disillusioned, like a dreamer who awakens in an implacable 
world. It is, indeed, "the death of God," the destruction of meta-
physical idealism that frees the attention for the lucid contempla-
tion of a tragic reality to which only our courage can raise a 
challenge. 67 
Chaos is life, while reason is paralysis and death. 
It may be interesting here to establish a comparison with the dis-
tinction made by Henri Bergson between "vital order" and "geomet-
ric order." In the "geometric order" of the universe, according to 
him, only reason is competent; it even represents the expression of 
the universe on the plane of thought. The "vital order," on the con-
trary, can be apprehended only through intuition. Intuition is the 
mental expression of that "vital order" which, in its most elevated 
manifestations, in man, becomes a "spiritual order." Matter and in-
telligence-for Bergson the concept of "intelligence" is almost syn-
onymous with "reason" in the traditional sense-represent forms of 
paralysis of life. They are an obstacle to life, but also constitute, at 
66. Ibid., sec. 5. 
67. Jean Granier, "La pensee nietzscheene du chaos," Revue de Metaphysique et de 
Morale, 2 (1971), 129-66. With regard to the meaning attributed by Nietzsche to chaos, 
cf. also Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), I, 349ff. 
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the same time, a support for its evolution. Bergson speaks of a shock 
that would emanate from matter and intelligence and would act as a 
stimulant on the activity of life and intuition. 
For Nietzsche, the conception of reason and the rational is similar 
to Bergson's. He too affirms that life in its profoundest aspects tran-
scends reason. He considers, on the one hand, that reason is a prod-
uct of "decadence," and because of that he finds himself at first sight 
in the service of the nihilist movement; on the other hand, however, 
he claims that "decadence" is not only useful but even indispensable 
for life. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, reason exercises a func-
tion analogous to that which Bergson attributes to it. In the strong, 
the will to power makes use of reason as of a driving-bolt, in order to 
soar up toward a greater perfection. The tragic affirmation of life is 
realized only in confrontation with the forms of its negation. For 
Nietzsche, as for Bergson, reason is at the same time an obstacle and 
a support for the expansion of life. 
One might object that there is, all the same, a difference between 
the Nietzschean concept of "decadence" and the Bergsonian notion 
of matter. To this it is proper to reply, however, that in reality the 
difference is far from being great. In fact, we read in Bergson: " ... 
with this image of a creative act that unmakes itself we shall already 
have a more exact representation of matter. And we shall see then, in 
vital activity, that which subsists of the direct movement in the in-
verted movement, a reality that is making itself in one that is unmaking 
itself. "68 Is matter not presented here as a sort of fall-out of the "elan 
vital," comparable to "decadence" as Nietzsche conceived it? 
According to Nietzsche, it is chance that reigns in the chaotic pro-
cess that is life. This does not mean the absence of all law, but only 
of a determined kind of law. The laws established by reason do not 
succeed in expressing in an exhaustive fashion the relations existing 
among the different facts and phenomena of life. Here again, one 
might have the impression that the Bergsonian philosophy expounds 
in systematic summary what Nietzsche's philosophy includes in 
germ. According to Bergson, we speak of chance when we are in 
the presence of facts that relate to the "vital order" while we expect 
to encounter the "geometric order," and vice versa. There exists no 
chance in the absolute sense. All change takes place in the frame-
work of one or the other of these two orders. 69 For Nietzsche too, 
chance is a phenomenon that is answerable to the vital order; ac-
68. H(•nri Bergson, [;evolution creatrice, 86th ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1959), p. 248. 
69. Ibid., pp. 234-36. 
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cordingly, we are incapable of explaining and foreseeing it by means 
of rational categories. For purpose and efficient cause are catego-
ries with the aid of which it is impossible to apprehend life. And 
what is true of life is true also of the value-judgments to which it 
gives birth. These last are to be considered and treated as vital phe-
nomena. In a passage of Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, let 
us recall, Nietzsche said: " ... the expression of every profound 
philosophical intuition, by dialectic and scientific reflection, consti-
tutes without doubt, on the one hand, the sole means of communi-
cating the content of intuition, but it is a poor means, indeed, in the 
last analysis, no more than a metaphorical transference, quite inade-
quate in a different sphere and language."70 Once again, what a re-
semblance to Bergson! For him too, "intuition" is the kind of know-
ing by means of which man succeeds in penetrating the very essence 
of life. And when Nietzsche speaks of "a transference ... quite in-
adequate in a different sphere and language," does that not recall 
that, according to Bergson, "intelligence," as a mental expression of 
"geometric order," can give only a quite inadequate explanation of 
vital phenomena? 
Moreover, Nietzsche's irrationalism can, if one wishes, be inferred 
in part from Schopenhauer's ideas of genius and from the difference 
that they establish between "concept" and "idea," just as between 
science and art. The "concept," according to Schopenhauer, is acces-
sible to all beings endowed with reason; by contrast, to know the 
"idea," it is necessary " ... to have raised oneself above all willing 
and all individuality to the state of a pure knowing subject; thus, it is 
attainable only by the genius, and thus by one who, motivated gen-
erally by works of genius, has attained an exalted state of mind by 
increasing his power of pure knowing." 71 Concepts are no more than 
simple instruments of science, which has phenomena as its exclusive 
object and obeys the principle of reason. Art, by contrast, is "the mode 
of contemplation of things, independent of the principle of reason; it is op-
posed therefore to the mode of knowledge properly subject to that 
principle which leads to experiment and science."72 The essence of 
genius consists in the aptitude for the contemplation of "ideas." "It is 
only by this contemplation, pure and completely absorbed in the 
object, that ideas are conceived, and the essence of genius consists 
precisely in an eminent aptitude for such contemplation."73 It may 
70. GOA, X, 25. 
71. Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. I of the Siimtliche 
Werke (Munich: Piper, 1924), 276. 
72. Ibid., I, 218. 
73. Ibid. 
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seem that, on this point, Bergson and Nietzsche both allowed them-
selves to be inspired by Schopenhauer. 74 
Zarathustra, in his poetic style, admirably illustrates Nietzschean 
irrationalism: 
Indeed, it is a benediction, not a blasphemy when I teach: "Over 
all things stand the heaven accident, the heaven innocence, the 
heaven chance, the heaven playfulness." 
"By chance" -that is the oldest nobility in the world, and this I 
restored to all things; I liberated them from servitude to purpose. 
This freedom and celestial serenity I placed over all things like 
an azure bell when I taught that over them and across them no 
"eternal will" -wills. 
This playfulness and folly I put in the place of that will when I 
taught "In everything one thing is impossible-rationality!" 
A little reason, to be sure, a seed of wisdom dispersed from star 
to star-this leaven is mixed in with all things: for the sake of 
folly, wisdom is mixed in with all things! 
A little wisdom is indeed possible; but I found this blessed certi-
tude in all things: that on the feet of chance they prefer-to dance. 
0 heaven over me, pure and high! To me that is now thy purity, 
that there does not exist any eternal spider-reason or spider web 
of reason: 
-that thou art to me a dance floor for divine accidents, that 
thou art to me a divine table for divine dice and dice players!-75 
This text recalls to us the profound admiration that Nietzsche, dur-
ing his first period, had already evinced for Heraclitus. Existence, a 
game that the gods play. Gods with human visages or men with 
divine faces? 
Even poetic expression does not suffice to communicate the ex-
treme richness of the interior vision. Zarathustra says: 
... in truth, I am ashamed that I am obliged still to be a poet! 
Where all becoming seemed to me to be a dance of gods and the 
playfulness of gods and the world seemed free and boisterous and 
as if returning to itself:-
74. In his work Die schaffende Natur (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1919), }. Reinke chal-
lenges the idea that Bergson depends on Schopenhauer, but he maintains that the 
latter could not have remained unknown to the French philosopher. He undertakes to 
show "a certain number of planes on which Schopenhauer and Bergson are near to 
each other" (p. 130). 
75. Z, III, "Before Sunrise." 
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-as an eternal fleeing of one another and seeking of one an-
other afresh of many gods, as the happy contradicting of one an-
other, hearkening again to one another, and belonging again to 
one another of many gods:-
Where all time appeared to me to be a happy scorning of mo-
ments, where necessity was freedom itself, playing happily with 
the sting of freedom:-76 
And in addition, Zarathustra, making allusion anew to the eternal 
recurrence and to the theodicy implied by belief in it, continues: 
Where I too found again my old devil and archenemy, the spirit of 
gravity, and everything that he created, compulsion, rule, neces-
sity, and consequence and purpose and will and good and evil:-
For must there not be that over which one dances and dances 
away? Must there not for the sake of the light, the lightest-be 
moles and grave dwarfs?77 
The "spirit of gravity" must exist in order that it may be possible 
for the strong to surpass themselves in dancing! In this symbol of the 
dance are expressed the lightness and freedom that characterize su-
perior men. Let us recall that in The Birth of Tragedy, dance was pre-
sented, along with music, as a Dionysian art! Zarathustra sees, then, 
in the "spirit of gravity," his "ancient devil and archenemy." What is 
thus alluded to here is "decadence" with all its works and nihilistic 
manifestations. It is, in the first place, a matter of the Schopenhauer-
ian philosophy, toward which, for a brief period, Nietzsche once felt 
himself attracted after reading The World as Will and Idea. We may say 
that the attraction toward Schopenhauer's ethic remained latent in 
Nietzsche, a little in the manner of a permanent temptation that, 
from time to time, he had to overcome afresh. 
But the theodicy inherent in the idea of the eternal recurrence con-
stitutes the culminating point of Nietzsche's opposition to Schopen-
hauer. One could not go farther "beyond good and evil." Besides, 
"beyond good and evil" is a formula the full sense of which one does 
not grasp without having understood that it is, from the very first, 
opposed to Schopenhauer and his moralistic conception of existence. 
According to Schopenhauer, existence means shortcoming and pun-
ishment. To that, Nietzsche opposes the innocence of becoming, the 
legitimation of becoming in all its forms. But if all the vital phe-
76. Ibid., "Of Old and New Law Tables," sec. 2. 
77. Ibid. 
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nomena are justified, this means that the "spirit of gravity" also has 
his approval: it is approved to the extent that the new freedom is the 
result of the fight against it, when, without that fight, it would be 
unrealizable. Thanks to the belief in the eternal recurrence, man is 
truly free, for, having bowed to universal necessity, he participates 
henceforth in the free play of the world. 78 
As a posthumous note indicates, play is "the ideal of one over-
flowing with strength."79 That is the reason why the higher man 
becomes like a child. In the chapter entitled "Of the Three Metamor-
phoses," Zarathustra recounts that he has first been a "camel," that 
he was then transformed into a "lion," and that finally he has be-
come a "child." The "camel" symbolizes the period when he was still 
under the control of morality and, in general, of the old tradition. 
Then there comes the phase when he is a "lion," when, with the 
strength of a lion, he fights against the values of yesteryear. At 
length, he attains a still more elevated state, that of approval of exis-
tence in all its forms, which alone permits him to engage fully in the 
play of the world. The creation of new values is a part of that game 
which, eternally, builds and destroys. Zarathustra says: 
Innocence is the child and forgetfulness, a beginning again, a 
game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy yea-saying. 
Yes, for the game of creation, my brothers, there is need of a 
holy yea-saying: The spirit now wills its own will; He who is lost 
to the world now wins his own world. 80 
This creative game is Dionysus himself. 
78. From the time of his youth, Nietzsche was interested in the antinomy between 
determinism and free will, between "fatum" and freedom (cf. in particular Heimsoeth, 
Metaphysische Voraussetzungen [above, n. 1], pp. 512ff.). It may be maintained that 
Dionysian play, in abolishing the separation of necessity from freedom, constitutes the 
highest expression of his idea of "fatum" conceived so much earlier. 
79. WKG, VIII-1, 127. 
80. Z, I, "Of the Three Metamorphoses." 
XVII. Nietzsche: What Christians 
and Non-Christians Can Learn 
Hans Kung 
(Translated by Edward Quinn) 
I 
Certainly Christians do not need to accept all that Nietzsche pro-
duces by way of criticism.* And with all due respect for his passion 
for truth, Nietzsche's truths are often half-truths. His knowledge of 
theology and Church history does not come up to the seriousness of 
his charges. Many passages, especially in the historically and exe-
getically oriented Antichrist, are more like pamphlets than records 
of cool investigation: Nietzsche's indignant and contemptuous lan-
guage is meant to wound. His slips are sometimes embarrassing, 
generalizations and labels abound, anti-Christian fanaticism clouds 
his judgment. Even his compliments on the antidemocratic order of 
precedence of the Roman hierarchy, their will to power and their 
aristocratic, lordly manners, and even on Jesuits, celibacy, and con-
fession, are questionable. Particularly questionable are his invectives 
against Luther as the corrupter of the pagan Renaissance, the plebe-
ian and hooligan, the most eloquent and most presumptuous peas-
ant in Germany, who approached all cardinal questions of power 
short-sightedly, superficially, and recklessly: "Luther, this calamity of 
a monk, restored the church and, what is a thousand times worse, 
Christianity, at the very moment when it was vanquished."1 What is to 
be said about all this? Detailed refutations would fill volumes and yet 
would not be worthwhile. For it is a question not of details but of the 
whole. Isolated positive statements on the Church and priests sim-
ply do not count by comparison with Nietzsche's wholly destructive 
criticism of Christianity as it has come to be. 2 
*The present chapter consists of an excerpt from Hans Kung, Does God Exist? An 
Answer for Today, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1980), pp. 405-15, 
reprinted by permission of the publisher. 
1. Ecce Homo, "The Case of Wagner," sec. 2; W, II, 1148. 
2. The positive statements are stressed-perhaps overstressed-by Karl Jaspers, 
Nietzsche und das Christentum, 2nd ed. (Munich: Piper, 1952), pp. 8-10. 
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Here in any case is a decisive rejection of Christianity, but surpris-
ingly enough we find respect for him whose person and cause Chris-
tianity invokes: Jesus of Nazareth. Certainly he, too, in the end is re-
jected by Nietzsche as the-admittedly "most interesting" -decadent, 
but without the tirades of hate and feelings of disgust usually linked 
with matters of Christianity. In his attempt at a critique of the Gos-
pels, Nietzsche thought he could establish a fundamental contradic-
tion: Here we have "the mountain, lake, and field preacher, whose 
appearance strikes one as that of a Buddha on a soil very little like 
that of India"3 and on the other hand "the aggressive fanatic, the 
mortal enemy of theologian and priest."4 Nietzsche thinks that this 
fanatic type only later "overflowed on to the type of the Master" as a 
result of Christian propaganda. 5 
What really interests Nietzsche about Jesus is "the problem of the 
psychology of the redeemer."6 Concepts such as "hero" and "genius" do 
not suit him: "a quite different word would, rather, be in place here: 
the word idiot."7 There is an odd agreement here with Dostoevsky's 
interpretation of Christ, and Nietzsche had perhaps read Dostoev-
sky's novel The Idiot. "Idiot" means "instinctive hatred of every re-
ality, as flight into the 'ungraspable,' into the 'inconceivable,' as 
antipathy towards every form, every spatial and temporal concept, 
towards everything firm, all that is custom, institution, Church."8 For 
the "good news" of this "bringer of glad tidings" consists in the fact 
that there are no longer any antagonisms. The barriers have fallen 
between Jews and non-Jews, foreigners and natives, even between 
God and man. Such concepts as guilt, punishment, and reward do 
not exist: "Blessedness is not promised, it is not tied to any condi-
tions: it is the only reality-the rest is signs for speaking of it."9 The 
kingdom of heaven of this "great symbolist" is "a condition of the 
heart-not something that comes 'upon the earth' or 'after death' . 
. . . It is everywhere, it is nowhere." 10 Hence it is practice, not be-
lief, that distinguishes Christians: no resistance to evil, no defense of 
one's rights despite calumny and scorn, passive acceptance of every-
thing that happens. That is why this Jesus of Nazareth died on the 
3. A, sec. 31; W, II, 1192. 
4. Ibid.; W, II, 1193. 
5. Ibid. 
6. lbid., sec. 28; W, II, 1190. 
7. Ibid., sec. 29; W, II, 1190-91. Cf. A, sec. 27; W, II, 1189. 
8. Ibid., sec. 29; W, II, 1191. 
9. lbidl., sec. 33; W, II, 1195. 
10. Ibid., sec. 34; W, II, 1196-97. 
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cross as he lived: "he entreats, he suffers, he loves with those, in 
those who are doing evil to him .... Not to defend oneself, not to 
grow angry, not to make responsible .... But not to resist even the 
evil man-to love him .... "11 
This is not an unsympathetic picture of Jesus of Nazareth. It is 
clear to Nietzsche that the message of such a "symbolist par excel-
lence" -who spoke only of innermost reality, of life, truth, light, and 
for whom all other reality had value only as a sign or a parable-
cannot be reduced to formulas, dogmas, and doctrines. It is clear too 
that the disciples understood him only when they could fit him into 
the well-known categories: prophet, Messiah, future judge, moral 
teacher, miracle man. But even that was a distortion, a misunder-
standing. And the whole history of Christianity, which became in-
creasingly vulgarized, barbarized, absorbed the doctrines and rites 
of all the subterranean cults of the Roman Empire, turned out to be 
the history of "progressively cruder misunderstanding of an original 
symbolism."12 Jesus' living practice was turned into a faith and this 
faith into a doctrine. Think, for instance, of what Christians (espe-
cially Paul) have made of the cross. In the sign of this cross-which, 
for Jesus, was precisely the most severe test of his love-revenge, 
retribution, punishment, justice, were preached and the glad tid-
ings turned into tidings of woe. It was now that the type of Jesus 
the fanatic was created: "Now all that contempt for and bitterness 
against Pharisee and theologian was worked into the type of the 
Master-one thereby made of him a Pharisee and theologian."13 
Is this a picture only in black and white? Certainly from the pres-
ent-day standpoint we must judge critically this style of historiogra-
phy and exegesis. But is it not more important for Christians-who 
see themselves in the light of their Christ Jesus-to note with what 
respect the person, the message of Jesus Christ is brought out here, 
even though we cannot agree with the picture as a whole? In indi-
vidual features-to the shame of many Christians-is not the mes-
sage perhaps more credibly proclaimed by this atheist and nihilist 
than it is by these Christians themselves? How many Christians 
even ask about the authentic, original Christianity? The main charge 
brought by Nietzsche deserves all our attention: "I shall now relate 
the real history of Christianity.-The word 'Christianity' is already 
a misunderstanding-in reality there has been only one Christian, 
11. Ibid., sec. 35; W, II, 1197. 
12. Ibid., sec. 37; W, II, 1198. 
13. Ibid., sec. 40; W, II, 1202. 
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and he died on the Cross. The 'Evangel' died on the Cross. What 
was called 'Evangel' from this moment onwards was already the op-
posite of what he had lived: 'bad tidings,' a dysangel. It is false to the 
point of absurdity to see in a 'belief,' perchance the belief in redemp-
tion through Christ, the distinguishing characteristic of the Chris-
tian: only Christian practice, a life such as he who died on the Cross 
lived, is Christian .... "14 And we may hear and wonder at the words 
in The Antichrist: "Even today such a life is possible, for certain men 
even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity will be possible at all 
times."15 Are not Christians challenged here continually to compare 
their claim critically with reality, to make theory and practice coincide 
credibly, to judge themselves by the source, by Jesus himself? 
The Antichrist is obviously more anti-Christian than anti-Christ: a 
provocation for Christians which can be salutary. We need only recall 
some typical headings to find sufficient material for critical reflection. 
First: How much is true in Nietzsche's critique of the Church? Church 
as power structure over men's souls, a kind of pseudo-state? Church 
in opposition to the gospel of Jesus and to honest, straightforward 
humanity? Church in conflict with all human greatness, intent on 
making itself indispensable? Church as a center of psychological 
forgery, devaluing the natural virtues of life and intruding into peo-
ple's private life? Churches as sepulchers of God, estranged from life, 
immobile, rigid ... ? 
Secondly: How much is true in his critique of the priesthood? Priests 
as the great haters in world history? The smartest, conscious hypo-
crites? Poisoners of life, parasites who live on men's sins, feelings 
of fear, and feelings of guilt? Who fear both sensuality and science, 
suppress both liberty and life? Priests--far too long wrongly re-
garded as the supreme type, the ideal, of man ... ? 
Thirdly: How much is true in Nietzsche's critique of the idea of God? 
That idea of God which is born out of resentment and plebeian mo-
rality, the one above this pitiful loafer morality of good and evil? That 
idea of God from which all that is strong, brave, heroic, proud, has 
been eliminated and which has made God into a God of the weak, 
sick, and decadent, a poor man's God, a sinner's God, a sick man's 
God? How much is true in the critique by Friedrich Nietzsche, who 
sees an abuse of divine dexterity in all talk of "grace," "providence," 
"experience of salvation"? Who finds "absurd" a God who cures a 
cold at the right time or gets us into the cab at the very moment of an 
14. Ibid., sec. 39; W, II, 1200. 
15. Ibid. 
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outbreak of heavy rain? A God, that is, who is more of a "servant," 
"postman," "Santa Claus": when all is said and done, a word for the 
most stupid kind of all coincidences? Must it not be admitted that 
this critique of God is made for man's sake: to protect human identity 
against a paralyzing knowledge, a petty moral supervision, an op-
pressive love of God? Did Nietzsche not get rid of God for man's 
sake: godlessness not as an end in itself but as a precaution against a 
belief in God that depreciates human existence? Cannot the immedi-
acy of human existence be threatened by an alienation brought about 
by religious influences? 
Nevertheless, something more has to be said: If Christianity really 
were as Nietzsche saw it, then it could be and would have to be 
rejected today, and for good reasons; 
if "God" were merely the counterconcept to life, and in it everything 
detrimental, poisonous, slanderous, the whole mortal enmity to life, 
were brought into a horrible unity; 
if the concept "beyond" or "true world" had been invented in order 
to devalue the only world that exists, in order to have no goal, no 
reason, no function left for this earthly reality; 
if the concept "soul" or "spirit" or, still more, "immortal soul" had 
been invented in order to despise the body, to make it sick, "holy," in 
order to approach with an appalling superficiality all the things that 
deserve to be taken seriously in life, that is, the questions of suste-
nance, a place to live, treatment of the sick, cleanliness, weather; 
if, instead of health, "salvation of the soul" were sought, as a manic-
depressive condition, a foile circulaire, alternating between spasms of 
penance and redemption hysteria; 
if both the concept of "sin" and that of "free will" had been invented 
in order to confuse the instincts and to make mistrust of these into a 
second nature; 
if the mark of real decadence were involved in the concept of the 
"selfless" or of "self-denial"; 
if self-destruction were made into a stamp in general use, into a 
"duty," into "holiness," into the "divine" in man; 
if, finally, the concept of the "good man" implied taking the side of 
all the weak, the sick, the failures, all those suffering from them-
selves, against the people who say Yes, who are certain of the future, 
who are guaranteed the future; 
if, then, all that were Christian morality, 16 
then-yes, then-we would have to subscribe along with Nietzsche 
16. Cf. the description in Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 8; W, II, 1158-59. 
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to Voltaire's Ecrasez l'infame! Then-yes, then-we would have to be 
with "Dionysus versus the Crucified."17 Then it would no longer be 
possible to be Christian, but only anti-Christian. 
But how often has Christianity-in certain forms of Protestant-
ism and Catholicism-actually been presented as it was seen by 
Nietzsche, who had gotten to know Christianity mainly in a Protes-
tant parsonage, a Christian boarding school, and through Schopen-
hauer's philosophy? And how often is it preached, commended, 
lived, in this way even today in the churches? 
All that we can say here is that Christianity does not have to be 
seen in this way. Indeed, it cannot be seen in this way if Jesus Christ 
is rightly understood. For in this light it is impossible to be a Chris-
tian without being human, to be a Christian at the expense of being 
human, to be a Christian alongside, above or below being human. 
Being a Christian must be radically, truly humanly being human, so 
far-that is--as it can fully incorporate the human, all-too-human in 
all its negativity. 1R 
II 
Non-Christians? Can even non-Christians learn from Nietzsche? The 
question might surprise anyone who was far too sure of knowing 
where he stood with Nietzsche. The question should surprise any-
one who is not clear about the consequences of getting involved with 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche pierced through to the foundations of human 
knowledge and questioned them as no one had done before him. No 
one has equaled him in the acuteness, depth, and radicalness of his 
thought: not Feuerbach, not Marx, and not even Freud; at most, 
Pascal. Ought not the consequences particularly of the nihilism ana-
lyzed by Nietzsche to have been considered at the opportune time? 
After all we have had to say about Nietzsche's struggle against 
Christianity, one thing is crystal clear. With all the passion that was 
in him, Nietzsche opposed a particular kind of human being: the 
sick, suffering, inferior, mediocre human being. The latter is the type 
of decay, disintegration, and weakness. At this very point, therefore, 
we have a revaluation of values, the will to power. Nature, seen from 
the Darwinian standpoint, is the model on which Nietzsche bases 
his picture of man: "The grandiose prototype: man in nature-the 
17. This is how Ecce Homo ends; W, II, 1159. 
18. Cf., on the whole subject, my work On Being a Christian (New York: Doubleday, 
1976), especially D: "Practice." 
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weakest, shrewdest creature making himself master, subjugating the 
stupider forces." 1<J 
As we have seen, Nietzsche nowhere saw the type he despised 
more fully realized than in Christianity, with its "God on the Cross," 
where "everything that suffers, everything that hangs on the Cross" 
is declared "divine."20 And who would say-particularly as a Chris-
tian-even today that this picture by Nietzsche of a suffering, guilty, 
inferior, feeble "typical" Christian is merely a caricature? Of course 
Christians, too, have learned something. Even within Christianity, 
today, there is no question of building up the hypocritical, the 
weakly, the mediocre, the frustrated, the guilty. But-and this ques-
tion must in turn be put to Nietzsche-what of the opposite type, 
which-after the publication of Zarathustra-he never tired of propa-
gating, commending, celebrating as an alternative: the superman? 
Is it, then, the superman or at least the man of power who should 
be sought and bred today? Who despises the mob and counts him-
self among the physically and mentally strong, the distinguished, 
aristocrats, privileged? Who, while certainly also ruthless toward 
himself, wants to exterminate whatever is mediocre and to cultivate 
whatever promises hardness and cruelty? Who as a beast of prey 
with the motto "live dangerously" pursues his interests regardless of 
the victims, if this only feeds power, is useful to life, is of service to 
the rulers? Who simply withstands his destiny right up to pointless 
extinction? 
In the second half of the twentieth century, this type of man has 
become only too well known: men without God, whose relationships 
with one another are concretized even into the private sphere, deter-
mined by functional and practical values, guided by power inter-
ests, the weak everywhere being the victim of the stronger, superior, 
less scrupulous. The horizon of meaning is in fact effaced, there 
are no longer any supreme values, reliable guiding principles, abso-
lute truth. In practice, does this not mean that a nihilism of values 
is determining human behavior? Has that not come to pass which 
Nietzsche foresaw-more clearsightedly than many before him? But 
it is often a mild, concealed, unemotional nihilism, without the pas-
sion of a Zarathustra but no less dangerous. Many today are distrust-
ful toward a loud, public nihilism, and no politician, anyway, could 
afford to indulge in it. But people permit themselves a mild, private 
nihilism, often guilelessly, innocently, perceiving the consequences 
only at a very late stage. For, after so many taboos were broken in 
19. Nachlaft (WM), sec. 856; W, III, 491. 
20. A, sec. 51; W, II, 1217. 
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the war years and subsequently, so many traditions disappeared, 
conventions were dropped, humanisms were emptied of meaning, 
despite all the prosperity and better education, in many families 
parents no longer know to which values, guiding principles, ideals, 
norms,. to which truth, they should cling and to which they should 
educate their children: devaluation (often without any revaluation) of 
values, the loss of which can then be noted, but can be canceled only 
with difficulty. In education, culture, economy, science, politics, "an 
incomplete nihilism" lived in a middle- or upper-class style, feeble 
and only half affirmed: "we live in the midst of it."21 
Sometimes, however, more is involved. Nihilism presents many 
faces, from bored, intellectual skepticism to brutal political anar-
chism. Undoubtedly it is not only because of a whole packet of social 
factors but in the last resort also because of a nihilistic lack of orienta-
tion and lack of norms, that there has been an alarming increase in 
the number of thefts, robberies, crimes of violence, murders, by chil-
dren, young people, students (more and more of them female), that 
the number of drug addicts, dropouts, suicides has risen tremen-
dously in the past decade, that susceptibility to ideologies has often 
amounted to mania. The "meaning deficit" and "meaning vacuum" 
in the Western affluent society, for a long time now, has not only 
provided the middle classes with intellectual titillation in the "theater 
of the absurd" of an Ionesco or a Beckett, has not only been diag-
nosed and deplored by psychotherapists and psychiatrists. 22 It is be-
ginning to be a political fact. 
Has Nietzsche, then, been proved right? As we saw, in many 
ways certainly with his analysis. Was Nietzsche right? Not with 
his alternative. For just as the weakling type, of Christian prov-
enance--as Nietzsche saw him-cannot be, may not be, the model 
for being truly human, neither can the superman, of secular prov-
enance. These are not true alternatives. Can weakness be overcome 
only by hardness? Are there no intermediate hues, no gradations, no 
mean? Are compassion, goodness, mercy, indulgence, fellowship, 
love, something that can only be denounced as weakness? Is there 
not also a mercy that comes from strength, a compassion from full-
ness, a goodness from the greatness of a man? Indeed, is not this 
perhaps the very goal that men should seek today, precisely as 
Christians, precisely in the light of belief in God? If not moralism, 
21. NachlajJ (WM), sec. 28; W, III, 621. 
22. Cf. section C. IlL 3 of Does God Exist? ("The Importance of Religion for Jung, 
Fromm, Frankel"). 
Nietzsche: What Christians and Non-Christians Can Learn 349 
then perhaps morality? If not idealism, then perhaps ideals? If not 
sanctimoniousness, then perhaps religion. 
The devastating crisis of meaning today not only affects the indi-
vidual but has also gripped society and its institutions: marriage 
and family, school and university, even the state itself. The question 
may occur to some people: What has all this to do with a "permis-
sive society," in which nothing is true and everything is allowed, in 
which no deeper meaning can be seen, in which everyone may be 
permitted everything? On the other hand, public discussion of hu-
man rights, of fundamental values, of commercial and political mo-
rality, shows that now, as before, there is undeniably a genuine need 
of norms, values, orientation, meaning. In this respect, of course, 
Nietzsche had developed his own sociological ideas. 
"Temporary preponderance of the social value-feelings compre-
hensible and useful: it is a question of creating a foundation upon 
which a stronger species will ultimately be possible.-Standard of 
strength: to be able to live under the reverse evaluations and to will 
them again eternally. State and society as foundation: world-eco-
nomic point of view, education as breeding."23 Three important as-
pects of Nietzsche's picture of society are combined in this note: 
education as breeding, the world-economic point of view of a total 
society, social value-feelings useful as precondition of the creation 
of a stronger species of man. 
Nietzsche attached little importance to education. For education 
means being concerned with the mediocre, with human beings en 
masse, raising them up to a higher level. He wants nothing of this: 
the gulf between the species must be widened; "establish dis-
tances" -this is the solution. 24 The lower species is the base on 
which the higher stands, on which alone the higher can perform its 
task. And what is due to the higher is nothing for the lower. "That 
which is available only to the strongest and most fruitful natures and 
makes their existence possible-leisure, adventure, disbelief, even 
dissipation-would, if it were available to mediocre natures, neces-
sarily destroy them-and actually does. This is where industrious-
ness, rule, moderation, firm 'conviction' have their place-in short, 
the 'herd virtues': under them this intermediate type of man grows 
perfect."25 
Where education is not desired, breeding must take its place. What 
23. Nachlafl (WM), sec. 903; W, III, 562. 
24. Ibid., sec. 891; W, III, 610. 
25. Ibid., sec. 901; W, III, 554. 
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Nietzsche wrote about this became the prescription followed by the 
National Socialist ideologists, blinded by their biology of race, fifty 
years later: "A question constantly keeps coming back to us .... Is 
it not time, now that the type 'herd animal' is being evolved more 
and more in Europe, to make the experiment of a fundamental, arti-
ficial, and conscious breeding of the opposite type and its virtues? 
And would it not be a kind of goal, redemption, and justification 
for the democratic movement itself if someone arrived who could 
make use of it-by finally producing beside its new and sublime 
development of slavery (that is what European democracy must be-
come ultimately) a higher kind of dominating and Caesarian spirits 
who would stand upon it, maintain themselves by it, and elevate 
themselves through it? To new, hitherto impossible prospects, to 
their own prospects? To their own tasks?"26 These ideas of Nietzsche 
were not disposed of when National Socialism came to its disastrous 
end. They are again relevant today in view of microbiological discov-
eries concerning the manipulation of genes. 
When such a doctrine of contempt for man is preached, it is not 
difficult to justify war, the sacrifice of the many, endurance at all 
costs: ·''One must learn from war: (1) to associate death with the 
interests for which one fights-that makes us venerable; (2) one must 
learn to sacrifice many and to take one's cause seriously enough not 
to spare men; (3) rigid discipline, and to permit oneself force and 
cunning in war."27 
In the present century, we have seen all these ideas exploited in 
the most cruel, albeit one-sided fashion, particularly when a real 
"superman" finally appeared. In the person of a German, which was 
not exactly what Nietzsche had expected. For Nietzsche was an anti-
nationalist and European, despiser of German philistinism, square-
ness, beeriness, nationalistic blustering, and at the same time an 
admirer of Latin form, French wit, and Mediterranean mentality. Al-
lowing for all this, Nietzsche must still be described as one of the-
involuntary-precursors of National Socialism (and Italian Fascism, 
which people like to forget today), which-understanding and mis-
understanding-put into practice essential ideas of Nietzsche. 28 
It was clear that Nietzsche could not think anything of democracy 
or parliamentary government, nor could he think anything of social-
26. fbid., sec. 954; W, III, 505-6. 
27. Ibid., sec. 982; W, III, 432. 
28. For early evidence of this, see Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks. A Series of 
Political Conversations with Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims (London: Thornton Butterworth, 
1939). 
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ism. The people? From the time of his early preoccupation with the 
Greeks, Nietzsche was fascinated by the idea of the elite, now with 
the power elite. The Revolution? For him it had only one good as-
pect: it produced Napoleon. Otherwise the result was a "social hodge-
podge": "the establishment of equal rights, of the superstition of 
'equal men.' "29 Universal suffrage, parliamentary government? For 
Nietzsche, this is the tyranny of mediocrity, the rule of inferior hu-
man beings. All that could so long be kept under now comes to the 
top: "the slave instincts, the instincts of cowardice, cunning, and 
canaille in those orders that have long been kept down."30 Walter Jens 
is right when he says: "While Kant and Hegel, Goethe and Heine, 
knew the age in which they lived and expected from the French 
Revolution or the Prussian court, from America or the republican 
spirit, influences that characterized their epoch ... while they were 
contemporaries, exchanging ideas with kindred spirits and oppo-
nents, Nietzsche lived alone, by himself, in a no-man's-land, in a 
realm of shades: blind not only in a physical sense. No Marx ever 
encountered him. The manner in which he describes socialism-'tyr-
anny of the stupid,' 'the herd animal itself as master,' 'a hopelessly 
sour affair' -displays pure ignorance. Nietzsche-it must be said-
did not know what he was talking about."31 
Also, did Nietzsche know what he was talking about when he 
compared the practical value of men-of the inferior men, it should 
be noted, not of the superior men-with the function of a machine? 
"The task is to make man as useful as possible and to approximate 
him, as far as possible, to an infallible machine: to this end, he must 
be equipped with the virtues of the machine (he must learn to expe-
rience the states in which he works in a mechanically useful way as 
the supremely valuable states; hence it is necessary to spoil the other 
states for him as much as possible, as highly dangerous and disrepu-
table)."32 Did Nietzsche know what he was talking about when he 
demanded "the production of a synthetic ... man for whose exis-
tence this transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondi-
tion, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being"?33 Did 
he know what he was talking about when he preferred to express his 
29. Nachlafl (WM), sec. 864; W, III, 708. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Walter Jens, "Friedrich Nietzsche. Pastor ohne Kanzel," Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 6 February 1974; reprinted in his collected articles, Republikanische Reden (Mu-
nich: Kindler, 1976), pp. 101-12. 
32. Nachlafl (WM), sec. 888; W, III, 630. 
33. Ibid., sec. 866; W, III, 629. 
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contempt for inferior human beings in a metaphorical language of 
industrial technology: "Lunatics, criminals, and 'naturalists' are in-
creasing: sign of a growing culture rushing on precipitately-i.e., the 
refuse, the waste, gain importance-the decline keeps pace."34 There 
is no doubt that we have here an anticipation of what Fritz Lang, in 
his famous film of the twenties Metropolis, evoked in expressionistic 
imagery, and Aldous Huxley, in Brave New World, in the early thir-
ties, developed in the shape of a negative Utopia: The mob has to 
function in the style of a machine, the rule of an aristocratic-techno-
cratic elite has been set up, the superman created. 
And Nietzsche himself? What a contrast between this man and his 
work, this message and this messenger. It must be made quite clear 
that here is someone who proclaims a philosophy of world-historical 
import with great visionary force, with the passion of a world-sur-
veying prophet and the gestures of the founder of a religiion-and is 
himself an unknown retired professor of ancient philology, traveling 
restlessly from place to place, barely managing to live in modest 
rooms of a hotel or bakehouse. Here is someone who proclaims the 
message of absolute hardness, ruthless cruelty, and the extermina-
tion of all that is ailing and weak-and has himself been a sick man 
since his student days, needs the help of the very people he de-
spises, depends on the compassion of the very people he opposes, 
is continually troubled about his food and mode of life, following 
planned diets, drawing up climatological graphs and even forging 
medical prescriptions. Here is someone who proclaims the doctrine 
of the superman, of light and of life-and never comes out of his 
own shadowy world, lives unsuccessfully remote from the reality of 
his time, conversing only with hotel guests and especially with his 
books. What a contrast! An essentially tender, vulnerable, rather 
timid, effusive person, whom everyone-even the most simple peo-
ple-found agreeable. And yet this hatred for people, particularly 
the weak and inferior. An absolutely intellectually honest thinker. 
And yet he prefers to adopt an aristocratic, upper-class manner and 
to talk about his supposed descent from a noble Polish family, in-
stead of admitting his origin from a Protestant pastor's family. A 
divided personality? Yet, in many respects: thinker, psychologist, 
rhetorician, preacher, but also actor in the grand manner, all in one 
person, whose thought is challenging in its radicality, whose destiny 
is shattering in its severity, whose teaching, however, is alarming in 
its consequences. 
34. Ibid., sec. 864; W, III, 708. 
XVIII. Humanity without the 
Fellow-Man: Nietzsche's Superman 
and Christian Morality 
Karl Barth 
(Translated by G. W. Bromiley) 
I 
We have to rule out the possibility of a humanity without the fellow-
man.* Hence we must not discuss it. But it will be worth our while to 
consider briefly what we are ruling out, what conception of man we 
are passing by without discussion. We may begin by admitting that it 
is not self-evident that it should be ruled out in this way, and thus 
passed by without discussion. In doing this, we follow the higher 
right of theological necessity. But on behalf of the rejected humanity 
which is either without or against the fellow-man, or pays him only 
casual attention, it may be argued that it is not only infinitely more 
appealing but even self-evident on a nontheological view. 
If we bracket the Christian judgment, does not the word "man" 
immediately and at bottom definitively conjure up a being which is 
basically and properly for itself, so that although it may be vaguely 
recognized in others it can be and is seen immediately and directly 
only in the self? According to this constantly victorious conception 
humanity consists in the fact that I am, that I am for myself, and 
neither from nor to others. In certain circumstances this "I am" can 
have a powerful radius. And it is not to be subjected to a moralistic 
judgment and condemnation as limitation or self-seeking. For after 
all, it will somewhere embrace others as well. The only trouble is that 
basically and properly it is without them or against them or only 
secondarily and occasionally with them and for them. 
"I am" -this is the forceful assertion which we are all engaged in 
*The present chapter consists of an excerpt from Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. 
G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrence, 5 vols. in 14 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-77), III-
2, 229-42, reprinted by permission of the publisher. 
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making and of which we are convinced that none can surpass it in 
urgency or importance; the assertion of the s~lf in which we can 
neither be replaced by any nor restrained by any. "I am" means that I 
satisfy myself even in the sense that I have to do justice to myself, 
that I am pressingly claimed by myself. "I am" means that I stand 
under the irresistible urge to maintain myself, but also to make 
something of myself, to develop myself, to try out myself, to exercise 
and prove myself. "I am" means further, however, that in every de-
velopment and activity outwards I must and will at all costs maintain 
and assert myself, not dissipating and losing myself, but concentrat-
ing even as I expand, and getting even as I give. It means that I must 
and will acquire and have personality. But the radius is even wider 
than this. "I am" means that I may and must live; that I may and 
must live out my life in the material and spiritual cosmos, enjoying, 
working, playing, fashioning, possessing, achieving and exercising 
power; that I may and must in my own place and within my own 
limits--and who is to say where these are to be drawn?-have my 
share in the goods of the earth, in the fullness of human knowledge 
and capacity, in the further development of human technique and art 
and organization. 
These are powerful projections of the "I am" outwards into space 
and time and its truth and poetry or rather its poetry and truth, its 
myth and history. And to these projections there certainly belongs 
the fashioning of a relationship to what is called "heaven" in the 
Bible and "God," "the gods," or "the divine" elsewhere; the con-
struction of a positive or negative, believing or skeptical, original 
or conventional position with reference to the ultimate limits and 
mystery of life, the incomprehensible which will finally confront all 
our comprehension. And inevitably in this onward progress of the 
"I am" the encounter with fellow-men will have its own specific 
and determinative part; the burning questions whether thiis or that 
person is important or indifferent to me, whether he attracts or re-
pels me, whether he helps and serves or obstructs and harms me, 
whether he is superior to me or I can master him and am thus supe-
rior to him. To these projections there also belong the dealings with 
him, with all the selection and rejection, the conflict, peace and re-
newal of conflict, the constant hide-and-seek, the domination and 
dependence, the morality and immorality which these dealings in-
evitably involve and without which life would certainly be much 
easier and simpler but also much poorer and duller. The only thing is 
that here too we have a projection of the "I am" outwards. Even the 
many forms of our fellows are ultimately elements in our own myth 
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or history, not found but invented and decked out by us, and merely 
speaking the words which we put on their lips. There are merely 
more or Jess serviceable or unserviceable figures in our own play, 
drawn into ourselves to the extent that we have in some way trans-
formed them into something that belongs to us. In their genuine 
otherness and particularity they are without like in the rest of the 
cosmos. 
Originally and properly within I am still alone by myself: in my 
freedom in relation to the whole cosmos; with my poetry and truth; 
with the question of my needs and desires and loves and hates; with 
my known and sometimes unknown likes and dislikes; with my ca-
pacities and propensities; as my own doctor, as the sovereign archi-
tect, director, general, and dictator of the whole, of my own earth 
and heaven, my cosmos, God, and fellow-men; as the incomparable 
inventor and sustainer of myself; in first and final solitude. Within 
this total conception there is naturally an infinite range of colors and 
contours, of nuances and emphases, to the final and apparently self-
exclusive extremes. It is a unity only in general. In detail the varia-
tions are so great as to make the common features almost unrecog-
nizable. It never repeats itself. It constantly takes on new forms not 
only in the different ages and cultures, not only in the distinction of 
individuals, but also within their own specific development, in youth 
and maturity and age, in the changing stations and circumstances of 
life. But we should not be misled. The "I am" may often be less 
powerfully at work as the basis and beginning of all things. We may 
not always see that in everything else we really have projections of 
this I. Our fellows in their otherness and particularity may often be 
more forcefully and obstinately and pertinently at work than our de-
piction suggests. Yet the overwhelming unity of the whole remains----. 
of an attempted humanity in which the fellow-man has no constitu-
tive function. And, if for a moment we suspend our Christian judg-
ment, we at once recognize that it is the most obvious thing in the 
world to answer the question of humanity with perhaps a more pro-
found and purified and convincing modification of this view. We 
have to realize what it means that theological anthropology cannot 
grasp this most obvious of all possibilities, but must reject it a limine. 
II 
By way of illustration we may refer to Friedrich Nietzsche. We do this 
for two reasons. He developed this conception of humanity with un-
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equaled logic and perspicacity. And in his refusal to evade its deep-
est root and supreme consequence, in his enthusiastic acceptance of 
them, he resolutely and passionately and necessarily rejected, not a 
caricature of the Christian conception of humanity, but in the form of 
a caricature the conception itself. He shows us how necessary it is 
that we for our part must less violently but no less resolutely reject 
the conception of humanity of which he is a classical exponent. 
In 1888 Nietzsche wrote his Ecce Homo, which was published in 
1908. This is an autobiography, of the same genre as Augustine's and 
Rousseau's Confessions, but with no admission of mistakes, and con-
stituting an unequivocal final testimony for the future interpretation 
of the author. Shortly after writing it, Nietzsche was declared to be 
afflicted with an incurable mental sickness. It was understandable 
that Franz Overbeck, one of his closest friends, should at first pre-
vent its publication. But he was not justified on material grounds, for 
whether Nietzsche was already ill or not when he wrote this book 
there can be no doubt that in it he rightly perceived and summed up 
the final intentions of his purposes and work as they had marked 
him from the very first. 
On the first page of Ecce Homo we read in heavy type the state-
ment: "Hear me, for I am he; do not at any price mistake me."1 And 
even more menacingly on the final page, again in heavy type: "Am I 
understood?-Dionysus against the Crucified .... "2 The first saying 
is a bizarre but genuine form of the first and final proposition of 
humanity without the fellow-man. Nietzsche liked to see it repre-
sented in the form of the ancient Greek god Dionysus. The second 
is the repudiation of Christianity self-evident on the basis of this 
humanity. 
"Hear me, for I am he; do not at any price mistake me." We shall 
first try to see what this means. Goethe too, whom Nietzsche usually 
although not always mentioned respectfully as a precursor, wanted 
to be regarded and estimated as "he," with a certain solemnity and 
joyous reverence making himself and his way and culture and work 
the theme of special consideration and explanation, and having an 
obvious consciousness of himself. But Nietzsche was basically and 
properly self-consciousness and nothing more. His angrily uncer-
tain: "Do not at any price mistake me" and later his eager: 'A.m I 
understood?" would have been quite unthinkable on the lips of Goe-
the. Goethe was on the same path as Nietzsche, an exponent of the 
1. Ecce Homo, Preface, sec. 1. 
2. Ibid., "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 9. 
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same "I am," but he knew when to stop, and said certain ultimate 
things about this beginning and end either not at all or very seldom 
and with great caution. He knew how often and not unjustly he was 
praised for keeping to the golden mean. He could do so, and neces-
sarily, because his self-consciousness was continually filled with the 
most attentive and deeply interested world-consciousness. The quiet 
fulfillment of almost uninterrupted work in the world outside gives 
to his picture, and his occasional self-portraits, the character of a 
cheerful sanity in which he could not be tempted by any anxiety lest 
he should be confused with others, because he was far too worldly-
wise even to make this a matter of debate. But Nietzsche was the 
prophet of that humanity without the fellow-man. He did not merely 
reveal its secret; he blabbed it out. He was in a nonclassical form 
what Goethe was in a classical. Apollo did not content him, it had to 
be Dionysus. Was he no longer sure of himself, as Goethe so obvi-
ously was? He once described himself as a victim of decadence, an 
example of the decline of the human type which he thought to be 
perfect and sometimes found to be represented and actualized in 
certain respects in Goethe. Did he perhaps really speak the final 
word of this humanity? At any rate, he had to cry out something 
which was in Goethe, and to which he occasionally gave expression, 
but which he wisely preferred to keep to himself-the fact that in a 
last and deepest isolation he and he alone was the eye and measure 
and master and even the essence of all things. What Goethe quietly 
lived out Nietzsche had to speak out continually with the nervous 
violence of ill-health. 
Basically, when he was not engaged in polemics but spoke posi-
tively, Nietzsche never spoke except about himself. If we study him, 
it constantly strikes us how little he deals with material and objective 
problems. What he himself was not, if it did not repel him and he it, 
interested him only as a paradigm and symbol, or, to use his own 
expression, a projection of himself. And even when he repelled, and 
was repelled, it was only because the object concerned either could 
not be used as a paradigm of himself (like Christianity), or could no 
longer be put to this service (like the later Wagner). Nietzsche was 
originally a Greek philologist, but he no longer needed Greek philol-
ogy when he had discovered Dionysus as "the one root of all Greek 
art," as "the philosophizing god," and this Dionysus was none other 
than himself, Friedrich Nietzsche. For a while he devoted himself 
with fiery energy to natural science under the banner of evolution, 
but when, probably in this sphere, he had discovered the "will to 
power" as the supreme and proper form of human existence-and 
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this, of course, as an unmistakable but impressive symbol of his own 
will-the subject did not present him with any further interest or 
problems. He wrote concerning "Schopenhauer as Educator," but 
the instructive Schopenhauer was admittedly he himself. And he 
magnified Wagner so long as he could find and represent in him 
himself and his own paganism-which was no longer possible after 
the personal injury done him by Wagner's Parsifal, in which he dis-
cerned a pilgrimage to Canossa. 
"Delight in things, it is said, but what is really meant is delight in 
oneself through the medium of things"3 -this is something which 
Goethe could never have admitted. Nietzsche did not merely admit 
it; he openly championed it as a maxim. In fact, he never really had 
any other. And so Zarathustra too-and there was little need for the 
pride with which Nietzsche expressly assures us of the fact-is none 
other than he himself, and this time the true Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
admits that by his ophthalmic affliction he had been redeemed from 
"the book" and had not read for many years-"the greatest benefit 
which I have ever experienced."4 For to read as the scholar reads is 
not to think but simply to answer to an attraction, to react. "I call it 
criminal that at the crack of dawn, in all the youth and freshness of 
his powers, the scholar-a decadent-should read a book."5 There is 
apparently only one exception: "As I see it, it is one of the most 
singular distinctions that anyone can evince to take up a book of my 
own:-I myself will guarantee that he will take off his shoes, not to 
speak of boots .... When Doctor Heinrich von Stein once honestly 
complained that he could not understand a word of my Zarathustra, 
I told him that this was quite usual. To have understood, i.e., experi-
enced six sentences of it is to be lifted on to a higher mortal plane 
than 'modern' men can reach."6 
Nietzsche was of the opinion that with his Zarathustra he had 
given humanity a greater gift than any so far given? He declared 
that in comparison with it the rest of human activity was poor and 
limited; that a Goethe or a Shakespeare could not last a single mo-
ment in this atmosphere of tremendous passion and exaltation; that 
face to face with Zarathustra Dante was merely a believer and not 
one who creates truth, a masterful spirit, a destiny; that the authors 
of the Veda were priests and unworthy to unloose the shoes of a 
3. MA, Ill, sec. 501. 
4. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Human, All-Too-Human, sec. 4. 
5. Ibid., "Why I Am So Clever," sec. 8. 
6. Ibid., "Why I Write Such Good Books," sec. 1. 
7. Ibid., Preface, sec. 4. 
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Zarathustra. And this is only the least to be said concerning it, giving 
no conception of the distance, the "azure isolation" of the work. 
"The spirits and qualities of all great souls put together could not 
produce a single speech of Zarathustra."8 Naturally this sounds dis-
ordered. But it is the position which Nietzsche indicated, to the rep-
resentation of which he dedicated his life's work. And what is this 
position but the "I am" of humanity without the fellow-man, except 
that this time it is adopted without condition or restraint, in all its 
nakedness? I am-in "azure isolation." 
Nietzsche often thought that he lived in indescribable wealth in 
this isolation, and these were the moments when he could beseech-
ingly and yet also angrily point to the fact that he had infinite things 
to give, that infinite things were to be received from him. But then 
he had to contradict himself, for how could he give wealth and life 
and joy in this isolation? On the contrary, "when I have given myself 
for a moment to my Zarathustra, I walk up and down the room for 
half an hour, unable to master an unbearable spasm of sobbing."9 
The desert grows: woe to those who fight it, 
Stone grates on stone, the desert gulps and swallows, 
And dreadful death looks gleaming brown 
And cowers--life is a cowering . . . 
Forget not man, hired out to pleasure, 
Thou art the stone, the desert, thou art death. 10 
And how is Zarathustra to be anything for others or give anything to 
them? If there were others, he would not be Zarathustra. "First give 
thyself, 0 Zarathustra."11 But he cannot do this even if he desired 
now that it has been and is his necessity and triumph to be "6,000 
feet beyond man and time."12 "The whole fact of man lies at a dread-
ful distance below him."13 
Alone! 
And who would dare 
To be a guest, 
Thy guest? ... 14 
8. Ibid., "Why I Write Such Good Books": Thus Spoke Zarathustra, sec. 6. 
9. Ibid., "Why I Am So Clever," sec. 4. 
10. "Dionysos-Dithyramben": "Unter Tochtern der Wiiste"; WKG, VI-3, 385. 
11. Ibid., "Von der Armut des Reichsten"; WKG, VI-3, 407-8. 
12. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Thus Spoke Zarathustra, sec. 1. 
13. Ibid., Preface, sec. 4. 
14. "Dionysos-Dithyramben": "Zwischen Raubvogeln"; WKG, VI-3, 387. 
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To whom is he, the superman, the absolute "I am," to give himself? 
And if there is someone, will he thank him for this or any gift? 
Who can love thee, 
The unattainable? 
Thy blessing makes all dry 
And poor in love 
-a thirsty land .... 15 
To this very day Nietzsche has been much admired and honored 
and loved. But he had no use for the fact; he could not love in re-
turn. Nothing is more striking than that he had no use at all for 
women. "They all love me," he could say, but without any satisfac-
tion. He can only ignore them or heap upon them scorn and his 
choicest invective. And in his very rejection of them he regards him-
self as "the first psychologist of the eternal-feminine."16 Yet in ad-
dition he cannot repay or be faithful to even the best and most sin-
cere of his male friends. "At an absurdly early age, when I was only 
seven, I knew that no human word would reach me, but has this 
ever caused me any obvious concern?"17 "An extreme candor to-
wards me is for me a necessary condition of existence; I cannot live in 
conditions of insincerity. ... This means that my intercourse with 
men constitutes no little problem of patience; my humanity does not 
consist in fellow-feeling with men, but in restraint from fellow-feel-
ing .... My humanity is a continual self-conquest." 18 It is also to be 
noted, of course, that Nietzsche described the contempt for man, 
misanthropy, as his greatest danger, and one from which he thought 
that he had finally redeemed himself. But how? By fleeing to a height 
"where there are no companions to sit at the well" and drink with 
him. 
On the tree of the future we build our nest; 
Eagles will bring us solitary ones food in their beaks. 
Not food which the unclean may eat, 
For they would think they were eating fire, 
And burn their mouths. 
We have no homesteads here for the unclean, 
To their bodies and spirits our fortune 
Would be an icy cavity, 
15. Ibid., "Von der Armut des Reichsten"; WKG, VI-3, 407. 
16. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books," sec. 5. 
17. Ibid., "Why I Am So Clever," sec. 10. 
18. Ibid., "Why I Am So Wise," sec. 8. 
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And we shall live over them like strong winds, 
Neighbors of the eagles and the snow and the sun, 
Like strong winds. 19 
In this way Zarathustra is lord even of misanthropy. But how? 
"Man is for him something unshaped, material, an ugly stone which 
needs the sculptor." His only impulse toward man is that of the ham-
mer to the stone. 
Oh, ye men, in the stone there sleeps a picture, 
The picture of all pictures! 
Oh that it must sleep in the hardest and ugliest stone! 
My hammer rages furiously against its prison, 
And pieces fly from the stone, 
But what care I!20 
Has he ever been obviously concerned that man is either unattain-
able or attainable only in such a way as to cause a repugnance from 
which he must seek that lofty refuge with the eagles and strong 
winds? And yet Zarathustra does frequently seem to be very greatly 
troubled by this inaccessibility. It is intrinsic to the superman, to Dio-
nysus, to Zarathustra to be almost torn asunder by sorrow at having 
to be the superman, Dionysus, Zarathustra. 
The world-a door 
To a thousand deserts silent and cold! 
Who has lost 
What thou lost, can find no rest. 
Thou standest pale 
Condemned to winter wandering 
Like smoke 
Always seeking the cold heavens. 
Fly, bird, rasping 
Thy song like a wilderness-bird!-
Conceal, thou fool, 
Thy bleeding heart in ice and disdain! 
The crows cry 
In whirring flight to the city. 
-Soon it will snow 
And woe then to him who has no home!21 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid., "Why I Write Such Good Books": Thus Spoke Zarathustra, sec. 8. 
21. "Mitleid hin und her (Vereinsamt)"; WKG, Vll-3, 37. 
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The only thing is that he soon rises up again like the eagle, scorning 
himself for his weakness, and finding joy and exultation and self-
glory in the very thing which pains him: 
Yea, I know whence I derive! 
Insatiable as the flame, 
I burn and consume myself. 
All I touch is light, 
And what I leave a cinder. 
I am indeed a flame! 22 
Which prevails-the complaint or the rejoicing? "I know my fate. 
The memory of something dreadful will be linked with my name, of 
an unparalleled crisis, of the most profound clash of conscience, of a 
decision conjured up against everything that has so far been believed 
and demanded and held sacred. I am no man; I am dynamite."23 Is 
this complaint, or rejoicing, or both? In the same breath Nietzsche 
can call himself both the incomparable bearer of good news and the 
"destroyer par excellence." "I am easily the most terrible man there has 
ever been, but this does not mean that I am not also the greatest 
benefactor." He promises that only because of him are there renewed 
hopes. And yet he prophesies: "There will be wars such as never 
were on earth. Only after me will there be high politics on earth."24 
According to view or inclination, we can be deaf to his true message, 
rejecting or believing either the one or the other, the evangelion or 
dysangelion, but his real place is beyond good and evil, not merely 
like that of a Hercules choosing between the two, but genuinely as 
the place of the superman, who conjoins good and evil and evil and 
good in himself, and is thus, like Voltaire, "a grandseigneur of the 
spirit,'"'25 "the first true man."26 It is thus that Nietzsche is he, and 
declares the fact, proclaiming himself and refusing to be mistaken. "I 
am the first immoralist."27 Immoral does not mean nonmoral. There 
is no point in making him a bogeyman in this sense. His immoralism 
consists in the fact that he has the question of morality behind him, 
that like God he is without "tables," that he "invents" his own cate-
goricall imperative, 28 that he is his own table. With the conclusion of 
22. FW, "Joke, Cunning, and Revenge," sec. 62. 
23. Ecce Homo, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 1. 
24. Ibid., sees. 1 and 2. 
25. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Human, All-Too-Human, sec. I. 
26. Ibid., "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 1. 
27. Ibid., "Why I Write Such Good Books": The Untimely Ones, sec. 2; "Why I Am a 
Destiny," sees. 2 and 5. 
28. A, sec. 11. 
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the Gotzendiirnrnerung in the same year, 1888, there followed indeed a 
"seventh day; the stroll of a God along the Po."29 The one who strolls 
in this way along the Po is the great "he" whom Nietzsche proclaims 
and whom he will not have mistaken for any other. 
A clever man of our own day has called Nietzsche "the greatest 
horse-dealer of any age." It cannot be questioned that we have here 
a genuine short circuit, a genuine deception and self-deception. But 
I should hesitate to accept that severe judgment because it would 
apply to too many things and people whose last intentions are 
merely represented with less restraint and we might almost say 
with greater honesty by Nietzsche. Goethe, Hegel, Kant, and Leib-
niz would come under the same condemnation, and not just a spe-
cifically German spirit, but the spirit of all European humanity as 
fashioned and developed since the sixteenth century. 
Outside Germany it has become customary today to represent and 
castigate Nietzsche as one of those who must bear responsibility, and 
even primary responsibility, for preparing and making possible Na-
tional Socialism. There is something in this. But it must not be for-
gotten that Nietzsche directed his most scathing terms against the 
German nationalism of his age, the age of Bismarck, so that any 
contribution he made to its development was highly indirect. More 
positively, dismissing Germany as the "plain" of European culture, 
he liked to remember that he was half-Polish by descent, and valued 
no literature or culture more highly than the French. And was he not 
the man who at the very height of the age of Bismarck expressed the 
view that it would be worth looking for a time to Switzerland to 
escape the opportunist outlook prevailing in Germany? And, like 
so many others, he praised Italy, and historically the Italian Renais-
sance, as his true home, perversely maintaining that he found his 
superman most adequately portrayed in its most notorious represen-
tative, Cesare Borgia. But the Italian Renaissance was the mother and 
model not merely of Italian but of all European humanity in the mod-
ern age. And so Nietzsche-Zarathustra emphatically wished to be 
understood as a European, as the best and only and final European. 
If his representation of humanity is "horse-dealing," the same is true 
at root-a hidden and suppressed, but very real root-of a number 
of others as well. And if Nietzsche prepared the ground for National 
Socialism, the same may be said with equal justification of other 
manifestations and expressions of the European spirit during the 
last centuries. It is thus a very serious and responsible undertaking 
29. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Good Books": Twilight of the Idols, sec. 3. 
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genuinely to oppose the humanity which he represented. The same 
consideration holds good in respect of his mental ill-health. If it 
was only as one who was mentally ill that he was capable of this 
representation, or conversely, if he became mentally disordered in 
the course of it, the question who was really deranged amongst 
them may be seriously asked in relation to many who were perhaps 
healthy in mind, or seemed to be so, only because they did not or 
would not see that to be a consistent champion and representative of 
this humanity is necessarily to be or to become mentally sick. The 
current affirmation and accusation are so serious that there is every 
reason to hesitate before making them. 
We now tum to the other saying: "Am I understood-Dionysus 
against the Crucified." 
At a first glance, it does not seem as if the book will finally lead 
to this antithesis, or that Nietzsche all the time wishes it to. be taken 
in the sense of this antithesis. Prior to the last five pages of the 
Ecce Homo we are not directly prepared for it even by the occasional 
flashes which anticipate this conclusion. Its pregnancy and violence 
do not seem to stand in any real relationship to the polemic of the 
book or of the life-work of Nietzsche summed up in it. Nietzsche was 
an indefatigable fighter. Proclaiming that existence on high, he could 
hardly be otherwise. He was always against what others were for. "I 
am the anti-donkey par excellence, and therefore a monster in world 
history." The continuation is, of course, as follows: "In Greek, and 
not only in Greek, I am the Antichrist." And under this title Nietz-
sche wrote a whole book in 1886. Yet we cannot conclude from the 
book that this was more than one of the many fronts on which he 
was active as "anti-donkey." Nietzsche attacked the philosophy, mor-
als, art, science, and civilization of his own and most earlier times, 
and in none of these spheres did he fail to leave dead and wounded 
behind him. Often rather sketchily in detail, but always with a sure 
intuitilon for essentials, for true correspondence and opposition, he 
attempted with equal taste and ruthlessness in all these fields a 
"transvaluation of all values" in the light of the superman and his 
will to power. It was only natural, therefore, that he should also 
attack Christianity. But that as "anti-donkey" he should supremely 
and decisively be ''Antichrist," that everything should finally become 
a formal crusade against the cross, is not immediately apparent, but 
has to be learned and noted from a reading of Nietzsche. Yet it must 
be learned and noted if we are to understand him. 
The strange culmination in the Ecce Homo is no mere freak. For the 
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book about Antichrist was not just one among many. Nietzsche did 
not fight on all fronts in all his books. And yet there is not a single 
one of them, so far as I can see, in which he did not have whole 
sections or notable individual statements devoted to Christianity and 
directed in more or less violent polemic against it. And the polemic 
gained in weight and severity with the passage of time. We might 
describe this conflict as a swelling base accompanying the others and 
finally overwhelming and taking them up into itself, until finally 
there is only the one theme: "Dionysus against the Crucified." 
But a second point has also to be learned and noted. The Anti-
christ has a definite and concrete sense. If he opposes Dionysus to 
the Crucified, according to the last five pages of the Ecce Homo this 
means that he opposes him, or rather himself, to what he calls Chris-
tian morality. Already in the sphere of morals as such it might have 
been said that this was not just one of Nietzsche's foes but like Chris-
tianity itself the great enemy which he always had in view when he 
fought the philosophy, art, science, and civilization of his time. From 
the very outset Nietzsche was concerned about ethics, and it was for 
this reason and in this sense that he was an "immoralist." And mo-
rality and Christianity finally coalesced for him in a single detestable 
form, so that wherever he encountered morality he thought that he 
could see and deplore and attack Christianity. The last five pages of 
the Ecce Homo begin with the words: "But in a very different sense as 
well I have chosen the word immoralist as my banner, my badge of 
honor; I am proud to have this word as a mark of distinction from 
humanity. For no one previously has experienced Christian morality 
as something beneath him. For this there was required a hardness, a 
perspective, a hitherto unheard-of psychological depth and radical-
ness. Christian morality has previously been the Circe of all think-
ers--they stood in its service. Who before me has descended to the 
depths from which there gushes out the poison of this kind of ideal 
-of world-renunciation?"30 And then he continues: "Am I under-
stood?-What separates and marks me off from the rest of humanity 
is that I have discovered Christian morality." Discovered it as that 
which has corrupted humanity! "Not to have seen this before seems 
to me to be the greatest stain which humanity has on its conscience 
. . . an almost criminal counterfeiting in psychologicis. Blindness in 
face of Christianity is the crime par excellence, a crime against life 
itself .... Millennia and nations, first and last, philosophers and old 
30. Ibid., "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 6. 
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wives~apart from five or six moments of history, and myself as the 
seventh-have all been equally guilty in this respect."31 And again: 
"Am I understood? ... The discovery of Christian morality is an 
event without parallel, a veritable catastrophe. Whoever sheds light 
on it is a force majeure, a destiny, breaking the history of humanity 
into two parts. One either lives before him or after him .... The 
lightning of truth shatters that which formerly stood completely se-
cure. Let him who understands what is destroyed see to it whether 
he has anything still in his hands."32 Nietzsche means that which 
must now be destroyed (it is not yet destroyed) on the basis of this 
epoch-making discovery. He thus concludes with Voltaire: Ecrasez 
l'infame. And this is what leads him to his final word: "Am I under-
stood?-Dionysus against the Crucified." 
It is not self-evident that Nietzsche's general offensive should 
finally be against Christianity in this sense and under this sign. 
Again, in the Ecce Homo itself and the earlier writings there seems at 
first to be a certain discrepancy of polemical standpoint. The offense 
of modern man is primarily at the incredible fact of the past reaching 
from remote ages into the present in the form of Christianity. "When 
on a Sunday morning we hear the old bells sounding, we ask our-
selves: Is it really possible? This all has to do with a crucified Jew of 
two thousand years ago who said that he was the Son of God."33 
The Greek in him is offended at the "non-Greek element in Chris-
tianity."34 The philologist is offended at the exegetical and historical 
methods of the apostle Paul: ''All these holy epileptics and seers did 
not possess a thousandth particle of the integrity of self-criticism 
with which a modern philologist reads a text or tests the truth of 
a historical event. . . . In comparison with us, they are moral cre-
tins."35 He is also incensed at the imprudence, impatience, and cru-
dity of modern Christian theologians which drive the philologist in 
him almost to frenzy. 36 Again, the aesthete in him experiences "a 
kind of inexpressible aversion at contact with the New Testament": 
little, bad-mannered bigots who quite uncalled-for try to speak about 
the deepest problems; a quite undistinguished type of man with the 
swelling claim to have more and indeed all value; something of foeda 
31. Ibid., sec. 7. 
32. Ibid., sec. 8. 
33. MA, III, sec. 113. 
34. Ibid., sec. 114. 
35. WM, sec. 171. 
36. A, sec. 52. 
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superstitio; something from which we withdraw our hands in case 
of defilement. 37 "We would no more choose to be 'early Christians' 
than Polish Jews .... They have a nasty smell. I have looked in vain 
even for one redeeming feature in the New Testament. It does not 
contain anything free or generous or open or sincere. Humanity has 
not even made its first beginning at this point."38 Arguments are also 
used which show that it was not for nothing that Nietzsche was the 
friend of F. Overbeck. The greatest witness against Christianity is the 
pitiable figure of the everyday Christian, whose complacency-he 
has no thought of seeking his salvation with fear and trembling-is a 
clear demonstration that the decisive assertions of Christianity are of 
no importance. 39 It is the Church, which is the very thing against 
which Jesus preached and taught His disciples to fight, embodying 
the triumph of that which is anti-Christian no less than the modem 
state and modern nationalism. 40 
It is to be noted that the fact that Nietzsche will have nothing to do 
with God is so self-evident that it plays no part at all in his argu-
ments against Christianity. In the Ecce Homo he said that he knew 
atheism neither as an experience nor as an event, but by instinct. 
"God is dead" -there is no need for heat or polemics. But is he quite 
so sure about this? The Dionysus-dithyrambs of 1888 show that he 
must have had some misgivings on the point. An "unknown God" 
obtrudes his obviously dangerous being in the speeches of a curious 
opponent of Zarathustra, and he is not a complete stranger to Nietz-
sche himself, this hunter, thief, robber, bandit, this great enemy, this 
executioner-God, etc., who tries to penetrate into his heart, his most 
secret thoughts. 41 But we need not pursue this aspect. Nietzsche's 
heart was not in contesting the existence of God, or in the other 
arguments to which we have referred. His central attack, into which 
he flung himself with all his force, was upon what he called Chris-
tian morality. All his other assaults upon Christianity derive their 
secret strength, and are initiated and directed, from this point. Even 
in the Antichrist this motif has become the cantus firmus, suppressing 
all the others. 
But what is the absolutely intolerable and unequivocally perverted 
element which Nietzsche thinks that he has discovered, and must 
37. WM, sec. 175. 
38. A, sec. 46. 
39. MA, III, sec. 116. 
40. WM, sees. 168 and 213. 
41. "Dionysos-Dithyramben": "Klage der Ariadne"; WKG, Vl-3, 397. 
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fight to the death, in Christian morality, and in this as the secret 
essence of all morality? Why is it that he must finally act in this 
matter as if there were no other foe upon earth, and no more urgent 
task than to vanquish it? The answer is given by Nietzsche himself 
with a hundred variations and nuances the complicated pattern of 
which we cannot follow, but the content of which is perfectly clear. It 
is because Christianity is not really a faith, and is not really "bound 
to any of its shameless dogmas," and does not basically need either 
metaphysics, asceticism, or "Christian" natural science, but is at root 
a practice, and is always possible as such, and in the strict sense 
has its "God" in this practice,42 that Nietzsche encounters it as the 
last enemy on his own true field. For he himself is finally concerned 
about a definite practice; he is decisively an ethicist. And he encoun-
ters it as an enemy because it opposes to Zarathustra or Dionysus, 
the lonely, noble, strong, proud, natural, healthy, wise, outstand-
ing, splendid man, the superman, a type which is the ve1y reverse, 
and so far has managed to do this successfully with its blatant claim 
that the only true man is the man who is little, poor, and sick, the 
man who is weak and not strong, who does not evoke admiration 
but sympathy, who is not solitary but gregarious--the mass-man. It 
goes so far as to speak of a crucified God, and therefore to identify 
God Himself with this human type, and consequently to demand 
of all men not merely sympathy with others but that they them-
selves should be those who excite sympathy and not admiration. 
"The neighbor is transfigured into a God ... Jesus is the neighbor 
transposed into divinity, into a cause awakening emotion."43 
"The absurd residuum of Christianity, its fables, concept-spinning, 
and theology, do not concern us; they could be a thousand times 
more absurd, and we should not lift a finger against them. But this 
ideal we contest."44 Nietzsche contests it as the greatest misfortune 
of the human race thus far. For it was the practical victory of a reli-
gion and morality of slaves, of failures, of those who go under, of the 
colorless, the mistaken, the worthless, the under-world, the ghetto, 
the variegated mass of abjects and rejects, those who creep and crawl 
on the earth revolting against all that is lofty. 45 It was "typically So-
cialist teaching." "What I do not like at all about this Jesus of Naza-
reth and His apostle Paul is that they put so many things into the 
heads of little people, as though their modest virtues were of some 
42. A, sec. 39; WM, sec. 212. 
43. WM, sec. 176. 
44. WM, sec. 252. 
45. A, sees. 22, 43, and 51. 
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value. The price was too high; for they have brought into disrepute 
the far more valuable qualities of virtue and manhood, opposing a 
bad conscience to the self-esteem of the excellent soul, and betraying 
even to self-destruction the noble, generous, bold, excessive inclina-
tions of the strong."46 And this pernicious ideal is Christianity both 
in kernel and in substance right up to the present day. It has been 
able to insinuate itself into the whole of Western culture, philosophy, 
and morality to their great detriment, namely, at the price of the 
surrender of their Greek inheritance and their surreptitious and fla-
grant barbarization. And apart from six or seven upright figures no 
one has ever even noticed the fact right up to the present time. "God 
has chosen what is weak and foolish and ignoble and despised in the 
eyes of the world, is how the formula ran, and decadence conquered in 
hoc signa. God on the cross--do we still not understand the terrible 
background significance of this symbol?-Everything that suffers, 
everything that hangs on the cross, is divine. We all hang on the 
cross and therefore we are all divine. . . . We alone are divine. . . . 
Christianity was a victory, and a more excellent way went down be-
fore it-Christianity is the greatest misfortune of the human race 
thus far."47 
This was what Nietzsche discovered as Christian morality, and this 
was his attack against it: the attack in which all his onslaughts on 
Christianity finally have both their origin and issue; the attack which 
finally emerged in Ecce Homo as the common denominator of his 
whole Dionysian offensive. What happened to the man that he had 
finally to burst out in this frenzied way and to give to his whole life-
work the stamp of this outburst: Dionysus against the Crucified? 
If we are to understand what took place, we must again draw 
some comparisons. Goethe, too, had no great time for Christianity. 
Nor did he merely repudiate the enthusiasm of his friend Lavater 
and similar contemporary manifestations of Christianity, but there 
lived and reverberated in him something of the Greek to whom the 
cross is foolishness, and we may even suspect that he was personally 
a far more obstinate pagan than Nietzsche. But his repudiation re-
mained cool and good-tempered and mild. For what are the occa-
sional slights which he allowed himself, as in his famous juxtaposi-
tion of the four annoyances, "tobacco-smoke, bugs, garlic, and [t]"? 
As he was content to be Apollo or preferably Zeus, as he did not 
think of dramatizing himself and his Hellenism in the form of Diony-
46. WM, sees. 209 and 205. 
47. A, sec. 51. 
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sus (he finally rejected this possibility in his Tasso, who is certainly 
no Dionysus), so he never even dreamed of compromising himself 
by explicitly and passionately opposing Christianity as Nietzsche did. 
And the same is true of the great philosophical Idealists of the time, 
of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. If they could not make much 
of the Christianity of the New Testament, they were restrained and 
cautious and sparing in their criticisms, trying to interpret it as posi-
tively as possible within the framework of their systems, within the 
limits of their own understanding. They did not oppose to it any 
Zarathustra. Among them there was indeed a Herder and a Schleier-
macher, with their strange but subjectively quite seriously meant at-
tachment to Christianity and the Church. It is a little different with 
the heirs and disciples of this classical period. We undoubtedly have 
to say of a Feuerbach or a StrauB that-more akin to Nietzsche-they 
suffered all their lives from Christianity, and made it their main task 
to combat it. But on poor StrauB Nietzsche looked down as from a 
tower and laughed. He did not even remotely see himself as in the 
same class. And he was right. What was their critical philosophy and 
philosophy of religion to him, their biblical and dogmatic criticism, 
their contesting of Christianity in the name of modern reason and 
the modern view of things? StrauB certainly could not have intro-
duced a Dionysus-Zarathustra (any more than Martin Werner in our 
own day), and certainly not the friend of nature, Feuerbach. 
The new thing in Nietzsche was the fact that the development of 
humanity without the fellow-man, which secretly had been the hu-
manity of the Olympian Goethe and other classical figures as well as 
the more mediocre, reached in him a much more advanced, explo-
sive, dangerous, and yet also vulnerable stage-possibly its last. The 
new thing in Nietzsche was the man of "azure isolation,"' six thou-
sand feet above time and man; the man to whom a fellow-creature 
drinking at the same well is quite dreadful and insufferable; the man 
who is utterly inaccessible to others, having no friends and despising 
women; the man who is at home only with the eagles and strong 
winds; the man whose only possible environment is desert and win·· 
try landscape, the man beyond good and evil, who can exist only as 
a consuming fire. And so the new thing in Nietzsche's relationship to 
Christianity necessarily consisted in the fact that this pressed and 
embarrassed him in a way which the others had not seen, or at most 
had only sensed. On this view Christianity seemed to be so incom-
parably dreadful and harassing, presenting such a Medusa aspect, 
that he immediately dropped all the other polemics which he needed 
to proclaim his Zarathustra in favor of the necessary battle against 
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this newly discovered side of Christianity, and all the other attacks 
on it, whether in the form of the dignified rejection of Goethe, the 
speculative reinterpretation of the classical Idealists, or the rational 
objections of their successors, necessarily seemed to him to be irrele-
vant, stupid, and even-and especially-frivolous. These predeces-
sors had not seen how serious the matter was or how much was at 
stake. They could not do so, because on the positive side they did 
not go far enough and were not consistent enough. At bottom, they 
really knew nothing of the "azure isolation" of the superman. They 
had been left far, far behind by Zarathustra. They still crept along the 
ground, having only an inkling of the proximity of the eagles and 
strong winds in which alone real man can breathe. How could they 
see the true danger in Christianity? How could they fail either to 
reach a frivolous compromise with this enemy, or, if they knew and 
attacked it as such, to commit the serious error of leaving it intact 
where it was really dangerous? Nietzsche, however, was consistent 
on this positive side. He trod the way of humanity without the fel-
low-man to the bitter end. And this enabled him, and him alone, to 
see the true danger at this point. 
And the true danger in Christianity, which he alone saw at the 
climax of that tradition, and on account of which he had to attack it 
with unprecedented resolution and passion-and with all the greater 
resolution and passion because he was alone-was that Christian-
ity-what he called Christian morality-confronts real man, the su-
perman, this necessary, supreme, and mature fruit of the whole de-
velopment of true humanity, with a form of man which necessarily 
questions and disturbs and destroys and kills him at the very root. 
That is to say, it confronts him with the figure of suffering man. It 
demands that he should see this man, that he should accept this 
presence, that he should not be man without him but with him, that 
he must drink with him at the same source. Christianity places be-
fore the superman the Crucified, Jesus, as the Neighbor, and in the 
person of Jesus a whole host of others who are wholly and utterly 
ignoble and despised in the eyes of the world (of the world of Zara-
thustra, the true world of men), the hungry and thirsty and naked 
and sick and captive, a whole ocean of human meanness and pain-
fulness. Nor does it merely place the Crucified and His host before 
his eyes. It does not merely will that he see Him and them. It wills 
that he should recognize in them his neighbors and himself. It aims 
to bring him down from his height, to put him in the ranks which 
begin with the Crucified, in the midst of His host. Dionysus-Zara-
thustra, it says, is not a God but a man, and therefore under the 
372 Karl Barth 
cross of the Crucified and one of His host. Nor can Dionysus-Zara-
thust:ra redeem himself, but the Crucified alone can be his Redeemer. 
Dionysus-Zarathustra is thus called to live for others and not him-
self. Here are his brothers and sisters who belong to him and to 
whom he belongs. In this Crucified, and therefore in fellowship 
with this mean and painful host of His people, he has thus to see 
his salvation, and his true humanity in the fact that he belongs to 
Him and therefore to them. This Crucified is God Himself, and 
therefore God Himself is only for those who belong to His host. 
They are then the elect of God. And Dionysus-Zarathustra can be 
an elect of God only if he belongs to them. Away, then, the six thou-
sand feet, the azure, the isolation, the drinking from a lonely well! 
Everything is back to disturb and destroy the isolation. The fellow-
man has returned whom Zarathustra had escaped or to whom he 
merely wanted to be a hammer, and he has returned in a form which 
makes escape impossible (because it embodies something which 
even Zarathustra cannot escape) and which makes all hammering 
futile (because in this form of suffering man there is nothing really to 
hammer). 
This was the new thing which Nietzsche saw in Christianity and 
which he had to combat because he found it so intolerable, wound-
ing, and dangerous. It was for this reason that in the last resort his 
"anti-donkey" meant Antichrist. And it was only perhaps a relic of 
the frivolity of which he accused others that sometimes he could act 
as if Christianity were mere donkey-dam and he could meet it with 
the corresponding attitudes and measures. We might well ask how it 
was that all their life long even StrauB and Feuerbach found it neces-
sary to keep hammering away at what they declared to be so bank-
rupt a thing as Christianity, especially in a century when it no longer 
cut a very imposing figure outwardly, and the battle against it had 
long since ceased to be a heroic war of liberation. But we have cer-
tainly to ask why Nietzsche was guilty of the Donquixotry of acting 
in the age of Bismarck as if the Christian morality of I Cor. 1 consti-
tuted the great danger by which humanity necessarily found itself 
most severely imperiled at every turn. Yet the fact remains that 
Nietzsche did take up arms against Christianity, and especially the 
Christianity of I Cor. 1, as if it were a serious threat and no mere 
folly. And he had to do so. We cannot explain this necessity in purely 
historical terms, which in this context means psychological and psy-
cho-pathological. That Nietzsche became deranged in this attack, or 
that he was deranged to undertake it, merely throws light on the 
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fact; it does not alter the necessity. The one who as the heir, disciple, 
and prophet of the Renaissance and its progeny discovered the su-
perman was quite unable-irrespective of historical and psychologi-
cal circumstances--to overlook the fact that in Western culture, in 
face of every repudiation, reinterpretation, or assault, persisting in 
spite of every evacuation, there existed at least in the form of the 
Greek New Testament such a thing as Christianity, so that from the 
pages of the New Testament he was inevitably confronted by that 
figure, and could only recognize in that figure the direct opposite of 
his own ideal and that of the tradition which culminated in him, and 
was forced to protest and fight against it with the resolution and 
passion which we find in Nietzsche, not as against asininity, but 
with the final resolution which is reserved for a mortal threat. 
Naturally there is an element of caricature in his depiction. Those 
who try to fight the Gospel always make caricatures, and they are 
then forced to fight these caricatures. Nietzsche's caricature consists 
in his (not very original) historical derivation of Christianity from a 
revolt on the part of slaves or the proletariat, for which Paul and 
other mischievous priests provided a metaphysical foundation and 
superstructure, and which thus became an incubus on the unhappy 
West. We all grasp at such aids as are available. And the nineteenth 
century had tried to bolster up Christianity with historical interpreta-
tions of this kind. Nietzsche was undoubtedly conditioned by his age 
when he thought that he could regard Christianity as typical Socialist 
teaching and contest it as such; for there did not lack those who in 
his own time thought that they should praise and commend it as 
typical Socialist teaching, or at least find a positive place for it as a 
transitional stage. At this point Nietzsche was perhaps loyally and 
sincerely a little class-conditioned. According to the Marxist analysis, 
he belonged to the middle class, although in a form worthy of Zara-
thustra. In this respect he was at one with D. F. StrauB, to whom the 
moderate Social Democratic teaching of the period was as a red rag 
to a bull. But this is not really essential. The caricature which he 
served up was itself an element in his resistance and attack. And of 
this attack we have to say that it was well aimed, that it centered on 
the point which was vital for Nietzsche as the most consistent cham-
pion and prophet of humanity without the fellow-man. It is another 
matter, and one that objectively considered is to the praise of Nietz-
sche, that he thus hurled himself against the strongest and not the 
weakest point in the opposing front. With his discovery of the Cruci-
fied and His host he discovered the Gospel itself in a form which was 
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missed even by the majority of its champions, let alone its oppo-
nents, in the nineteenth century. And by having to attack it in this 
form, he has done us the good office of bringing before us the fact 
that we have to keep to this form as unconditionally as he rejected it, 
in self-evident antithesis not only to him, but to the whole tradition 
on behalf of which he made this final hopeless sally. 
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